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Judgement Analysis of Patient Management: 
General Practitioners* Policies and Self-Insight. 
Clare Harries 
In this thesis judgemeni analysis (multiple linear regression techniques) was used to 
look at both GPs' decisions to prescribe certain types of drug for patients and their 
judgements of patients' risk of coronary heart disease. Al l of these were idiographic 
analyses in that decision making by each GP was modelled separately. Judgement analysis 
(paramorphically) describes a subject's judgement or decision making policy in terms of 
the relative influence of different pieces of information. 
The amount of information subjects could take into account was limited. For all 
types of judgemeni or decision doctors were influenced on average by only four of the 
thirteen or twelve cues available. 
The decision to prescribe one of the types of drug was modelled not only in terms 
of the individual effects of cues (judgement analysis) but also in terms of the influence of 
the doctor's assessment of the patient's risk. Doctors agreed more about judgements of risk 
and the factors influencing this than about prescription. Doctors only prescribed to patients 
they rated as at high risk but factors such as for example smoking behaviour led some 
doctors not to prescribe to individuals in this group. 
Judgement and decision making policies (explicit policies) were also elicited 
verbally from doctors. These showed greater agreement than the policies captured using 
judgement analysis (tacit policies) did. When these explicit policies were compared to tacit 
policies a moderate amount of correspondence was found. However, doctors tended to 
over-rate the importance of certain cues. A number of explanations for this pattern of self-
insight were investigated including the possibilities that doctors have self-insight but are 
unable to state it and that the pattern was an artefact of linear modelling. Both of these 
hypotheses were rejected. Subjects' explicit policies were found to resemble the pattern of 
selection of information more than the pattern of its use. Both the hypotheses that subjects' 
explicit policies were based on phenomenal knowledge and diat they are based on some 
ideal model (influencing which cues are selected) were supported. 
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Glossary of Terms 
These, sometimes quite context specific, terms are explained on their first occurrence in this 
thesis hut for easy reference the explanation is repeated here. 
Additive 
Calibration 
CHD 
CJA 
Cognitive control 
Compensatory 
Configural 
Consistency 
Cue 
Cue use 
Cue selection 
Explicit knowledge 
Explicit learning 
Explicit policy 
HRT 
Idiographic 
fflD 
Implicit Knowledge 
The influence of (a function of) each cue is independent of the value 
of other cues. 
The nearness of judgements to the criterion they are trying to 
estimate. Measurement in terms of difference between values and 
the criterion rather than correlation. 
Coronary Heart Disease. Blood supply to the heart muscle (supplied 
by the coronary artery) reduced. 
Clinical Judgement Analysis. A subsection of Judgement Analysis 
and of Social Judgement Theory (see Chapter 3). The analysis of 
judgements made by health professionals in their field of practice. 
Consistency with which a particular policy is used. 
A compensatory policy is one in which the value of one cue and its 
impact on the judgement or decision can be compensated for by the 
value of another cue, which will also, independently, influence the 
judgement or decision. Linear models assume compensatory 
behaviour. 
Judgement making is influenced by the relationships between cues. 
The degree to which a subject makes the same decision about the 
same case on a second presentation. Measured using correlation (m) 
of judgements made on two presentations of same set of cases. 
Piece of information available (describing a hypothetical patient or 
case). 
A cue is defmed as being used when its index of relative importance 
(standardised regression coefficient in these studies) is significantly 
different from 0. 
In Study 2 (Chapter 6) subjects were only aware of cues they 
selected to reveal on each case. Cue selection policies used in the 
analysis in Study 2 consisted of sets of cue weights each of which 
indicated the percentage of times that cue was selected over a series 
of cases. 
Knowledge that is accessible to consciousness (and is 
communicable). 
The subject is aware of (trying) to learn and explicitly held strategies 
are invoked. 
A subjective model of a doctor's decision or judgement making 
policy. Sets of subjective ratings (stated by the doctor after the task) 
indicating the relative importance of different cues on decision 
making. 
Hormone Replacement Therapy. Also the task used in Study 1 
(Chapter 5) in which subjects made judgements about their 
likelihood of prescription of HRT for hypothetical patients. 
Response on 0-100 scale. 
Analysis of the judgements and policy of an individual. See also 
Nomothetic. 
Ischaemic Heart Disease. Reduction of blood flow to the heart. 
Knowledge a subject is shown to have: it is manifested in their 
behaviour. But it is not accessible to consciousness or 
vii 
Implicit learning 
IS 
JA 
Judges 
LIPID 
Linearity 
MIGRAINE 
Nomothetic 
Objective policy 
Paramorphic 
Policy 
P R E S C R I B E 
Relative 
Importance 
R I S K 
Self-insight 
SJT 
Stated policy 
Subjective policy 
Tacit policy 
behaviour. But it is not accessible to consciousness or 
communicable. 
Subject learns of relationship between cues (stimuli) or between 
cues and behaviour without being aware that they are learning. 
Information Selection task of Study 2 (Chapter 6) in which subjects 
made judgements about their likelihood of prescription of lipid 
lowering agents for hypothetical patients but did this only on the 
basis of the cues they had selected. Response on 0-100 scale. 
Judgement Analysis. The analysis of judgement (or decision) 
making in which static statistical models are formed of the 
relationship between cues and judgements. 
People making judgements. 
Task used in Study 1 (Chapter 5) in which subjects made 
judgements about their likelihood of prescription of lipid lowering 
agents for hypothetical patients. Response on 0-100 scale. 
The relationship between every cue and the judgement is linear 
when a regular increment (or detriment) of any cue leads to a regular 
increment or detriment of the criterion. See also configural. 
Task used in Study 1 (Chapter 5) in which subjects made 
judgements about their likelihood of prescription of prophylaxis for 
migraine for hypothetical patients. Response on 0-100 scale. 
Based on judgements of several individuals and trying to ascertain 
the underlying pattern. See also Idiographic. 
Same as tacit policy. 
A representation having the same shape. Used to describe the 
models formed in judgement analysis: the psychological 
representation of the policy may be different but its general shape 
(in terms of its implementation) is captured. 
The judgement or decision policy of a subject is a (static) 
description of the relationship between cues and judgements (over a 
set of cases). 
Task used in Study 4 (Chapter 8) in which subjects made 
judgements about their likelihood of prescription of lipid lowering 
agents for hypothetical patients. Response on "very low" to "very 
high" anchored scale. 
The influence a cue has on judgement making. Different measures 
have been used for this but most amount to a measure of the 
contribution that a cue has made to the total variance in judgements. 
Task used in Study 4 (Chapter 8) in which subjects made 
judgements about the risk of coronary heart disease for hypothetical 
patients. Response on "very low" to "very high" anchored scale. 
A subject's ability to state the relative importance of pieces of 
information in their decision making. See Chapter 4. 
Social Judgement Theory. Term coined by Hammond to refer to the 
approach in judgement analysis whereby the probabilistic nature of 
the real world is taken mto account. See Chapter 3. 
Same as explicit policy. 
Same as explicit policy. 
An objective model of a doctor's decision or judgement making 
policy. Here sets of standardised regression coefficients indicate the 
relative importance of different cues on decision making. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
This thesis has as its main substance the examination of patient management 
decision making and patient judgement by General Practitioners (CPs). The nature of 
general practice, which will be outlined in this introductory chapter, is such that certain 
decision analytic methods are more applicable and profitable than others (see Chapter 2). 
Judgement Analysis, introduced in Chapter 2 and further described in Chapter 3, is the 
main method used here to ascertain the factors affecting CPs' judgement and decision 
making. 
Patient management is what the CP decides to do with the patient (or suggest that 
they themselves should do). The decision is made during the course of a consultation. 
Examples of patient management include prescription (when the CP hands you a script at 
the end of the consultation saying something along the lines of "This should clear it up."); 
referral ("..make an appointment with the nurse on the way out." or "You should get a 
letter from the hospital in a few days.") or temporizing ("Lets leave this a few days and see 
if it gels any better by itself."). In this thesis, the patient management strategy focussed on 
is prescription. This is a common patient management strategy and makes up the largest 
item on CPs' budgets (Audit Commission. 1994). Here, decision making by CPs on a few 
different types of prescription is analysed in terms of the influential factors. The influence 
of pieces of information is looked at both individually and in terms of combined 
contribution to judgements about a patient's risk which itself influences decision making. 
Decision making by CPs is also used to look at evidence for two other phenomena 
The first is the dissociation between explicit and implicit knowledge. Evidence from a 
number of areas of research suggest that there are limits to self-knowledge: Explicit 
knowledge is accessible to consciousness and can be communicated. Implicit knowledge 
can be exhibited but the subject is not aware of what they know and cannot state it 
Literature on self-knowledge and self-insight is reviewed in Chapter 4. In the studies 
presented in this work, CPs' ability to state the factors affecting their decision making is 
looked at and an explanation is sought as to the basis of this explicit knowledge. The other 
phenomenon which will be looked ai in relation to decision making and judgement making 
by CPs is the limit to information processing capacity. This is introduced in Chapter 3. 
Limited information processing capacity - limited working memory capacity - has been 
used to explain a number of aspects of human behaviour. Most notably, it is used to 
explain our suboptimal performance in a number of settings. The implications of limited 
information processing capacity for medical decision making are discussed. 
Throughout the following chapters a number of terms will be used that may be 
medical, may be specific to the work described here or may be unusual for some other 
reason. Although these will all be defined at their first point of introduction, a brief 
definition will also be found in the Glossaiy of Temis. 
Decision making by General Practitioners 
The structure of the National Health Service (NHS) is such that, nasty accidents 
aside, the person who plays the largest part in determining the re-establishment or 
maintenance of your health is your General Practitioner (GP). Their role has been long-
established as the gatekeeper to the resources of the NHS. Over the last few years, changes 
in funding have, in this environment of private enterprise, led to considerable changes in 
the role and provisions of different parts of the NHS. General Practice in particular. 
Increasingly, emphasis is placed on the General Practice team. Different primary care team 
members are encouraged to take on their own caseload. Nevertheless, GPs still differ from 
hospital doctors in the ways briefly outlined by Brooke and Sheldon (1985) and described 
below. 
Patient management by General Practitioners is unique amongst doctors in the 
NHS. GPs see a vast array of case types of grossly differing severities. Instead of having a 
clinically specific area of expertise defined by a specific and largely identifiable structure 
of knowledge, GPs encounter a vast array of problems whose treatment requires the use of 
a vast and expanding knowledge base. It is the identifiable knowledge base that has made 
several other areas of medical expertise appropriate subjects for the development of expert 
systems. 
Problems encountered by hospital specialists have already been defined somewhat 
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before reaching the expert. This is not just in lenns of the type of case. Al l cases must be 
non-trivial to merit referral. On the other hand, patients seen by GPs may range from 
having no problem in anyone's eyes, to having essentially trivial problems which are of 
concern to the patient, to having life-threatening and urgent problems. Brooke and Sheldon 
(1985) indicate that an increase in the number of psychosocial problems being presented is 
also a feature of general practice. GPs are the first line management. They sort through 
cases, dealing with many problems themselves and referring a huge number of problems to 
other agents such as nurses, physiotherapists, counsellors, psychologists, consultants, even 
social workers. 
For a long time GPs have been under incredible pressure at work. The number of 
patients on practice lists is large, the average GP seeing 140 patients a week just during 
surgery (Audit Commission. 1994). The time that can be spent on each consultation is 
necessarily limited. Average consultations have been found to last 5.5 or 6.6 minutes 
(Monrell. Evans. Morris and Roland. !986). Time pressure and the desire to bring the 
consultation to an end have been cited as leading to greater than otherwise prescribing (e,g. 
Audit Commission, 1994. p. 17). At the same time a person is the patient of a particular 
doctor for a long time: for as long as they are living in that area. This contrasts with 
hospital medicine where each consultation may be longer but an individual is the patient of 
a particular doctor for a period of time defined by their treatment. In General Practice 
patients can come back and their progress can be observed over a period of time. The 
doctor often has personal experience of the patient outside the role caused by the currently 
presented problem. 
What this combination of factors described in the last few paragraphs leads to is the 
emphasis in primary care of patient management rather than diagnosis led treatment With 
the wide variety of cases the development of expert systems and decision making theories 
for General Practice is problematic (Fox. 1985). Medicine in general, but general practice 
in particular has been described as an art: Decisions are often made intuitively rather than 
with a full and explicit understanding of the problem and its solution. Management 
decisions are made on the basis of evidence available at the lime and it is rare that a 
diagnosis will be complete prior to treatment of the problem. Treatment and assessment of 
the problem are often built up side by side over a period of consultations. 
So decisions made in general practice are not necessarily based on the models 
explicitly taught in medical schools. These advocate data collection, diagnosis, therapy 
planning and management. Models of the general practice consultation are less straight 
forward. For example. Figure 1.1 shows a model quoted by Fox (1985) where a number of 
management strategies are available after a certain degree of problem definition. Actual 
patterns of practice are built up over a period of time. Although doctors in primary care can 
go back to first (biomedical) principles to decide what to do, immediate patient 
management decisions are more likely to be based on practical experience and judgements 
about the best person and way of handling the problem. 
Risk assessment ^ 
Referral' 
History taking 
PROBLEM DEFINITION 
Diagnosis 
Temporising Investigate Nothing 
Figure 1.1 Example of a model of decision making by General Practitioners (Fox, 1985) 
Analysis of decision making in General Practice 
Research into decision making in General Practice, has tended to follow two 
distinct lines. One method of investigation is based on epidemiological type of analyses 
influenced by the principles of health economics or survey or questionnaire techniques. 
The other approach gathers information from the GP in the form of verbal protocols to 
analyse the consultation, medical problem solving, knowledge base underlying reasoning, 
or the decision making process. These two approaches will be summarised in the next two 
paragraphs. There are, however, other ways of analysing decision making which will also 
be briefly outlined here. 
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The influence of health economics on research reflects an emphasis on expenditure 
in the NHS. The emphasis of cost benefit analyses and the search for good quality of life 
per year measures continues. CPs are provided with feedback in the form of the 
Prescribing Analysis and CosT (PA([rr) system. They are set target levels of prescription 
which are agreed with their FHSA. Much research involves looking at outcomes of 
prescription decisions and comparing this to global differences in population. For example, 
in the Office of Health Economics* symposium on factors influencing clinical decisions in 
general practice, John Griffin discusses the influence of factors such as the number of 
Catholics in a country, consulting rales by ethnic minorities and the unemployment levels 
of the population on drug prescription* (Griffin, 1990). There are trends in terms of 
epidemiology and population features. But decisions taken are analysed in groups. 
Individual differences are rife in general practice as elsewhere in medicine. Decisions are 
made on the basis of factors such as the knowledge of the patient and of resources quite 
apart from an understanding of the principles of medicine. There may be several different 
types of decision being grouped together. The emphasis of this sort of research is on the 
patient and environment and on when prescription (or referral etc.) occurs - one end point 
of decision making. This sort of approach to decision or judgement making - where 
individuals responses are grouped for analysis - is known as nomothetic analysis. 
The other approach to medical decision making in general practice analyses the 
sequential process of diagnosis and decision making during the consultation. This leads to 
the imposition of the kind of consultation framework that Fox (1985) gave an example of 
(see Figure 1.1 above). The framework is the whole consultation - information gathering, 
risk assessment, diagnosis and problem definition efc. These may be idealistfc rather than 
based on what actually goes on during the consultation where two people are involved in 
the interaction, and questions of resources, patient attitude, psychosocial problems etc. all 
play a part. Brooke and Sheldon (1985) criticise several existing models of Ckneral 
Practice decision making (of this type) for their emphasis on the somewhat redundant 
process of diagnosis. One line of research has concentrated on the whole consultation, on 
* There is, incidentally, a strong positive correlation between a country's percentage spend 
of gross national product on drugs and the number of Catholics; there is increased 
prescribing in areas of high unemployment and there are ethnic differences in rales of 
consultation. 
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doctor patient communication and on doctor-centred versus patient-centred decision 
making (see McWhinney, 1985).^ Many of these models are able to generalise across 
several types of case which is of course an intrinsic part of general practice. However, 
again much reliance is on (the experimenter's interpretation oO doctors' explicit 
representations of the consultation. 
Some models looking at medical decision making in general terms have attempted 
to describe the strategies being used in expert medical problem solving (see Elstein 
Shulman and Spraflca, 1990). Early studies were influenced by Newell and Simon's (1972) 
approach to analysing simpler problem solving (Elstein, Shulman and Sprafka, 1978) and 
there is emphasis on problem definition or diagnosis rather than patient management. 
Verbal protocol analysis has lead to the identification of strategies such as problem closure 
(hypothetico-deductive method), pattern recognition or pattern directed search, as well as 
of course abundant use of heuristics (see also Brooke and Sheldon, 1985). The 
hypothetico-deductive model of decision making, suggests that hypotheses are formed 
early in the process, and then evidence for their confirmation sought, Patel and Groen 
(1986) have suggested that on common problems in their domain of expertise experts are 
more likely to use a forward chain of reasoning to reach a diagnosis. Grant and Marsden 
(1987) cite the recognition of forceful features as a prime part of diagnosis and others have 
pointed out that much of the data could be explained in terms of pattern matching. 
As well as descriptions of general strategies, models of particular decision making 
or problem solving and of knowledge structures have also been formed from analyses of 
verbal protocols. A decision maker's verbal protocol or their responses to probes can be 
analysed in terms of the underlying propositional knowledge (Patei and Groen, 1986). 
hypotheses being formed or causal networks of production rules. In this case a structure is 
formed, identifying logical connections between information considered by an individual 
and the end judgement or decision. Fox (1985) emphasises the importance of the explicit 
formulation of decision processes in forming expert systems. He advocates the 
construction of rules to represent a CP's general policy or their network of decisions as at 
2 Being patient-centred is characterised by being aware of the patient's point of view and 
attitude towards their illness and taking their wishes into account. Doctor-centred 
approaches focus on the illness itself, its identification, and how best to overcome it. 
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least an educational exercise. In conu asi to the general models described in the last 
paragraph this allows the formation of models specific to a type of encounter and specific 
to a doctor. There are however dangers here. One is that i f decision making in a 
particular case is being discussed, there may be overemphasis on the features of that 
particular case. Factors that are not obvious in the case may be neglected. Secondly, 
several models of hierarchical rules can be analysed from the same data. For example, 
Groen and Patel (1985) cite Clancey (1984) as showing with his Neomycin model the 
possibility of analysing several models from the same protocols. 
This problem solving approach, modelling the problem solving process, is one of 
three methods for looking at medical decision making discussed in Chapter 2. Chapter 2 
introduces three methods for the analysis of an individual's judgcmcni or decision making 
(idiographic analysis) - decision analysis, information processing analysis and judgement 
analysis - and compares them. All have different emphases and are more or less 
appropriate for different settings. Decision analysis again shows the influence of 
economics. This concentrates on the decision rather than on decision making. The decision 
is structured in terms of options and outcomes with the aim of identifying the ideal for that 
individual. Behavioural decision making theories and decision analysis tend not to be 
appropriate for the analysis of General Practice decision making. Reasons for this will be 
discussed in Chapter 2. 
The information processing approach is described above. The information under 
examination can be identified in ways other than verbal protocol analysis. However, much 
is left to the interpretation of the analyst and again the influence of particular features of a 
case may be distorted. In addition to that, i f verbal protocols are to be used then'ihe subject 
may be required to talk aloud during the task. The appropriateness of this for general 
practice is discussed in Chapter 2. 
Judgement analysis has been applied to decision making by GPs and is the method 
used in this thesis. Judgement analysis also puts a structure on decision making. This time 
however, the structure is a more objective, statistical one. The effects of information 
processing over lime are lost but the relative influence of cues on the decision making can 
be seen and a policy is captured. These different approaches are compared in Chapter 2. In 
Chapter 3 the studies applying judgement analysis in the medical context (Clinical 
Judgement Analysis) are reviewed. 
Issues being addressed 
One of the reasons judgement analysis is so useful in capturing GPs* policies is 
because it provides an objective measure of how information is combined. There is no 
reliance on subjects' ability to state what they are doing. [There is also little reliance on 
interpretation by the experimenter.] Self-knowledge is discussed in Chapter 4. Generally 
subjects* ability to state causal, process or combinatorial information seems limited. The 
dissociation of explicit and implicit knowledge in the field of medicine has implications for 
how i i is taught and how performance is evaluated. Explicit knowledge cannot be relied 
upon to give information about implicit knowledge. 
One model of the development of expertise in medicine can give some insights as 
to how the dissociation between known and practiced behaviour might come about. 
Schmidt and Boshuizen (1993) hypothesize that as expertise is aquircd, functionally 
different patterns of knowledge are developed. After aquisition of large amounts of disease 
related causal knowledge, upon contact with clinical experiences this is transposed to what 
Schmidt and Boshuizen describe as illness scripts. These are context based models of 
causal patterns of disease. After increased contact with clinical cases, they describe the 
impact of episodic memories of cases on practice. The implications of this last stage are 
that some sort of system of recognition system must have been developed for new cases to 
be recognised as similar to old. This sort of knowledge only comes with contact with 
numerous cases. An analogy can be made to learning any skill. A person can be told 
verbally what to do. But it is only through practice that they are able to translate this into a 
process. However, i f a skilled person is asked how they do what they do they are likely to 
give the same description that they were initially given as instruction. For example, a 
doctor may have a good explicit understanding of the biomedical principles underlying 
clinical practice and may have good explicit procedural knowledge but may act intuitively, 
reflecting implicit knowledge. 
The type of procedural knowledge that is expressed explicitly is only one aspect of 
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the procedure. It is this that is used to convey to a person some of the fundamentals of a 
procedure. But it does not convey what an expen is doing. It is this sort of procedural 
knowledge that is tapped during verbal protocols. Einhom. Kleinmuntz and Kleinmuntz 
(1979) have described process tracing and policy capturing as two aspects of the same 
phenomenon. Here 1 wish to argue that they are two phenomena within the same process. 
That processes are taught or explicitly described in terms of phenomenal information -
information attended to. How cues are combined is discovered after attending to that 
information. When subjects are asked to state combining information they rely simply on 
the type of process knowledge that they can state - the type that they were taught and the 
type of which they are aware. Evidence for this is looked at over all the studies, described 
in Chapters 5 to 9. 
If there is evidence for the dissociation of explicit and implicit knowledge in 
general practice as elsewhere, then there are a number of possible explanations. The 
possibility that the tacit policies captured in judgement analysis do not adequately capture 
behaviour is explored and discussed. Judgement analysis captures static policies. Dynamic 
or otherwise non-linear policies may apparently be mostly captured with a linear model but 
the variance left unexplained may be the key to their existence. Insight may appear to be 
lacking where tacit and explicit policies are forced into static linear structures. Evidence 
for this is explored in Chapters 6 and 9. Similarly some other feature of the task setup such 
as orthogonality of cues may effect the policy captured. The effects of task design on 
apparent behaviour is discussed in the chapter on judgement analysis (Chapter 3) and in the 
final discussion in Chapter 10. If the lack of self-insight on policy capturing tasks is not 
task created, then the basis for these explicitly stated policies and this discrepancy between 
stated and tacit policies can be explored. This is done in Chapter 6 in relation to 
phenomenal knowledge. 
The other theme that is explored in relation to GPs' decision making is the limits to 
information processing capacity. In the studies described differences in policy are 
measured in terms of the amount of as well as which pieces of information GPs took into 
account. It was hypothesized that, like any information processing, the number of cues that 
GPs can take into account when decision making would be limited. With experience, 
information processing capacity is still limited in terms of the number of chunks of 
information that can be held in working memory. However, wiihin the domain of expertise 
these chunks take on different amounts or groups of informaiion. Theoretically then GPs 
should be able to use more information in their domain of expertise than in other areas 
since it will be grouped together in chunks. However, the ability to process more 
information relies on being able to chunk it. This does not mean that more is attended to. It 
means that patterns are seen rather than individual features. Medical diagnosis has been 
likened to pattern matching. Grant and Marsden (1987, also Gale and Marsden, 1985) 
describe the importance of the recognition of forceful features. But the advantage gained 
by the knowledge of patterns is lost when the material seen does not fit those patterns. As 
will be seen, the sets of cases presented did not fit those patterns. 
Summary overview of the chapters 
The next three chapters give an overview of literature that has a bearing on themes 
discussed in this thesis. Chapter 2 provides a rationale for the use of judgement analysis on 
GP decision making. Chapter 3 outlines some of the findings of judgement analyses and its 
applications in medicine, some design variations and their effects on findings. Chapter 4 
introduces the literature on self-knowledge, including an outline of the degree of self-
insight shown in judgement analysis studies. The following chapters are all experimental 
ones. 
In the first study, described in Chapter 5, GPs' policies in different types of decision 
making are captured. As stated before the essence of general practice lies in the sheer 
variety of cases that may be seen. Here, more than one type of case was presented and 
doctors* performances on these were compared. Doctors' explicit stated use of cues was 
also noted and was compared to their captured policies. Study 1 then is used to look at the 
possibilities for policy capturing in general practice decision making, at doctors' ability to 
use cues and which cues are used on different decision making tasks, to compare stated and 
actual policies and to describe the nature of the relationship between the two. The next 
chapter (Chapter 6) tests one of the hypotheses concerning self-insight - namely that what 
subjects can describe is what they have attended to. Chapter 7 looks at the degree of self-
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knowledge shown by subjects when asked to pick out rather than state their policies. This 
forced choice task may prove useful for analysing whether meta-knowledge exists but 
cannot be stated. 
One of the tasks presented in Chapter 5 and also in Chapter 6 involved making 
decisions that would usually be based on assessments of risk factors. Chapter 8 gave 
doctors the task of making judgements about a patient's risk. Doctors also made managerial 
decisions on the same set of cases. The difference in policies for the judgement and for the 
decision were compared. However, in addition the degree of self-insight shown into 
judgement making on risk was of interest. If subjects are taught to assess risk as part of the 
management decision making under examination, then the explicit knowledge might have 
a bearing on the self-insight shown in both the management task and the risk judgement 
task. Chapter 9 looks at an alternative explanation for the findings of self-insight in 
judgement analyses. It addresses the issue that the findings are a product of the task design 
or analysis used. Chapter 10, the final discussion, pulls together the findings from the 
experimental studies and literature. 
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Chapter Two 
Analygis of Judgement and DeciMon Making 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to look at three approaches used to examine the 
judgement and decision making process in individuals and to compare their 
appropriateness for the examination of patient management decision making by GPs. The 
nature of decision making in General Practice was introduced in Chapter 1. To recap, in an 
environment where problems are ill-defined and may or may not be severe, time per 
consultation is limited but knowledge of and contact with the patient is long term, GPs tend 
to be oriented towards (immediate) patient management decision making. This contrasts 
with the ideals of hospital medicine where therapeutic plans are set up after comprehensive 
identification of the disease and more time is allowed for consultation. 
In keeping with the findings of other disciplines, there are individual differences in 
judgement and decision making in general practice. Thus one of the important features of a 
method for looking at GP decision making is that it should take decision making by 
different GPs separately. The study of an individual's policy in decision making is an 
idiographic analysis (see Hammond. McClelland and Mumpower. 1980, Chapter 10). This 
contrasts with nomothetic analyses that group decision making by different subjects 
together and assume that different subjects' policies are, bar random error, essentially the 
same. The three theoretical approaches that will be discussed here - decision theory, 
problem solving and social judgement theory - can all look at individual's policies. 
Although nominally different, the types of behaviour looked at in the study of decision 
making, problem solving and judgement making are often the same. This will be discussed 
later. However, the three approaches have very different ways of analysing behaviour -
through decision analysis (utility or risk based models), through process tracing models 
and through judgement analysis (often linear regression models) respectively. This chapter 
will outline the characteristics and benefits of the different approaches with reference to 
their suitability for analysing decision making behaviour in general practice. 
12 
Decision making, judgement making and problem solving 
In the laboratory, problems used in the study of problem solving are such that the 
goal is clear and predefined. In practice in the real world, problems are seldom like this. 
However, the information processing approach of Newell and Simon (1972) influenced 
Elstein, Shulman and Sprafka (1978) in their analysis of medical problem solving (see 
Elstein, Shulman and Sprafka, 1990). The problems under consideration were diagnostic 
problems. Even when physicians' performances on paper-presented patient management 
problems were analysed, the focus was on the diagnostic process rather than patient 
management. Human problem solving methodology was applied to the complex field of 
medical judgement and decision making. Subjects were encouraged to think aloud and their 
verbal protocols, as well as their observed behaviour, were analysed in terms of the cues 
gathered and the hypotheses explicitly generated. The phenomenon Elstein et al were 
referring to under the title "medical problem solving" is diagnostic judgement and decision 
making. The goal of the problem would be achievement of the ideal decision or the correct 
judgement. 
Just as "problems" in the real world are not the clearly defined phenomena of the 
laboratory, the distinction between judgement and decision making too can become hazy in 
the real world. They are fundamentally interiinked but the distinction between them is itself 
slim (Arkes and Hammond, 1986). Judgements have to be made in order to make decisions. 
Judgement making can be thought of as a decision to opt for a particular judgement. 
Decision making can be thought of as a judgement to choose a particular option. For both 
judgement and decision making certain information about a situation is available. There is a 
range, or a number, of possible options to choose from. One of these is selected. Where this 
is acted upon it can be considered a decision. Where it is assimilated into the subject's view 
of the world a judgement has been made. 
Judgements may be either categorical or continuous and medicine includes both. 
Diagnostic judgements are categorical. Judgements of severity may be continuous or 
categorical. Judgements of risk may again be expressed continuously (in terms of numerical 
probability) or in categorical terms of moderate or high risk etc. Decisions, including 
patient management decisions, are in general categorical: A choice is made 
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between the options available. Decision analyses particularly involve framing the decision 
in terms of the relative merits of a number of choices. However, choice may be made with 
more or less certainty (a continuous variable) and some cases may fall into diagnostic 
categories more easily than others. The congruence of the phenomena being observed in 
theories of decision making, of problem solving or of Judgement making in the real world, 
means that the same real world domain can be examined using different methods and 
different approaches. 
There are different types of judgements and decisions and these may be more or 
less suitable to analysis by the different approaches. Maule and Svenson (1993) distinguish 
between static, sequential and dynamic decision or judgement situations. Static situations 
are those where only one judgement or decision is being made, on the basis of the 
information available at the time. A sequential situation is made up of a series of static 
decisions or judgements each of which is affected by the previous one in the sequence. A 
dynamic situation is one in which decisions are made in the context of an external 
environment that is changing continuously. In fact decisions in medicine are most likely to 
be of the latter type when the situation is viewed over a period of time. However, decisions 
during one consultation can be viewed as sequential. Several static decisions or judgements 
can also be identified within this. Even static decisions may vary. They may be complex, 
important decisions (about which the decision maker may feel anxious). They may be 
(frequently occurring) easy and apparently automatic. Both of these sorts of static decision 
or judgement may occur during the general practice consultation. Both decision analyses 
and judgement analyses are really most suited to the analysis of static decisions. Where the 
decision situation is sequential or dynamic either a series of analyses may be done or a 
process tracing technique may be used. 
Related to this, and discussed further in Chapter 4, there are some judgement 
processes of which the subject may be able to say little. Recognition and automatic 
processes are examples given by Ericsson and Simon (1980, 1984) as being unsuitable for 
protocol analysis. The distinction between these and complex, considered processes need 
not be rigid; Through practice decisions or judgements that were once complex and 
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effortful may become automatic (Schneider and Shiffrin, 1985)'. Learning to categorize 
cases on the basis of diagnosis may be an example of aulomization: At first diagnosing 
may be a slow carefully considered process but after a while the type of case may be 
known automatically. Some short cut technique may be used or the process may truly 
become automatised. One step diagnosis by experts may resemble a recognition process. In 
the problem solving framework, after practise the achievement of diagnosis may occur by 
insight as well as through trial and error or some sort of hypolhetico-deductive method. 
Alternatively judgement or decision processes may have been learnt implicitly 
(Reber. 1989; Benry and Dienes, 1993; Berry, 1994). In this case the workings of the 
judgement or decision process would not have been made explicit. But they would have 
been learnt in the course of dealing with real clinical cases. Schmidt and Boshuizen's 
(1993) theory of the development of medical expertise in terms of functionally changing 
knowledge structures might be classified thus. They hypothesize that as skill develops, the 
pattern of behaviour calls upon different types of knowledge. Initially, knowledge is learnt 
in terms of abstract patterns of diseases. Then models or scripts of clinical problems in the 
form of actual patient encounters are learnt as the student doctor is transferred to the 
clinical setting. Finally, the process becomes one of matching prototypes. Memories of 
actual previous encounters are accessed in making decision about how to treat the current 
patient. If the treatment behaviour is learnt on the job, whilst explicitly thinking about the 
pattern of disease, it might be considered an implicitly learnt process. 
Both of the ways of looking at expert decision making described in the last two 
paragraphs suggest that there is one type of decision making that is automatic or has 
become a process of recognition. In this type of static situation process tracing techniques 
may be of questionable value. Certainly protocol analysis has been identified as being 
inappropriate (see earlier). Other process tracing techniques such as information boards 
may or may not prove useful. Decision analyses would also appear to be of doubtful use in 
this type of situation. If a diagnosis or decision has occurred to someone in an automatic or 
semi-automatic way it is unlikely that they have explicitly analysed all the different options 
* One interpretation of the automisation phenomenon is that the process becomes made up 
of short cut methods based on recategorisation (Cheng, 1985). However. Schneider and 
Shiffrin (1985) argue that this does not explain all the findings. 
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and will be able to outline them. Judgement analysis on the other hand may be appropriate 
in that it does not interfere with behaviour or rely on the subject's interpretation of their 
behaviour. 
Distinctions between approaches 
Approaches to decision and judgement making can be found to differ along several 
lines. Firstly, they differ in terms of their original motivating discipline. Much of decision 
theory was originally based in the principles of economics. The influential problem solving 
work evolved within the domain of cognitive science and artificial intelligence (AI). Social 
judgement theory rests firmly within the realms of psychology. Hammond, McClelland 
and Mumpower (1980) distinguish between economic and psychologically based 
approaches to human judgement and decision making although they do not discuss 
problem solving analysis approaches. In the first chapter of their book "Time pressure and 
stress in human judgement and decision making" Maule and Svenson (1993) outline other 
essential distinctions between approaches to the analysis of judgement and decision 
making. They distinguish between structural approaches and process approaches, between 
riskless and risky decision making and between normative, descriptive and prescriptive 
approaches. 
Structural analyses differ fundamentally from those in process terms. Structural 
approaches analyse the relationship between the information available for basing the 
judgement or decision on and the decisions or judgements made. Process approaches try to 
get at the underlying, sequential cognitive processes. Both behavioural decision theory 
models and models of judgement analysis are structural models. Analyses of decision 
making problems on the other hand tend to be process oriented. 
Riskless decision making is defined by Maule and Svenson as decision making in 
the situation where all outcomes are known with certainty. They describe this situation as 
realistically unlikely. However, making choices between known alternatives would be 
example of this (see the section on the decision theory approach). The group of decisions 
Maule and Svenson place under the title "risky" is subdivided into uncertain decision 
situations and risky decision situations by Fishbum (1988). Risky decisions are those 
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where, although the outcome is not known, the probability of each occurrence can be 
estimated. Much behavioural decision theory has been based on this sort of well defined 
gamble. In uncertain decision situations, the probability of different outcomes is not 
known. Medical judgement and decision making is intrinsically bound up with both 
uncertainty and risk. The effect of risk or uncertainty on decision making can be 
incorporated in different ways. 
Decision making theories can be normative, descriptive or prescriptive. A 
descriptive decision making theory or model captures the essence of an individual's actual 
behaviour. Decision making models are prescriptive i f they define the ideal option and how 
the decision maker can reach it. A normative model of decision making just defines the 
optimum decision. Some authors choose to talk of normative theorems as i f this were the 
opposite of description (e.g. von Winterfeldt and Edwards, 1986). In general terms a 
normative model is one that sets out what the norms or laws of a situation are and is usually 
expressed in terms of a formula. Laws in society are prescriptive in that they set out a mode 
of behaviour that should be followed. Laws of nature are simply (mathematical) 
formulations of how a phenomenon occurs and are therefore in some way descriptive. 
However, in the realms of decision, judgement, thinking and associated research, a 
normative model is one whereby the ideal solution is calculated without reference to the 
method of thinking or cognitive capacity of the subjects but with reference to the 
environment (Baron, 1988; Maule and Svenson, 1993). 
Al l normative decision making or judgement making theories will refer to a type 
of decision or judgement. Some of these are designed to structure the decision making or 
judgement making process as it is being carried out (a priori analyses). This is the form of 
decision analysis. Other normative decision making or judgement theories take sets of 
decisions or judgements and form an a posteriori model of the effects on judgement of 
different facts (Arkes and Hammond, 1986). Social Judgement Theory and Judgement 
analysis are just such models (see Hammond, Stewart, Brehmer and Steinman, 1975). 
The aim here was to describe GPs' decision making as it is, not to capture what 
GPs might consider to be the ideal mode of decision making. Therefore a descriptive model 
of decision making is necessary. Much uncertainty abounds in general practice decision 
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making. Therefore the method used need to be able to be applied to risky decision making 
or decision making under uncertainty. The description of the behaviour in terms of a 
process or a structural model is perhaps a matter of taste. 
The decision theory approach 
The main characteristic of decision analytic techniques is that it is the decision, and 
the individual's perception of the decision, that is analysed. Because of this the majority are 
structural rather than process approaches: The structure of the decision is analysed. The 
decision is seen as a choice between different options which lead to a number of differing 
outcomes, depending on interim uncertain events. The decision analysis is carried out by 
initially identifying the options and outcomes. Use is often made of some measure of the 
(perceived) probability of an event (outcome) and its utility. An option's utility is its 
usefulness or worth. Some models have incorporated other psychological aspects of 
decision making such as regret and rejoicing. 
There are several riskless decision analytic models. These consider how choices are 
made between differently valued known options. Options are compared on the basis of 
their overall utility. Examples of these are:-
• Multiattribute Utility Theory (MAUT) in which options arc described in terms of 
the utility of their different attributes. Attributes themselves are weighted in 
comparison to each other and the final choice is based on the sum of the weighted 
attribute utilities (Edwards and Newman, 1982); 
• Elimination by Aspects in which options are seen in terms of a scalable set of 
aspects (attributes) and the option is chosen that is left having eliminated options 
scoring badly on important aspects (described in Wright 1984, p 105-107); 
• Minimax strategy where the option that minimises the maximum losses is chosen 
(Lee, 1971 p,33-3) can be equated in principle to the Maximin strategy where the 
choice producing maximising the minimum utility would be opted for (Wright 
1984 p. 12), A maximax strategy selects the choice with the maximum (possible) 
utility. 
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Decision theories however, also explicitly take into account the uncertainty 
involved in a decision. Some of the above strategies (such as MAUT and maximin) can 
when expected attribute utilities are used instead of attribute utilities. These sons of models 
are most relevant to decision making in general practice, which is rife with uncertainty. 
The original utility based model of decision making under uncertainty was expected utility 
theory which was formalised by two economists - von Neumann and Morgenstem (1947). 
This included uncertainty simply in terms of probability attached to the particular 
outcome's utility and is consequently a model of risky rather than uncertain decision 
making. According to this normative model, sums of probability weighted utilities are 
compared for each option and the one with the best expected utility should be chosen. 
Although this type of expected utility model could be useful in normative terms, it does not 
deal with the subject's expectations about the likelihood of events. 
In Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) theory it is the subject's expectations (or view 
of the probability of an event) rather than an objective probability that is included (see 
Wright, 1984 for a discussion). The perceived utility and perceived likelihood of these is 
used to calculate the best option to be taken. However. SEU too is descriptively inadequate 
even for the decision making on the simple gambles used in laboratory experiments. 
Expected Utility theories rest on certain axioms. 
• Cancellation (also the sure thing principle): any outcome that is not affected by 
the decision taken should not be allowed to influence the decision making. 
• Transitivity: If option A is preferred to option B and option B is preferred to 
option C then option A should also be preferred to option C. 
• Dominance: I f option A is belter than option B in one condition and at least 
equal to B in all other respects, then option A should be the decision taken. 
• Invariance: The same decision should be preferred no matter how the decision 
options are represented. 
However, these axioms are found to be violated by subjects' behaviour (Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1988). For example, subjects' favouring of certainty is such that the axiom 
of cancellation is inappropriate. Two otherwise equal gambles are assessed differently 
depending on whether they both additionally have a certain probability of an outcome of 
nothing or something (Allais' Paradox, 1953 - see Kahneman and Tversky, 1979 p.265). 
The principle of invariance is broken when subjects respond differently to decisions 
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described in terms of gains rather than losses (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 
SEU has been found to be lacking as a descriptive model. Its status as a normative 
model has also been questioned (see Wright, 1984, p.64). However, decision analysis 
which is based on the principles of SEU has been found to be useful as a normative, 
prescriptive model when the decision is complex (Pollitser, 1991). Much of its use depends 
on a decomposition of the decision in terms of options and outcomes, probability and 
utility. These are attached to nodes and branches in a schematic representation of the 
decision known as the decision tree. It may be the aid in identification of options and 
possible outcomes, rather than the calculation of expected utilities per se, that makes 
decision analysis useful in complex situations but of questionable value in simple ones 
(Pollitser, 1991). An example of a simple decision tree on the assignment of a diagnosis of 
pneumonia can be seen in Figure 2.1. Decision analysis has been widely used in medicine 
(see any volume of the journal Medical Decision Making). For example, Barrett, Parfrey, 
Foley and Detsky (1994) compared choice of contrast media in the diagnostic cardiac 
catheterization. 
Probabiliiy Outcome 
m\ NODE 
AaNODE 
Assisn 
tamonia 
Diagnosis 
Assign 
Non-Pneumonia 
Paiioiitas 
have pneumonia 
Menidoesnoi 
have pneumonia 
l^tieiKloes 
have pneumonia 
tat does not 
have pneumonia 
(P) 
(1-P) 
(P) 
(l-P) 
Figure 2.1 Decision Tree for a pneumonia diagnosis problem: 
Wright (1984), adapted from Christensen-Szalanski and Busheyhead (1979) 
Regret theory models decision making in terms of the regret or rejoicing that 
different outcomes would elicit having made a choice as opposed to i f they had occurred 
anyway (e.g. Loomes and Sugden, 1982). Violations of the principle of transitivity are 
accounted for in terms of comparative assessments of options rather than their independent 
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valuation. However, Regret theory maintains the axioms of invariance and dominance and 
thus, for example, does not account for the different risk seeking and risk aversive 
behaviour when problems are presented differently (Tversky and Kahneman, 1988). 
Hynes, Levine. Littenberg and Nease (1994) recently developed a measure of regret by 
comparing the utility of outcomes of avoidable compared to unavoidable blindness. 
Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) goes a long way towards giving a 
descriptive account of decision making. Decision making is seen to have two phases - a 
framing and editing phase and an evaluation phase. In this psychological theory the 
difference in perception or framing of the decision in terms of losses and gains is taken into 
account. In simple gambles the observed risk aversion with gains and risk seeking 
behaviour with losses is predicted by the theory. The effect of framing on decision making 
has also been seen in complex real worid decisions. For example. McNeil, Pauker, Sox and 
Tversky (1982. also described in McNeil. Pauker and Tversky, 1988) presented subjects 
with statistical information about two treatments for cancer. Therapy preferences were 
dramatically affected by whether the information for both was presented in terms of 
mortality or in terms of survival. Similarly, Verhoef, de Haan and van Daal (1994) found 
prospect theory predicted healthy women's patterns of risk aversion and risk seeking with 
respect to gambles with years of life. Most subjects were risk seeking in the short term (up 
to the lifetime they aspire to) but risk averse in the long term. However, although Prospect 
theory explains general patterns of decision making and can be used in both nomothetic 
and idiographic analyses, its use for describing medical decision making is questionable. In 
the majority of circumstances, decision making in general practice is plagued with 
uncertainty and not just risk. Analyses looking at behaviour in terms of prospect theory 
have presented subjects with clearly defined gambles. Probabilities are set to describe 
outcomes. The statistics are to be taken as presented. In general practice (and indeed the 
rest of medicine) where statistics exist they are often debated. 
Ford (1987) objects to the use of probability per se in theories of decision making: 
Probability is established by pseudo-identical repetitions of events whereas each decision 
is a unique situation. Probability density functions (p.d.f.) are of no help in determining 
what will happen in one particular instance. In addition, p.d.f. are based on the inclusion of 
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all hypothesized rival outcomes. If an outcome has been omitted from this, the 
probabilities of other outcomes would numerically change. Subjective assessments of 
probability (subjective probability), however, do not function like this. It is not 
necessarily true that a decision maker would feel the likelihood of original outcome had 
changed. According to Ford (1987) both his own Perspective theory and Shackle's theory 
(Shackle. 1952, 1961) incorporate the perception of uncertainly in terms of'potential 
surprise'. Gains and losses are included in terms of an 'ascendancy function' and. in the 
case of Perspective theory, as a utility base measure of the 'perspective index*. Portfolio 
theory (Coombs, 1975) discusses preferences between options in terms of risk preferences 
and maximising expected utility. 
Support theory (Tversky and Koehier, 1994) gives an account of subjective 
probability in terms of the relative support a subject attributes to an event. Probabilities are 
attached to hypotheses rather than to events and the same event may be described by more 
than one hypothesis. The probabilities subjects ascribe to the same event have been found 
to differ depending on how it is described. This violates the principle of extensionality 
which is upheld by objective probability (whereby the probability of the same event or 
events has the same probability of occurrence). Support theory accounts for this. The 
probability of implicit disjunctions (whereby a description implicitly encompasses several 
types of event) are assessed with a global judgement based on support for the most 
representative and salient events making up the disjunction. When the disjunction is made 
explicit (referred to as "unpacking"), the subject may be reminded of possibilities they had 
previously overlooked, or the explicit mention of an event may increase its salience and the 
sum of subjective probabilities exceeds that of the implicit disjunction. Tversky and 
Koehler (1994) give several examples of this, however, the phenomenon has also been 
demonstrated in medicine. 
Redelmeier, Koehler, Liberman and Tversky (1995) showed that house officers^ 
estimating the probability of three possible diagnoses for a case assigned lower 
probabilities for the "none of the above" category than house officers for whom "none of 
the above" had been further specified in terms of two other diagnoses plus "none of the 
^ These are qualified doctors. 
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above". When another sample of doctors was asked to assess the probability of one of four 
possible prognoses for a case, each subject gave a relatively high probability of the 
outcome they were specifically asked to rate and the sum of probabilities was 164% 
(objective probabilities should sum to 100%). This unpacking phenomenon is also seen in 
terms of decision making. When several possible diagnoses were explicitly suggested on a 
case description the patient management decision by fourth year medical students changed 
compared to when only one diagnosis was explicitly suggested. In this latter case the 
possibility suggested on its own appeared more likely than when other alternative 
possibilities were additionally mentioned. Decisions are affected by discounting of 
unspecified possibilities. 
Decision theory based methods that might potentially do well descriptively have a 
number of problems. Firstly, some models break up the decision in terms of poorly defined 
components such as the risk preference referred to in Coombs' Portfolio theory (1975). 
Secondly, there may be difficulty measuring even clearly defined components such as 
relate to utility and probability in complex real life decision making. One of Janis and 
Mann's (1977) criticisms of many decision making theories is that they are applied to 
important, meaningful, stress causing decisions but are often tested on insignificant or 
hypothetical decisions such as clearly laid out simple gambles. This difference is important 
because they hypothesize that the fact that the decision environment is a stressful or risky 
one plays an important part in the way the decision is made. Indeed there is evidence that 
decision making under time pressure and stress does affect the underlying decision making 
or judgement making behaviour (Edland and Svenson, 1993). 
The use of decision analytic techniques such as described above have additional 
problems in the realm of GP decision making. Al l are a priori methods in that they analyse 
the decision as it is being carried out and before a decision is reached (see Arkes and 
Hammond, 1986). There are several problems associated with this. Firstly, just doing a 
concurrent analysis may prove difficult when the consultation is carried out under time 
pressure anyway. Secondly, what the subject says may not be a reliable description of their 
thoughts or attitudes but may be created for that analysis (see Chapter 4 on Self-
knowledge). Thirdly, related to this, between them the subject and analyst need to have a 
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good understanding of ihe decision situation in order to be able to identify all options and 
outcomes. This may also prove problematic in the prescriptive application of decision 
analysis to general practice decision making. Finally, explicitly breaking up the process 
may change the subject's behaviour, making the approach of little descriptive use. 
Although some experts perceive SEU as a formalised version of their reasoning, the fact 
that it is formalised leads to a change of effect (Kassirer. Kuipers and Gorry, 1982). In 
general practice, as stated in the previous chapter much decision making is carried out 
intuitively. Although some different decision options and their outcomes will be 
considered, the explicit outline of all possibilities may change the CP's behaviour. 
Problem solving analysis - Process Tracing techniques 
Process tracing techniques try to describe the decision making process rather than 
the perception (and evaluation) of the decision. The use of process tracing techniques 
originated in the investigation of problem solving (Newell and Simon, 1972). Here a 
subject's exploration of the problem space of relatively simple problems was described. A 
process rather than structural description is created. The analysis done is a posteriori (see 
Arkes and Hammond, 1986) but the data is gathered during the decision making process. 
In process tracing techniques the decision making or judgement process is mapped through 
time in terms of the pieces of information attended to. The most widely used process 
tracing technique for data gathering is protocol analysis. However, subjects' eye 
movements, information seeking and response time can also be used as sources of 
information about the decision making or judgement process (Maule and Svenson, 1993). 
In protocol analysis, verbal protocols are elicited as the subject carries out a 
decision making or judgement task. It has been argued that although time taken may 
increase, concurrent thinking aloud by subjects does not lead to any change in decision or 
judgement making behaviour (Ericsson and Simon, 1980, 1984). These verbal protocols do 
not provide reliable information about the way decisions are made but may be useful 
sources of data about information attended to, in the way that retrospective accounts would 
not. Ericsson and Simon (1980, 1984) suggest that it is the content of working memory that 
is elicited. Thinking aloud is only possible where there is a process rather than an instant 
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conclusion. In these cases subjects' descriptions of the contents of their consciousness 
gives more information than the final judgement or decision. Even Ericsson and Simon 
(1980, 1984) argued that there were some mental processes {e.g. recognition processes) for 
which introspection was of limited use and which might be subject to interference. It may 
be that many intuitively made judgements or decisions are just such one step processes (see 
Chapter 4 on self-knowledge). As discussed earlier, many (well practised) medical 
decisions are intuitive or automatic. Process u-acing techniques will not be of use in 
describing this behaviour. 
Although elicitation of a verbal protocol may not interfere with the decision making 
process and, like other process tracing techniques, will yield useful data about the 
information being attended to, these data then need to be used by the analyst to describe 
the process. Relevant information may not have been made explicit. For example, a person 
thinking aloud about prescribing HRT for a menopausal woman may omit to make explicit 
the fact that it is important that the case is female and of menopausal age because these 
things may seem so obvious to the decision maker. The analyst would need to give the 
subject a male case in order to find out the relevance of gender to the decision process. 
The final description of the process is usually in terms of production (IF... THEN...) 
rules. The analyst may need to have some knowledge of the decision situation in order to 
identify these rules. Patel and Groen (1986) suggest that the use of Newell and Simon's 
(1972) process tracing methodology may be difficult in verbally complex situations. 
However, their use is possible. For example, Boreham (1989) used process tracing 
techniques to map out a doctor's decisions on drug dosage in the control of epileptic fits. 
However, although he felt a significant amount of expertise had been readily expressed as 
production rules, these rules were occasionally overridden. Since the rules were formed on 
the basis of decision making on only three cases there may be many other types of cases 
they would not f i t Einhom, Kleinmuntz and Kleinmuntz (1979) also identified the 
difficulty of identification of rules from verbal protocols. Both reliability of the protocols 
and the rules were questionable. Protocols may not elicit all the information attended to. 
Rules were difficult to formulate. Process tracing of decisions by novices (on cereal 
preference) fared better than decisions by experts (on MMPI profiles). 
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When knowledge has been successfully elicited from an expert it has been 
combined with the fruits of artificial intelligence research and used to form the knowledge 
base of expert systems and other decision simulators or decision aids (Kassirer, Kuipers 
and Gorry, 1982; Fox, 1984; Lundsgaarde, 1987). Several descriptive studies have relied 
on protocol analysis of patient management problems {e.g. Elstein, Shulman and Sprafka, 
1978). TTie importance of the knowledge base in this sort of expert decision making is now 
well accepted. Elstein, Shulman and Sprafka (1990) identified the need to look at decision 
making on several types of decision in order to identify expert novice differences. 
However, the results of Boreham's (1989) study also show the importance of using several 
different cases to model the rules used in one decision. 
Process tracing techniques allow the subject to express the final decision or 
judgement as they would usually - in categorical or continuous terms. This is certainly an 
advantage in terms of interference with the decision making process. The focus is on the 
information aquisition phase of decision or judgement making. Information combination is 
inferred by the decision maker and included implicitly in the rules formed (Einhom, 
Kleinmuntz and Kleinmuntz, 1979). The use of process tracing techniques in general 
practice is problematic. As mentioned earlier, the intuitive judgements and decisions (those 
that were implicitly learnt or have become automatic) will be difficult to describe. Where 
decision making is less automatic, however there are also difficulties. One of the key 
features of general practice is the interaction between patient and doctor. Talking aloud 
techniques may well interfere with a behaviour in which talking is often involved. The use 
of hypothetical patients presented on, for example, an information board would be a 
possibility. Again, the formation of rules from data about the information gathered would 
be necessary. 
Social Judgement Theory (SJT) 
The remit of social judgement theory (Hammond, Stewart, Brehmer and Steinman, 
1975) and of judgement analysis is very different from the other two methods discussed 
above. Decision analysis describes the decision situation (or the subject's perception of it) 
and process analysis describes the process undergone. Although again it is essentially a 
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structural approach, judgement analysis, however, describes the judgements or decisions 
taken in temis of the infomiation available. The subject's response is compared to the 
stimulus of the cues (or information available) and the relationship between the two is 
modelled statistically. In this form it is essentially a descriptive approach. However, it also 
has prescriptive applications. Chapter 3 will discuss judgement analysis in more detail. 
In order to carry out judgement analysis, both the response and the cues or 
information available must be clearly measurable. The analysis (usually multiple linear 
regression or analysis of variance) is carried out after a number of judgements have been 
recorded on a set of situations defined along the same dimensions. In the case of clinical 
judgements these would be cases about which the same pieces of information are known. 
Subjects' responses must be expressed along a one dimensional scale. Decisions and 
categorical judgements may be able to be fitted into one dimension i f options are mutually 
exclusive. However, often in medicine decisions include options that can be mutually 
inclusive e.g. any combination of prescribing, referring, giving advice on lifestyle etc. 
Each option or combination of options can be considered separately: Responses can be 
recorded for these in terms of likelihood or confidence e.g. Poses, Cebul, Collins and Fager 
(1985). Complex decisions can be analysed by comparing models showing the factors 
affecting the choice of each options on a type of case {e.g. the multivariate lens model 
analysis of Cooksey and Freebody, 1985). 
Linear models have been found to be a good fit for much human judgement making 
(Dawes and Corrigan, 1974). However, it may be the case that the linear fit of the model of 
the judgements or decision making is moderate but not good. This may be either because 
the judge is using a non-linear model or being inconsistent in decision making. But even 
non-linear models can be approximated by linear ones so that important cues can be 
identified. 
Both intuitive or carefully and explicitly thought through decisions and judgements 
can be modelled using judgement analysis. However, no self-knowledge is required of the 
subject and the analyst only needs to collect the data and see how input (a description of 
the case to be considered) varies with output (the decision or judgement made). Judgement 
analysis has both a descriptive and a prescriptive role to play: the decision or judgement 
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making by the subject is modelled (in the context of the predictability of the real world) 
giving a description. Descriptions of a subject's model can be fed back to them along with 
descriptions of colleagues policies, to gain greater agreement, or the ideal policy, to gain 
greater accuracy. This cognitive feedback can be used prescriptively by the subject. 
Although judgement analysis does not have a probabilistic index of uncertainty, the 
basis of social judgement theory is to take into account the predictability of the 
environment. The ideal judgement or decision may follow a non-linear or inconsistent 
pattern. Lens model analysis (Brunswik. 1952), from which social judgement theory was 
developed (Hammond, Stewart, Brehmer and Steinman, 1975), analyses a subject's 
judgements in terms of the information used (judgement analysis) and compares this with 
the ideal judgements and how well they can be modelled in terms of the information 
available. A study by Tape. Heckerling, Ornato and Wigton (1991) illustrates the 
importance of seeing the success of judgements in context. The accuracy of physicians 
estimates of pneumonia was found to differ in the states of Illinois, Nebraska and Virginia. 
However, the predictability of pneumonia in patients in Illinois, Nebraska and Virginia, on 
the basis of the information available, was found to vary in a similar manner. 
In that judgement analysis can be used whether judgements are intuitive or thought 
out it is useful to analyse general practice decision making. However, because of the 
diversity of cases seen in general practice, collecting large enough samples of the same 
type of decision problem would be difficult for several problems. Identification of the 
information available about a patient is also problematic in a clinical relationship 
characterised partly by its longevity. The GP may be aware of many things about the 
patient that are not explicitly discussed during the consultation. However, the use of 
hypothetical patients (with hypothetical histories) gives a solution to both of these 
problems. 
Errors in Judgement and Decision Making 
One of the odd things about judgement and decision making is that it is taught in 
terms of the process involved, but is often judged in terms of the outcome. This is 
especially true in the area of medicine: It is difficult to imagine complaints about the 
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practice of a doctor when patients are doing well. However, even when the result is death or 
debilitation the doctor's behaviour or practice may not be at fault. One maxim might be that 
the best decision is not always the one with the best outcome. Errors in judgement and 
decision making can however occur for different reasons. For example, humans may make 
errors due to the degree of uncertainty involved in the judgement or decision making. 
Related to this, they may make non-systematic errors or may make mistakes in applying 
any strategy for other reasons. Humans may also show systematic biases, and may actually 
be using an erroneous or non-ideal strategy. But the identification of an error relies on 
identification of an ideal process. I f this is not identified then it might be the probabilistic 
world that is to blame for a poor outcome rather than a suboptimal decision making 
process. 
Judgement and decision making is permeated with uncertainty at all levels. The 
actual environment in which the judgement is being made may be probabilistic in itself the 
relationship between variables and the variable being judged is not completely 
determinable. In the context of decision making the subject does not know exactly how the 
choice made wil l affect the outcome: Other undetermined factors may come into play once 
the decision has been made. This does not necessarily mean that the possibilities are 
undetermined in themselves, rather that the judge or decision maker has not yet determined 
what they are and cannot calculate what they wil l be. Within this probabilistic environment, 
the subject may incorrectly guess the value of many unknown variables. Several types of 
decision analysis aim to quantify or at least conceptually capture this uncertainty in terms 
of probability or subjective probability (SEU - see Von Winterfeldt and Edwards, 1986) or 
risk (Portfolio Theory - Coombs, 1975) or some measure of expected loss and gain 
(Prospect theory, Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) or potential surprise (Shackle's theory, 
1952, 1961). Judgement Analysis on the other hand does not explicitly incorporate 
uncertainty. Where the environment is modelled. Social Judgement Theory takes its 
probabilistic nature into account (see Chapter 3). 
In the context of medicine especially there is much uncertainty. Diagnoses are 
categorical judgements based on information about a patient. This information often relates 
in some probabilistic rather than deterministic way to diagnostic categories. Complications 
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arise and diseases may follow different and unpredictable paces of development in 
different individuals. Where processes of disease development are understood outcomes 
and interventions may be predictable. However, often there are so many things to be taken 
into account when considering the best option that, even if the information was all readily 
available, the physician (in common with other decision makers) simply cannot hold it all 
at once. 
It is these limits of human information processing that underiie the theory of 
'bounded rationality': Humans are limited in their ability to reason perfectly, to problem 
solve, to make ideal judgements or ideal decisions not least because of the limits on the 
amount of infomiation that they can process at any one time. To make the best decisions or 
judgements humans must be selective about and adapt the information available into 
simple frameworks. But limits to information processing may lead to two types of error (1) 
the inadequate use of any strategy with frequently occurring but unsystematic errors or (2) 
the use of heuristics that lead to systematic biases (see below). 
The importance of our cognitive capacity is widely accepted: many theoretical 
approaches have acknowledged infomiation processing limits. For example, Janis and 
Mann (1977) discuss how stress may lead to different types of decision making in terms of 
the effectiveness of information processing. Simon put forward the idea of a "satisficing" 
principle: Humans pick an option that is good enough rather than hold on till the ideal 
choice is found (Wright, 1984 p. 104-105). Decision analysis attempts to put some structure 
on the task to ease handling of information (See Von Winterfeldt and Edwards, 1986). 
Indeed most decision aids are based on the principle of "divide and conquer" (Slovic, 
Fischhoff and Lichtenstein, 1977), aiming to limit the amount of information that must be 
attended to at any one time. The problem is not just a matter of how we cope with 
uncertainty given our limitations: Models of choice based on trying to weigh up fully 
known alternatives against each other also take limitations into account. Tversky's notion 
of "elimination by aspects" discusses decision making in terms of looking at a few pieces 
of information at a time (see Wright 1984, p. 105-107 for a brief description). 
Where errors are unsystematic such as when a subject has no real policy, is 
inconsistent, or makes mistakes, again different approaches to analysing decision making 
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and judgement may be beneficial. Decision analyses, described above, may help to clarify 
exactly which pieces of information are important to the decision maker and may help to 
take them all into account. Process tracing techniques such as verbal protocol analysis may 
help because the subject is led to think about a policy and be consistent in its application. 
Judgement analysis allows ascertainment of the subject's policy. 'Bootstrapping' is the 
process whereby this policy is then applied to a new set of data with better results than the 
error-prone human from whom it was derived (see Chapter 3). 
Limits to our information processing capacity have been put forward as reasons for 
our use of heuristics (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). The point of a heuristic or "rule of 
thumb" is that it usually yields an appropriate formulation of an idea in an easier way than 
other, more thorough methods of information processing would. However the use of 
heuristics may lead to biases. It has often been through these biases or systematic errors 
that the particular heuristics have been educed e.g. representativeness and availability. 
Kahneman and Tversky showed the use of heuristics in subjects' judgements of likelihood 
of events or categorizations. Where decisions are being restructured in terms of the 
subjects' likelihood judgements, this is obviously relevant to decision making. However, 
there are other heuristics such as Discounting (Kelley, 1972; described in Heller, Saltzstein 
and Caspe, 1992) and other biases, e.g. confirmation bias, that have been identified that 
clearly affect judgement making (Janis and Mann, 1977, p.82-85). Many of these may 
derive from limits on our cognitive capacity. For a fuller discussion and review of biases in 
judgement see Evans (1992) or with reference to medicine see Heller, Saltzsiein and Caspe 
(1992). Boreham (1989) suggested that the production rules identified in process tracing 
were capturing the heuristics used in expert decision making. 
A systematic bias shows use of an erroneous strategy. To overcome this sort of 
error in judgement and decision making, prescriptive models can be applied: during 
decision analysis the ideal decision can be mapped out using the subject's utilities or 
cognitive feedback can be used in the context of judgement analysis. In judgement analysis 
algebraic models look at which items of information are used in relation to each other to 
come to a judgement (Hursch, Hammond and Hursch 1964, Tucker 1964). Where access 
can be gained to the criterion being estimated, its relationship to the information can also 
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be calculated and this can be fed back to the subject (see the section below on cognitive 
feedback). With process tracing techniques, models formed from the protocols of experts 
can be used to guide more naive individuals through the decision making process^. 
So, errors that are systematic biases or or mistaken policies can be rectified by use 
of a prescriptive model of one sort or another, e.g. decision analysis or cognitive feedback. 
However, systematic errors caused by the use of heuristics may be eliminated by decision 
aids or other systems to aid the handling of information. Unsystematic errors can also be 
rectified by the use of a decision aid or through bootstrapping to identify the core policy to 
be implemented. 
Overview 
As stated eariier the three different approaches described briefly in this chapter 
each have their pros and cons. One obvious difference is the mode of response. Decision 
analytic methods necessitate a categorical response. Although analysis in terms of 
production-rules may be easier i f the response is categorical, process tracing techniques 
may allow the subject to define the response being given. Having defined the judgement or 
decision being made judgement analysis necessitates a response along a scale (for 
regression analyses) or in terms of categorical, mutually exclusive options (for analyses 
using ANOVA). This is in accordance with several sorts of judgement anyway (e.g. 
judgements of severity or risk) but also allows the subject to express categorical 
judgements or decisions in terms of degrees of confidence or likelihood. 
The type of decision or judgement being made will have a strong bearing on which 
method is suitable. Although judgement analysis can be applied to both decisions that are 
carefully thought through and 'instant' ones, both decision analysis and protocol analysis 
may rely on subjects having some ability to verbally express their perception of decision or 
judgement making. The analytic demands on the subject are intellectually fewer in process 
tracing techniques than in decision analysis, but this relies on decision or judgement 
making occurring in a series of (verbalizable) steps. Where decisions or judgements are 
made quickly, the elucidation of the steps in the process may not be possible. Much of 
^ These models can also be used as the basis of an expert system. 
32 
General Practice and medicine has been described as iniuitive. CPs spend on average seven 
minutes with their patient in a consultation and many judgements and management 
decisions are made about the patient. Information is presented to them in the consultation 
on top of previous knowledge they have amassed. In an interview study, many general 
practitioners, most of whom also participated in Studies I . 2 and 3 reported here, explicitly 
admitted lack of knowledge of the mental processes that affect their decision making. 
Others described the process of negotiation with the patient once they themselves had 
worked out courses of action; another group focussed on medical experience, and others 
discussed the issue in decision theoretic terms (Di Caccavo and Reid, 1995). Thus in this 
study, judgement analysis, which does not require metacognition. or any sort of insight on 
the part of the subject seemed an appropriate method. 
Well 
Structured 
A 
Task 
Structure 
Poorly 
Structured 
Scientific 
experiment 
1 
Controlled 
trial 2 
Quasi experiment 3 
4 System-aided Judgement 
5 Peer-aided Judgement 
6 
Intuitive 
Judgement 
High 
A 
Possibility of 
manipulation; 
visibility of 
process; 
time required. 
Low 
Intuition 4, > Analysis 
Cognitive f^ode 
Figure 2.2 Diagram of Hammond's six modes of enquiry, taken f rom Hamm (1988) 
Hammond's Cognitive Continuum shown in Figure 2.2 also provides a good 
argument for the advantage in the clinical setting of judgement analysis over the other 
approaches discussed here (see Hamm, 1988). The cognitive continuum is a framework of 
thinking. Analytical thinking occurs at one end and intuition at the other end of a 
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continuum. Most thinking, being quasi-rational, lies somewhere in the middle. The degree 
of conscious awareness of the process decreases as the process becomes more intuitive. 
Hammond argues that the appropriateness of the type of thinking depends on how well the 
task is structured. Where tasks are well structured, any of the judgement and decision 
analysis approaches are useful. At the analytical, well structured end of the continuum, 
judgement analysis may require a more complicated model than a simple linear one. 
However, as tasks become less well defined judgement analysis has an advantage over 
other methods, Hamm (1988) argues that thinking in the clinic usually involves intuitive or 
peer-aided judgement. He refers to the work of Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) who argue that 
more and more intuition is involved in the judgement and decision making process as 
greater expertise is gained. Thus clinical judgement and decision making by experienced 
doctors would best be modelled using judgement analysis. 
The purpose of the analysis is also important in considering which method to use. 
Descriptive applications of decision analytic techniques have been found wanting, 
Prescriptively they are widely used in medicine and elsewhere for decision support but 
there are problems even with this application (see Doubilet and McNei l (1985) for a 
discussion of decision analysis in medicine). The descriptive capabilities o f Prospect 
theory, whilst impressive in a risky decision making setting, are of less use in a situation 
characterised by uncertainty rather than risk. Process tracing techniques can be both 
descriptive and prescriptive and have been used to develop expert systems and other 
computer based decision aids. Descriptively and prescriptively they are useful i f (and this 
may sound tautological) the process is one that is identifiable through time. Some 
pioneering work in medical decision making and judgement was done using protocol 
analysis (Elstein. Shulman and Sprafka, 1978). The emphasis in this sort of research is on 
data aquisition rather than interpretation or use. The assumption is that i f data is collected 
or attended to consciously then it must have a bearing on the decision. But Elstein, 
Shulman and Sprafka (1978) found no correlation between data collected and accuracy of 
its interpretation (see Eistein. Shulman and Sprafka, 1990). I f a subject is aware of the 
process and the information they are attending to process tracing w i l l be useful for training 
but of little use to the individual concerned. I f the subject is not aware then process tracing 
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techniques can be of li i i le descriptive or prescriptive use. Although the model may be a 
paramorphic rather than a representative one (Hoffman, 1960). judgement analysis is 
clearly useful descriptively. 
Each of these three approaches has a different role to play. This is much the 
conclusion reached by Einhom, Kleinmuntz and Kleinmuntz (1979) who discuss the 
relationship between linear models (the basis of judgement analysis) and process tracing 
models of judgement. The difference between these two is in terms of differ ing levels of 
analysis and of emphasis within the same behavioural phenomenon. Kaplan (1975) pointed 
out that our understanding of any phenomenon is dependent on the approach taken. This 
becomes particularly important when, as in a probabilistic environment, a subject's 
behaviour and policy is evaluated not by its outcome but by comparison with some ideal. 
In these studies the decision is not easily analysed, whether intuitive quasi-rational or 
analytical. General practitioners do not necessarily have the time or the ability to talk us 
through the process. They have become experts who are working under time constraints 
and the method of judgement analysis that interferes least and describes best that process 
seems the most efficacious. 
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Chapte r Three 
Judgement Analysis and its A p p l i c a t i o n in M e d i c i n e 
In t roduct ion 
The basic principle of judgement analysis was introduced in Chapter 2. Its aim is to 
capture judgement or decision making pohcies in terms of the available pieces of 
information. The decisions or judgements could be those of several people (a nomothetic 
analysis) or of individuals (an idiographic analysis). In judgement analysis, judgements (or 
decisions) are made over a number of cases or situations which are made up of pieces of 
information (cues). The judgements are described statistically in terms of the information 
that is available (see Stewart, 1988). This chapter wi l l outline the findings and uses of 
judgement analysis and some of its applications in medicine but first a word about 
terminology. Where judgement analysis is applied to clinical judgements it is known as 
clinical judgement analysis (CJA). Social Judgement Theory (SJT) provides a framework 
within which judgement analysis is usually carried out. Social Judgement Theory (SJT) is 
based on the psychology of Egon Brunswik (1952) and places the ability to make correct 
judgements within the framework of the probabilistic real world environment (see Brehmer 
and Joyce, 1988). This contrasts with the deterministic and process oriented view of much 
of science (and medicine). Another term often used to refer to judgement analysis is 
"Policy capturing". However, this term has been objected to for two reasons*. Firstly, it 
assumes that there is something there that is being captured. In fact, as is pointed out later, 
the description of judgement policy is a paramorphic representation of behaviour 
(Hoffman. 1960). Secondly, it is not immediately obvious that the term policy refers to the 
judgement policy. The term has been used in other contexts to refer to some ideal or 
prescribed mode of behaviour. Throughout this thesis the term "policy" wi l l refer 
(descriptively) to judgement policies. 
There are a number of ways of carrying out judgement analysis. The decision or 
judgement and the information pertinent to it must be identified. But then the decisions or 
judgements to be analysed can be real ones or made on hypothetical cases. A subject's 
policy is described in terms of the relative importance of the cues available in his or her 
' Tom Stewart makes this point in a message on the electronic mail Brunswiklist, 8/95. 
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judgement or decision making. Although multiple linear regression is commonly used as a 
basic analysis, non-linear terms can be included, though add little to the f i t of the model to 
the judgements (Brehmer and Brehmer, 1988). Having identified the relative importance of 
each piece of information in the decision making or judgement making this can be 
compared with a subjective measure of each cue's relative importance in an examination of 
self-insight. It can be compared with other subjects' relative importance weights of cues or 
it can be compared with the ideal relative importance weights. In either of these cases the 
models produced can form the basis of a "lens model analysis" of achievement or 
agreement. This wi l l be described later. 
The widespread use of judgement analysis, linear modelling and social judgement 
theory in medicine can be seen in the overviews of the area (Stewart and Joyce, 1988; 
Wigton, 1988a and 1988b and Engel, Wigton. La Duca and Blacklow, 1990). Work has 
been carried out looking at diagnostic judgements (e.g. Tape, Heckeding. Omato and 
Wigton, 1991; Poses, Cebul, Collins and Eager, 1985; Centor. Witherspoon, Dalton, Brody 
and Link , 1981; Wigton. Hoellerich and Patil, 1986), judgements of severity (e.g. Kirwan, 
Chaput de Saintonge. Joyce and Cunrey, 1983b; Fisch, Gil l is and Daguet 1982; Fisch, 
Hammond Joyce and O'Reilly, 1981; Chaput de Saintonge. Kirwan, Evans and Crane, 
1988; Kirwan, Chaput de Saintonge and Joyce, 1990), of risk or morbidity (e.g. Tape, 
Kripal and Wigton, 1992; Rovner, Rothert, Holmes, Ravitch. Holzman and Elstein, 1985), 
and other judgements about the patient or other subjects within medicine (e.g. Rothert, 
1982; Chaput de Saintonge, Crane. Rust. Karadia and Whittam, 1988; Speroff, Connors 
and Dawson. 1989). Several studies have looked at patient management decisions such as 
prescription (e.g. Holzman, Ravitch, Metheny, Rothert, Holmes and Hoppe. 1984; Elstein, 
Holzman, Belzer and Ellis, 1992), referral (e.g. Rovner, Rothert. Holmes. Ravitch. 
Holzman and Elstein. 1985; Rothen, Rovner, Elstein, Holzman, Holmes and Ravitch, 
1984) or other, more specific types of management (e.g. Smith and Wigton, 1983 analysed 
decisions about tube feeding in seriously i l l patients). 
As can be seen from the repetition in the above references, some of these studies 
have collected more than one type of judgement about the same case (e.g. Rovner, Rothert, 
Holmes, Ravitch, Holzman and Elstein, 1985; Fisch. Hammond Joyce and O'Reilly, 1981). 
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Judgement analysis has also been used on decisions about applicants for medical courses 
and posts (e.g. Young, Woodiscroft and Holloway, 1986, cited in Wigion. 1988a) and on 
clinical decision making by other professionals apart f rom doctors and medical students 
{e.g. Holzemer. Schleutermann, Farrand and Miller , 1981. Ullman, Egan. Fielder. Jurenec, 
Pliske. Thompson and Doherty, 1981; Ullman and Doherty, 1984). Judgement analysis can 
only use judgements on a univariate scale. Judgements that are normally forced to be 
categorical can be expressed in probabilistic terms (e.g. Tape, Heckerling, Omato and 
Wigton, 1991; Poses, Cebul, Collins and Fager, 1985) or in temis of certainty (e.g. Fasoli, 
Lucchelli, Blasi, Tosi and Colombini, 1992; Roose and Doherty, 1976) or as degrees of 
severity (e.g. Kirwan, Chaput de Saintonge, Joyce and Currey, 1983a,b.c; La Duca, Engel 
and Chovan, 1988). 
Judgement analysis identifies policies being used. The proliferation of individual 
differences in medical decision making has been well documented (e.g. Slovic, Rorer and 
Hoffman, 1971, cited in Wigton, 1988a; Fisch, Gillis and Daguet, 1982; Kirwan, Chaput 
de Sainionge. Joyce and Cunrey, 1983; Fasoli, Lucchelli. Blasi, Tosi and Colombini, 1992). 
As a consequence idiographic analyses, taking decision making by one individual, may be 
more useful than nomothetic analyses where judgements f rom several individuals are 
grouped to identify trends in behaviour. [Judgement analyses can of course be done on 
either.] However, caution is needed in interpretation of inter-individual comparisons. 
When cues are correlated, different policies of cue use may lead to the same judgements or 
decisions (Brehmer and Brehmer, 1988). Although capturing actual differences in policies, 
studies, as w i l l be seen later, some aspects of task design such as the degree of inter-cue 
correlation may exaggerate differences in individuals* practices. Judgement analysis can 
however be used prescriptively to reduce individual differences. Cognitive feedback or 
feedback of policy, which w i l l be described later in this chapter, has been found to help 
both agreement between medics and their achievement of correct judgements (see Wigton. 
1988b). 
As die above overview has shown, clinical judgement analysis has usefully 
captured individuals' policies in a variety of clinical decision or judgement making 
situations. The findings in medicine however, also f i t the general conclusions reached by 
38 
Brehmer and Brehmer (1988): 
(1) that linear models adequately describe the judgement process. 
(2) that judges are inconsistent, 
(3) that there are wide interindividual differences, 
(4) that judges use few cues, 
(5) that judges have little self-insight. 
Brehmer and Brehmer examine the validity of these conclusions and point out that 
design aspects of judgement analysis which may have affected results have rarely been 
controlled for. Different design aspects of judgement analysis are discussed below. 
Study design and real versus 'paper' cases 
There are a few factors that clearly affect the results of judgement analyses. The 
cues that are presented, the range they take and their intercorrelations can be seen to affect 
subjects' apparent consistency, the fit of the linear model generated, agreement between 
subjects and the number of cues used. 
The number of cues presented wi l l affect the subject in several ways. Firstly i f only 
a few cues are presented where more would be available in real l i fe the task may seem less 
realistic. I f non varying information is given as a f i l ler then the results are less 
generalisable. For example some medical studies might describe several different cases, all 
o f whom were white 50 year old males. I f more cues are varied then the number of cases 
needed for analysis increases dramatically. 
The range of cues presented is again important. The relative importance of the cue 
seen w i l l o f course be affected by its range in the cases presented. I f a cue varies greatly it 
may account for most of the variance in decision making and the role of the other cues in 
decision making may be obscured. I f different sets of cases are presented to the same or 
different subjects different policies wi l l result: Cue weights w i l l be d i f fe ren t 
Inter-cue correlations can have several effects. Firstly, subjects who alternate use of 
highly correlated cues between cases may appear to have greater consistency of policy than 
is actually the case. Consequentially they may appear to have a better fitting linear model. 
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Where cues intercorrelate it is diff icul t to identify the actual cues leading to variance in 
decision making. Subjects may appear to use fewer cues than they actually are. For 
example. Phelps and Shanleau (1978) found subjects used a maximum of three cues where 
an intercorrelated cue design was used and a step-wise regression was run as normal. But 
when the factors were put into one-variable regression analyses seven to eleven cues were 
significant and the same judges used between nine and eleven cues where cues were 
orthogonal. Reilly and Doherty (1992) ended up measuring the influence o f twelve 
correlated cues in terms of five factors. Finally, intercorrelated cues may exaggerate the 
agreement between subjects. Although Brehmer and Brehmer (1988) make this point the 
other way around: tasks with orthogonal cue design may exaggerate the disagreement 
between subjects the point is the same one. Differences of policy which show up best with 
an orthogonal cue design may disappear when the relevant cues are highly correlated as 
they often are in real l ife. 
Judgements for analysis can be made on real or hypothetical cases, presented as 
real or paper 'patients'. 'Paper' patients are written descriptions of the case which may 
appear on cards or paper (e.g. Holmes, Rovner. Rothert. Schmitt, Given and lalongo. 
1989), on computer screens {e.g. Wigton, Patil and Hoellerich, 1986) or could in theory 
just be described to the subject. Wigton (1988a) gives a summary of use o f paper and 
actual cases in clinical judgement analyses. Judgements are by necessity given as a 
univariate response but using real patients maximises validity so that generalisations can be 
made to real l i fe {e.g. Poses. Cebul. Collins, and Fager. 1985; Tape, Heckerling, Omalo, 
and Wigton, 1991). However, there are a number of disadvantages to this approach too. 
For example, there are problems of interpretation of cue use where cues naturally correlate, 
the range of cases presented cannot be controlled, measurement of independent variables 
may be d i f f icu l t , and the same cases cannot be presented to more than one subject so that 
iniersubject comparisons may be confounded. Using paper patients can overcome some of 
these problems but a question hangs over the validity and therefore generalizability of 
results. 
The validity of paper cases, or their ability to elicit judgement and decision making 
similar to real l i fe , has only been examined in a few studies. Morrel l and Roland (1990) 
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who concluded that the validity o f paper cases varied and couldn't be guaranteed can be 
regarded as correct. However, in their analysis they fa i l to examine the differences between 
those studies where validity was good and those in which it was deficient and they fa i l to 
make any assessment o f the means o f measurement o f validity. For example all the studies 
they cite as examples o f where poor validity has been shown are total task studies such as 
patient management problems rather than judgement analysis studies (e.g. Goran, 
Williamson and (jonella, 1973; Page and Fielding, 1980; Norman and Feightner, 1981). 
The validity o f the former, measured in terms o f the whole behaviour, including the 
information selected, tend to have low validity. The total task may be made up o f a series o f 
judgements rather than just the end judgement or decision and so may be more open to 
inconsistencies. 
The appearance o f validity o f judgement analyses depends partly on how validity 
is measured. I f global comparisons are made and behaviour is compared over sets o f 
decisions or judgements it is important that the case mixes presented in real l i fe and on 
paper cases is the same. Otherwise cue use and judgements made could vary considerably 
for one individual's behaviour (e.g. Holmes et al, 1989) or between groups. For example, 
Morrell and Roland (1990) found a poor correlation between doctors' referral rates on a set 
o f 21 paper cases and in real life. This may be because the case mix was not matched with 
any o f the doctors' case loads. Similarly, although Holmes ei al (1989) set up their cases to 
reflect epidemiologic data, the real patients included in the study aged f rom 16 years 
whereas the youngest paper 'patients' were 25 years. Fenichel, Murphy, Wigton and 
Schwartz (1984) found that cue use was much the same on paper and real cases but they do 
not mention controlling for a similar case mix. When the distribution o f cases has been 
carefully controlled for correlations between behaviour in real l i fe and on paper cases 
validity has been good. For example, Rovner, Rothert, Holmes, Given and lalongo (1986) 
found that the number o f tests physicians ordered on paper cases correlated highly wi th the . 
number they ordered on actual cases. The correlation was slightly higher where cues were 
present in realistic proportions and the same cues seemed to affect the decision as affect 
real l i fe decisions. However, on the real l i fe cases, physicians used slightly less tests. 
Case by case comparisons o f validity compare the judgement made by an 
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individual on a real case and on a paper version of the same. However, some account must 
be taken of the level of consistency shown and this is generally measured with a repeated 
presentation of cases. Kirwan. Chaput de Sainionge, Joyce and Currey (1983a) found a 
high correlation (mean r = 0.9) between rheumatologists judgements of disease activity on 
real patients and paper cases made from these. However, consistency was also extremely 
high on these paper cases (mean r = 0,97). Although quoted as an example of the validity 
of paper cases in antibiotic prescription for Otitis Media (Chaput de Saintonge and 
Hattersley, 1985). Chapui de Saintonge and Hathaway (1981) showed a significant but not 
brilliant level of agreement between diagnosis reached in real l i fe and that shown on paper 
version and paper version plus photograph of the ear in question (K = 0.45). Agreement 
here may have been reduced since decisions in three conditions rather than two were being 
compared. In both the Chaput de Saintonge and Hathaway (1981) and the Kirwan, Chaput 
de Saintonge. Joyce and Currey (1983a) studies the real l ife decision making could have 
been made more artificial and perhaps more similar to the paper case decision making by 
the use of profomia lists to record patient data. Although behaviour may be warped just in 
the clear collection of cues and the univariate expression of judgement analysis, the paper 
presentation of cases does not seem to make this any worse. 
Linear modell ing and consistency 
In making a judgement, proximal and distal variables are put together to form a 
"cognitive map" (Tolman. 1948). This map can be statistically modelled. The 
representation o f the judge's map. through linear regression of the judgement on the 
various variables (cues) or through analysis of variance techniques, is a "paramorphic" one 
(Hoffman, 1960). This is not necessarily what is going on inside the judge's mind but is 
one way of representing it. The ability of the model to describe the judge's decision making 
behaviour is measured by its f i t . This is a measure o f the amount of variance in the 
judgement or decision making that can be explained by the variables available in the 
model. In the case of a linear model this coefficient of mult iple determinat ion of a model 
(R2) is the square of the multiple correlation between the cues and the judgement (R). 
I f the cases are described in terms of independent variables ( X i ) and the judgement 
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made on a case is the dependent variable (K5) then the linear estimation of K5 is Y's: 
Ys = bso + b,,X, + bs2X2 + bs3X3 + . . . . + bsiXi 
The linear f i t of the model shows the subject's consistency of policy use or 
cognitive control. Hammond, Stewart, Brehmer and Steinman (1975) define this as the 
similarity between an individual's judgements and the predictions of a specific model (see 
also Hammond and Summers, 1972). O f course this is affected by the consistency of 
judgement or decision making as well as the appropriateness of the model for the judge's 
behaviour. The index used for consistency, or reliability, is the correlation (ru) between 
judgements on repeated cases. 
Where consistency has been measured in studies it has varied from person to 
person. For example, Einhom (1974) found consistency ranged f rom r = 0.19 t o r = 0.93. 
Averages, typically around r = 0.7, indicate that not all variance in judgements could be 
accounted for by one static model (see Appendix 1). Consistency of categorically 
expressed judgements can be expressed as a percentage agreement in responses. In these 
circumstances consistency appears to be generally good. For example, Chaput de 
Saintonge and Hattersley (1985) found consistency varied between 79 and 100% 
agreement. Where only a few cases are repeated init ial judgements may actually be 
remembered and consistency may be inflated. Bech. Haaber, Joyce and the Danish 
University Antidepressant group (1986) is cited by Brehmer and Brehmer (1988) as an 
example of this. 
Studies using linear models have found an interesting phenomenon known as 
bootstrapping. In a comparison of the performance of judges with the performance of 
their linear models on new sets of data (a 'hold out' sample), the linear model is superior or 
as good as the judge (Meehl, 1954). In a review o f the one study in which the judge was 
clearly superior to the model, Meehl (1965) came to the conclusion that the clinicians in 
the study had actually had access to "signs" that were not included in the actuarial models 
and stayed with his initial viewpoint. In fact even improper models can also be found to 
outperform judges i f the correct variables are included (see Dawes, 1979 for a discussion). 
The explanation usually put forward for bootstrapping is that subjects lack consistency. 
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Random errors produced by the subject w i l l lead to different decisions being made on 
different occasions. Using a formula eliminates the error caused by the inconsistency in the 
judge's implementation of his or her own policy (see Baron. 1988). 
Measurement of consistency is important in determining whether the model used 
has captured all the explicable variance. A linear f i t may be low because the subject is 
using a non-linear model or because they are fai l ing to consistently apply any model. 
Generally there is a significant correlation between linear f i t and consistency (Brehmer and 
Brehmer, 1988). Linear fit varies between individuals and often where the linear fit is low 
the subject is inconsistent. However, linear fit is not a measure of the judge's consistency 
unless all consistent behaviour has been captured by the model. 
Although it may seem as i f judgement making is a complicated, non-linear process, 
in practice, a linear model approximates the data very well (Brehmer and Brehmer, 1988; 
Maule and Svenson, 1993). Slovic and Lichtenstein (1971) indicate that multiple 
correlations of artificial tasks tend to be in the 0.80s and 0.90s and they tend to be in the 
0.70s where the cases are more complex realistic ones. Although different indices have 
been used such as linear f i t . multiple correlation, percentage agreement or a Fisher's z 
value of any of these many studies since then have shown a similar pattern (see Appendix 
1). 
Despite the usual adequacy of linear models, a judge may be using a non-linear 
model, A model formed by multiple regression assumes linear additive behaviour. Stewart 
(1988) outlines alternative possibilities. For example, i f subjects were using a conjunctive 
model, in which case all cues would have to have high values to elicit a high response, or a 
disjunctive model, in which case a high value on any of the cues would lead to a high 
response, the model would not be additive. Non-linear models can be created by the 
inclusion o f curvilinear or configural (interactive) functions in the multiple regression 
equation or by fi t t ing other equations (see Ganzach and Czackes. 1995; Einhom. 1970). 
Where terms are simply added to the original linear equation the fit would improve in any 
case. Usually little is added by the inclusion of non-linear components (Hoffman, Slovic 
and Rorer, 1968). However, this little may be a significant amount and some subjects may 
have configural policies (Summers. Talioferro and Fletcher, 1970; Wiggins and Hoffman, 
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1968; see also Cioldberg, 1968). Unusually Einhom (1972) found a conjunctive model was 
the best f i t for all three o f his subjects). But even i f the actual judgemental behaviour is 
non-linear it can still be well approximated by a linear equation. Rorer (1971) and Dawes 
(1968) apparently show that a high degree o f f i t can be seen when looking at the correlation 
between various non-linear models and the output o f the linear approximation to these 
models (see Dawes and Corrigan, 1974). Indeed it may be that the little predictive power 
gained by the addition o f terms to the regression function is due to overfit t ing o f the model 
to the data set rather than a better capturing o f the judge's policy (Hammond, Stewart, 
Brehmer and Steinman, 1975, Goldberg, 1968). 
From Slovic and Lichtenstein (1971) it would be expected that clinical judgement 
analyses, consisting o f complex realistic judgements would tend to have lower linear fits. In 
fact a number o f aspects o f the task have been seen to affect linear f i t . For example, Slovic 
and Lichtenstein (1971) cite studies that show multiple correlation coefficients decrease as 
the correlation between cues decreases although the pattern o f cue use remains much the 
same. Similarly they gave evidence to suggest that as the number o f cues increases linear f i t 
decreases. Einhom (1971) suggested that as more cues are introduced, subjects may use 
more complex, nonlinear policies. He pointed out the distinction between complexity o f 
mathematical descriptions o f models and their cognitive dif f icul ty . However, consistency 
has also been seen to decrease with more cues (Hoffman and Blanchard, 1961, cited in 
Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1971). 
However, the study by Reilly and Doherty (1992) produced results which support 
only the first o f these findings and do not support the second. Multiple correlation 
coefficients for subjects given six cues were no different to those given twelve but subjects 
whose cues were orthogonal had worse multiple correlation coefficients than those whose 
cues were representative and were thus correlated. However, Cook and Stewart's (1975) 
subjects do tend to have better linear fits on the three cue task than on the seven cue task. 
The studies cited by Slovic and Lichtenstein varied the number o f cues presented between 
two and seven. The difference between studies that f ind differences and those that do not 
may lie in the number o f cues being presented: there is a detrimental effect when six or 
seven cues are presented as opposed to two or three but there is no more worsening when 
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more cues are added beyond that. Although subjects may be relying on non-linear policies 
when more cues are available they may also change which cues they rely on to make 
decisions. When cues are intercorrelated this would not have so drastic an effect as when 
cues are orthogonal. Where there are more cues more different ones may be relied upon and 
consistency may decrease. 
Number of cues used 
In multiple linear regression analyses several indices have been used for the 
estimation o f the relative importance o f cues (Darlington, 1968; Stewart, 1988). This is the 
amount o f influence a cue has on the judgement making or in other words how much the 
judgement or decision w i l l change as the value o f the cue changes. Indices that can be used 
for this are the standardised regression coefficient or beta weight {e.g. Tape, Heckerling, 
Ornato and Wigton, 1991), the 'squared validity' or the square o f the correlation between a 
cue and the judgement (r^\ Darlington's (1968) usefulness index (e.g. Reilly and Doherty, 
1992), Hoffman's relative weights (Hoffman, 1960) and Darlington (1968) also cites a 
measure used by Englehart (1936)^. When cues are intercorrelated these different indices 
lead to different sets o f weights (Schmitt and Levine, 1977; Darlington, 1968). When cue 
intercorrelations are zero all these indices become equivalent (Darlington, 1968) and cues 
can be defined as used when the index o f relative importance is significant. Although 
multiple regression is o f value in ascertaining the relative importance o f each cue in the 
judgement or decision making, it is not the only statistical method used in judgement 
analysis. The analysis o f variance ( A N O V A ) allows easier ascertainment o f cue 
interactions where cues are expressed categorically (e.g. Hoffman, Slovic and Rorer, 1968; 
Phelps and Shanteau, 1978). This may o f course add artificiality to the task. In an A N O V A 
approach the relative importance o f cues can also be measured (Hoffman, Slovic and Rorer, 
1968). Cues showing a significant main effect can be viewed as influencing 
^ Darlington's usefulness index is a measure of tJie amount the fitT?^ drops if that cue is not included in the 
linear equation. Hoffman's relative weights (W^ = ^ ) which sum to 1 are similar: Hoffman refers to them 
as the independent contribution of each cue to the linear model. However, Darlington (1968) points out lliat 
this is only true when cues are orthogonal. Engelhart's (1936) measure of the contribution to variance of the 
cue and its combination wiili other cues is similarly criticised by Darlington. 
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decision making significantly, those with an insignificant main effect do not influence 
decision making and have not been used. 
In both types of analysis where cues have a significant impact on the decision 
making it indicates they are being used. Brehmer and Brehmer (1988) slated the common 
finding that judges use few cues. The majority of studies are more interested in which cues 
rather than how many cues were used. Some idea of the range in numbers of cues and 
cases presented can be seen in Appendix 1. Many studies only present a few cues. For 
example, Rovner et al (1985) varied four cues when looking at factors affecting doctors' 
decisions to refer obese patients. However, even when only a few cues are presented, they 
are not all used {e.g. Holzman, Ravitch, Metheny, Rothert. Holmes and Hoppe, 1984). 
Where more cues are presented the number actually used is still limited. Brehmer and 
Brehmer (1988) report that when 64 cues were available six to nine cues were used (Roose 
and Doherty, 1976) and when 19 cues were available, one to six cues were used (UUman 
and Doheny, 1984). In a more recent study judgements were based on between one and ten 
out of 19 cues available (Reilly and Doheny, 1989). An average of f ive (range two - seven) 
were used when Chaput de Saintonge, Kirwan, Evans and Crane (1988) presented 
rheumatologists with ten cues. In the study by Fisch, Hammond, Joyce and O'Reilly (1981) 
subjects used on average four out of eight standard Hamilton Depression Rating Scale 
cues, but used an average of five cues when they chose the eight available. In the condition 
where 12 correlated cues were presented, subjects in Reilly and Doherty's (1992) study 
used one to four cues. As stated previously, it is less clear which or how many cues have 
been used when cues are intercorrelated {e.g. Poses et al, 1985; Phelps and Shanteau, 
1978). Altogether, even when many cues are available the average number of cues that 
have a significant affect on subjects' decision or judgement making can be counted on one 
hand with some subjects necessitating the use of a second. 
This finding is interesting from the point of view of determining the limits of 
human information processing. Simon (1974) re-estimated the number of chunks that can 
be held in working memory as not seven (plus or minus two) as Mi l le r (1956) had 
suggested, but nearer four or five. However, the chunk capacity of working memory does 
seem to decrease slightly as the size of chunks increases. Experts are supposed to have the 
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same working memor>' capacity as novices but may chunk the information differently in 
their domain of expenise (Simon, 1974). For example. Simon (1974) describes a study by 
de Groot (1978) who found that experts' memory for impossible chess game patterns was 
no better than novices and the positions of about six pieces could be matched up. But when 
the pattern was a possibility they had a considerable advantage and could reproduce the 
positions of 20-25 pieces. In medicine, Elstein et a/(1990. p. 10) report that successful 
physicians do not generate nor store more hypotheses than unsuccessful physicians do. 
Shanteau (1992) found that the number of cues used by experts was equal to, i f not fewer 
than, the number used by novices. However, judgement analysis measures the cues rather 
than chunks that influence behaviour. It would be expected that i f more expert subjects are 
able to group information thai more cues would be found to influence their decision 
making than influences that of novices. However, two of the studies cited by Shanteau 
(1992) are judgement analyses and in the more general studies cited above the number of 
cues used is still limited. 
One explanation for this l imit to the number of cues used is that the advantage 
gained by experts in grouping cues which correlate in the real world may be lost when 
orthogonal cues are used. The chunking or pattern recognition hypothesized as being used 
automatically by experts may be actually based on the identification of a few key features 
in a correlated group. Indeed the use of forceful features in diagnosis has been shown by 
Gale and Marsden (1985; also Grant and Marsden, 1987). Thus where cues are correlated 
patterns are recognised on the basis o f one or two cues, in orthogonal cases just those two 
cues w i l l be used. I f a representative design was used (cues were correlated as they are in 
real l ife) the actual use of only a few cues would be blurred by the apparent use of other 
conrelating cues. The use of orthogonal cues allows this distinction. 
Indiv idual Differences 
Despite the fact that subjects use relatively few cues i t is a different few cues that 
they are using. The ability to distinguish relevant from irrelevant information, rather than 
the amount of information used, can be seen as the main distinction between experts and 
novices (Shanteau, 1992). But even within groups of experts considerable differences in 
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cue use is shown (see Wigion, 1988; Engel et ai 1990). Orthogonal cues will of course 
show policy differences between judges thai may be of little significance where cues are 
iniercorrelated in real life (Brehnier and Brehmer, 1988). However, i f correlated cues were 
used these policy differences would be difficult to ascertain. There is some evidence that 
subjective descriptions of policy show greater agreement than tacitly calculated ones 
(Chaputde Saintonge and Hattersley, 1985). 
Subjective models and self-insight 
It was mentioned in Chapter 2 that one of the advantages of judgement analysis 
over other methods is the lack of reliance on what the subject is able to explicitly state 
about his or her judgement or decision making. Subjects' verba! reports may be unreliable 
when certain types of information are requested (White 1988). or may not be useful 
because of the nature of the task {e.g. the automatic processes described by Ericsson and 
Simon, 1980, 1984), or where the process is verbalizable much effort may be required on 
the part of the experimenter to develop models to fit it. Ericsson and Simon (1980. 1984) 
amongst others argue that certain types of knowledge about certain processes are 
verbalizable. The issue here is not really about what is known, although one cannot assume 
that which is verbalised is 'known'^. The main issue is that i f subjects cannot verbalise their 
policy then they cannot communicate it to others. Therefore, in order to discover a person's 
policy, it is not good enough just to ask them. 
In keeping with the idea that people find it difficult to verbalise their policies, 
several judgement analysis studies have also collected data about the subjects' assessments 
of the relative importance of cues. In comparison with the analysis of their tacitly held 
policies these have been found wanting (Slovic and Lichienstein. 1971). There is some 
evidence that self-insight is affected by the correlations between cues, although perhaps 
surprisingly, the number of cues presented does not seem to be an influencing factor. The 
few studies looking at recognition of policies have also found moderate but significantly 
positive results (Reilly and Doherty, 1989. 1992; Wigton. personal communication). These 
significant results have been taken as an indication that subjects do have insight into their 
It may not be true. 
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policies (Reilly and Doherly, 1992). However, none of these studies took account of the 
similarity of policies being presented. See Chapter 4 for greater discussion of self-
knowledge. 
The Lens model and Social Judgement Theory 
One type of judgement analysis, associated now with the framework of Social 
Judgement Theory, is lens model analysis. Egon Brunswik (1952) called his approach the 
Lens Model because of the similarity between a diagrammatic representation of the 
workings of a lens and his diagrammatic representation of the workings of human 
judgement in a probabilistic setting (see Figure 3.1). Although Brunswik labelled the 
various phenomena associated with perceptual judgement in a probabilistic setting, 
Hammond and others extended the model to form a framework for looking at general 
judgement and decision making, such as social judgement, under uncertainty (see Hursch, 
Hammond and Hursch 1964, Brehmer, 1988). The crux of the Lens model is to see how 
accurate judgements are whilst taking into account the predictability of the real 
phenomenon being judged. For example, it may be that with the information available a 
person is able to make a judgement that is correct eighty percent of the time. They may 
look for ways of improving their accuracy. However, analysis of the actual phenomenon 
being judged may show a probabilistic element: using that information it is only 
predictable eighty-three percent of the time in any case. 
The focus is the interplay between two systems - a person's judgement and the 
environment^ Both systems are modelled, commonly using policy capturing procedures 
such as linear regression. The use of other modelling procedures for example fuzzy logic is 
also being explored (Cooksey. in preparation). Then any systematic variance, not captured 
by the models, is compared. The linear estimation of the judgement made (Ys) is Y's » as 
described earlier. Similarly, if the criterion being judged is actually Ye^ its linear estimation 
isK^ = beo + be\Xi + beiXz + ^^3X3 + . . . . + fce/i-^n, where X are the 
cue values and b are regression coefficients. 
In this case the 'environment' refers to the criterion being judged or an ideal decision 
trying to be attained. 
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KEY: 
r 
^ ^ Correlation between cue and criterion value (cue validity) or Judgement value (cue utilisation validity) 
<] f> Correlation between Judgement and criterion (achievement = r J or between their models (matching = G) 
_ 3^ Standardised regression coefficient of cue 
See test re. other symbols 
C R I T E R I O N S I D E J U D G E M E N T S I D E 
Figure 3.1 Diagram of the univariate Lens Model showing the relationship between the criterion (Yc), the linear estimate of it (Y'c) from the cues (Xi), the 
judgement (Ys) and the linear estimate of the judgement (Y s) from the cues (Xi). For key to the indices, see the Lens Model Equation in the text. 
The section on linear models in this chapter discussed the possibility of non-linear 
behaviour by the subject. The environmental criterion may also have a non-linear 
relationship with the cues available. So Yj = Y's+ Zj and Y<, = Z^, where Z, and Ze are 
residuals each made up of a consistent non-linear component and a random error 
component. 
The lens model equation (Hursch, Hammond and Hursch, 1964; Tucker. 1964) 
describes the level of accuracy of the judgement (the achievement) in terms of the 
relationship between the two linear models of the systems, the similarity between the non-
linear systematic variance of judgement and environment and the amount both judge and 
environment are unpredictable. 
The Lens Model Equation 
= R,R,G + C\A(1 -mU -J^^) 
ra (achievement /accuracy) = correlation between judgements (Ys )and criterion (Yc) 
Rj (cognitive control)^ = correlation between predictions from the linear model of the 
judge {Y's) and actual judgements from which it was calculated (KJ = coefficient of 
multiple correlation between cues and judgements. 
Re ninear predictability of criterion)* = correlation between predictions from the model 
of the environment (Y'^) and the environmental criterion (Y^) = coefficient of multiple 
correlation between cues and criterion. 
G (matching / r J = conrelation between predictions based on the two models (Y's and Y'c). 
C (configural /non-linear matching) = correlation between the components of the 
environment and the judge's behaviour that are not accounted for by the two respective 
5 R^s = the coefficient of multiple determination of the judgements 
= the fit of model to the judgements 
= the variance in the judgements explained by the model 
where r,/ = correlation between the judgement and cue X/ = utilization validity. 
6 = the coefficient of multiple determination of the criterion 
= the fit of model to the criterion 
= the variance in the criterion explained by the model. 
= Pel Ttfl +Pe2 1^e2 + Pe^ ^ey + - + Pen Tf,, 
where r^ / = correlation between the criterion value and cue X/ = validity. 
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models (Zs and Zc). 
Achievement can be seen to vary with different values of the lens model equation 
indices. For example, if environment follows a perfectly linearly modellable pattern. RE = 
J and the level of achievement can be seen as being affected by the amount of correlation 
between the two models and the correlation between the judge and the model of the judge. 
The second component of the equation 
tends towards zero as RE tends towards one. Alternatively, if the judge is perfectly 
linearly modellable the level of achievement is affected by correlation between the two 
models and the linear predictability of the criterion. Again the second component has 
tended towards zero. If both the linear models are perfect (both RE and Rs are both 
approximately one) the second component has tended towards zero but the first component 
has tended towards G or the correlation between the two perfect models. In another 
scenario suppose that one or both of the linear regression models does not estimate the 
criterion or judgement (respectively) very well. In this case RE orRs or both would be close 
to zero and the first component of the equation would be close to zero. J-R^E or ]-R^s or 
both would be close to one and therefore the second component of the equation would be 
significant. Achievement {RJ would be mainly affected by C which can be thought of as a 
measure of the extent to which YE and ^5 diverge from their respective linear models in the 
same manner. So, as the goodness of fit of the models varies and RE and Rs vary between 
zero and one, different amounts of weight are given to G and C in determining the level of 
achievement. 
The success or achievement of a person's judgement or decision making is defined 
by the relationship between their judgements or decisions and the ideal judgement or 
decision (the criterion). Lens model analysis has an important role to play in capturing the 
different components of judgement making. If a judgement is inaccurate it may be because 
the judge is using the wrong method or is not using any method at all, or because the thing 
being judged is an evasive phenomenon and no model can be found to describe it. The 
importance of the lens model approach is well illustrated in a study by Tape, Heckeriing, 
Omato and Wigton (1991) in which the accuracy of physicians estimates of pneumonia 
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were found to differ in Illinois, Nebraska and Virginia. However, an analysis of the 
environmental system found that predictability differed similarly. The information 
available was less good an indicator of whether the patient has pneumonia in Illinois than in 
Virginia or Nebraska. 
The environmental criterion does not have to be known to do a Lens model 
analysis. An expert's judgements can be taken as the criterion. A consensus between several 
judges can be taken as the criterion. Another subject's judgements can also be put on the 
other side of the Lens model and agreement can be analysed in a similar way to 
achievement. Usually however, a one-sided lens model is performed. This analysis without 
an environmental side of the lens is judgement analysis or policy capturing. However, the 
assumptions of Social Judgement Theory of the probabilistic nature of the worid are borne 
in mind. In any of these types of analyses the relative importance of different cues can be 
compared. 
Practical applications 
One of the difficulties of judgement analysis in general, as described so far, is the 
need for the details of the judgement or decision process to be expressed on a 
unidimensional scale. Many judgements and decisions are very complicated affairs and the 
decision options are not usually expressible in a solely scalar form. In most cases there are a 
number of options which may each be expressed in a continuous fashion but which may 
have specific discrete possibilities. Each of these options may be independent or it may be 
possible to chose more than one at a time. The lens model described so far is the univariate 
one: it allows analysis of decisions or judgements that can be expressed on one continuous 
scale. Cooksey and Freebody (1985) also describe a multivariate lens model that permits 
the analysis of "complex human inference tasks". The multivariate analysis relies on 
finding the largest canonical correlation between the judgement and the environment 
(standardised cue weights are used). Canonical weight vectors are obtained and then the 
multivariate achievement is decomposed into the various lens model indices. An alternative 
is to express the judgement or decision in a continuous scalar form. 
Judgement analysis is obviously useful in identifying a subject's policy in 
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circumstances in which it is difficult for them to express the process involved; where 
generalisations rather than specific cases are being discussed. For example, an expert's 
policy can be elicited just as they perform a task in everyday life. Real or hypothetical 
cases can be used. If hypothetical cases are used comparisons can be made between 
different subjects since performance on the same cases can be compared. This might be 
useful even where subjective descriptions of policy are available. Subjective policies 
elicited have tended to show greater agreement than was shown by tacit policies {e.g. 
Chaput de Saintonge and Hatiersley. 1985; Kirwan, Chaput de Saintonge, Joyce and 
Currey. 1983c). If real cases are used and some other measure of the criterion is available 
or the ideal decision can be calculated a lens model analysis can show the exact source of 
disagreement or lack of achievement. A second use of the tacit policy might be in 
eliminating a subject's random errors through bootstrapping (discussed earlier in the 
chapter) or using a computer run algorithm of the policy to make judgements. 
Although subjects' policy descriptions have been unreliable this should not be taken 
as proof that they do not know the policy they are using (see Chapter 4). However, a third 
increasingly realistic use of judgement analysis is in training through cognitive feedback. 
This has been found to change subjects' performance on tasks although again this does not 
prove whether they are receiving new information about their own policies or not. The 
phenomenon of cognitive feedback has been much explored in judgement analysis, 
especially in the context of medical judgement and decision making (Wigion, 1987; Poses. 
Cebul Wigton and Collins, 1986; Tape, Kripal and Wigton, 1989; Tape, Kripal and 
Wigton, 1992; Wigton, Patil and Hoellerich, 1986; Wigton, Poses. Collins and Cebul, 
1990). Information about the accuracy or success of decision making or judgement making 
is rarely received. Feedback is only normally gained (if at all) on positive decisions made. 
For example, the employer never finds out if a person rejected for an post would have been 
successful at it, an adoption panel never finds out i f the family they did not allow to adopt 
a child would have brought it up successfully. The doctor never finds out i f a treatment 
option not plumped for would have been beneficial. A dissatisfied patient may simply go 
to another doctor rather than risk the worsening of their complaint. A dead patient will 
obviously not return and give the clinic feedback. A doctor may not find out about the 
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affects of his or her decisions or the accuracy of his or her judgements for several reasons. 
However, there is evidence to show that even if we do have information about the 
correct judgement or decision (outcome feedback) it does not lead to any change in 
behaviour. A number of authors have shown that outcome feedback (giving the correct 
results of each judgement), which is not feedback in the strict sense at all. makes no 
difference to judgement making (Steinman, 1974; Doherty and Balzer. 1988 and Balzer. 
Doherty and O' Connor. 1989). Perhaps biases such as hindsight bias and confirmation bias 
add to our lack of awareness of any shortcomings of our judgements: Things we definitely 
know we feel would have been likely to happen. When our hypothesis is confirmed or our 
judgement proves right we notice (see Evans, 1989). 
Applications of cognitive feedback have been increasing that have lead to greater 
specification as to which parts of feedback lead to an improvement in performance (Balzer. 
Doherty and O' Connor. 1989) or greater agreement between subjects (Luckett and Hirst. 
1989; Chaput de Saintonge and Hattersley, 1985 and Kirwan etal, 1983b). Cognitive 
feedback can include any of cognitive information about the relationship between 
judgements made and the cues available (or the subject's policy), task information about 
the relationship between the ideal judgement and the cues available (or the ideal policy) 
and functional validity information about the relationship between judgements and 
criterion values and between the model of the criterion and the model of judgements. The 
lens model, which includes all of these types of information is clearly of use here. 
Performance is improved because of increased matching of ideal and subject policies rather 
than an increase in consistency (Balzer. Doherty and O' Connor, 1989). However, a more 
recent study has demonstrated that although task information can lead to dramatic changes 
in behaviour, the addition of cognitive information and functional validity information 
gains nothing (Balzer. Sulsky. Hammer and Sumner. 1992), see Chapter 4. 
Any of these applications would be difficult without a computerised version of the 
lens model or judgement analysis such as POLICY PC (Executive Decision Services Inc., 
Albany. NY). Use of computers for training in medicine has been slowly increasing 
(Frisse. 1992). Greatest success in the introduction of information technology and 
computer decision aids seems to lie within the realms of general practice. General 
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Practitioners are increasingly used to using computers. In an area where intuition is rife the 
possibility of leammg to modify behaviour on the basis of instant, computer presented 
feedback generated within the framework of Social Judgement Theory seems a real one. 
Conclusions 
This chapter gave an overview of the applications of judgement analysis and SJT 
to medicine. The probabilistic nature of the worid means that the best decision does not 
necessarily lead to the best outcome. In medicine in particular the SJT approach is useful. It 
refrains from focussing on the decision making process or aspects of the decision itself and 
instead focuses on the information available to make the decision and on how this shapes 
the decision made. Aspects of judgement analysis study design and their implications for 
findings were discussed. Interpretation of results of studies presented in later chapters will 
be made with these design variables in mind. In Study I (Chapter 5) three different types of 
GP decision making are analysed using judgement analysis techniques. This amounts to an 
analysis on one side of a lens model analysis: No ideal or criterion decision is identified. 
However, in Study 4 (Chapter 8) GPs* judgements are analysed in a (two sided) lens model 
analysis. This takes into account the probabilistic relationship between pieces of 
information in the real worid. It is this complex probabilistic environment that characterises 
the uncertainty of medical decision making. 
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Chapter Four 
Self-knowie(jge 
Introduction 
This chapter reviews the literature on self-knowledge. Judgement analysis, the 
method used in studies reported throughout this thesis, is an unusual method of 
investigation of judgement or decision making in that there need be no reliance on the 
subject's interpretation of their own behaviour. As was seen in the brief review of these 
methods in Chapter 2. both process tracing techniques and decision analysis approaches 
often rely on subjects' stated interpretations of their own cognitive processes (process 
tracing) or of the decision making situation. Where methods other than verbal protocol 
analysis are used in process tracing much reliance is then placed on the experimenter's 
analysis of the situation. As this chapter will show, a considerable amount of research 
questions the validity of explicit statements about our self-knowledge. Thus the avoidance 
of reliance on metacognition is an important aspect of judgement analysis. There is a 
second benefit of a review of the literature on self-knowledge at this point, apart from 
justification of the use of judgement analysis. One question running through the thesis is 
whether subjects* statements about their behaviour could be relied upon at any level. Here 
the pattern of self-knowledge seen in the literature is reviewed. 
The "unknown" known 
The issue of self-knowledge appears in a number of different areas of research. For 
example, research into implicit learning (e.g. Reber. 1989; Berry and Dienes. 1993). 
perception without awareness (e.g. Merikle. 1992). expertise and automatic processing 
(e.g. discussion in Cheng. 1985 and Schneider and Shiffrin. 1985). reasoning and biases 
(e.g. Evans. 1989 chapter 5). problem solving and insight (e.g. Schooler. Ohisson and 
Brooks. 1993). memory, judgement and decision making (e.g. Reilly and Doherty 1992). 
attribution, emotions and attitudes (e.g. Nisbett and Ross, 1980 chapter 9) plus a whole 
host of work on introspection and verbal reports (e.g. Ericsson and Simon. 1980. 1984) 
have all involved discussion of self-awareness or self-knowledge. 
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Many researchers have put forward dichoiomous theories about knowledge based 
on the statable and therefore explicitly known, versus the unstaiable (un)known. The idea 
of a distinction between conscious and unconscious processing has become part of our 
culture: it is generally accepted that there aie things about ourselves and our mental 
processes of which we may not be aware. The division point of the dichotomy has varied 
from author to author. Berry and Dienes (1993) distinguish between implicit and explicit 
knowledge and between implicit and explicit learning. Implicit learning differs from 
explicit learning in that the environment is 'understood' without (or despite) the use of 
explicitly held conscious strategies. Explicit knowledge is accessible to consciousness and 
is communicable. Implicit knowledge is knowledge thai the subject can be shown to have 
in thai it is manifested in their behaviour but is less accessible to consciousness and 
communication. 
Other authors have distinguished between automatic and conu-olled processing. 
With practice a behaviour or process that previously required conscious effort and was 
controlled becomes automatic and unconscious. It has been argued (Cheng, 1985) that this 
automatization is often a task specific change of tactic rather than a more general transfer 
to a different processing domain. Schneider and Shiffrin (1985) argue that re categorisation 
does not explain all the findings and that some tasks are automatised. The idea is still there 
that the process becomes less accessible; less conscious steps are involved. Certain 
behaviours become automatised with practise. If expertise develops with practice 
automatization may be one of the features of expertise. Policy capturing tasks focus on 
experienced subjects since novices have no policy to be captured. If the process has 
become automatised or rationalised, as happens with practice, self-insight may be reduced. 
In Ericsson and Simon's (1984) discussion of the appropriateness of verbal 
protocols to analyse underlying mental processes, such automatised processes are one type 
they identify as being unreporiable. The other type of mental process for which verbal 
reports are redundant are recognition processes. Research on expertise has moved away 
from searching for different ways of thinking and has realised the importance of the 
knowledge base in expert behaviour (see Gilhooly, 1990; Gilhooly and Simpson, 1992). As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, experts and novices do not differ in the amount of 
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information they tend to use. With this emphasis on the importance of domain knowledge, 
expert behaviour has been likened to pattern or schema recognition (Gilhooly. 1990; 
Gilhooly and Simpson, 1992). Patel and colleagues have also suggested that rather than a 
hypothetico-deductive process physicians tend to use something more akin to pattern 
recognition, or production rules in making diagnoses in their domain of expertise (see Patel 
and Groen. 1986. Groen and Patel, 1985). Concurrent verbal reports can however give 
insight into the information that is attended to (from which thought processes can then be 
inferred) in other situations. 
Evans (1984) makes a distinction between heuristic and analytic reasoning. 
However, this is not a conscious-unconscious distinction of the type previously discussed. 
He argues that although the bias-invoking heuristics are preconscious. and can be 
compared with Ericsson and Simon's recognition processes, some of the analytic process 
that may also cause (more reciifiable) biases may be preconscious. Analytic processes then 
may be of the automatised or controlled type or may be the implicitly learned or explicitly 
learned type (see Evans. 1989 for a discussion). 
Self-knowledge: introspection vs. self-hypothesising 
According to Flanagan (1991), Dennett (1982) has made a distinction between 
autophenomenology or comment on a psychological system from the inside and 
heterophenomenology or comment on a psychological system from the outside. 
Theoretically, an individual is in a position to give both of these types of comment: she can 
observe her own behaviour and make hypothetical judgements about it or she can 
introspect and describe the phenomena of which she is aware. Some combination of the 
two may also occur. Even those that argue that much of self-knowledge is based on 
hypothesizing, such as Nisbett and Ross (1980 chapter 9) argue that there is still some 
information to which the individual subject may have privileged access. Self-knowledge 
would be shown when the individual's description of themselves or their behaviour is equal 
to or better than that given by an outsider with full knowledge of the environment and 
behaviour. 
From a practical point of view, where self-knowledge has been shown to be correct, 
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it doesn't really matter whether it has been arrived at through introspection or through 
hypothesizing with good knowledge of the situation. However, the method of elicitation 
does matter if it is to be taken as representative of self-knowledge. Self-reports have 
frequently been found to be erroneous {e.g. Nisbett and Wilson. 1977). If there are these 
two types of self-knowledge possible (direct and inferred), some testing methods may 
encourage hypothesis testing even where direct inu-ospection is possible. 
Types of self-knowledge: Separate phenomena vs. levels 
To have self-knowledge is to know (things about) oneself as a psychological 
system e.g. what you know, how you know it, how you came to a conclusion, how you feel 
etc. Although all examine self-knowledge in a broad sense, research areas such as these 
mentioned above focus on different phenomena. It might be argued that these separate 
phenomena actually represent different levels of self-knowledge. Flanagan (1991) 
distinguishes five forms of self-knowledge ranging over basic awareness of the existence 
of one's thoughts and mind (Simple Cartesianism), of one's mental state, of the content of 
intentional states, of the causes of those states, and of the functioning of internal mental 
processes. With this structure of breakdown, to have a certain form of self-knowledge 
might imply that you have certain other forms. For example, it is difficult to conceive of 
having access to the contents of one's mental states without having knowledge of the 
mental states and knowledge of the existence of one's own mind. 
Difficulty arises if an assumption is made that subjects have a certain level of self-
knowledge and subsequent levels are being tested. Of the different types of self-
knowledge, some can be seen to fall into levels and are accessible through 'introspection' 
i.e. there are some of which one can be directly aware. This might be referred to as 
phenomenal knowledge. Other types of self-knowledge one cannot be directly aware of but 
can only hypothesize about. Causal self-knowledge and process self-knowledge are of this 
latter type. 
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How to test self-knowledge 
Generally speaking the distinction between the things of which we are aware and 
unaware is measured in terms of our ability to state them. I f knowledge is then shown in 
some other way this is taken to mean that we were not aware of what we knew. In other 
words a subject's self-knowledge is measured in terms of how well their elicited description 
of their behaviour or reasoning fits the observed facts. If, for example, causal reports are 
inaccurate in terms of covariation observed by the experimenter the assumption is that the 
subject's self-insight was erroneous. 
There are problems associated with taking any sort of verbal report as a measure of 
what a subject knows consciously (White, 1988; Evans, 1989). Not only is an 'incorrect' 
account not proof of lack of self-knowledge; but a 'correct' account is no proof of the 
existence of self-knowledge. Firstly, what people say may not be what they know or are 
aware of i.e. they may deliberately give a false account. Secondly, the relevant facts as 
perceived by the experimenter may not be the relevant facts as perceived by the subject. For 
example, it may be the case that subjects give a 'false' account of their behaviour because 
they were not aware of the manipulations of the experimenter or because they interpret 
things in different ways from the experimenter. Thirdly, even i f experimenter and subject 
accounts match, this is no proof of knowledge rather than similar hypothesizing: i t may be 
that the subject is 'rationalising' about his or her own behaviour in the same way as the 
experimenter is. 
Retrospective and concurrent verbalisations each have their pros and cons. 
Ericsson and Simon (1980,1984) argued that although retrospective reports may be open to 
error from forgetting and subsequent hypothesizing, concurrent verbal reports may be more 
accurate. They argue that concurrent reporting of behaviour may slow but not cognitively 
alter performance and can therefore be a useful source of data. 
The crux of the difference seems to be that where concurrent verbalisations are 
useful 'as sources of data* the type of self-knowledge elicited is of a phenomenological 
nature* . Concurrent verbalisation allows comment on which pieces of information are 
being attended to at which time - information that may be forgotten before retrospective 
' The phenomena consciously experienced are described and no interpretation is given. 
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reports. Ericsson and Simon (1980) were frank about the limits on the use of verbal reports 
to get at what lies in 'shon temi memor>''. This sort of introspection is only of use if the 
processes being described are more than one-step processes, unlike recognition and 
automatic processes (including implicitly learned processes). They were wary of the 
infiuence of the insu-uctions given to the subjects which should not draw their attention to 
things that would otherwise not be attended to. Kellogg (1982) also argued that thinking 
about one's mental processes has value in yielding information about hypothesis testing but 
not about automatic processes. However, this argument is tantamount to saying that where 
processes are automatic and unconscious (as measured by their verbalisability) 
introspection (verbal description of mental processes) yields little. Similariy where 
processes are verbalisable. verbalisation is useful. 
Asking subjects to verbalise self-knowledge other than just the focus of attention 
may lead to alterations of the patterns of behaviour that would not be found with 
retrospective verbalisation. For example, Wilson and Schooler (1991) found naive judges, 
asked to analyse why they made judgements (study one) or to evaluate the atuibutes used 
and reasons for judgements (study two), agreed less with experts than control subjects who 
just made judgements. However, Schooler, Ohlsson and Brooks (1993; Experiment 3) also 
found that non-directive concurrent verbalisation impaired results in insight^ as opposed to 
non-insight problem solving. Insight problem solving would however, be classified by 
Ericsson and Simon as unsuitable for concurrent verbalisation because it is a 'one-step' 
process. 
Thinking aloud seems to come easier to some subjects than to others and elicits 
information of varying richness. For example, Elstein, Holzman, Belzer and Ellis (1992) 
obtained verbalisations from subjects making judgements about the likelihood of 
prescribing a steroid. Transcripts varied in length from one sentence to three pages. There 
is no guarantee that all pieces of information being attended to can be verbalised. 
Concurrent verbal reports will focus on the case being undertaken rather than 
generalising across any range of cases. Subjects giving retrospective accounts are in a 
better position to make judgements about their behaviour over several cases. Causal and 
^ Insight problem solving is characterised by a sudden realisation of the answer. 
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process accounts of information processing falls into this category: They are not 
phenomenological so much as interpretative descriptions of behaviour. 
Knowledge of causes and processes 
Research on self-insight into causes of behaviour and judgements has typically 
found that subjects' reports are inaccurate. Classic studies by Nisbett and Wilson (1977) 
and also Wilson and Nisbett (1978) are summarised by Nisbett and Ross (1980) as finding 
that effects of influential factors are missed and effects of non-influential factors are 
fabricated in causal reports. Nisbett and Wilson concluded that reports were based on "a 
priori, implicit causal theories, or judgements about the extent to which a particular 
stimulus is a plausible cause of a given response". 
A number of criticisms have been made of these studies. Ten years after the 
publications, White (1988) reviewed many of the subsequent criticisms such as the 
questionable relationship between verbal reports and self-knowledge. White discusses the 
distinction between the processes whose accessibility is under question, and their 
accessible contents and products that are described in phenomenological reports. 
Obviously the accessibility of content and process is not a valid method of distinguishing 
between them when accessibility is precisely what is then being measured. 
White refers to the work of Sabini and Silver (1981) who make an analogy between 
human and machine information processing. A distinction can be made between the 
program specifying conditionals, the 'trace' or relationships between specific inputs and 
outputs. White's point is that the trace can be observed without being able to specify 
conditional relationships. Similarly, the programme can be known and conditional 
relationships specified without knowledge of the u-ace. It may be that Nisbett and Wilson 
were giving one description of the trace or relationships between variables, whereas the 
subjects were giving a different type of description. 
The point that is important here is that there is more than one way to skin a cat: 
There is more than one way to discuss information processing. One way is by describing 
the conditional process relationship, another is by describing correlations between 
variables - or describing the trace in some way. Another is by describing the contents or 
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subject of the trace or the inputs and outputs. It seems that causal descriptions of behaviour 
and process descriptions of behaviour are not different levels of self-knowledge rather than 
separate phenomena. To be able to describe the process does not imply an ability to 
describe the trace, nor the u-ace-specific inputs and outputs. To be able to describe the trace 
does not imply description of the process. 
What this amounts to is that there may be different ways of explicitly knowing. If 
asked for one sort of explicit knowledge hypothesizing may be necessary to develop the 
currently held explicit knowledge or awareness. Rich (1979) proposes that content answers 
a "What?" question and process answers a "How?" question. Hixon and Swann (1993, 
experiment 3) found that the wording of the question affected whether or not an increase in 
time to 'self-reflect' led to an increase in 'self-insight' by subjects with negative self-
concepts. Given a 'why' focus, subjects rated the more favourable descriptions of a pair of 
self-concepts as more accurate whether they had 45 or 10 seconds to evaluate a pair of 
personality descriptions supposing to represent themselves. Given a 'what' focus, subjects 
given longer periods (45 seconds) tended to rate the less favourable descriptions of their 
personality as more accurate, whereas subjects given less time (10 seconds) rated the more 
favourable descriptions as more accurate. Hixon and Swann were hypothesizing that 
differences in the instructions given to subjects was the reason for the different findings by 
studies looking into changes in self-insight with increased time to self-reflect. The 
explanation given by Hixon and Swann is that the 'what' focus facilitated introspection, the 
'why' focus disrupted it. Another explanation is that the 'what* focus allowed introspection 
of the type that fitted with the evaluation being given whereas the 'why' focus led to a 
different type of introspection or 'self-hypothesising'. 
Nisbett and Wilson (1977) and Nisbett and Ross (1980) argue that there cannot be 
direct 'introspection' of the type being discussed: At this causal (and process for that 
matter) level, only theories or hypotheses could be produced about either the behaviour of 
self or others and that the only difference between hypothesizing about self and 
hypothesizing about others is the source of the basic information. Different types of 
explicit knowledge may be constructed as there are different theoretical ways of structuring 
information processing. 
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Sclf-insight in Judgement Analysis 
"Self-insighi" was the term used by Reilly and Doheny (1989) to refer lo subjects' 
causal knowledge of the relative importance of various pieces of information in their 
judgement making. 
Judgement analysis (JA), as the name suggests is an analysis of how a subject 
makes judgements. To recap from Chapter 3, in a typical judgement analysis, an objective 
model of the subject's policy, made up of indices of relative importance for each cue 
available, is calculated using multiple linear regression. Hoffman (1960) pointed out that 
this method gives a statistical "paramorphic" representation of the behaviour rather than 
describing the psychological process of decision or judgement making. The description is 
at a somewhat causal level: co-variation of cues and judgements is described without 
indication of the 'program' underlying that co-variation. Cues are identified that play a part 
in the process but exactly how they play that part is left open. 
The subject's elicited model, whether linear and directly comparable to the 
objective model, or non-linear, has consistently been found to be inferior to the objective, 
linear model (Slovic and Lichtenslein, 1971; Reilly and Doherty, 1992). The degree of this 
inferiority varies considerably between subjects within studies: Some individuals show 
good self-insight (Chaput de Saintonge and Hattersley, 1985; Ullman and Doherty, 1984). 
Interpretation of the measure of self-insight is also difficult. For example, the same 
correlation may be a sign of self-insight because it is significantly non-zero or a sign of 
poor insight because it is sub-optimal (Reilly and Doherty, 1992). The use of different 
indices makes comparisons of self-insight across studies difficult. The fit (R^) of subjective 
and objective models of the data may be compared {e.g. Cook and Stewart, 1975). Fits of 
subjective models may be compared to those of equal weight or random weight models 
{e.g. Kirwan, Chaput de Saintonge, Joyce, Holmes and Currey, 1986; Fisch, Hammond, 
Joyce and O'Reilly 1981). Multiple correlation coefficients (R and R^ )^ of two models may 
be compared {e.g. Reilly and Doherty. 1989). Subjective cue weights may be directly 
Here, R refers to the correlation between predicted judgements from an 
objective model and actual judgements. Rs refers to the correlation between predicted 
judgements from a subjective model and actual judgements. R^ gives a measure of the 
amount of variance explained by the model in question. 
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correlated with objective weights indicating relative importance (e.g. Reilly and Doherty^ 
1992), Predictions from the two models may also be coneiated. With these between study 
and between individual differences Brehmer and Brehmer (19S8) were reluctant to draw 
conclusions about the degree of self-insight demonstrated in JA studies. However, bearing 
in mind that average self-insight is generally found to be significant but sub-optimal it 
seems fair to describe it as moderate. 
Subjective weights, comparable to linearly based objective relative importance 
weights, have been elicited in a number of different ways: Hoffman (1960) (and also 
apparently Martin (1957) according to Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1971) originally proposed 
the now widespread method of dividing up 100 points between all the cues available (e.g. 
Kirwan, Chaput de Saintonge, Joyce, Holmes and Currey, 1986; Rothert, 1982; Ullman, 
Egan, Fielder, Jurenec. Pliske, Thompson and Doherty, 1981; Chapul de Saintonge, 
Kirwan. Evans and Crane, 1988; Mear and Firth. 1987; Reilly and Doherty, 1992; 
Summers, Talioferro and Fletcher, 1970; Cook and Stewart, 1975). Sections of pie charts 
have also been used as a method of allocation (Fisch e( al. 1981). Subjects have rated cues 
to indicate their relative importance (Reilly and Doherty. 1989; Cook and Stewart, 1975). 
Roose and Doheriy (1976) changed these subjective ratings into ranks. Paired 
comparisons, ratio techniques and judgements of the number of times a cue was influential 
over f if ty judgements have also been used (Cook and Stewart. 1975). 
With these subjective weights, average self-insight is moderate no matter how it is 
measured. As expected, when subjective weights are put into a linear equation the degree 
of variation in judgements explained by the model is less than that explained by the line of 
best fit (the objective model). However, this is even true when cross-validating: The degree 
of variation explained by subjective models is less than that explained by objective models 
when both are used to predict judgements on a new data set (Roose and Doherty» 1978; 
Reilly and Doherty. 1992; Reilly and Doherty. 1989). As the studies in Table 4.1 illustrate, 
the average degree of variation explained by subjective models has varied (0,34 < R s^ < 
0,76). Clinical Judgement Analysis (CIA) studies typically show lower R s^ than studies 
involving other subjects. One reason for looking at the degree of variation explained by the 
subjective model in the context of that explained by the objective model is that it may be 
67 
thai the amount of variation dial can be explained is limited. Linear fit decreases when a 
subject is being inconsisieni in iheir decision making or when using a non-linear policy. 
When the 21 sets of data from studies in Table 4.1 giving both linear fit and subjective 
model fit are plotted in Figure 4.1, increased fit of the data by subjective models tends to 
coincide with an increased linear describability of data anyway. Worse performance by 
subjective linear models seems to be related to worse performance by any linear model. 
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Figure 4.1 Plot of average or median fit of subjective linear model to judgement 
data (Rs^) with average or median linear fit of data (R^). Data from 21 studies marked in 
bold on Table 4.1. 
Greater insight is gained as to why subjective weights give a sub-optimal 
description of data by comparing subjective and objective weights directly. Table 4.1 
shows that average correlations between objective and subjective weights for sets of data 
vary between r = 0.2 (Reilly and Doherty. 1989) and Fisher's z = 0.92 (Reilly and Doherty. 
1992). Subjective weights given over cues show relatively flatter distributions, with 
virtually no zero weights being assigned (Ullman and Doherty, 1984; Mear and Firth, 
1987; Reilly and Doherty. 1989). Subjects generally report using more cues than they are 
shown to use from objective models (Ullman and Doherty, 1984; Slovic and Lichtenstein, 
1971). For example, Summers et al (\910) show that although only 26% of subjects in 
their sample actually used all four cues available 98% reported doing so. Slovic and 
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Lichtenstein (1971) point out that subjects tend to overestimate the importance of minor 
cues and underestimate the importance of a few major cues. 
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Figure 4.2 Hypothetical graphs showing (a) an equal distribution of cue weights (b) a 
peaked distribution, typical of actual cue use and (c) a Hatter distribution of cue weights 
typical of subjective ratings. 
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Table 4.1 Examples of Measurement of Self-Insight in J A 
Reference r Rs' R R ' . Cues Cases S Measure Judgement 
Chaput de Saintonge & Hatiersley 1985 0.8-1.0 24 50 6 I —> decn rules Antibiotics for OM 
Chaput de Saintonge et al 1988 >0.8(15<p) 10 30 487? 100 Changes in R.A. 
Cook & Stewart 1975 0.75 0.79 See 3 50 21 100 Financial aid applications (FA) 
0.58 0.73 text 7 50 21 100 Graduate school applications. (OA) 
0.76 0.82 " 3 50 19 Rate (MOO) FA 
0.49 0.69 7 50 19 Rate (MOO) GA 
0.72 0.82 3 50 17 Paired comp. FA 
0.49 0.71 7 50 17 Paired comp. GA 
0.74 0.81 3 50 29 Ratio FA 
0.54 0.69 7 50 29 Ratio GA 
0.75 0.82 3 50 21 Times influential FA Faculty members and graduate 
0.55 0.76 7 50 21 Times influential GA 
0.72 0.81 3 50 16 ICR I + 100 FA 
0.50 0.67 7 50 16 ICR 1 + 100 GA 
0.75 0.83 3 50 20 ICR 11 FA 
0.52 0.70 7 50 20 ICR 11 GA 
Elstein etal 1992 2 12 1 + P. A. ^ d . rules HRT prescription 
Fisch etal 1981 0.6 8 49 \5(p Depression assess and prescribe 
0.49 0.75 0.25 8 16 seg. pie Cues chosen by subjects 
Holzman etal 1934 4 24 7Aq> Qu. HRT 
Kinvan et fl/1986 0.39 0.73 0.41 10 50 89<p 100 R.A. assessment 
0.34 0.88 4 I -> prod, rules 
Mear& Firth 1987 0.30 0 ^ 0.73 0.31 9 30 38 100 F J ^ . risk & return 
Reiily & Doherty 1989 0.20 0.7 19 115 40 Rate (1-9) before Job assessment by students 
0.44 Rs = 0.34 0.7 & after task 
Reilly & Doherty 1992 ' 0.43 0.73 6orth 100 (70) 19 100 Room mate assessment 
0.66 0.84 6 rep 100 (70) 21 100 by students 
0.69 0.73 12orth 100 (70) 19 100 Cross validated Obj & subj wts 
0.92 0.81 12 rep 100(70) 18 100 on 30 cases. 
Table 4.1 continued on next page. Key on next page. 
Table 4.1 continued. 
Reference r R / R R^E Cues Cases S Measure Judgement 
Roose & Doherty 1976 0.75 66(^9) 360 (200) 16 Rate rank Salesmen selection 
Rothert 1982 0.37 0.68 4 27 30 9? 100 Compliance with hypertensive 
0.41 0.53 4 27 30 pats 100 regimen judgement 
Roihert et A/1984 0.75 4 24 45 I Endocrine disorder + obesity 
Ullman era/1981 0.7* 0.63* 0.75* 19 80 16 100 '/'judgements of hyperactivity 
Ullman & Doherty 1984 0.67 7 52 lOOcomp UI V judgements of hyperactivity 
0.66 (75%) 19 80 lOOcompUI '/'judgements of hyperactivity 
Summers et al 1970 Ks = 0.6* 0.75* 4 175 131 lOO + P.A. Nation assessment by students 
Key:- r = average correlation between statistical and subjective cue weights, R^ ^ = average linear fit of equations using subjective weights, R = average 
coefficient of multiple correlation of the statistical weights, R^ = average linear fit of the regression equation. Mean R^£ = average variance explained 
by a model of equal cue weights. Cues = number of variables available. Cases = number of cases over which the statistical weights were calculated, S = 
the number of subjects. Measure = method used to assess insight ( I = interview. 100 = distn 100 points, pie = allocation of segments of a pie diagram, 
P.A. = protocol analysis, Qu. = questionnaire, rate = assign each cue a number (options in brackets). Times influential = number of cases on which cue 
was influential [turned to proportion], paired comp. = pairs of cues rated for equality of importance cue ratings summed over all pairings, ratio = 
moderate cue assigned 100 points and other cues assigned ratios of that to indicate their relative importance, ICR I = most likely judgements of each 
value of a cue taken separately, ICR I I = non-linear indication of cue use: each level of each cue given an importance rating between 1 and 9 regardless 
of the value of other cues). Judgement = type of judgment or decision being measured. * = median value; q) = physicians, ip = psychologists, pat = 
patients; orth = orthogonal cues, rep = realistically correlated cues. 
Although subjective weights tend to form a less sharply peaked graph than 
objective weights do (see Figure 4.2), their distribution still tends to be closer to that of 
objective weights than an equal distribution of weights would be (Mear and Firth, 1987). 
Studies comparing the degree of variation in judgements explained by subjective models 
with that explained by equal weight models generally show subjective weight models to be 
superior (Mear and Firth. 1987; Fisch eial, 1981; Cook and Stewart. 1975). This need not 
indicate any self-knowledge at a causal or process level but may just indicate an awareness 
of which cues were and were not looked at. One study found that subjective models were 
actually worse than equal weight models for 49 out of 89 subjects (Kirwan et aL 1986). 
Subjective distributions tend generally to be flat and indicate the use of what are 
insignificant cues. Differences in self-knowledge shown may actually relate more to the 
way the subject used the cues rather than a special self-knowledge on their part. For 
example, i f all cues that were attended to played an equal part in the judgement, then a 
subject giving almost equal weights to all cues to which he or she attended would 
apparently show good insight. Adelman, Sticha and Donnell (1984) found that differences 
in peakedness of the ideal distribution of cue importance and use on both a five cue and a 
nine cue task led to different distributions of subjective and multiple regression based 
weights. 
It may be that the peakedness of the objective distribution of cue use is what affects 
apparent variance in self-knowledge with changing numbers of available cues. As the 
number of cues available increases it may be that unused cues of which the subject is 
aware are added. If subjects generally lend to give flat distributions of subjective weights, 
in tasks where more of the cues available would be used insight should be belter than 
where just one or two of the cues stand out as being important. If several unused cues are 
available on a task worse insight would be shown. Two studies using changing numbers of 
cues apparently show differing results: Cook and Stewart showed an decrease in self-
insight on a seven cue task as opposed to a three cue task whereas Reilly and Doherty 
(1992) showed an increase in self-insight in subjects with twelve rather than six cues 
available. One explanation for this discrepancy is that there was a dramatic increase in the 
number of insignificant cues between the six and twelve cue tasks. Indeed, Reilly and 
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Doherly comment that there were a smaller proportion of zeros in the six cue task. Many 
fewer cues may have been unused on the three and seven cue tasks and indeed the insight 
shown is unusually high. 
A number of methods have been used to elicit non-linear subjective policies. 
However, the same pattern of limited self-knowledge emerges as is seen with linear 
subjective models, in interviews leading to a series of decision rules (Chaput de Saintonge 
and Hattersley, 1985); in protocol analyses and in questionnaires subjects have indicated 
using cues that have been found to be statistically unimportant (Holzman, Ravitch, 
Metheny, Rothert, Holmes and Hoppe, 1984). Average fits of these other sorts of 
subjective models have also consistently been found to be worse than linear fits of the 
same data {e.g. Kirwan et al, 1986). However, studies have differed as to whether there is 
an improvement (Summers et al, 1970) in prediction from using non-linear as opposed to 
linear subjective models or not (Cook and Stewart, 1975). 
Other evidence for self-insight in JA 
There are two areas of research within judgement analysis that might challenge the 
idea that subjects only have moderate self-insight. Two studies by Reilly and Doherty 
(1989, 1992) have shown that subjects were able to pick out their own policies from all 
other subjects' objective and then subjective policies at much greater than chance rates. 
These results were also shown in the clinical field by Wigton (personal communication). 
However, because of the confounding factor of the similarity between policies the sub-
optimal but significantly positive results shown here do not allow any further conclusions 
than subjective ratings did. 
Secondly the effects of cognitive feedback, discussed in Chapter 3, indicate that 
when subjects are given information about the ideal policy their performance can be 
changed, although the addition of information about their own policy makes no difference 
to this improvement. In a discussion on the psychological validity of the different indices 
of relative importance, Schmitt and Levine (1977) suggest comparing change of behaviour 
on feedback of policy using different indices. They also suggest training subjects to make 
judgements that conform to their subjective weights. But the fact that cognitive 
73 
information (CI) does nothing to change the subject's behaviour is important. It is cognitive 
information that subjects are asked to give as subjective policies and it is this that they do 
not do well in. Although unable to express it in terms of subjective weights, one 
explanation is that subjects already 'know' the information being given to them in terms of 
objective weights. Subjective ratings then, as interpreted by the experimenter, are not a 
measure of what the subject actually knows. Again this is not conclusive evidence of 
knowledge: It may be that performance can be improved with task information simply 
because the attention paid to cues can be changed or some other strategy used. No 
understanding is needed as to the way weights describe contingent connections. The subject 
need not have any great self-knowledge other than of the cues they attend to. In accordance 
with this, Luckett and Hirst (1989) found that although agreement with the official policy 
weighting system was improved with feedback, there was no relationship between degree 
of self-insight and feedback. Groups of subjects received no feedback, outcome feedback, 
task information or both task information and outcome feedback. However, Luckett and 
Hirst credit the similarity between groups to the generally good self-insight shown by all 
groups (mean correlation between subjective and objective weights = 0.78, 0.76, 0.86, and 
0.80 for the different groups used). 
General judgements of contingent or correlational relationships 
The fact is that in general, never mind with reference to one's own behaviour, 
humans have difficulty in judging correlations (see Baron, 1988 chapter 14; Nisbett and 
Ross, 1980 chapter 5). The scales used to express relationships are at best non-linear 
functions of correlation coefficients. When "theory free" data is presented subjects' 
perception of covariation is insensitive: correlations of 0.2 and 0.4 are not perceived at all. 
Correlations of 0.6 and 0.8 are rated as being small. Subjects are quite good at identifying 
correlations around 0 and around ± 1, but have difficulty quantifying moderate correlations 
and in differentiating low correlations. However, more important than this problem of 
scaling is the systematic biases that we are prone to. These can be classified into two types 
that are really fundamentally related. 
Subjects show an attentional bias whereby it seems to be the proportion of times 
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two dichotomous variables are both positive that subjects use to measure their relationship. 
At best account is additionally taken of one or both of the positive negative cells. Account 
is rarely taken of when both are negative which is also necessary to calculate correlation. 
This bias occurs whether the data are arranged in a two by two contingency table or are 
perceived sequentially as they are experienced in real life (Nisbett and Ross, 1980 chapter 
5). Prior beliefs can also be said to have an effect on the perception of correlation. Nisbett 
and Ross present several studies in which subjects, including practising clinicians, perceive 
the covariations they expect to be in the data and do not perceive counter intuitive 
covariations that actually do exist. Subjects' statements about relations between variables 
are based on prior expectations or hypotheses. Although data driven estimates of 
correlation might be percieved as conservative, theory driven estimates (where the material 
is meaningful in the real worid) are not. 
The illusion of control can be linked to the attentional bias: subjects think they 
have control over a task because often what they want to happen happens when they behave 
in a certain way. However, this is also related to the effect of prior beliefs on our 
judgements. Subjects tend to find the correlations they think will be there not only through 
attending to the co-occurences that they are expecting but also through selective 
interpretation of evidence (Baron, 1988). Examples can be found where subjects both 
choose evidence to test particular hypotheses and ignore evidence against them (Baron, 
1988). 
Conclusions 
Although the general conclusion from JA studies is that subjects have a 
significant, moderate but sub-optimal, degree of self-insight when measured by eliciting 
subjective weights or through policy recognition, the negligible effect of feedback of 
Cognitive information (CI) on policy change must indicate that either subjects are receiving 
no new knowledge, or that they are not using this new knowledge (see earlier in this 
chapter and also Chapter 3). I f the former is the case then the apparent lack of insight 
shown by elicited subjective weights must be a feature of report rather than knowledge. 
There are different possible reasons for the problem of self-knowledge lying at the level of 
report. It may be the form of report that is problematic. It may be experimenter's 
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that is problematic. Again it may be that generally verbal reports should not be equated 
with conscious knowledge or awareness (White, 1988). If the latter is the case: new 
knowledge is not being used it may be because it is not meaningful to the subject in terms 
of actually carrying out the task. If subjects are not using the new knowledge they have 
aquired from cognitive feedback then one explanation lies in the discrepancy between 
explicit and implicit knowledge. 
It appears from all this that, when making judgements about causes of one's own 
behaviour, humans are prone to the same problems as when making judgements about the 
behaviour of others. The problem may be a scaling one similar to the problems shown in 
general by subjects making assessments of relationships between variables. For example. 
Doherty and Balzer (1988) argue that the lack of self-insight shown in studies eliciting 
subjective weights may well be misleading. They comment that the construct validity of 
subjective weights has not been established and reiterate that subjective-objective weight 
correspondence is imperfect but not absent. Brehmer and Brehmer (1988) also comment 
that the apparent lack of complete self-insight may occur at the point of interpretation of 
the investigator. They cite as evidence a study by Ekegren (1983) who found that subjects 
could communicate with fellow subjects about their policies in a way that allowed 
reproduction of judgements. Both of these challenges to the use of subjective reports are 
feasible. However, in a study on implicit learning by Mathews, Buss, Stanley. Blanchard-
Fields, Cho and Druhan (1989) described by Berry and Dienes (1993 p. 41) yoked subjects 
following the explicit descriptions of implicit learners had greater than chance and 
improving performance. But this was always worse than that of their instructors. The 
suggestion by Brehmer and Brehmer also seems questionable given that some subjects 
show good insight given the same form of reporting and interpretation as others. 
It may be that the little added in descriptions of judgement making when using a 
non-linear as opposed to linear model is significant when trying to distinguish between 
good and moderate self-insight. It may be that individuals have used cues in a non-linear 
way to different degrees and so appear to have different degrees of self-insight when linear 
comparisons are made. However, if this were the case although weights of relative 
importance do not match up, non-linear models of judgements should be able to account 
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for more variance than their linear counterparts. The few studies using non-linear models 
do not show that this is the case. 
The inability to describe causal or process aspects of judgement behaviour may 
have a parallel in research in implicit learning. The ability to express rules explicitly lags 
behind but may eventually match implicit learning of those rules. Some researchers have 
suggested that explicitly held mental models of the situation are gradually formed as more 
trials are completed. Evidence for this comes from McGeorge and Burton (1989) who 
developed computer simulations from subjects' instructions for others (described in Berry 
and Dienes, 1993 p.24). Several subjects were able to describe their learnt behaviour in a 
modellable way. Explicit knowledge is gradually built up on the basis of implicitly learnt 
behaviour. This explicit knowledge is used to help subsequent learning. The suggestion is 
that these explicit verbalisations encapsulate the subject's developing mental model. Causal 
or process descriptions of judgement making may be the explicitly held hypotheses. 
Hypotheses will be based on salient features of the task in hand and may be affected by the 
way subjects have discussed or explicitly thought about the topic before. In medicine the 
way a hypothesis is expressed about a type of case will be influenced by how that case has 
been explicitly learnt about. But a doctor's intuitive behaviour may have been learnt more 
or less implicitly in the hospital. 
A comparison can be made with the biases caused by prior beliefs about 
correlations (see earlier). It may be that the cues subjects are rating are those that they 
believe affect their decisions, regardless of whether they have done on this occasion. For 
example, in judgement analysis, reports may be based on something with which the subject 
is more familiar generally such as real life parameters or ideal textbook models or may be 
based on salient features of the task which might be those to which they attended. Some 
studies seem to provide fuel for the idea that subjects are giving prior belief driven 
hypotheses. For example, Chaput de Saintonge and Haitersley (1985) found the expressed 
policies of their doctor subjects suggested agreement that was not apparent in models of 
their diagnostic policies. Goldstein and Mitzel (1992) also found that although subjects 
used relative importance ratings to infer preferences in particular data sets they could give 
more general relative importances. However, subjective ratings will vary i f collected 
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before or after a task and so are not simply biased by real life parameters or general 
hypotheses (Reilly and Doherty, 1989). 
In line with differences in types of self-knowledge, causal hypotheses may be based 
on phenomenological experience. For example, Reilly and Doherty (1992) suggested that 
subjective weights might be reflective of the focus of the subject's attention. The subject 
has a certain level of self-knowledge in that they are aware of the features of the task that 
they paid attention to but not how these had a bearing on the decision. Attentional focus 
may be influenced by the theory held about what should affect decisions, regardless of 
whether or not that is how decisions were affected. 
To summarise, it appears that certain types of description, namely causal and 
process descriptions, of behaviour must necessarily be based on hypotheses rather than on 
direct awareness of behaviour. The degree of self-knowledge shown when forming these 
hypotheses increases as greater familiarity with the task is shown: implicit learners and 
novices to tasks were able to show some level of self-knowledge. However, loo great a 
familiarity with a task and explicit learning of it perhaps leads to a reliance on explicitly 
held knowledge that interferes with assessment of current behaviour. 
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Ch<\pter Five 
Study One: Capturing GPs* Prescribing Policies 
Introduction 
The first study in this project is somewhat explorative. Judgement analysis 
techniques, outlined in Chapter 3, were used to capture General Practitioners' patient 
management decision making policies on different tasks. Two main areas were of interest, 
apart from whether CPs' policies could be captured. These were the number of cues 
subjects used on the different tasks and subjects' ability to state the relative importance of 
cues. 
One of the obvious benefits of judgement analysis is that it does not rely on 
subjects' descriptions of their own judgement making behaviour. There are circumstances 
in which analysing verbal protocols can be of use but the ascertainment of the relative 
impact of cues is not one of them (see Chapter 4). The circumstances in which protocol 
analysis may be of use is i f the spiel is concurrent. This in itself may alter the process of 
capturing a general practitioner's decision making process since, in a normal encounter, 
communication plays a large part. Where a think aloud method is used, either with video 
presented or written material, the protocol may focus on aspects of the one or two cases 
presented rather than on the general decision making situation. Although this enables a 
clear account of the thought processes for that case, comparison is lacking and 
generalisations cannot be made about behaviour. At best, think aloud methods will elicit 
which cues are attended to during the judgement or decision making and perhaps in what 
way they were influential. From this the experimenter can map out the process, and work 
out the influence of cues over a number of cases, in a process tracing technique. Subjects' 
staled judgement or decision making policies give poor descriptions in comparison to those 
derived statistically (see Chapter 4). Slovic and Lichtenstein's(1971) review and 
subsequent studies report our inability to state the relative importance of cues and our 
tendency to both underestimate the importance of influential cues and overestimate the 
importance of uninfluential cues. 
Both previous policy capturing studies and clinical problem solving or decision 
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making studies have failed to give subjects any range of tasks (Elsiein, Shulman and 
Sprafka, 1990; Brehmerand Brehmer, 1988). The focus has often been on differences 
between experts and sub-«xperts {e.g. Patel. Groen and Arocha, 1990). Individual and 
expert-novice differences have been found to depend on differences in knowledge structure 
that are task dependent. Inter-task comparisons are obviously important in capturing other 
aspects of expertise (Elstein et al, 1990). Other researchers have looked at more than one 
type of judgement made on the same case {e.g. Rovner, Rothert, Holmes, Ravitch, 
Holzman, and Elstein, 1985; Fisch, Hammond, Joyce, and O'Reilly, 1981). The 
judgements are usually made at the same time and may influence each other. Comparisons 
between different types of decision making must usually be made across studies and 
therefore across subjects. 
In General Practice, which is characterised by the sheer range of possible 
complaints that may appear, the presentation of more than one type of task might be 
considered to be particularly important (Essex, 1985, p. 183). This first study examines the 
ability to capture policies in three areas of decision making. These areas are related only in 
that they are all within the realm of the General Practitioner and they involve decisions on 
the prescription of prophylactics: lipid lowering treatment, prophylaxis for migraine and 
Hormone Replacement Therapy (HRT). 
Lipid lowering drugs are prescribed to reduce the cholesterol or fat levels in the 
blood and reduce the progression of atherosclerosis, myocardial infarctions (heart attacks) 
and of Coronary Heart Disease (CHD) in general in those with raised blood cholesterol 
levels (Heller, 1987; British National Formulary. September 1994, pp.106-107). I f the 
treatment proved satisfactory i.e. side affects were bearable and cholesterol levels were 
reduced, the patient would take the medication, daily, for a long time. Prophylactics can be 
prescribed to prevent migraine headaches. These are chronic headaches often accompanied 
by blurred vision and nausea and can be quite disabling (MacGregor. 1993). Their 
frequency and duration varies from person to person although women are two to three 
times more likely to have migraine attacks than men (Grant. 1992). Again tablets are taken 
every day but even i f successful the need for u-eatment is reviewed every six months 
(British National Formulary, September 1994. p. 192). Hormone Replacement Therapy 
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(HRT) adjusts the homione levels in a menopausal female to relieve symptoms associated 
with menopause and assist prevention of osteoporosis (Grant, 1992, pp. 329-332). 
Administration may take several forms and the initial period of treatment where there is an 
intact uterus is about a year (British National Formulary. September 1994. p. 286). 
The three tasks differ in certain ways. Firstly, they differ as to the amount of 
agreement shown explicitly in their use. The use of lipid lowering drugs has been under 
dispute for some lime. The evidence is only now coming out in favour of their use (e.g. 
Oliver. 1987; Marmot. 1994) and there is considerable variation in the availability of lipid 
clinics (Laker, Reckless. Betteridge. Durrington. Miller. Nicholls. Shepherd, and 
Thompson. 1991). In stark contrast, use of prophylaxis for migraine is not subject to 
disputes in the national medical press and use of HRT. although not being pushed by every 
General Practitioner in Britain, only lends to be discussed in terms of the pros and cons of 
its different forms. It was thought therefore that greater disagreement, in judgement and 
policy would be shown on the LIPID task. 
Secondly, the tasks differ in their effects on the patient. Although all three types of 
treatment are preventative to some extent, use of a lipid lowering drug will not make any 
immediate difference to the quality of the patient's life. Prophylaxis for migraine will 
however prevent previously endured migraine headaches and HRT will alleviate 
menopausal symptoms as well as being beneficial in preventing osteoporosis and reducing 
the risk of heart problems. As a consequence of this it might be expected that the tasks 
would differ in terms of the amount CPs were influenced by the patient's attitude to 
treatment: Doctors might be more influenced by patients' requests for treatment where the 
patient will actually feel the result and will obtain symptom relief. 
Thirdly, it was hypothesized that the tasks would differ in the amount of 
information that would ideally be used. This is introduced here without certainty since 
there was no criterion ideal on any of the tasks. Several pieces of information are reported 
in the medical literature as related to risk of CHD and therefore to whether to treat with 
lipid lowering therapy. There are a number of pieces of information that are relevant to 
prophylactic treatment of migraine too. However, the framing of the decisions in both of 
these cases were such that fewer of the independent variables presented in the MIGRAINE 
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task were relevant than in the LIPID task. To confirm this the number of cues explicitly 
thought to be of relevance were looked at and it was expected that doctors would state that 
more cues were important on the LIPID task than on the MIGRAINE task. 
The greater number of relevant cues, the more cognitively demanding the task. I f a 
task is more cognitively demanding less cognitive control would be expected (see Chapter 
3). Cognitive control is seen in the fit of the model to the judgements. Therefore on the 
LIPID task» where more cues were thought to be relevant and there would therefore be less 
cognitive control, lower fits were expected than on the MIGRAINE task. 
Despite differing numbers of relevant cues it was also expected that no more cues 
would actually be used on the LIPID task than were used on any of the other tasks and that 
the number used would be limited. Other studies have shown that there are limits to our 
cognitive capacity and that subjects tend to take into account around 5 or 6 cues (see 
Chapter 3). For example, experts have been found to use no more cues than novices 
(Shanteau. 1992). 
The number of cues that are relevant to a decision is important in that it affects the 
peakedness of the distribution of importance weights. This phenomenon is discussed in 
Adelman. Sticha and Donnell (1984) (see Chapter 3 and Figure 4.2 in Chapter 4). Where 
several cues are important the pattern will be generally flatter than where fewer cues are 
important. In this case the pattern of cue weights for MIGRAINE, where fewer cues were 
thought to be relevant, should be more peaked than that for LIPID. This is the expected 
pattern of explicitly generated weights as discussed earlier. However, if as hypothesized 
the number of cues actually used on the tasks did not differ, the peakedness of the 
objective importance weights of cues should be similar between tasks. This leads to a 
prediction about self-insight on these two different tasks. Distributions of subjective 
weights have been found to be flatter generally than those of objective weights (see 
Chapter 4). The expected explicit pattern of subjective weights on the LIPID task is 
expected to be flatter than that on the MIGRAINE task since more cues are thought to be 
relevant. But tacit patterns of cue use are expected to be the same on the two tasks. Two 
things could happen here: I f subjects have no self-insight there is more likely to be a match 
between explicit and tacit policies if more cues are indicated as being used on the explicit 
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policy. In this case self-insighi will appear lo be beiier on the LIPID task. On the other 
hand, i f some degree of self-insight is shown and the cues used on the tacit policy are a 
subset of those stated as being used in the explicit policy then self-insight will be worse 
where there is more of a discrepancy between explicit and tacit policies. In this case self-
insight would appear to be better on the MIGRAINE task. The explicit policies of the 
LIPID task would be relatively flatter, whereas objective weights would be equally peaked. 
A number of findings are expected: In line with other studies it was expected that 
policies on the three tasks would be able to be captured using multiple linear regression 
and that cue use would be limited and be much the same between tasks. It was expected 
that the number of cues thought to be influential in explicit policies would differ between 
tasks. If this is the case it was thought that cognitive control (linear fits) would be less on 
tasks where more information was thought to be relevant. Self-insight was expected to be 
suboptimal in general: the importance of uninfluential cues would be overestimated and 
that of influential cues would be underestimated. Differences in self-insight between tasks 
would depend on the general degree of self-insight being shown. 
Method 
Subject recruitment 
Recruitment of subjects for Studies 1-3 (Chapters 5. 6 and 7) was done within 
recruitment for a larger project consisting of these plus two additional studies'. A notice 
about the project was put in the national medical press. Then 202 doctors, in the PL 
postcode region^ of Devon, were contacted by post. They were asked to respond, through a 
prepaid envelope or by telephoning, i f they required more information about the project. 
Eighty-nine doctors (44%) replied affirmatively and they were sent further details in which 
they were asked to contact us again i f they wished members of the project team to visit 
them to discuss the project or i f they wished to participate in one or all of the studies of the 
* A PCFC funded project looking at Medical Decision Making in Primary Care 
comprising of a total of 5 studies. There were 7 people participating in this project Two 
of these, myself included are Research Students. One member is a General Practitioner 
and lecturer for the RCGP. The remaining four members of the team are permanent staff 
in the Department of Psychology at the University of Plymouth and supervised the work 
of the Research Students. See the Author's Declaration at the beginning this thesis. 
2 In our sample of 35 subjects the doctors who were furthest north of Plymouth were in 
Tavistock and the furthest east of Plymouth was in Kingsbridge. 
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project. All dociors who had been sent further information but who had not replied were 
additionally contacted by telephone and were asked whether or not they wished to 
participate in the project. Thirty-five of the 89 doctors sent further information participated 
in this study (39%). 
Doctors were given a financial incentive to participate in the study in the form of 
monetary payment at a rate of £25 per hour for every hour spent on the tasks. They were 
also promised eventual feedback of findings which might provide them with a better 
understanding of their own decision making. 
For anonymity all participating doctors were allocated project specific codes. These 
were used in all studies. 
Subjects 
Thirty-five general practitioners, recruited as part of a larger project, participated in 
this study. Thirty-two of these doctors participated in a follow up test of consistency ten 
months (range 8 to 13 months) after the original tasks-*. 
The average age of the participating doctors was 39 (ranging from 31 to 55, one 
unknown). The average period since qualifying was 15.4 years (ranging from 7 to 31 
years) and the average period of work in general practice was 9.3 years (ranging from 6 
months to 27 years). There were four females in the sample and 31 males. Doctors were 
recruited from different types of practice setting including health centres and one single-
handed practice and the range of practices included those in the city centre and in villages 
outside Plymouth. 
Tasks and instructions 
There were three possible computer tasks for each doctor to complete, each 
requiring judgements about 130 separate cases presented in turn. After each task the doctor 
was asked a series of questions aimed at establishing what they felt had been affecting their 
own decision making on that task, and how it might relate to anything they do in real life. 
^ Two doctors withdrew due to increased work loads (GP8 and GP35). One withdrew for 
other reasons not related to the project (GPIO). 
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,These tasks wil l be referred to as the original tasks and this study as the original 
study. An average of 10 months later (range 8-13 months) doctors were tested with a 
precise repetition of the first 30 cases of each computer task to see how consistent their 
judgements of decisions were. Table 5.1 shows which original tasks and consistency tasks 
were completed by each doctor. 
Table 5.1 Tasks completed by each doctor 
GPcode L I P I D Consistency M I G R A I N E Consistency H R T Consis 
GPl Y Y Y Y _ _ 
GP2 Y Y Y Y _ 
• GP3 Y Y Y Y _ 
GP4 Y Y Y Y _ 
GP5 Y Y Y Y _ _ 
GP6 Y Y Y Y _ 
GP7 Y Y Y Y _ 
GPS Y - Y _ _ 
GP9 Y Y Y Y Y Y 
GPIO Y - Y _ 
GPl I Y Y Y Y _ . 
GP12 Y Y Y Y _ 
GP13 Y Y . Y Y Y Y 
G P U Y Y Y Y _ 
GP15 Y Y Y Y _ 
GP17 Y Y Y Y Y 
GP19 Y Y Y Y _ 
GP20 Y Y Y Y 
GP21 Y Y Y Y _ 
GP22 Y Y Y 4 Y _ 
GP23 .5 - Y Y 
GP24 Y Y Y Y Y 
GP25 Y - Y . _ 
GP26 Y Y Y Y * 
GP27 *6 - Y Y Y Y 
GP28 Y Y Y Y Y 
GP29 Y Y Y Y _ 
GP30 Y Y Y Y Y 
GP3I Y Y Y Y Y Y 
GP32 Y Y Y Y _ 
GP33 Y Y Y Y Y Y 
GP34 Y Y - . Y Y 
GP35 Y Y Y Y Y _ 
GP36 Y Y Y Y Y 
GP37 Y Y Y Y _ _ 
Total 33 30 34 31 12 6 
Al l computer tasks were presented on the same portable Acorn A4 computer and in 
most cases the doctor was visited in his or her practice surgery. Five of the doctors 
^ This doctor only complete the first 100 cases of this task. Analysis was based on this. 
5 This GP served as a pilot for this task. 
* * indicates subjective policies were elicited but decision data failed to save 
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participated at their home (GP15, GP17, GP19. GP2I, GP24) and two doctors came to the 
Department of Psychology at Plymouth University to participate (GPI, GP26). 
For the main tasks iwo hours of the doctors' time was booked in one sitting and 
they were told that there were up to three tasks that could be done depending on the time 
left after each one. It was emphasised that they should make decisions at whatever speed 
they felt was appropriate to the task. Most doctors were able to complete both tasks on one 
occasion. However. GP29 and GP37 each had a week between the first and the second 
task. GP25 had just over a week between the two. GP22 ran out of time and only 
completed 100 of 130 cases on the second task, though did answer questions about these 
afterwards. GP35 and GP36. volunteering to give more time and do an extra task, had 
about one month between the second and the third task. 
The consistency tasks were run in conjunction with Studies 2 and 3 (see Chapters 6 
and 7). Limits on the doctors' time meant that not all were able to complete all consistency 
tasks (see Table 5.1). 
Each of the main tasks had an initial set of instructions followed by sequential 
presentation of 130 cases which differed on 13 distinct cues. The instructions indicated that 
the cases to be presented were hypothetical and that there were certain assumptions that 
could be made regarding the 'patient's' previous treatment. On all of the tasks it was made 
clear that the option to refer patients to a consultant was not available and the treatment 
decision lay in the hands of the GPs themselves. The instructions for the original tasks are 
shown in Appendices 2. 3 and 4. 
On the LIPID task doctors were told that dietary advice had been given, the 
cholesterol level had been tested six months previously and where appropriate cessation of 
smoking had been recommended. They were told to assume that all modifications to the 
patient's life style that were likely to occur had been made and that the cholesterol level 
reflected any such changes. The doctors were asked to indicate the likelihood that they 
would prescribe lipid lowering drugs for each patient. 
On the MIGRAINE task they were told that advice had been given on lifestyle 
modification in order to avoid trigger factors and it was indicated that there was a high 
degree of confidence that this was migraine headache. The doctors were required to 
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indicate the likelihood of them prescribing some prophylactic treatment. 
On the HRT task doctors were told that there was no reason why the patient should 
already be receiving HRT, they had a normal pelvic examination and there was no other 
relevant medical history. It was indicated thai the decision was on the likelihood of 
prescribing HRT in whatever panicular form that would take for each patient. 
Generation of items and presentation of the tasks 
Table 5.2 shows the 13 cues used in each of the three tasks in the fixed order 
presented to subjects (left hand column) and also the range of values available. Both the 
cues and their ranges were selected with the assistance of a non-participating GP, who was 
a member of the project team. Cues were arranged such that where a general consensus of 
medical opinion could be identified in the literature, use of this consensus policy would 
lead to a positive regression coefficient (see Table 5.2 for directionality). Ranges were set 
so that more than one cue would need to be considered. For example, the blood cholesterol 
level was not allowed to be set at such a low level that no doctor would ever consider 
treating with lipid lowering drugs or so high that treatment would be automatic. This was 
done with the advice of Dr. John Dean, the General Practitioner on the Medical Decision 
Making project team (see Author's Declaration). Some of the cues (e.g. Age, Occupation, 
Gender, Attitude to treatment) were presented on more than one task so that their use could 
be compared between tasks. Both clinically relevant and irrelevant information was 
provided. 
The 130 cases were created for each task thus. The range and settings which would 
be suitable for each of the 13 cues were allocated. These were entered into a random 
generation program' in which categorical data was represented as ordinal integer numbers. 
The program used to generate the cue values was separate from that which presented the 
task to the subjects. The generation program computed a correlation matrix between cue 
values after an initial generation and then repeated the process generating a number of sets 
of values in an attempt to minimise the maximum intercorrelation. For all tasks, the final 
' As noted in the Author's Declaration, the majority of the software used in these studies 
was written by Jonathan Evans. 
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set of values chosen was such that the largest intercorrelation of any two was less than 
0.20. In fact the maximum correlations between cues over the cases generated were 0.185, 
- 0.189 and 0.192 on the LIPID, MIGRAINE and HRT tasks respectively. Appendix 5. 6 
and 7 show inter-cue correlations on the three tasks. Once generated, the cue values for the 
task were stored in a data file read by the program presenting the experiment proper. 
'Occupation' was initially allocated in terms of social class. During the execution of 
the program this was then allocated a specific job title picked randomly by the program 
from a prespecified set of about ten possibilities for each class, obtained from OPCS 
Classification of occupations, 1980. [These are shown in Appendix 8,] Thus all doctors 
saw an identical set of cases except for the specified occupation. 
The program which presented the task to the doctors showed one screen of 
instructions followed by a separate screen for each patient. In each case a set of cue labels 
appeared on the left hand side of the screen, in the order and form shown on the left of 
Table 5.2. To the right of each label was printed the particular value assigned to that case. 
Figures 5.1 a, b and c show an example of a case from each of the tasks. 
Data recorded 
Doctors were asked to indicate the degree of likelihood of their prescribing the 
treatment specified on each task. Doctors registered their responses using a mouse^ to 
indicate their likelihood of prescribing. Movement of the mouse pointer was restricted 
within a fixed rectangle on the screen (see Figure 5.1). The rectangle was anchored with 
0% at one end and 100% at the other. Likelihood was shown as a dark area drawn from 0 
to the current mouse position and also by a number printed next to the rectangle. Both were 
updated as the mouse was moved. The initial mouse position for each case was set at 50%. 
All doctors completed at least two of the tasks, with the LIPID first. Doctors 
completing all three tasks did the MIGRAINE task second and then the HRT task. Al l but 
one of the doctors who completed only two tasks did the LIPID and the MIGRAINE tasks: 
One (GP34) opted to do the HRT task rather than the MIGRAINE task. 
^ When a doctor was unfamiliar with computers brief verbal instructions on how to use the 
mouse were given. 
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Table 5.2 Cues and their ranges on the LIPID, M I G R A I N E and HRT tasks 
C U E W E I G H T 
Cue 
C H O L E S T E R O L L E V E L 
HYPERTENSION 
A G E 
GENDER 
OCCLfPATION 
E V I D E N C E OF ARTERIOSCLEROSIS 
SMOKES 
DIABETES 
COMPLIANCE WITH ADVICE ON DIET 
WEIGHT 
ATTITUDE TO TREATMENT 
F A M I L Y HISTORY I.H.D. 
PERSONALITY 
NEGATIVE 
L I P I D 
POSITIVE 
Range 
DURATION OF ATTACK 
FREQUENCY OF ATTACK 
A G E 
GENDER 
OCCUPATION 
MISSES WORK 
SMOKES 
NAUSEA 
VISUAL DISTURBANCE 
WEIGHT 
ATTITUDE TO TREATMENT 
RESPONSE TO A C U T E TREATMENT 
PERSONALITY 
MENSTRUATION 
HOT FLUSHES 
A G E 
OCCUPATION 
MOOD STATES 
SMOKES 
LIBIDO 
VAGINAL DRYNESS 
WEIGHT 
ATTITUDE TO TREATMENT 
FAMILY HISTORY I.H.D. 
FAMILY HISTORY B.C. 
PERSONALITY 
6.5~S 
No/Yes. well controlled/Yes, poorly controlled 
30-60 
Female/Male 
l/ll/lllnm/lUm/lV/V 
No/Yes 
No/Occasionally/Regularly/Heavily 
No/Yes, well controlled/Yes, poorly controlled 
No/Some/Yes 
UnderfNormal/Over/Obese/Very obese 
Opposed/Cautious/Open to advice/Requesting treatment 
Noflnd degree relative/lst degree relative 
Co-operative/Passive/Demanding 
M I G R A I N E 
2-24 
About every six montlis/About every three months/ 
Monthly/Fortnightly/Weekly 
30-60 
Female/Male 
l/ll/lUnm/lUm/lV/V 
Yes/No 
No/Occasionally/Regularly/Heavily 
Absent/Mild/Severe/Disabling 
Absent/Mild/Severe/Disabling 
Under/Normal/Over/Obese/Very obese 
Opposed/Cautious/Open to advice/Retjuesting treatment 
Good/Some response/No response 
Co-operative/Passive/Demanding 
HRT 
No periods/Infrequent periods/Normal periods/Irregular periods 
No/Yes 
40-55 
l/ll/lllnm/lUm/lV/V 
Normal/Somewltat irritable/Highly irritable 
No/Occasionally/Regularly/Heavily 
Normal/Some loss/Major loss 
No/Yes 
Under/Normal/Over/Obese/Very obese 
Opposed/Cautious/Open to advice/Requesting treatment 
No/lnd degree relative/lst degree relative 
No/Znd degree relative/lst degree relative 
Co-operative/Passive/Demanding 
89 
CASE 2 
CHOLESTEROL L E V E L 
HYPERTENSION 
AGE 
GENDER 
OCCUPATION 
EVIDENCE OF ARTERIOSCLEROSIS 
SMOKES 
DIABETES 
COMPLIANCE WITH ADVICE ON DIET 
WEIGHT 
ATTITUDE T O TREATMENT 
FAMILY HISTORY I.H.D. 
7.4 
Yes, well controlled 
43 
Male 
Lavatory Cleaner 
Yes 
Regularly 
No 
No 
Very obese 
Opposed 
No 
Demanding 
P R E S C R I B E LIPID LOWERING AGENT 
100% 50^ 
Figure 5.1 (a) Example of a case from the LIPID task 
C A S E 2 
bURATION OF ATTACK (untreated)^ 
FREQUENCY O F ATTACK 
AGE 
GENDER 
OCCUPATION 
MISSES WORK 
SMOKES 
NAUSEA 
VISUAL DISTURBANCE 
WEIGHT 
ATTITUDE T O TREATMENTj 
R E S P O N S E T O ACUTE TREATMENTS 
PERSONALITY 
7 hours 
Fortnightly 
60 
Male 
Management Consultant 
No 
Occasionally 
Mild 
Disabling 
Very obese 
Open to advice 
Good 
Passive 
PRESCRIBE PROPHYLACTIC TREATMENT 
100%;! 50% 
Figure 5.1 (b) Example of a case from the MIGRAINE task 
C A S E 2 
MENSTRUATION 
HOT FLUSHES 
AGE 
OCCUPATION 
MOOD STATES 
SMOKES 
LIBIDq 
VAGINAL DRYNESS! 
WEIGHT 
ATTITUDE TO TREATMENT 
FAMILY HISTORY I.H.D. 
•AMILY HISTORY O F BREAST CANCER 1st degree relative 
PERSONALITY Demanding 
Normal periods 
Yes 
55 
Printer 
Somewhat irritable 
No 
Normal 
Yes 
Normal 
Open to advice 
No i 
PRESCRIBE HRTi 
M3l 
Figure 5.1 (c) Example of a case from the HRT task 
Missing data 
For two doctors, data was only saved for two tasks even though three were 
completed. Data for the third task of GP26 failed to be saved because the program was full 
(an error not allowed to happen again) and data from the first task undertaken by GP27 
also failed to save. GP22 ran out of time on the MIGRAINE task and only completed 100 
cases. Analysis was done on these. Where a doctor made a mistake or skipped over a case 
and brought this to the attention of the experimenter the decision and latency data for this 
case were not included in the analysis. Latencies of cases during which a doctor was 
interrupted were also excluded from the analysis. 
Pilot 
The tasks were piloted on both the team GP (John Dean) and another doctor not 
participating in the study and some adjustment of range was made as a result of this. 
Adjustment was also made to the instructions for the LIPID task after the first doctor of the 
sample had completed the task and as a result the data for GP23 for the LIPID task is not 
included. 
Self-insight measure and post task interview 
After completing each task the doctor was given a list of the cues that were 
available on the task and was asked about how they had affected his or her decisions over 
the 130 cases (see Appendix 9). Firstly an effort was made to quantify the doctor's 
perception of each cue's relative importance to the decision. They were presented with 
values at either end of a cue's range. They were asked which of the two would be more 
likely to make them prescribe, other things being; or i f there was no difference between 
them. They were then asked to give each cue a rating between 0 and 10 to indicate how 
much of a bearing it had on their decision. The doctor was told that '0' indicated that that 
dimension had no bearing on the decision. '10' indicated that it had maximum bearing on 
the decision and that he or she could allocate the same number to more than one 
dimension. They were also shown an anchored scale indicating these values. Secondly, 
having rated each dimension, the doctor was given an opportunity to discuss his or her 
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strategy on the task and to indicate for example whether the affect of one particular 
dimension was dependent on the value of other dimensions. The doctor was then prompted 
to talk about their behaviour, with references to cases such as these, in real life. For 
example, each doctor was asked specifically about how their behaviour on the task 
compared to that in real life and what sons of factors would be affecting the decision to 
prescribe the particular type of drug in real life. 
During the post-task interview values and responses were noted down on a standard 
sheet (Appendix 10). In addition the discussion was tape recorded. 
Consistency task 
Each consistency task - conducted several months after the original study -
consisted of the first 30 cases of the original task in the original order. The on-screen 
instructions were unchanged except in reference to the number of cases. Responses were 
entered in the same way as on the original tasks. Cases from the LIPID task were the 
presented first and were immediately followed by cases from the MIGRAINE task. For 
doctors who had completed the HRT task in the original study, the consistency test for this 
followed. 
Results and Discussion 
There are two main topics to be discussed in this section. Since the three tasks 
presented predominantly different cues and were asking the judge to make different 
decisions the cues used will differ between tasks. These differences may be of more 
interest to medics than to psychologists. A few cues were presented on more than one task 
and their impact on the different decisions can be compared. However, in all tasks the 
number of cues presented was the same (13) even though more or less of these may have 
been relevant, and the doctor was told to do the task in their own time. Similarities and 
differences in performance and information handling between the tasks can be compared in 
terms of cognitive control and capacity. The second topic of interest is doctors' ability to 
state what their policy was. 
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Definitions 
Cognitive Control and consistency:- The judgements or decisions made on cases by each 
doctor were regressed onto the 13 cues available to give a model of the tacit policy used by 
each doctor. The total amount of variance in judgement making by the doctor explained by 
the model can be seen in its linear fit (R^). If this is low it may be due to two reasons: 
Firstly, i f consistency is low as well, there is no policy to be described in terms of the 
regression coefficients. It may be that doctors are being inconsistent or that they simply 
have hardly varied their decision at all (in which case the variance to describe is near zero). 
Consistency here was measured as the correlation between decisions made on the first 
thirty cases on their original and subsequent presentation 10 months later. Secondly it may 
be that the judge is using a non-linear but consistent model - in which case consistency will 
be high. 
Tacit policies:- The judgement analysis is idiographic in that each doctor's policy is formed 
on an individual basis from the judgements that he or she made on a task. Tacit policies are 
made up of sets of standardised regression coefficients. Standardised regression 
coefficients show the relative importance of each cue in this model. A number of other 
indices could have been used for this, as was discussed in Chapter 4, but these become 
equivalent when intercue correlations are negligible as here (see method). A standardised 
regression coefficient indicates the variation in the judgement that would result in a change 
of one standard deviation of the cue. For example a standardised regression coefficient of 
0.8 indicates that for a change in the cue of one standard deviation, the judgements change 
by 0.8 of their standard deviation. Cues with coefficients close to zero had no significant 
bearing on the judgement. The definition of cue use throughout depends on the coefficient 
being significantly different from zero (p < 0.05). The sign of the coefficient indicates the 
way in which the cue influences the judgement. The meaning of positive or negative 
coefficients can be seen from Table 5.2 in the method. A positive coefficient indicates the 
doctor was more likely to prescribe for values of that cue towards the right of Table 5.2. A 
negative coefficient indicates the doctor was more likely to prescribe for values of that cue 
towards the left. 
Explicit policies:- Subjective policies of cue weights comparable to the regression weights 
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were formed from the subjective ratings of relative importance of the cues given during the 
post-task interview. These were assigned signs depending on the value of the cue that had 
been indicated as most likely to be prescribed for and these were comparable to the signs 
of the regression weights. See Table 5.2 above. Since subjective ratings are on a different 
scale to standardised regression coefficients, subjective weights were calculated to be 
directly comparable. Subjective weights are similar to standardised regression coefficients 
in that when used in a linear equation, with standardised values of cues, a set of decisions 
with standard deviation I and mean 0 is the resulL The calculation used for subjective 
weights can be seen in Appendix 11. 
Agreement and Consistency: Comparisons between tasks 
Table 5.3 shows the average mean response for doctors on a task and the standard 
deviation of this. Agreement between dociors in terms of decision response over the 130 
cases was calculated for each task in terms of Kendall's W. These are shown in Table 5.3. 
Greatest agreement was shown on the MIGRAINE task and least on the LIPID task. 
Kendall's W varies between 0 (no agreement) and 1 (full agreement). Since there is 
disagreement on the use of lipid lowering therapy in the general medical press this result 
was expected. However, agreement was moderate even on the MIGRAINE task. 
Table 5.3 Concordance between doctors on different tasks. 
Task N Average response St. dev. response Kendall's W* p 
LIPID 33 33.6 23.0 0.25 <0.01 
MIGRAINE 34 41.5 13.9 0.56 <0.01 
HRT 12 55.9 16.6 0.37 <0.01 
* Kendall's W is a measure of concordance ranging from 0 to 1: I indicates that there is 
full agreement, 0 indicates that there is no agreement. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, agreement between subjects is affected by both 
agreement in policies (knowledge) and consistency of utilisation of those policies 
(cognitive control). Consistency of utilisation of policies can be seen in two ways. One 
measure is the linear f i t of the model of the judgement making. However, linear fit could 
be low because the subject's behaviour is inconsistent in itself (poor cognitive control) or it 
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could be low because the subject is being consistent but is using a non-linear policy. In this 
case another model might be more appropriate. Consistency or reliability measures the 
subject's ability to give the same judgement to the same case when it is presented more 
than once: If subjects are inconsistent in their own judgement making, between subject 
consistency is also likely to be low. 
Table 5.4 Mean Consistency (r) and Linear fit (R^) of models for each task 
Task N Mean consistency' St. dev. r Mean St. dev. R^ 
LIPID 33 0.35 0.23 0.42 0.16 
MIGRAINE 34 0.71 0.19 0.64 0.14 
HRT 12 0.30 0.08 0.47 0.14 
The ability of the regression models to explain variance in doctors' judgements 
varies significantly between tasks, just as agreement does (F (2»76) = 19.75, p < 0.01). 
Table 5.4 shows the mean linear fit and mean consistency on the different tasks. The 
multiple correlation coefficient (transformed to Fisher's z) for doctors was significantly 
higher on the MIGRAINE than on the LIPID task (t = 5.45, N = 32, p < 0.01). The linear 
fit and consistency for each doctor on each task are shown in Appendices 12, 13 and 14. 
Subjects* consistencies were measured as the correlation between responses on the 
consistency task and on the original presentation of those cases. The greater agreement 
between judgements and in linear f i t shown on the MIGRAINE task is accompanied by 
significantly greater consistencies: There was a significant difference between Fisher's z 
transformations of consistencies on the MIGRAINE and the LIPID task (t = 6.19. N = 29, 
p < 0,01). Several doctors were inconsistent'** in making judgements over the first 30 cases 
of the LIPID task. In contrast on the MIGRAINE task only one doctor was this inconsistent 
(GP31) and the other 30 had significant and high consistencies. So disagreement or 
inconsistency between doctors may be related to the degree of cognitive control (as 
measured by consistency) they show over their own behaviour on the task. Generally, tasks 
that lead to lower consistencies show poorer linear fits and have less agreement within 
doctors. 
' Consistency was the conrelation in responses over 30 repeated cases for 30, 31 and 6 
doctors on the LIPID. MIGRAINE and HRT tasks respectively. 
There was no significant correlation between the judgements made on cases in the 
original and in consistency tasks. 
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Within each task there was also a positive correlation between doctors' 
consistencies and their linear fit. Linear fit can be thought of as a measure of consistency 
of use of policy. The correlation between Fisher's z transformations of consistency and the 
multiple correlation coefficient (R) on both the LIPID (r = 0.403, p < 0.05) and 
MIGRAINE (r = 0.732, p < 0.05) tasks was significant. The same correlation over very 
few doctors completing the consistency judgements on the HRT task was not significant (r 
= 0.253, p > 0.05). 
Where linear fits are low there are two possible reasons ( I ) cognitive control or 
consistency is poor and (2) the subject is using a consistent but non-linear policy. 
Obviously since here it is a doctor's policy that we wish to capture there is concern as to 
whether that policy is sufficiently described by a linear model. I f any doctor showed good 
consistency but poor fit of the model that would be reason to suppose that the policy they 
were implementing was non-linear. No doctor seems to show this pattern and poorer linear 
fits are associated with worse consistency in decision making. There is one caveat. Namely 
that when a doctor has varied insignificantly in the judgements made across cases, and the 
standard deviation of responses was low, both the consistency measure and the linear fit 
wil l be low. After all there is negligible variance to be explained. This seems to be the case 
for GP28 on the LIPID task who judged that it was unlikely that he would treat any of the 
cases with lipid lowering agents'*. It might be argued that GP28 was consistent in 
implementing the policy of not prescribing. 
Table 5.5 Correlations of R and consistency with standard deviation of responses'^ 
Task N Correlation of consistency and St. dev.'^ P 
LIPID 30 0.188 >0.05 
MIGRAINE 31 0.189 >0.05 
HRT 6 0.653 >0.05 
N Correlation of R and St. dev.*^ P 
LIPID 33 0.475 <0.05 
MIGRAINE 34 0.440 <0.05 
HRT 12 -0.196 >0.05 
His greatest likelihood of prescribing was 35 on the 0 to 100 scale. 
Correlation coefficients used as data here are transformed to Fisher's Z. 
*^The standard deviation of judgements on the 30 repeated cases. 
*^The standard deviation of all 130 cases. 
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The relationships between standard deviation and both linear fit and consistency on 
the three tasks can be seen in Table 5.5. There was no significant relationship between 
consistency and standard deviation of the judgements on the repeated cases on any task. 
However, the correlation between linear fit and standard deviation is significant and 
positive for both the LIPID and MIGRAINE tasks. In other words where doctors had low 
standard deviations {i.e, varied little in their judgements) they tended to have poor linear 
fits - after all there was little variation to be explained! However low consistencies were 
not simply a product of lack of variance on these tasks: Linear fits were related to poor 
consistency and to lack of variance in judgements but these did not amount to the same 
thing. 
Although doctors did differ in consistency within each task, the correlation between 
consistency shown on the MIGRAINE and LIPID tasks was insignificant (r = - 0.106, N = 
29, p > 0.05). In other words doctors who were more consistent on the LIPID task were no 
more likely to be consistent on the MIGRAINE task than other doctors. 
Although the first 30 cases were used to measure consistency, there is some 
evidence to show that doctors were less consistent in decision making over these cases than 
over the other 100 cases in each task. As Table 5.6 shows, when the first 30 cases were 
removed from analysis of linear fits (leaving the last 100) on all tasks both linear fits and 
inter-doctor agreement improved. Most improvement can be seen on the LIPID task. There 
was negligible change in the policies captured. 
Table 5.6 Effects of inconsistency in judgement making on the first 30 cases 
Cases Kendall's W Mean R^ 
LIPID (N = 33) 130 0.25 0.42 
LIPID (N = 33) last 100 0.28 0.49 
Significance of t test of difference (p<0.01) 
MIGRAINE (N = 34) 130 0.56 0.64 
M I G R A I N E (N = 34) last 100 0.57 0.66 
Significance of t test of difference (p<0.01) 
H R T (N = 12) 130 0.37 0.47 
H R T (N = 12) last 100 0.38 0.52 
Significance of t test of difference (p=0.12) 
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Complexity of tasks 
LIPID task appears to be harder than the other two tasks in thai the consistency 
both within and between doctors is worse on the LIPID task than on the other two tasks. In 
addition to this, longer was spent on cases in the LIPID decision as can be seen on Table 
5.7. A one way ANOVA shows that this between task difference in latencies was 
significant (F(2,76) = 11.96, p < 0.01). However, of course the longer latencies could be 
due to the fact that it was the first task. Similarly, as seen on Table 5.7, there were 
significant differences between case latencies on all three tasks. This could be because 
some cases were more difficult and required longer or it could be because doctors spent 
longer on earlier cases and speeded up as they got used to the task. 
Table 5.7 Average Latencies on the LIPID, MIGRAINE and HRT tasks 
Task Mean average latency St, Dev. of average latencies 
LIPID 16.72 6.74 
MIGRAINE 10.51 4.69 
HRT 10.39 4.29 
That the LIPID task is a more complex task also seems to be the perception of the 
subjects. The LIPID task differed from the MIGRAINE task in that more cues were 
thought to be clinically relevant to the LIPID decision than the MIGRAINE decision'^. 
That this was the perception of the doctors seems to have been confirmed in the way that 
they have rated the relative importance of cues. Subjective ratings of cues for the three 
tasks are summarised on Tables 5.8, 5.9, and 5.10. AH subjective ratings are shown in 
Appendices 15. 16, and 17. On all three tasks all cues were rated as having had an effect on 
decision making in that all cues had at least one non-zero subjective rating. However, on 
the LIPID task the smallest number of non-zero ratings that any cue had was 10 
(occupation) whereas on the other two tasks cues had only one non-zero rating (smoking 
on the MIGRAINE task, occupation on the HRT task). In addition to this on the LIPID 
task more cues were getting higher ratings. An ANOVA indicates that there was a 
Cholesterol level, hypertension, old age, male gender, evidence of arteriosclerosis, 
smoking, poor diet, diabetes, being over-weight and having a family history of ischaemic 
heart disease are all known to increase the risk of ischaemic heart disease. These risks 
are discussed in several books e.g. Sharp (1994), Heller, Bailey, Gott, and Howes (1987). 
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significant difference between tasks in the number of cues being rated above 5'*^  (F(2,76) = 
9.46, p < 0.01). Doctors rated on average 2 more cues above 5 on the LIPID task than on 
the MIGRAINE task (/< = 1.97, l = 4.27, p < 0.01). 
Agreement of judgement policy 
Agreement between doctors in terms of the cues they fel l were important can also 
be compared. Summary of cue ratings on the three tasks are shown in Tables 5,8, 5.9 and 
5.10. Greatest disagreement was again on the LIPID task. This was not just in terms of 
which cues were said to have influenced their decision making but also in terms of how 
they were said to have influenced i t On all tasks some cues were seen as important in 
different ways: some doctors had felt they were more likely to prescribe and had given a 
positive non-zero rating whilst other doctors had felt the same cue would make them less 
likely to prescribe and had given it a negative non-zero rating. However, on the LIPID task 
eight cues had both negative and positive non-zero ratings, compared to four and three on 
the MIGRAINE and HRT tasks. In the latter cases conflicts were the result of single 
deviant doctors. There was greater disagreement as to which cues were said to have 
influenced decision making on the LIPID task than on the MIGRAINE task: On the 
MIGRAINE task certain cues were said by neariy all doctors to have affected their 
decision making, whilst the remaining ones were generally said not to have been 
influential. On the LIPID task a number of cues were said by some doctors not to have had 
an influence and by some to have been influential. 
Actual agreement between doctors* policies is seen in terms of similarity of cue 
use. Here cues with significant standardised regression coefficients (p < 0.05) were defined 
as used. The LIPID task appears to be a more complex task in that longer was spent on 
cases, greater inconsistency was seen both between and within doctors judgements making, 
and more cues were thought to be important. In fact no more cues were actually used on 
the LIPID task than on either of the other two tasks (F(2.76) = 1.62. p = 0.205) and the 
average number used on each task was four. The ranges were similar on each task (LIPID: 
2-7; MIGRAINE 1-8; HRT 1-7). It might be argued that the cognitive constraints as to the 
Chosen arbitrarily. 
101 
amount of information used shown in the task would not apply in real life where 
information is introduced sequentially and may be reviewed several times during the 
consultation. Although the time-span of consultations is much longer than time spent on 
cases in any of these tasks, where latencies differed both between doctors as well as 
between tasks there was no difference in the number of cues used. The number of 
significant cues did not correlate significantly with doctors' average latencies on any task 
(LIPID: r = 0.169, N = 33, p < 0.05; MIGRAINE: r = 0.265, N = 34, p < 0.05; and HRT: r = 
0.068, N = 12, p < 0.05). So doctors who spent longer considering cases were not using any 
more cues than those who spent less time. The number of cues used by each doctor on the 
tasks is shown along with doctors' policies in terms of cue standardised regression 
coefficients in Appendices 18, 19, and 20. 
The average cue use on each of the tasks are shown in Tables 5.11, 5.12 and 5.13. 
Some disagreement in cue use policies were seen on all tasks. This would be predictable 
given that the number of cues used varied. However, it is possible that a core of cues tend to 
be used by doctors although some doctors use additional cues. This could be said to be the 
cases on the MIGRAINE task where four cues: duration, frequency, attitude to 
treatment and response to acute treatment all appear to be used much more than the 
others. There are also many significant inter-cue correlations of regression coefficients. 
These are shown in Appendix 22. Cues either tend to be used instead of each other e.g. 
occupation and misses work or as well as each other e.g. duration and response to acute 
treatment. Significant correlations of cue regression coefficients with the number of 
significant cues indicate either that as the number of cues increases there are cues that tend 
to be added (having small weights). Or, as the number of cues increases, the regression 
coefficients tend towards zero since with the use of more cues each cue has a relatively 
smaller weight (the correlation coefficient is negative). Frequency is the only cue that 
correlates significantly with the number of significant cues as the number of cues increases 
the regression coefficient of frequency tends to decrease. It doesn't appear to be the case 
that there is a core of cues being used on the other two tasks. Although it might be argued 
that Cholesterol, diabetes and attitude are used more than the other cues on the LIPID task. 
Appendices 21 and 23 show that there were few significant inter-cue correlations of 
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standardised regression coefficients on the LIPID task and HRT tasks. 
Table 5.8 Subjective ratings LIPID task (N = 33) 
Cues +ve ^ r o -ve Mean St. dev. 
CHOLESTEROL L E V E L 33 0 0 8.65 1.40 
HYPERTENSION 27 2 4 4.24 4.93 
A G E 0 8 25 -5.5 3.70 
GENDER 24 9 0 3.99 3.72 
OCCUPATION 3 23 7 -0.52 1.54 
E V I D E N C E OF ARTERIOSCLEROSIS 27 6 0 5.15 3.13 
SMOKES 11 4 18 -1.91 6.05 
DIABETES 27 3 3 5.05 5.14 
COMPLIANCE WITH ADVICE ON DIET 21 tl 1 3.68 3.75 
WEIGHT 4 8 21 -3.06 4.49 
ATTITUDE TO TREATMENT 26 7 7 5.02 3.45 
FAMILY HISTORY I.H.D. 30 3 0 6.17 2.92 
PERSONALITY 6 20 7 -0.05 2.20 
Table 5.9 Subjective ratings MIGRAINE task (N = 34 doctors) 
Cues +ve zero -ve Mean St. dev. 
DURATION OF ATTACK 33 1 0 6.8 2.6 
FREQUENCY OF ATTACK 34 0 0 9.2 1.2 
A G E 0 32 2 -0.3 1.1 
GENDER I 32 I O.I 1.1 
OCCUPATION 4 24 6 -0.2 2.7 
MISSES WORK 0 4 30 -6.2 3 
SMOKES 0 33 I -0.3 1.5 
NAUSEA 22 12 0 3.4 3.2 
VISUAL DISTURBANCE 22 12 0 3.3 3.1 
WEIGHT 0 31 3 -0.6 2.1 
ATTITUDE TO TREATMENT 30 4 0 5.9 3.4 
RESPONSE TO A C U T E TREATMENT 29 4 1 5.6 3.2 
PERSONALITY 8 25 I 0.9 2.7 
Table 5.10 Subjective ratings HRT task (N = 12 doctors) 
Cues +ve zero -ve Mean St. dev. 
MENSTRUATION I 2 9 -5.42 5.23 
HOT FLUSHES 12 0 0 8.75 1.14 
A G E 4 3 5 -1.33 4.91 
OCCUPATION 0 11 1 -0.33 1.16 
MOOD STATES 9 3 0 4.08 3.00 
SMOKES 4 7 1 0.63 2.82 
LIBIDO 11 1 0 5.33 2.90 
VAGINAL DRYNESS 12 0 0 7.25 1.71 
WEIGHT 0 7 5 -1.42 2.23 
ATTITUDE TO TREATMENT 10 2 0 7.08 3.53 
FAMILY HISTORY I.H.D. 6 6 0 2.17 2.69 
FAMILY HISTORY B.C. 0 8 4 -1.33 2.19 
PERSONALITY 3 9 0 0.88 1.86 
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Table 5.11 Standardised regression coefficients LIPID task (N = 33 doctors) 
Cues +ve ns. -ve Mean St. dev. 
CHOLESTEROL LEVEL 31 2 0 0.38 0.17 
HYPERTENSION 7 25 I 0.06 0.11 
AGE I 23 9 -0.07 0.14 
GENDER 5 28 0 0.05 0.12 
OCCUPATION 3 30 0 0.03 0.06 
EVIDENCE OF ARTERIOSCLEROSIS 6 27 0 0.09 0.19 
SMOKES 3 19 11 -0.09 0.18 
DIABETES 20 11 2 0.15 0.18 
COMPLIANCE WITH A D V I C E ON DIET 6 25 2 0.03 0.11 
WEIGHT 0 25 8 -0.07 0.13 
ATTFTUDE TO TREATMENT 16 17 0 0.17 0.20 
FAMILY HISTORY I.H.D. 7 26 0 0.06 0.10 
PERSONALITY 2 31 0 0.00 0.07 
Key:- +ve, -ve = significantly positive, negative (p < 0.05), n.s. = not significant 
Table 5.12 Standardised regression Coefncients MIGRAINE task (N = 34 doctors) 
Cues +ve n.s. -ve Mean St. dev. 
DURATION OF ATTACK 15 19 0 0.1 0.08 
FREQUENCY OF ATTACK 33 I 0 0.67 0.23 
A G E 1 32 1 -0.03 0.06 
GENDER 4 30 0 0.02 0.06 
OCCUPATION 0 31 3 -0.02 0.06 
MISSES WORK 0 25 9 -0.06 0.10 
SMOKES I 33 0 0.04 0.05 
NAUSEA 4 28 2 0.03 0.09 
VISUAL DISTURBANCE 6 28 0 0.06 0.09 
WEIGHT 0 33 1 -0.01 0.04 
ATTITUDE TO TREATMENT 18 16 0 0.24 0.21 
RESPONSE TO A C U T E TREATMENT 20 14 0 0.14 0.11 
PERSONALITY 0 32 2 -0.03 0.04 
Key:- +ve, -ve = significantly positive, negative (p < 0.05), n.s. = not significant 
Table 5.13 Standardised regression Coefficients HRT task (N = 12 doctors) 
Cues +ve n.s. -ve Mean St. dev. 
MENSTRUATION 0 9 3 -O.IO 0.17 
HOT FLUSHES 10 2 0 0.35 0.19 
A G E 5 7 0 0.11 0.19 
OCCUPATION 0 10 2 -0.02 0.09 
MOOD STATES 5 7 0 0.12 0.13 
SMOKES 0 12 0 0.02 0.04 
LIBIDO 5 7 0 0.12 0.13 
VAGINAL DRYNESS 5 7 0 0.13 0.17 
WEIGHT 0 10 2 -0.06 0.09 
ATTITUDE TO TREATMENT 9 3 0 0.35 0.22 
FAMILY HISTORY I.H.D. 0 12 0 0.00 0.05 
FAMILY HISTORY B.C. 0 12 0 -0.05 0.06 
PERSONALITY 0 12 0 0.01 0.04 
Key:- -i-ve, -ve = significantly positive, negative (p < 0.05), n.s. = not significant 
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Another measure of agreement in terms of cue use, apart from simply which cues 
are significant is how they are significanL In this respect, greatest disagreement can seen 
on the LIPID task. Five cues Hypertension, age, smoking, diabetes, and compliance 
with advice on diet acted both as indicators and contra-indicators to prescribe. In non-
medical terms, some doctors were significantly more likely to prescribe and some doctors 
were significantly less likely to prescribe given a cue. This is comparable to the positive 
and negative non-zero ratings that some cues were given. This disagreement was greatest 
on smoking where, although 14 doctors did not use the cue, three were more likely to 
prescribe for heavy smokers and 11 were more likely to prescribe for non-smokers. Again 
two cues on the MIGRAINE task but none on the HRT task had both positive and negative 
significant standardised regression coefficients. 
This differing level of agreement in policy on the three tasks can also be seen 
when agreement between judgements predicted from tacit policies (standardised regression 
coefficients) is measured. Kendall's W was calculated for judgements predicted from 
subjects' tacit policies on the LIPID task (W = 0.46). the MIGRAINE task (W = 0.76 and 
the HRT task (W = 0.53), The greater concordance between judgements predicted from 
policies compared to that of actual judgements (Table 5.3) can be put down to the degree 
of inconsistency in doctors' behaviour. The level of agreement is even greater between 
judgements predicted from doctors' explicit policies but again there are differences 
between tasks: agreement is greatest on the MIGRAINE task (W = 0.62, 0.75 and 0.63 on 
the LIPID, MIGRAINE and HRT tasks respectively). 
Of the cues that were available on all three tasks (age, occupation, smoking, 
attitude to treatment and personality) Attitude to treatment was the only one used by a 
considerable number of doctors on all three tasks. Regression coefficients for altitude 
correlated significantly on the LIPID and MIGRAINE tasks (r = 0.560): doctors who were 
less likely to prescribe for those opposed to treatment on one task were also less likely to 
do so on the other. Given the very different medical nature of these two tasks this 
correlation strongly suggests a general personality characteristic which inclines some 
doctors to be generally more sensitive to the wishes of patients than others. Although 
weight was only used by one doctor on the MIGRAINE task, on all three tasks there was a 
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trend for doctors to be less likely to prescribe for patients who were overweight. When 
gender was significant, on both the LIPED and MIGRAINE tasks, doctors were more likely 
to prescribe for males. Appendix 24 shows the correlations between indices of relative 
importance on the different tasks. 
Self-insight 
Doctors' insight into the effect of cues on their decision making was measured in 
three different ways. The explicit stating of relative importance can be compared to the 
measured relative importance of cues (standardised regression coefficients) for each doctor. 
However, this can only be a global comparison since the two measurements are on 
completely different scales. Consequently, subjective weights, directly comparable to 
standardised regression coefficients were calculated from subjective ratings. These were 
used in one measure of self-insight when predictions of decisions on cases when subjective 
weights have been used as elements in a regression equation were compared with actual 
decisions on those cases. Finally, tacit and explicit policies (sets of subjective weights) 
were compared: the stated importance of cues was compared to the relative importance of 
cues. Doctors' subjective weights on the three tasks are shown in Appendices 25, 26 and 27. 
Subjects were asked for relative importance ratings in terms of the bearing 
particular cues had had on their decisions. I f subjects were able to describe cues' relative 
importances in this way then where a cue of great importance had a high rating there should 
be a strong likelihood of prescription for that patient in comparison to other patients. I f the 
doctor's decision making can be described in linear terms at all then there should be a 
strong correlation between his orher actual decision values and values predicted using his 
or her subjective weights as elements in a regression equation. Of course this will always be 
less than the amount explained by the line of best fit (the tacit policy) measured by R. 
Using predictions from subjective weights a linear model was formed that could be 
compared with actual decisions. The ability of this model to describe the decision making 
behaviour is measured by which is the square of the correlation between the subjective 
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linear model predictions and the actual decisions. As Table 5.14 shows, there was 
considerable variation in R/ within tasks. There were significant differences in 
between tasks too (F(2,76) = 8.93, p < 0.01). Doctors'/?^ on the MIGRAINE were 
significantly greater than their R^ on the LIPID tasks (m = 0.14, t = 6.14, p < 0.01). 
are shown in Appendices 25, 26 and 27. 
Table 5.14 Square of correlation of subjective predictions and actual decision values 
Task Mean R/ St. Dev. R^^ Mean R^ 
LIPID 0.21 0.13 0.42 
MIGRAINE 0.36 0.13 0.64 
HRT 0.27 0.15 0.47 
This measure of insight seems to be doctor related as well as task related: doctors 
showing greater insight than their colleagues on the LIPID task also did on the MIGRAINE 
task (r = 0.515, p < 0.05). Although differences between tasks and doctors were significant 
when taken over all doctors, when a two way ANOVA was done on the small group of 10 
doctors who completed all three tasks, there were neither significant differences between 
doctors nor between tasks (F(9,18) = 1.134 and F(2,18) = 2.875 respectively). However, 
this general inter-task and inter-doctor variation may be a reflection of the difference in 
ability to be described linearly at all, i.e. differences in cognitive control or linearity of 
behaviour rather than self-insight. On all three tasks there was a significant correlation 
between R^ and R (r = 0.54, 0.57 and 0.65 on the LEPED, MIGRAINE and HRT tasks 
respectively (p < 0.05)). In other words, where doctors' decisions can be modelled well 
linearly at all, predictions made from fitting subjective weights into a linear equation f i t the 
data better than where decisions are less easily modelled linearly. However, there is a 
significant correlation between poor linear f i t and inconsistency. In this case it would not be 
surprising i f the subject had poor insight. On the HRT task, where doctors had spent longer 
on cases they tended to also have a better R^ (r = 0.60, p < 0.05). This correlation was not 
significant on the LIPID or MIGRAINE tasks (r = 0.07 and r = 0.16, p > 0.05). 
In accordance with the suboptimal linear model formed, the correlations between 
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subjective weights'^ and standardised regression coefficients for each doctor were 
moderately good on all three tasks as shown in Table 5.15. The correlation for each doctor 
on each task is shown in Appendices 25, 26 and 27. In siark contrast to the significant 
differences between tasks when Rs was measured, there was no significant difference 
between the correlations seen on any of the tasks (F(2.76) = 0.40, p = 0.671 '^). This is 
interesting since it contradicts two prior expectations. Firstly, one of the hypotheses in the 
introduction was that self-insight would be worse on the LIPID task. Many cues would be 
rated as important but only the same number of cues would be used as on the MIGRAINE 
task. Both of these are the case but the subjective-objective weight correlation on the 
LIPID task is not significantly different from the MIGRAINE task. Secondly, considering 
that consistency within a subjects'judgements was generally worse on the LIPID task 
anyway subjects would be expected to be less good at explicitly capturing their policy, 
since they don't have such a clear policy. 
Table 5.15 Correlation of regression coefficients with subjective ratings of relative 
importance 
Task Mean correlation Standard deviation 
LIPID 0.66 0.16 
MIGRAINE 0.69 0.14 
HRT 0.67 0.21 
What is interesting is that the discrepancies between subjective and objective 
relative importances seem to be quite specific. Plots of subjective ratings against 
standardised regression coefficients for all doctors are shown in Figure 5.2. A certain clear 
triangular pattern can be seen: Although cues that are rated low tend to have little impact 
on the decision making (low standardised regression coefficients). When a cue is rated 
highly it sometimes does and sometimes does not have a strong impact on the decision 
making. 
These of course would be the same as correlations of subjective ratings here since for 
each doctor they are perfectly correlated. 
Fisher's z transformations of correlations were used for this comparison. 
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Figure 5.2. Plot of Subjective ratings against standardised regression coefficients for (a) the 
LIPID task (N = 33), (b) the MIGRAINE task (N = 34), and (c) the HRT task (N = 12). 
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Figure 5.3. Plot of Subjective weights against Standardised Regression Coefficients for all 
doctors on the (a) LIPID task (N = 33), (b) MIGRAINE task (N = 34). and (c) the HRT 
task ( N = 12) 
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It might be argued thai this triangular pattern could have arisen as a result of 
different uses of the subjective rating scale: some doctors might rate their cue with highest 
impact at six and others at ten when they both might have high standardised regression 
coefficients. However, the uiangular pattern can still be seen when subjective weights are 
plotted against regression coefficients. These triangular plots are shown in Figure 5.3. 
Similarly the triangular pattern can be measured statistically in two different ways. 
Firstly a comparison was made between the number of cues rated above five by a doctor 
and the number of cues that were significant for him or her. If the doctor was using the 
rating scale as specified in the instructions then only those cues rated zero would have been 
thought to have no effect on decisions. Any rating above five could be interpreted as 
indicating the doctor thought that had a fairiy strong bearing on the decision. The number 
of cues rated above five should have been less than or equal to the number of significant 
cues if doctors were showing good insight, since certainly all those cues rated above five, 
and possibly those rated between one and five should have been significant ones. In fact, as 
Table 5.16 shows, the number of cues a doctor rated above five wns greater than the 
number of significant cues for him or her on all three tasks and on the LIPID and 
MIGRAINE tasks this difference was significant. So doctors were giving more cues high 
ratings than were even significant. 
Table 5.16 Differences between the number of cues doctors rate above five and their 
number of significant cues 
Task Mean difference between number of cues t p 
rated above 5 and number of significant cues 
LIPID 2.455 6.21 < 0,001 
MIGRAINE 1.235 3.63 0.001 
H R T 0.917 1.42 0.180 
Secondly, a comparison was made between the range of regression coefficients for 
cues given subjective ratings below the doctor's mean subjective rating (A) with the range 
of regression coefficients for cues given subjective ratings above the doctor's mean 
subjective rating (B). As would be expected, the mean regression coefficient of each group 
with subjective ratings above the mean rating was higher than the mean regression 
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coefficient of the group with subjective ratings below the mean rating. So doctors were 
showing some degree of insight again: the group of cues that were rated as more important 
than average were, on average, more important than average. However what is interesting 
to note is that the standard deviation of regression coefficients of this group of higher rated 
cues was significantly larger than the standard deviation of the regression coefficients of 
lower rated cues. The higher rated cues had regression coefficients ranging from high to 
low whereas regression coefficients for the lower rated cues all tended to be low. 
Table 5.17 Differences in means and standard deviations of regression coefficients of 
cues dichotomized in terms of high and low subjective ratings 
Average difference 
Average difference in standard 
in means of deviations of 
Task groups A and B St. dev. p groups A and B St. dev. p 
LIPID 0.123 0.072 <0.0l 0.127 0.089 <0.0I 
MIGRAINE 0.202 0.080 <0.0I 0.249 0.120 <0.01 
HRT 0.144 0.056 <0.0I 0.144 0.080 <0.0I 
Group A = regression coefficients of cues with corresponding subjective ratings below a 
doctor's mean subjective rating 
Group B = regression coefficients of cues with corresponding subjective ratings above a 
doctor's mean subjective rating. 
When actual values of subjective weights and regression coefficients are compared, 
some degree of insight could be said to be shown in that on average where a cue has been 
used in a certain way it has on average been said to be important in that way. This can be 
seen in Figures 5.4, 5.5. and 5.6. Age on the HRT task, personality on the MIGRAINE 
task and occupation on the LIPID task are exceptions to this. However, it appears that, in 
accordance with the over-rating seen above, mean subjective weights are nearly always 
greater than mean regression coefficients. The most obvious exception to this is frequency 
on the MIGRAINE task. On the LIPID and MIGRAINE tasks, although both subjective 
and objective measures indicate cholesterol and frequency were the most important cues, 
there is slight disagreement as to the relative importance of the other cues. On the HRT 
task there is similar disagreement. The fact that these subjective-objective differences in 
mean weight vary from cue to cue seems to indicate that the overesiimation of relative 
importance is cue related. 
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Figure 5.4. Self-insight as shown by the comparison of average subjective weights and 
average standardised regression coefficients for all doctors on the LIPID task (N = 33). 
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Figure 5.5. Self-insight as shown by the comparison of average subjective weights and 
average standardised regression coefficients for all doctors on the MIGRAINE task (N = 
34). 
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Figure 5.6. Self-insight as shown by the comparison of average subjective weights and 
average standardised regression coefficients for all doctors on the HRT task (N = 12). 
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The fact thai it is cue related, and not doctor related can be seen even better another 
way. The results of a two way ANOVA on the absolute value of the differences between 
doctors' subjective and objective weights for each task are shown in Table 5.18. Although 
there was no significant difference between doctors in their tendency to over-rate cues, 
cues did differ significantly in their propensity to be over-rated. 
Table 5.18 Two way analysis of variance of subjective weight-regression coefficient 
differences 
Task F statistic, between doctors p F statistic, between cues p 
LIPID F(32,384) = 1.048 0.4 F( 12.384) = 5.532 <0.01 
MIGRAINE F(33,396) = 1.457 0.05 F( 12,396) = 20.49 < 0.01 
HRT F( 11,132) = 0.966 0.48 F( 12,132) = 4.268 < 0.01 
In accordance with this over-rating of the importance of certain cues, thei*e were 
significant negative correlations between the number of cues rated above five" and the 
self-insight correlation (Rs) on both the LIPID and MIGRAINE tasks (r = -0.4 and -0.48. p 
< 0.05). This correlation was not significant on the HRT task, in which the sample size was 
small (r = -0.03, p > 0,05, N = 12). However, the correlation between the self-insight 
correlation and the number of significant cues for doctors was significant on this task (r = 
0.66, p < 0.05). But it was not significant on either the LIPID or MIGRAINE tasks (r = 
0.07 and 0.28. p > 0.05). Thus on the HRT task when doctors had used more cues they 
tended to show better insight. Where doctors had rated several cues highly on the LIPID 
and MIGRAINE tasks, predictions of decisions were less good. 
I f overall doctors were to show reasonable insight in terms of matching their 
subjective weights of relative importance to objective ones, then mean subjective weights 
of cues should approximate to objective ones. If there is little matching in terms of 
averages this may either be due to few doctors showing large misjudgements or due to 
standard discrepancies between objective and subjective weights across all doctors. This 
could either be because doctors all show poor insight or because of the way subjective 
weights are calculated or ratings measured. It has been shown above that the importance of 
cues was sometimes over-rated but rarely under-rated: some cues were more likely to be 
Five was chosen arbitrarily. 
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over-rated than others, but no doctors were significantly more likely to over-rate than other 
doctors. Perhaps understandably therefore, there was an association between the predictive 
ability of a linear model of subjective weights and the number of cues that were being rated 
highly on the LIPID and MIGRAINE tasks. It may be that where more cues were rated 
highly there was a greater tendency to over-rate. This measure of insight was also 
associated with the number of cues that were significant: on HRT when more cues were 
significant for a doctor prediction tended to be better. There is perhaps less chance of over-
rating where more cues are important. Although inter-doctor and intertask differences in 
prediction from linear models of subjective weights were significant, these were related to 
differences in ability to describe that set of decisions linearly anyway - reflected in lower 
coefficients of multiple determination or linear fits (R). 
This first study seems to indicate that doctors can't explicitly state their policy of 
cue use very accurately. It might be argued that the pattern of self-insight shown is because 
we haven't modelled their decision making correctly. Although possible, this seems 
unlikely because whether doctors have good or poor linear fits they still over-rate cues. It 
might also be argued that doctors can say what affects their decision making but just can't 
quantify it. Perhaps there is a scaling problem in the estimation of relative importance as 
there is in the estimation of correlation in "theory free" data (see Chapter 4). I f that were the 
case, then when subjective and objective measures of relative importance were compared 
by rank correlations should be good. In fact Spearman's rank correlations of subjective and 
objective cue weights were quite good but again far from ideal (e.g. mean r = 0.59 on the 
LIPID task; mean r = 0.64 on the MIGRAINE task). 
Conclusions 
Generally, GPs' decision making policies on the three tasks can be described using 
judgement analysis techniques and these capture policies better than explicitly stated 
relative weights of cues'. The LIPID task appeared to be a more difficult task than the other 
two: longer was spent on cases in the LIPID task, more cues were given high ratings in 
explicit policies than on the other tasks, less consistency and lower linear fits were seen and 
there was less agreement between subjects. Between task comparisons may of course 
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be subject lo order effects and the increased latencies and worse consistencies on the 
LIPID task may have been due to unfamiliarity with the computer presented task. 
The actual number of cues used in tacit policies did not differ between tasks despite 
differences in latencies. Doctors might have been expected to use more cues in tasks on 
which they spent longer since reduced time pressure might reduce cognitive load. One 
interpretation is that the limit to information use is an artefact of judging a large number of 
computer presented cases in one session, with all information being presented at once. In 
real life where information is gathered sequentially it may be that more information can be 
taken into account when making the decision. This seems unlikely since limits to cognitive 
capacity, whether expert or novice, have been demonstrated using different tasks, including 
those not presented on a computer, using far fewer cases, and not presenting all the 
information in one go (see Shanteau, 1992; Elstein etal, 1990). However, the amount of 
information used here can be compared with that of Study 2 (Chapter 6) where information 
is gathered sequentially. 
The linear predictions of judgements from subjective weights on the MIGRAINE 
task were better than that of the other two tasks. This is most likely to be due to better 
linear describability rather than greater self-insight. There was no significant difference 
between tasks when tacit and explicit policies were compared directly: Subjective and 
objective weights were found to correlate moderately well on all tasks. More cues were 
rated as important than were actually important on all tasks and on all tasks this over-rating 
of cues tended to be cue but not doctor related. This similarity in self-insight is surprising 
given that more cues were rated as important on the LIPID task but the same number was 
actually used. The effects predicted may have cancelled themselves out. The pattern of 
insight seen was a triangular one whereby when subjects indicated that they did not use a 
cue they did not. When they indicated that a cue had been used it may or may not have 
been used. 
There could be a number of explanations for this pattern of self-insight. 
Measurement of self-knowledge is a comparison between an objective measure of a 
subject's behaviour and a subjective measure of the subject's behaviour as the diagram in 
Figure 5.7 demonstrates. There are two types of explanation. One suggests that subjects' 
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self-insight appears to be limited because the method used to elicit either tacit (objective) or 
explicit (subjective) policies was inappropriate. The other gives explanations for the pattern 
seen in terms of the information subjects might be giving us. " 
Subjective 
measure of ^ subject's 
behaviour 
COMPARISON 
= measure of 
self-knowledge 
/ Objective 
\ measure of \ subject's 
behaviour 
Subject's ratings of 
the relative importance 
of cues in decision 
making on that task. 
Policy capturing: 
Relative importance 
of cues in decision 
making on that task. 
Figure 5.7. Measurement of self-knowledge 
Evidence for the inappropriateness of using subjects' stated reports (their explicit 
policies) as a measure of what they know is examined, using an alternative measurement of 
subjects' self-insight, in Chapter 7. Another argument might be made that measurement of 
subjects' tacit (and explicit) policies in terms of a static, linear model is inappropriate. 
Subjects' ratings of the relative importance of cues might be based on a non-linear model. 
This Confounded Rating Hypothesis is introduced in Chapter 6 and further evidence for it 
is examined in Chapter 9 when alternative models are fitted to judgement data. 
Another possibility is that doctors are stating some sort of relative importance 
other than the actual influence cues had on decision making. Often cues are important in 
clinical terms when their 'presence' increases the patient's morbidity or risk of death. A 
doctor may have indicated that a cue was very important i f it had a strong bearing on the 
need to do something, even i f that something was not the sort of decision making that we 
were asking about. This hypothesis is discussed further in Chapter 8. However, i f this is the 
case it does not necessarily suggest that the measurement of self-knowledge is flawed since 
the subjective measure has not been captured. Why subjects were giving this interpretation 
to the influence of cues would have to be questioned and it might be said to f i t the second 
type of explanation. 
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Assuming that both explicit policies and tacit policies have been elicited 
appropriately, to obtain the moderate degree of self-insight consistently seen in judgement 
analyses, explicit statements about causal knowledge must be based on something. One 
possibility is that stated above - that they are based on the clinical meaning of importance. 
Another possibility (the Attention Hypothesis) is that they are based on subjects' attendance 
to cues which is generally agreed to be both accessible and statable (see Chapter 4). The 
pattern of self-insight seen involves the overestimation of the importance of some cues. 
Cues that are looked at more often or are more salient would therefore be rated as being 
more important than cues that are looked at less often. The relationships between cue 
attendance, stated cue use and actual cue use are examined in Chapter 6. 
Even i f there is good evidence that what subjects say correlates well with their 
attendance to cues this is of course not evidence that one is based on the other. Indeed it 
begs the question as to on what cue attendance is based. Both cue attendance and stated cue 
use could be based on something else. For example both could be based on something 
doctors were taught explicitly - some ideal model, or some a priori hypothesis as suggested 
by Nisbett and Ross (1980). Both this and the Attention Hypothesis would fit with the type 
of self-knowledge seen in other studies (discussed in Chapter 4). This possibility is 
discussed in Chapter 8. 
^ The maximum p o s s i b l e l i n e a r f i t would have been 1, i n which c a s e Che 
s u b j e c t would be c o n s i s t e n t l y implementing a l i n e a r a d d i t i v e p o l i c y . 
However, the minimum p o s s i b l e l i n e a r f i t would not have been z e r o . Howell 
(1982, p.498) has noted that an R of 0.1 ( = 0.0\) would be expected i f 
random data were r e g r e s s e d onto 5 p r e d i c t o r s over 50 c a s e s . 
I t has been suggested that s u b j e c t s may have anchored t h e i r responses 
around the 50% mark s i n c e a t the s t a r t of each c a s e the marker was 
p o s i t i o n e d t h e r e . Although s u b j e c t s may have a l r e a d y made t h e i r d e c i s i o n 
before l o o k i n g a t the response bar t h i s i s a p o s s i b i l i t y . I n s u f f i c i e n t 
adjustment from the 50% mark would have l e d to l e s s c o n s i s t e n c y and a 
reduced l i n e a r f i t . I t i s u n l i k e l y t h a t t h i s c o u l d have accounted f o r the 
p a t t e r n of s e l f - i n s i g h t seen. I f a l l cues had the same percentage drop i n 
the v a r i a n c e they were accounting f o r , cues w i t h g r e a t e r impact might 
have dropped i n importance more than cues w i t h l e s s impact. But i f a 
s u b j e c t has r a t e d two cues e q u a l l y , they s h o u l d have the same reduced 
impact, g i v e n t h i s l a c k of v a r i a n c e i n response. O v e r - r a t i n g of the 
importance of cues cannot be accounted f o r by the p o s s i b l e e f f e c t of 
anchoring and adjustment although t h i s would have l e d t o a reduced l i n e a r 
f i t . 
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Chapter Si.\ 
Study T w o : Information Selection Study 
Introduction 
Chapter 5 showed the pattern of discrepancy between how GPs said cues affected 
their decision making (their explicit knowledge) and how they actually used cues (their 
implicit knowledge). To recap, the number of cues influencing a subject's decision making 
was small. However, the number of cues given high subjective ratings of importance was 
greater than this: Some cues were being over-rated. Given the literature discussed in 
Chapters 3 and 4 it is unsurprising that subjects' estimates of cue use are poor. Firstly, the 
sort of information requested is essentially causal or correlational knowledge. The 
regression coefficients used as indices of importance in the tacit policies are a measure of 
how variance of the cue corresponds to variance in judgements. But causal (or 
correlational) knowledge is not directly experienced. It has been argued that processes or 
causal relations are theoretical constructs (White, 1988. p. 15-16). In order to get to the 
relative importance of cues subjects would have to make inferences from their direct 
experiences over the set of cases. This in itself is not grounds to infer poor self-insight: 
Knowing which pieces of information they attended to subjects are probably in a better 
position to state cues' relative importance than others would be. 
Secondly, however, policies were modelled on experts' behaviour. Subjects were 
well practiced at making these sort of decisions.' Along with recognition and insight (aha) 
experiences automatic behaviour has been identified as an area in which verbal reports of 
behaviour are not useful (Ericsson and Simon. 1980. 1984). Skills become automatic with 
practice. Indeed the automatised diagnostic skills shown by doctors have been likened to 
pattern recognition because of the importance of the knowledge base (see Patel and Groen. 
1986). Thus subjects may have had little self-insight into processes that had become 
automatic. Thirdly however, poor self-insight was expected in any case purely because 
previous judgement analyses have shown that subjects' stated descriptions of causes of 
behaviour are poor. 
' Judgement analysis of novices' judgements is of dubious value since they have not 
developed policies to capture. In this case both linear fits and consistency will be low. 
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Poor self-insight was expected because in situations like this, where the behaviour is 
well practised and it is causal knowledge that is requested, subjects do show limited self-
insight. A number of possible explanations for this were introduced at the end of Chapter 5. 
In this chapter the hypothesis to be explored is the Attention Hypothesis. This assumes that 
the apparent poor performance of subjects' ratings of importance is genuine and that these 
ratings are based on experiential knowledge or attendance to cues. One of the central 
themes of metacognition is that humans' knowledge of and ability to state how they do what 
they do (explicit knowledge) and their knowledge in doing it (implicit knowledge) are two 
fundamentally different things. Humans have direct awareness (at best) of phenomenal 
experience. Access to this sort of knowledge, knowledge of the content of short term 
memory (Ericsson and Simon, 1980; 1984) is feasible and can be verbalised. Access to any 
other sort of knowledge, such as processes combining the perceived information are only 
hypotheses. But hypotheses must be based on something. One possibility is that there are 
commonly held and explicit explanations for behaviour. Another possibility is that they are 
based on the phenomenal knowledge of which subjects are aware. Here this basic view of 
metacognition is adhered to. The only phenomenal knowledge subjects would have about 
the cues would be their attendance to them. Therefore it was hypothesized that subjects' 
ratings of importance would be based on phenomenal knowledge of attention to cues. 
There are a few ways to ascertain which cues a subject is attending to. Firstly, they 
can talk aloud during the task. In the course of this they should refer to those cues that they 
heed. However, they may of course attend to cues that they do not mention and where 
judgement making is virtually automatic, talking aloud may change the nature of the 
behaviour (Wilson and Schooler, 1991; see also White, 1988). Secondly, eye movements 
could be traced and the relative amount of time spent on different pieces of information 
could be used as a measure of the amount it was attended to. However, subjects in these 
studies were visited in their places of work where it would have been impractical to take the 
expensive and bulky equipment, and which may have again interfered with the judgement 
making process. Thirdly, one can adopt the method used in the following study, where 
subjects' selection of cues can be used as a measure of which cues are attended to. 
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Here information is only revealed when the subject requests it. Obviously the cues not 
attended to cannot influence judgement making. The cues influencing judgement making 
will be the cues selected or some subset of them. 
In the mechanical information boards used in some information processing studies 
all cases (alternatives), and their component cues, are presented simultaneously for 
inspection. According to Billings and Marcus (1983) subjects' estimates of covariation 
have been found to be better under simultaneous presentation conditions. Thus self-insight 
might have improved if this was the presentation format. However^ cases in the surgery 
would not be seen simultaneously and this mode of presentation may reduce the validity of 
the task. In this study cases were presented sequentially so that subjects were forced to 
employ an interdimension information search strategy on each case (see Billings and 
Marcus. 1983). 
Where the attendance to cues over the set of cases is compared to their relative 
influence on judgement making and their stated relative influence on judgement making, 
the Attention Hypothesis predicts that stated cue use would resemble attendance (or 
selection) of cues more than it resembles cue use. In this case the correlation between 
subjective ratings (slated cue use) and cue selection should be high and higher than that 
between subjective ratings and standardised regression coefficients (actual cue use). 
I f patterns of subjective ratings bear greater resemblance to regression coefficients 
than do patterns of cue selection, this would suggest that subjects have better self-insight 
than they would i f they were just relying on information about their selection of cues. If 
there was no significant difference between these two sets of correlations then the 
implications are that subjects show no better insight than i f they had based their decisions 
on cue selection. 
Another topic to be addressed in this study is the relationship between process 
tracing and policy capturing analyses of judgement making. A distinction can been made 
between the information aquisition and information combination phases of judgement or 
decision making (see e.g. Einhom. 1972). Verbal protocol analysis has given evidence for 
non-compensatory followed by compensatory processes when subjects are considering a 
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large number of alternatives (Olshavsky, 1979; cited by Billings and Marcus, 1983)^. But 
the two judgement stages do not necessarily refer to the aquisition and combination phases. 
Billings and Marcus (1983, p.377) note that process tracing and policy capturing focus on 
two different aspects of the judgement making process (information gathering and 
evaluation respectively) and found compensatory and non-compensatory policies used in 
both. Einhorn, Kleinmuntz and Kleinmuntz (1979) suggested that process tracing 
implicitly captures the information combination phase of judgement making as well as 
explicitly capturing the information gathering phase. They argue that the two methods 
capture the same process at different levels of generality and demonstrated that both could 
be used to capture the same judgement making. In line with this, in certain studies patterns 
of cue selection have been taken to be representative of aspects of the underlying 
judgement policy. For example, a linear compensatory model is inferred where the subject 
has selected the same infomiation about each case (see Billings and Marcus. 1983). 
Einhom, Kleinmuntz and Kleinmuntz (1979) analysed two different types of 
judgement using both process tracing and policy capturing. In their first study on 
judgements of adjustment on MMPI profiles policy capturing was considerably better at 
predicting the subject's cross validated judgements than was the process u-acing model 
based on an analysis of verbal protocols. Einhom, Kleinmuntz and Kleinmuntz gave two 
possible explanations for the poor performance by the process tracing model. Firstly, 
subjects may be able to say little about their judgement making in the first well practised 
scenario (MMPI judgements). Secondly, it is incredibly difficult for an experimenter to 
form sets of rules describing the judgement making process from verbal protocols. In their 
second study on judgements of cereals the subject's^ judgements on a cross validation 
sample were predicted about equally well by both methods. The essential argument - that 
both types of analysis are useful and complementary is certainly true. They were both 
useful descriptively at one level. However, to say that both describe the same process but 
at different levels of generality is misleading. They only describe the same process in as 
2 To recap, compensatory models {e.g. linear) imply that the judgement is affected by the 
values on all the cues. Non-compensatory models {e.g. Elimination by aspects) suggest 
that cases having for example a low value on one cue cannot be compensated for by a 
high value on another cue (see Chapter 3). 
^ There was only one subject. 
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much as the experimenter infers the information combination pattern on the basis of the 
information selected. 
Billings and Marcus (1983) too looked for evidence of a convergence of results using 
different methods. Subjects'judgements on the same set of apartments were analysed using 
process tracing techniques in one task and using policy capturing in a second task. In both 
tasks compensatory and non-compensatory policies were compared. In the process tracing 
analysis these were measured by examining the information search pattern (constant 
amount per alternative as opposed to a varied amount per alternative). In the policy 
capturing analysis linear, log models and ANOVAs were used as indices of linear and non-
linear behaviour. Although, as predicted by Billings and Marcus, on both tasks there was an 
increase in compensatory models under increased information load, there was no 
convergence in the two measures of behaviour. Subjects measured as using a compensatory 
policy on one task (with one analysis) were equally likely to be using a non-compensatory 
policy as a compensatory one on the other task (with the other analysis). 
The two methods did not capture the same underlying behaviour. Cue selection and 
cue combination are two quite separate parts of judgement making. One interpretation is 
that Billings and Marcus (1983) found no relationship between configurality of cue 
selection and interaction of cue use or curvilinear cue use. The idea that both process 
tracing and policy capturing capture the same process is misleading. However, although 
Billings and Marcus presented the same alternatives, cue selection and policy were 
measured in two separate tasks that differed in some fundamental ways. These presented 
the alternatives sequentially or simultaneously leading to judgement making or choice 
respectively and varied different aspects of information load (number of alternatives 
presented at one time or time pressure). These differences could have lead to differences in 
behaviour and contributed to a lack of correlation. 
In this study information selection and combination were measured on the same task. 
Where information aquisition forms part of the judgement process non-linearity of 
information selection might contribute to non-linearity of judgement making. It might be 
argued that selective revelation of cues would be odd i f they were not selectively influential 
on the judgement. Non-linearity or configurality of information selection would 
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be seen in terms of selection of differing numbers of pieces of information on different 
cases. The standard deviation of the number of cues a doctor selected on cases could be 
used as an index of this. Configurality of cue use could be seen in terms of the amount of 
systematic variance explained by a linear model. Sets of judgements can be seen as 
consisting of three components: inconsistent behaviour and consistent behaviour which 
itself consists of systematic linear behaviour and systematic non-linear behaviour. The 
linear f i t gives a measure of how much systematic linear behaviour there is, but this is 
limited by both the non-linearity and the consistency of behaviour. Consistency can be used 
to measure the total amount of systematic behaviour. Of consistent behaviour, the less 
systematic linear behaviour is, the more configural the behaviour, or the more systematic 
non-linear behaviour there is. 
Where there is more variance in the number of cues selected on different cases, 
indicating configural cue selection, less of the systematic variance would be explicable with 
a linear model, indicating configural cue use. In other words when consistency has been 
partialled out, i f the two methods (information selection and combination) are really part of 
the same phenomenon, a negative correlation would be expected between linear f i t and the 
variance in cue selection. In this study, where both cue selection and cue use are measured 
this can be tested. However, cue use could still be configural even i f the same cues were 
selected on every case. Linear or non-linear strategies may be used in either of these phases. 
Cue selection and cue combination are two quite separate parts of judgement making and it 
is expected that there will be no relationship between configurality of the two. 
The second issue raised in Study 1 was that of the limitations to information 
processing. The apparent limits to information processing capacity were seen in the limits 
to the number of cues that doctors were taking into account on tasks. In a demonstration of 
poor self-insight, this was less than the number of cues doctors indicated were of 
importance. The limits to human information processing capacity lie in working memory. 
In previous studies, limits to information processing have been seen in terms of the number 
of hypotheses considered (Elstein etal, 1990), limits to memory, number of diagnostic 
statements (see Shanteau, 1992) and also in the number of cues used in judgement making 
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(see Chapter 3). These different measures tap different pans of information processing. 
This study will address whether information aquisition as well as evaluation is limited. 
Method 
Subjects and logistics 
This Study was run during the same session as both the consistency task (Study 1) 
and the Policy Recognition task of Study 3 (described in Chapter 7). The average lime 
elapsed since subjects were seen for the primary study was ten months (range 8 to 13 
months). 
Thirty doctors who had participated in Study 1. described in Chapter 5. participated 
in this study (Study 2).^ * Al l of these had completed the LIPID task of Study 1. They 
completed the Consistency task of Study 1 immediately prior to this Study. Four subjects 
were female. 
The Information Selection task 
The Information Selection task will be referred to as the IS task. The LIPID task 
always refers to the LIPID task of Study 1 (described in Chapter 5). Subjects were 
presented with a series of cases on which they had to make decisions about their likelihood 
of prescription of a lipid lowering agent. This was the same decision as subjects had made 
on the LIPID task of Study I . On each case in the IS task subjects chose the information 
they considered relevant to a case before making a judgement about their likelihood of 
prescription of a lipid lowering drug. The cases used were the same as the last 100 cases on 
the LIPID task of Study 1 (Chapter 5). They were presented in the same order and earned 
the same case number as the LIPID task. The cues presented and their ranges were shown 
in Table 5.2 (Chapter 5). As in the LIPID task, in the IS task the likelihood of prescription 
of a lipid lowering drug was entered using the computer mouse. Prior to this information 
was selected and revealed using a concept keyboard. Only the information selected about 
each case by subjects was revealed to them. 
These were doctors who wished to participate in a second study and for whom the LIPID 
task data had been saved. All of these had done the consistency task described in Study 1 
(Chapter 5). 
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The original 130 cases on the LIPID task had been generated to give a maximum 
inter-cue correlation of 0.2 over 130 cases. The greatest inter-cue correlation on the 100 
cases presented in the IS task was 0.26 (between Occupation and Compliance). All inter-
cue correlations on the IS task are shown in Appendix 29. 
Information Selection 
Information revelation was independent for each case. The screen seen at the start 
of a case is shown in Figure 6.1. Apart from the case number, initially only the type of 
information available was displayed. This was on the left hand side of the screen. 
Subjects revealed the information they wanted by pressing the relevant area of a 
specially adapted A4 sized concept keyboard. This contained horizontal, clearly labelled 
bars which corresponded to the types of infomiation available on the screen and were in 
the same relative positions. As bars on the keyboard were pressed the information appeared 
on the right hand side of the screen opposite the corresponding information label as can be 
seen in Figure 6.2. For example, having pressed 'Gender' on the concept keyboard the word 
'Male' or 'Female' would appear opposite the word 'Gender' on the screen. 
The bottom section of the keyboard was labelled 'Ready to make decision'. When 
this was pressed the response bar appeared at the bottom of the screen as shown in Figure 
6.3. The mouse then became active and no more information could be revealed about that 
case. Pressing the mouse button to register a judgement caused the next case to appear on 
the screen. 
Instructions 
The instructions for the information seeking task were presented on a laminated 
sheet due to space restrictions on the Acorn A4 portable computer. These are shown in 
Appendix 28. Subjects read them in their own time immediately prior to the task. The 
assumptions about each case were the same as those in the LIPID task of Study I . In 
addition to that subjects were given specific instructions on how to reveal information they 
wanted about each case prior to making a decision. 
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CASE 31 
- J 
CHOLESTEROL LEVEL 
HYPERTENSION 
AGE 
GENDER 
OCCUPATION 
EVIDENCE OF ARTERIOSCLEROSIS 
SMOKES 
DIABETES 
COMPLIANCE WITH ADVICE ON DIET 
WEIGHT 
ATTITUDE TO TREATMENT 
FAMILY HISTORY I.H.D. 
^ „ PERSONALITY 
Figure 6.1 The saeen seen at the start of a case in the Information Selection task. 
CASE 31 
oo 
CHOLESTEROL LEVEL 
HYPERTENSION 
AGE 
GENDER 
OCCUPATION 
EVIDENCE OF ARTERIOSCLEROSIS 
SMOKES 
DIABETES 
COMPLIANCE WITH ADVICE ON DIET 
WEIGHT 
ATTITUDE TO TREATMENT 
FAMILY HISTORY I.H.D,; 
^ ^ J ' E R S O N A L I T Y 
59 
Male 
Figure 6.2 The screen seen during information selection on a case in the Information Selection task. 
CASE 31 
CHOLESTEROL L E V E L 7.9 
HYPERTENSION 
AGE 59 
GENDER Male 
OCCUPATION 
EVIDENCE OF ARTERIOSCLEROSIS 
SMOKES No 
DIABETES Yes, well controlled 
COMPLIANCE WITH ADVICE ON DIET 
WEIGHT Under 
ATTITUDE T O TREATMENT Opposed 
FAMILYHISrORY l.H.D. ist degree relative 
PERSONALITY 
PRESCRIBE LIPID LOWERING AGENT 
1 o(m 50% 
Figure 6.3 The screen seen after information selection and during decision making on a case in the Information Selection task. 
Results and Discussion 
The two main topics of interest in Study 1, information processing capacity and self-
insight are both explored here. The finding of limited use of cues of Study 1 will be looked 
at in relation to the selection and use of cues in this study. The Attention Hypothesis will be 
tested as an explanation for the pattern of self-insight seen in Study 1. In addition, cue 
selection behaviour will be analysed and discussed with reference to its use in process 
tracing techniques. Firstly however, subjects' behaviour on this information selection (IS) 
task wil l be compared with that on the LIPID task of Study I . Change in behaviour between 
the LIPID and IS tasks can be looked at in in terms of how similar judgements were, how 
similar policies were and how much consistency there was again within and between 
doctors'judgement making on the two tasks. This involves comparison of both judgements 
made and the tacit policies leading to them on LIPID and IS tasks. 
Change and consistency of judgements 
Since the cases on the IS task were the same as the last 100 in the LIPID task of Study 
1 judgements on the two tasks can be compared. Similarity can be measured in two ways: 
Responses on cases be directly compared or they can be correlated. To test the significance 
of the change in judgement making between studies for each doctor, a paired t test was 
done over the two sets of judgements on the 100 cases. There was no trend here. The IS 
task does not make doctors any more or less likely to prescribe. Ten doctors were 
significantly more likely to prescribe on the IS task, twelve were significantly less likely to 
prescribe and for 8 there was no significant change in likelihood of prescription. Table 6.1 
shows that the average mean judgement for both tasks was the same. 
Table 6.1 Comparison of indices on the IS and LIPID tasks 
Task N Average St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Kendall's d.f 
Mean of mean , 
judgement ^ 
LIPID (100) 30 33.0 23.7 0.49 0.16 0.28 99 
IS 30 33.0 20.1 0.51 0.16 0.35 99 
^ Kendall's W is a measure of concordance ranging from 0 to I. I indicates thai there is full agreement, 0 
indicates that there is no agreement. 
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Consistency is a measure of agreement on two presentations of the same case in terms 
of the correlation. It measures whether doctors were still relatively more likely to prescribe 
for cases for which they were previously relatively more likely to prescribe. The correlation 
between judgements made on different presentations of these 100 cases (the inter task 
consistency) was calculated for each doctor (see Appendix 30). These correlations were 
reasonable (mean r = 0.48). I f judgements were different, it could be due to a change of 
policy over time, due to inconsistency in judgement making on either task (or both), or due 
to change of judgement making behaviour with a change in task format. The indication here 
was that what little change there was was due to inconsistency or change in policy over 
time rather than change in behaviour induced by the task. General change of decision 
making over time and inconsistency was seen in performance on the Consistency task of 
Study 1 which was conducted during the same session as the IS task. In the Consistency 
task the first 30 cases of the LIPID task were presented in the original format for a second 
set of judgements. A few doctors had been seen to be inconsistent in judgement making on 
the first thirty cases of the LIPID task in that the correlation between the two sets of 
judgements they had made was not even significant. However, over the next 100 cases, 
with the change in task, only one doctor was not significantly consistent in his decision 
making behaviour. Same format consistency (mean r = 0.35) was significantly worse than 
the inter task consistency (t = 2.61, p = 0.01, N = 30)^ . However, this comparison needs to 
be viewed with some caution since judgement making on the first thirty cases had been 
shown to be less consistent within the LIPID task (see Chapter 5). Any change in behaviour 
is general change in behaviour over time or inconsistency rather than due to the change in 
task format. 
The average linear fits (R^) of policies on the LIPID and on the IS tasks are shown in 
Table 6.1. After both were transformed in to Fisher's z there was no significant difference 
between the multiple correlation R for doctors on the IS task and on the last 100 cases of 
the LIPID task (t = 0.76, p = 0.45) and the correlation between Fisher's z transformations of 
the two was significant (r = 0.48, N = 30, p < 0.01). So linear fits were not significantly 
different from those on the LIPID task and doctors showing consistency 
^ This is the I test of the difference in Fisher's z transfomiations of the two sets of consistencies. 
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in policy use on the LIPID task also tended lo on the IS task. 
Doctors who had good linear fits on the IS task tended to be those who made the 
same judgements as on the LIPID task. After both were converted to Fisher's z there was a 
significant correlation between inter task consistency and R on the IS task (r = 0.396. N = 
30). This can be compared to the significant correlation between consistency and R on the 
LIPID task in Study 1. Generally doctors whose behaviour was less well captured by a 
linear model tended lo be less consistent over time. However, not all doctors f i t this 
pattern. Doctors having poor between task correlations but good linear fits on the IS task 
may have changed policy (such as GP21 and GP36) or lacked a policy on the LIPID task 
(such as GP13). GP14 and GP15 however show both poor between task consistency of 
judgements and very low linear fits on the IS task. However, GP13, G P U and GPI5 have 
in common that on one of the tasks their decision making hardly varied. GP15 almost 
never prescribed on the IS task. GP14. consistent with his behaviour on the last 100 cases 
of the LIPID task, hardly deviated from the midpoint of the response scale. Similarly 
GP13. nearly always prescribed for the last 100 cases of the LIPID task. 
When judgements vary little, consistency of judgement making wil l appear low 
since correlation is used as the index. On the LIPID and MIGRAINE tasks of Study 1 there 
was a significant correlation between standard deviation of judgements and the multiple 
correlation coefficient of cues onto those judgements (R). This correlation was also 
significant on the IS task: r = 0.45, N = 30. p < 0.05. In other words when on the IS task a 
subject's judgements varied less, less variance in them could be explained by variance of 
the cues. This would appear to be the case for GPU and GP15. Appendix 30 shows 
standard deviations and average judgements for all GPs on the IS task and over the same 
cases on the LIPID task. However, the inter task consistency in judgement making was not 
significantly correlated with either the standard deviation of the LIPID task judgements (r 
= 0.202. p > 0.05) or of the IS task judgements (r = 0.196, P > 0.05). In other words, rather 
than lacking variance in their judgements, some GPs must have been genuinely 
inconsistent in judgement making or in use of a judgement making policy. 
Despite general similarity in the judgements being made, a change of behaviour can 
be seen on the IS task: Between subject agreement was slightly improved. Kendall's W are 
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shown for the two tasks in Table 6.1, This improved agreement could be due to increased 
consistency by doctors or it could be due to greater similarity of policies. Linear fits of 
models* which have been seen to correlate with consistency, were the same on both tasks. 
Change in policies will be examined next. 
Change in cue use 
Consistency of policy is measured in terms of change in the cues used. As before, 
tacit policies were calculated using standardised regression coefficients as a measure of 
cues' relative importance (see Chapter 5). Sets of standardised regression coefficients were 
calculated for each doctor on judgements made on the last 100 cases of the LIPID task 
(shown in Appendix 31) and on the IS task (shown in Appendix 32). General patterns of 
cue use on the two tasks were much the same as can be seen when Tables 6.2 and 6.3 are 
compared. Cholesterol level. Diabetes and Attitude to treatment are the most positively 
used cues on both tasks. Age. Smokes and Weight are the most negatively used cues on 
both tasks. 
IS task ^ 
Standardised regression coefTidents 
0.8 
0.4 0.6 08^ 
LIPID task (Study 1) 
Standardised regression coeffidents 
calculated from Judgements 
on the last 100 cases 
-0.8 
-1-" 
Figure 6.4 Cue Standardised Regression Coefficients for all doctors calculated on the last 
100 cases of the LIPID task (Study 1) and the IS task. 
133 
Table 6.2 Standardised regression coefncients last 100 cases of L I P I D task (N = 30 
doctors) 
Cues +ve n.s. -ve Mean St. dev. 
CHOLESTEROL LEVEL 29 1 0 0.41 0.18 
HYPERTENSION 6 23 1 0.05 0.11 
AGE 1 19 10 -0.09 0.15 
GENDER 3 27 0 0.04 0.12 
OCCUPATION 3 27 0 0.05 0.07 
EVIDENCE OF ARTERIOSCLEROSIS 6 24 0 0.11 0.19 
SMOKES 2 19 9 -0.10 0.19 
DIABETES 14 14 2 0.15 0.20 
COMPLIANCE WITH ADVICE ON DIET 3 26 1 0.02 0.09 
WEIGHT 1 24 5 -0.07 0.16 
ATTITUDE TO TREATMENT 13 17 0 0.17 0.22 
FAMILY HISTORY l.H.D. 4 26 0 0.05 0.10 
PERSONALITY 2 28 0 -0.02 0.08 
Key:- +ve, -ve = significantly positive or negative regression coefficient; n.s. = not 
significant. 
Table 6.3 Standardised regression coefficients IS task (N = 30 doctors) 
Cues +ve n.s. -ve Mean St. dev. 
C H O L E S T E R O L L E V E L 26 4 0 0.41 0.21 
H Y P E R T E N S I O N 4 22 4 -0.01 0.12 
A G E 0 19 11 -0.12 0.12 
G E N D E R 6 24 0 0.08 0.11 
O C C U P A T I O N 1 28 1 0.03 0.06 
E V I D E N C E O F A R T E R I O S C L E R O S I S 9 21 0 0.09 0.15 
S M O K E S 2 18 10 -0.13 0.21 
D L ^ L B E T E S 15 15 0 0.17 0.18 
C O M P L L \ N C E W I T H A D V I C E O N D I E T 4 26 0 0.04 0.09 
W E I G H T 0 24 6 -0.06 0.09 
A T T I T U D E T O T R E A T M E N T 18 12 0 0.26 0.23 
F A M I L Y H I S T O R Y l . H . D . 7 21 2 0.05 0.13 
P E R S O N A L I T Y 1 28 1 -0.01 0.09 
Key:- +ve. -ve = significantly positive or negative regression coefficient; n.s. = not 
significant. 
The relationship between cue use by doctors on the IS and LIPID tasks is plotted in 
Figure 6.4. The regression coefficients on each task for all doctors are included in this 
graph. Only one cue appears to have changed in the way it was used but that was of little 
import (positively) on the LIPID study. Indeed the similarities between policies on the two 
tasks can again be seen in Figure 6.5 where the mean standardised regression coefficient 
for each cue on the tasks are compared. 
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Average standardised regression coefTicients last 100 cases on LIPID task 
Average standardised regression coefficients on IS task 
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Figure 6.5 Average Standardised Regression Coefficients calculated from judgements on the IS task and on the LIPID task of Study 1 (last 100), N = 30. 
A good correlation of a doctor's standardised regression coefficients on the LIPID 
and the IS task would show consistency of policy for an individual doctor. The correlations 
between these standardised regression coefficients for each doctor are also shown in 
Appendix 30. The average correlation between regression coefficients on the two tasks was 
good (average r^ = 0.58, o = 0.3). However, the correlation was not significant for ten 
doctors who may have changed policy between studies. Of these ten. three may have 
pooriy captured policies on one of the tasks due to lack of variance; three doctors who had 
been significantly less likely to prescribe for smokers on the LIPID task were not 
influenced by the cue on the IS task; Four doctors were significantly influenced by attitude 
on the IS task when they had not been on the LIPID task. Three of the doctors were 
significantly influenced by Evidence of arteriosclerosis on the IS task when they had not 
been on the LIPID task; one GP. who relied primarily on Evidence of arteriosclerosis on 
the LIPID task, was not influenced by it at all in the IS task. 
Where cues are orthogonal as here, change in policy would lead lo a change in set 
of decisions. Therefore it is unsurprising that the doctors that had higher correlations 
between standardised regression coefficients of cues on the LIPID and the IS tasks (r^,). 
showing better consistency in the policy they were using, also tended to show more 
consistency in decisions made between these two tasks' (r = 0.792. N = 30, p < 0.05). 
In general doctors are consistent in both policy and judgement making between 
tasks. However, consistency of policy obviously affects consistency of judgement making. 
Where doctors were inconsistent in policy use (as measured by linear fit) on the LIPID task 
they were also on the IS task. Where subjects were inconsistent in policy use between the 
two studies (perhaps because of inconsistency on the LIPID task) they tended to be less 
consistent in policy use on the IS task. The slight improvement in agreement on the tasks 
may be due to the slight change in policy by a few doctors. Two doctors had policies on 
the IS task that couldn't really be explained in terms of the cues available because they had 
not varied judgements made on the task. 
' Fisher's z transformations of r^  and r were used, 
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Similarity of latency effects 
As Table 6.4 shows, the number of cues subjects were selecting on a case is 
unsurprisingly correlated significantly and positively with the latency on that case for 
almost all doctors (it does take longer to press more buttons). However, latencies were also 
still significantly positively correlated with latencies on the LIPID task for a large 
proportion of doctors. In other words for several doctors there were cases they chose to 
think about for longer on both the LIPID and IS tasks. 
Table 6.4 Summary of within-doctor correlations over the 100 cases on the IS task 
Mean r St. dev t p No. significant 
IS latencies with LIPID task latencies 0.16 0.16 5.40 <0.01 13/30 
IS latencies with number of cues selected 0.48 0.27 9.39 < 0.01 27/29^ 
IS latencies with judgement 0.26 0.25 5.73 <0.01 19/30 
Number of cues selected with judgement 0.31 0.38 4.33 < 0.01 23/29' 
As in Study 1. several doctors were more likely to prescribe for cases on which 
they had spent longer. Also, for the majority of doctors, there was a significant positive 
correlation between the number of cues they looked at on a case and their likelihood of 
prescribing for that case (mean within-doctor correlation = 0.31. standard deviation = 0.38, 
N = 29). For three doctors this correlation was significantly negative. One doctor always 
selected the same five cues and so the calculation was not possible for him. Two different 
types of policy then can be seen: Twenty doctors, with a significant positive correlation, 
could be said to be looking for reasons not to prescribe. Cases they spent less time on they 
were less likely to prescribe for. As soon as they'd found reason not to prescribe they made 
that judgement. They needed more evidence that they should prescribe. In collecting that 
evidence, and being more likely to prescribe, they spent more time on the case. Three 
doctors were looking for evidence to prescribe, and as soon as they'd found it they made 
that judgement. I f they carried on looking at more information it was less likely that they 
were going to prescribe. 
® One doctor (GPI9) selected the same number of cues on every case and the correlation 
was not possible. 
' The correlation was significantly negative for three doctors. CP 19 again not included 
(see footnote 1). 
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Models of information processing and measurement of capacity 
As stated previously, cue selection has been used in information processing studies as 
a measure of the subject's policy on the task. Einhom, KJeinmuntz and Kleinmuntz (1979) 
suggested that the sort of information gleaned in process tracing models captured the same 
underlying process as policy capturing does but at a different level of generality. They felt 
that the information combination and use of feedback in judgement making are implicit in 
process tracing models, which mainly focus on information search. This section wil l show 
that the analysis of Judgements in terms of information selection is not capturing the same 
underlying process that policy capturing does. 
Doctors varied in the number of cues selected on each case. Al l but one doctor (who 
selected all 13 cues) had an average cue selection per case of between 3 and 10 (median = 
6.43, N = 30). The mean of the average number of cues doctors selected on cases is notably 
higher than the number of cues that were significant for doctors (average = 4, range 2 to 8). 
The cues affecting decision making should be some degree of subset of the cues selected. 
But doctors selected more cues than affected their decision making. Standard deviations of 
the number of cues doctors were selecting on cases ranged from 0 to 4.32 (median = 1.7, N 
= 30). In terms of information processing capacity, this finding is interesting. I f limits to 
information processing capacity lie in working memory then not only should the 
information affecting decision making be limited but so too should the information 
attended to. For the majority of doctors this is the case - the information selected, used here 
as a measure of attention, is less than that available. However, it is more than that actually 
used. Information is selected sequentially, remains on the computer screen and need not be 
held in working memory. Thus more information can be selected than is actually used in 
the combination stage of judgement making. 
As indicated in the introduction, linear compensatory rules have been inferred where 
subjects select the same cues on each case. Configurality of cue use - the use of non-linear, 
non additive (non-compensatory) policies - might be indicated by selection of different 
cues on cases. The standard deviation is one measure of the amount a subject's cue selection 
changes over cases. So this could be taken as an indication of the degree of configurality of 
cue use. Since doctors had different standard deviations, it might be 
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thought that they were showing different degrees of configural cue use. However, cue 
selection and cue use are not the same thing and configurality of cue selection and 
configurality of cue use are not the same thing. Billings and Marcus (1983) showed the 
discrepancy between measures of behaviour based on cue selection and those based on cue 
use policy capturing. However, their measures were on two separate tasks. Here both policy 
capturing and cue selection measures were carried out on the same task. 
In order to test the effect of irregularity of cue selection on configurality of 
judgement making, tlie standard deviation of the number of cues a doctor selected on cases 
was correlated with their multiple correlation coefficient, partialing out consistency. 
Configurality of cue use would be measured by the paucity of the linear fit (R2) or multiple 
correlation coefficient (R) in explaining the systematic variance in the subject's behaviour. 
The linear fit is influenced not only by the linearity of judgement behaviour but also by its 
consistency. Configurality of cue selection is indicated by the standard deviation of the 
number of cues a doctor selects. I f configurality or irregularity of cue selection has an 
effect on configurality of judgement making this correlation should be significant and 
negative. In fact, using Fisher's z transformations of the multiple correlation and 
consistencies, the partial correlation was insignificant (r = -0.121, p > 0.05, N = 30). In 
other words those doctors exhibiting irregular cue selection were no more likely to exhibit 
non-linear cue use than doctors more uniform in their cue selection. Configurality of cue 
selection cannot be taken as an indicator of configural judgement making. This has 
interesting implications for the literature discussed in the introduction. It emphasises the 
difference between the somewhat accessible information gathering stage and the implicit 
information combination phase of information processing and judgement making. Doctors 
may show configural cue use regardless of their configurality of selection. 
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Cue selection Policies 
Static models of cue selection, which are comparable to other static measures of 
cue use such as policy capturing, can be measured in two ways. One index is the number of 
times a doctor selected a cue at all during the 100 cases or its percentage selection. [These 
are shown in Appendix 33]. The average percentage of cases on which cues were selected 
by doctors is shown in Figure 6.6. Another index is the average position at which it was 
selected. When a cue was selected first it scored a selection rating of 13. when it was 
selected second it scored 12. third 11 etc. When a cue was not selected at all it scored 0 on 
that case. The average selection position of cues could be calculated for each doctor, 
showing a selection policy. [These are shown in Appendix 34.] The average of these is 
shown in Figure 6.7. 
Figures 6.6 and 6.7 are obviously extremely similar. The two measures of selection 
were found to correlate highly with each other over the 13 cues for every doctor (average 
correlation = 0.92. a = 0.15, N = 30). Position of cue selection may have been affected by 
the order of presentation of cues on the screen. Cues could not be revealed simultaneously 
and apparent differences in preference for cues might simply be the result of behaviour that 
has been forced to be sequential. The number of selections out of 100 was used in all the 
following calculations and this will be referred to as the selection frequency. However, the 
high correlation between the two indices of selection is important. Firstly it indicates 
relative consistency of cue selection - an important feature if consistency of cue use is to be 
obtained. Secondly, it may indicate that those cues selected later whilst looking at the case, 
were not selected so often. This is important when considering the possible configural use 
of cues. It indicates that some cues only become relevant or important (and are therefore 
selected) when other cues have been found to have certain values. However, this 
correlation may be exaggerated by the proportion of cues never selected and therefore 
scoring zero in both indices. 
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Figure 6.6 Average percentage of cue selection for each cue over all doctors on the 
Information Selection task. 
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Figure 6.7 Average cue selection rating for doctors on the Information Selection task (13 = 
first selected cue). 
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Figure 6.8 Average absolute standardised regression coefficients on the Information 
Selection task 
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Figure 6.9 Average absolute subjective rating of cue importance (from the LIPID task. 
Study 1) 
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Self'imight 
Having established that, for the majority of doctors, tacit policies varied little from 
those on the LIPID task in Study 1, we can compare the subjective ratings of importance 
obtained on that task with measures made on the IS task such as the attention paid to each 
cue. Cue selection was used as a measure of attention. One theory of metacognition is that 
we only have insight into experience and are no better than others at describing the causes 
of our behaviour. I f this is the case in this task subjects should have good knowledge as to 
the cues they attended to (experiential knowledge) but not the causal knowledge of the 
relationship between cues and judgements requested. According to the Attention 
Hypothesis the ratings of importance subjects are giving cues should relate better to this 
experiential knowledge than to the actual bearing cues had on decision making. Cue 
selection was used here as a rough measure of attention. 
Cue selection can be compared directly to the two other cue related measures -
standardised regression coefficients and subjective ratings. Since cue selection is always 
positive, absolute values of standardised regression coefficients and subjective ratings were 
calculated for each doctor. The averages of these are shown in Figures 6.8 and 6.9. 
To test the Attention Hypothesis, the correlations between subjective ratings and 
standardised regression coefficients for each doctor were compared with the correlations 
between subjective ratings and cue selection for that doctor. In all these analyses Fisher's z 
transforms of correlations were used in comparisons. Only 19 doctors were used for this. 
The ten doctors who had apparently changed policy between tasks were not included'**, nor 
was GPI4 whose linear model was a poor description of his policy on the IS task (R2 = 
0.13). However, for the remaining 19 doctors the correlation between subjective ratings on 
the LIPID task and cue selection on the IS task (average r = 0.65, s = 0.15) was 
significantly greater than the correlation of the subjective ratings with standardised 
regression coefficients of the IS task for that doctor (average r = 0.46, s = 0.16) (t = 4.88** , 
p < 0.01). This indicates that doctors' ratings of importance bore more resemblance to the 
'° The correlation between standardised regression coefficients on the LIPID task and on the IS task were not 
significant for GPI, GP2, GPI3, GP15. G17, GP20, GP21, GP24, GP35, GP36. 
" This is a t test of the difference in Fisher's z values of the two sets of correlations. 
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way they looked at cues than to the way they used them, as predicted by the Attention 
Hypothesis. 
I f stated cue use is based on patterns of cue selection, predictions of actual cue use 
(regression coefficients) on the basis of selection should be no worse than those based on 
subjects' ratings. Again the ten doctors who had changed policies and GP14, whose policy 
could not be captured on the IS task, were not included in analyses. For the remaining 
doctors the average correlation between cue selection frequencies and standardised 
regression coefficients on the IS task was 0.59 (standard deviation = 0.17). As stated 
earlier, the average correlation between subjective ratings and the standardised regression 
coefficients (on the IS task) is 0.46 (standard deviation = 0.16). There was a significant 
difference between Fisher's z transformations of these two sets of correlations: t = 3.3, p < 
0.01). So here cue selection is in fact a better description of cue use than stated cue use is. 
However, there is a confounding factor in this comparison in that one of these correlations 
is comparing doctors' behaviours across studies whereas the other compares behaviours 
within a study and therefore might expect to be better. Both standardised regression 
coefficients and cue selection were measured on the IS task. Subjective ratings were 
obtained on the LIPID task. 
This can be altered so that both comparisons are within study. Subjective ratings from 
the LIPID task are correlated with standardised regression coefficients from the (last 100 
cases of the) LIPID task (average r = 0.55, s.d. = 0.19). On the IS task cue selection is again 
compared to standardised regression coefficients on the IS task (average r = 0.59, s.d. = 
0.17). The difference between these for the 19 doctors who did not change behaviour was 
not significant (t = 0.83, p = 0.42). I f all doctors who did both tasks are included in the 
comparison there is again no significant difference between the correlations between cue 
selection and regression coefficients on the IS task (average r = 0.59, N = 30) and between 
subjective ratings and regression coefficients on the LIPID task (average r = 0.51, N = 33): 
F(l,61) = 2.6, p = 0.112. Selection of cues was no more similar to the pattern of cue use 
than stated policies were. In fact there was no difference in prediction of cue use from 
knowledge of cue selection and prediction of cue use from knowledge of subjects' stated 
policies. 
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A note on the Confounded Rating Hypothesis 
Grounds for another possible explanation for the pattern of self-insight seen in 
Study I can also be explored here. The Confounded Rating Hypothesis predicts that the 
apparent over-rating of the importance of certain cues is due to their non-linear use. This 
questions the validity of both tacit and explicit linear models of decision making. The 
assumption is that subjects do have good self-insight, that subjective ratings are actually 
reflective of the influence a cue has on some cases, but that this influence is non-linear. 
Either the importance is dependent on the value of other cues or there is a non-linear 
relationship between cue and judgements. Although the evidence for the Confounded 
Rating Hypothesis is tested in Chapter 8, here is a preliminary discussion. 
One example of how the Confounded Rating Hypothesis might occur is i f a doctor, 
who would potentially prescribe for a case on the basis of its clinical information, is 
strongly influenced one way or the other by the patient's attitude. The same doctor would 
not even bother finding out the patient's attitude to treatment i f there was no clinical 
necessity'^ for the treatment. If the doctor was basing rating of importance on the potential 
effect of the cue then the doctor might rate attitude highly. However, its regression 
coefficient would depend on the number of cases for which treatment was considered 
clinically relevant and therefore on which attitude was selected. Imagine the situation 
wherein the majority of cases clinically merited prescription: Attitude was selected 
relatively often and had a high regression coefficient Here the cue may not have been 
over-rated. Alternatively imagine the situation where few cases merited prescription, 
attitude would be ascertained less often and have a lower regression coefficient. Here the 
amount of times a cue is selected indicates when it is relevant. Those cues that are over-
rated should be ones that are not selected that often. This would lead to a dissimilarity 
between subjective ratings of cues and their selection: The selection pattern should be 
more like the pattern of standardised regression coefficients than the subjective ratings are. 
If the Confounded Rating Hypothesis is true, the relationship between the selection 
ft*equency of cues and their regression coefficients should be better than that between their 
subjective ratings and their regression coefficients. In other words cue selection would be a 
Clinical necessity or merit for prescription is as perceived by the doctor. 
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significantly belter predictor of actual policy than staled policy is. Although this has been 
demonstrated to be false (correlations between cue selection patterns and regression 
coefficients were no different to those between subjective ratings and regression 
coefficients), it does not disprove the Confounded Rating Hypothesis. Configurality of cue 
selection has been taken to be an indicator of configurality of cue use. They were shown 
earlier to be uncorrelated. 
Configural cue selection was measured in terms of the standard deviation of the 
number of cues selected on cases. Higher values meant there was more variation in the 
number of cues that might be selected. Doctors who were uniform in the number selected 
would have a standard deviation of 0. The correlations between absolute values of 
subjective ratings and standardised regression coefficients on the LIPID task (last 100 
cases) are a measure of self-insight. The correlation between self-insight (Fisher's z) and 
configurality of cue selection was not significantly different from zero (r = 0.297. N = 30. 
p > 0.05). In other words, those doctors who were selecting cues configurally. showed no 
worse self-insight, were no more likely to over-rate cues, than other doctors more uniform 
in their cue selection. However, again this is not evidence for the Confounded Rating 
Hypothesis since the doctors who were uniform in cue selection could have been using 
cues configurally (and over-rating their importance) but not selecting them configurally. 
Thus confounded rating could be shown because of configurality at a later point in the 
judgement process. 
Evidence for the Confounded Rating Hypothesis must be looked at in terms of 
configurality of cue use rather than configurality of cue selection. This is done in Chapter 
8. 
Conclusion 
Generally behaviour on the IS task had changed little from that on the LIPID task 
in Study 1 despite the change in presentation of the cases. Slightly more agreement was 
seen between doctors'judgements. Agreement is affected by both consistency and 
agreement in policy. Since linear fits were unchanged consistency of behaviour, which was 
seen to correlate significantly with linear fits in Study 1, was unlikely to have changed. 
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Change in agreement was most likely to be due to the slight change in policy by some 
doctors. 
The Confounded Rating Hypothesis could not be proved one way or the other here 
because of the lack of correlation between configurality of cue selection and configurality 
of cue use. ConfiguraJity of cue selection does not appear to affect the overall configurality 
of judgement making. This is evidence for the relative independence of behaviour in the 
different stages of information processing. Einhom, Kleinmuntz and KJeinmuntz (1979) 
suggested that process tracing and policy capturing models were looking at these different 
aspects of the same phenomenon. The interpretation here is that they are looking at 
different phenomena within the same process. No correlation was seen between behaviour 
on the information selection and information combination phases of judgement making. 
Although the information involved in the latter is by necessity a subset of the information 
involved in the former (and subjects were tending to look at more cues than had a bearing 
on the decision), patterns of non-linear behaviour on the two were different. Both may be 
linear or non-linear. Assumptions about the latter made on the basis of the former, as occurs 
in process tracing, may be subject to problems as has occurred in other studies (see 
Einhom, Kleinmuntz and Kleinmuntz, 1979). At the same time extrication of the two 
phases is useful to characterise the whole decision or judgement making process. 
Different amounts of information were used in the different phases of judgement 
making and both appeared to be limited. The information phase seemed less so than the 
combination phase. It was hypothesized that the sequential and then maintained revelation 
of the former may have been of help in overcoming cognitive limitations. 
The Attention Hypothesis is still viable. It appears that subjects are stating relative 
importances that are more akin to the amount they look at cues than the amount they use 
them. Regression coefficients were as predictable from the pattern of cue selection as they 
were from the pattern of stated cue use. No better self-insight is shown than i f cue selection 
ratings had been used as a measure of the importance of cues. That subjects are basing 
ratings of cue importance on their cue selection is one interpretation. However, alternative 
hypotheses also f i t this finding. For example, doctors could be basing their ratings on an 
ideal model of their behaviour. They may also choose to look at cues because they felt they 
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should be affecting their decision making. Both could be based on the cues the subject 
believes to be relevant to the judgement in real life. In this case both cue selection and cue 
imponance ratings are based on some other factor. However it would be hard to identify 
the source of CPs' ideal model of behaviour. However, this is comparable to the idea that 
subjects give previously held, often socially agreed, causal theories (see Nisbett and 
Wilson. 1977; Nisbett and Ross, 1980; White, 1988). 
In line with this, another possibility introduced at the end of the last chapter is that 
doctors have grasped at some other meaning of importance. Which cues are of clinical 
importance is explicitly discussed by doctors and their ratings of relative importance could 
be based on these. This hypothesis is explained and tested in Chapter 8. However, the 
results of this study already indicate thai this is unlikely. Although subjects might select 
the cues that they consider relevant to the case, unless all cues that are selected are of 
clinical importance there is no reason to suppose that the pattern of selection would 
resemble the pattern of clinical importance. 
Another possibility is that cues could be rated as important on the basis of the 
distribution that they would take in cases seen by the subject in real life rather than on what 
was seen during the task. The cues that are relevant to this type of decision or judgement 
would be selected on the task (just as they would be ascertained in real life). The ranges of 
cues were known on this IS task since the same cases had been looked at previously. If 
they could stale the relative importance of cues for real life decision making it would be 
surprising i f when asked specifically about behaviour on a task they could not give those 
relative importances. However, it may be that real life ranges of cues were familiar and 
more easily accessed. Both of these possibilities reinforce the idea that explicit knowledge 
of behaviour is something separate from tacit policies of behaviour. This possibility will be 
referred to again in the final discussion in Chapter 10. 
However, the correlation between cue selection and subjective rating of importance 
was not perfect. This could have been because the confounding effect of change of task or 
perhaps different doctors showed this pattern of insight for different reasons. Alternatively, 
stated cue use might be additionally influenced by other factors such as cue (or case) 
salience. The other possibility, mentioned in the concluding section of Chapter 5, is that 
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the over-rating seen in this measure of self-insight is just typical of the pattern of 
estimation of covariation. These are affected by prior beliefs about the relationships 
between cues as described in Chapter 4. This will be further discussed in Chapter 10. 
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Chapter Seven 
Study Three: Policy Recognition 
Introduction 
In Chapter 5 measurement of self-knowledge was seen as a comparison between a 
subject's perception of their own behaviour and an objective measure of it. Verbal 
elicitations were used to identify subjective knowledge. However, as outlined in the review 
of the literature on self-insight in Chapter 4, one criticism of much research into 
metacognition lies in the use of subjects' reports. There are two types of argument against 
the use of verbal reports. These wi l l be discussed below. This chapter presents an 
alternative measure of self-knowledge (also used by Reilly and Doherty, 1989; 1992). Here 
the objective model of behaviour used in Study 1 is maintained. But subjects' knowledge of 
this is elicited in a forced choice task. 
One criticism of the use of subjects' verbal reports points out that they are not 
measuring self-knowledge but the ability to express this verbally. Examples can be given as 
to why this might be the case. In discussing knowledge of implicit learning Berry and 
Dienes (1993) suggest a few factors that may contribute to subjects' failure to state the 
metaknowledge they have: The amount of knowledge may be great and not enough time 
may be given to its elicitation; subjects may choose not to give knowledge they have low 
confidence in; finally they suggest that the problem may lie in the actual expression of 
knowledge -
"Subjects may not retrieve relevant knowledge in free recall because they 
may not know what specific questions to ask themselves to reveal their own 
knowledge." 
Other authors have suggested that process or causal explanations are not immediately 
accessible (Nisbett and Wilson, 1977); that processes are theoretical constructs in any case 
(Nisbett and Ross, 1980) and that as a consequence subjects are more likely to give 
previously held (a priori) theories or construct explanations when asked for causal 
explanations of their own behaviour (Nisbett and Wilson, 1977). Reilly and Doherty (1989, 
1992) criticise both the equation of self-knowledge with verbal reports and also the use of 
correlations, which are quite open to interpretation, as an index of self-insight. The range 
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between a statistically significant correlation and perfect correlation is large. Where 
correlations stop showing poor self-insight and start showing moderate self-insight or stop 
showing moderate self-insight and start showing good self-insight is open to debate. 
The second criticism of the use of verbal reports as a measure of self-knowledge 
lies in the discrepancy between subjects* stated and actual knowledge that is often given as 
evidence of poor melacognition. In a discussion of subliminal perception for example. 
Berry and Dienes (1993) refer to the difference in results obtained when measurement is 
based on subjective reports compared to objective forced choice tests. Below the subjective 
threshold but above the objective one. subjects are apparently unaware that they have 
knowledge and believe they are guessing. But performance is significantly greater than 
chance and can be influenced by priming effects near the objective threshold. This 
constitutes what Berry and Dienes refer to as the layperson's definition of subliminal 
perception: semantic influence can occur below the point at which subjects state that they 
do not know. However, at this level retrieval of knowledge is also possible. The subjective, 
objective threshold distinction in the realm of subliminal perception is problematic in that 
both knowledge as measured above the objective threshold and semantic influence of the 
cue are measured in terms of subjects' above chance performance. Explicitly stated 
knowledge tends to be measured in comparison to an ideal description. 
The subjective threshold has also been the standard measure for explicit knowledge 
in the implicit learning literature. Subjects' descriptions of underlying rules or policies are 
generally worse than their implicit performance. But there is evidence that after many trials 
explicit knowledge may improve (see Berry and Dienes, 1993). However. Berry and 
Dienes (1993) argue for use of an objective threshold there too. Subjects' knowledge in 
implicit learning can be characterised by forced choice categorization rather than through 
free recall and then knowledge of rules underiying a task appears to be better. Care must be 
taken as to whether explicit or tacit knowledge is being elicited in these cases. I f exemplars 
are used in the forced choice categorization task it may be tacit knowledge rather than 
explicit knowledge that is being measured. 
Forced choice categorization can be used to measure a subject's self-knowledge. It 
is one thing to objectively measure what a subject knows or how they behave. It is another 
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thing to measure their knowledge of what they know of their behaviour (their self-
knowledge). If a subject's behaviour conforms to certain rules then it could be argued that 
they have the knowledge of those rules but they do not know they do. Explicit knowledge 
of the rules could be demonsu^ted by verbal elicitation. But metaknowledge can also itself 
be measured through behaviour such as a choice between rules on a forced choice task, or 
some other measure of perfomiance. The work of Reilly and Doheay (1989 and 1992) 
does just that in the context of policy recognition. If subjects are aware of their policy and 
therefore have good self-insight but are unable to state it this should come out in a 
recognition task. 
In their studies Reilly and Doherty (1989. 1992) both measure self-insight in the 
usual way and also test subjects' recognition' of their own policies in a forced choice test. 
They found that subjects picked out their own policies at much greater than chance levels. 
However, although the interpretation of standard methods for measuring self-insight is 
questionable, the significance of subjects' ability to recognise their own policy also does 
not prove self-insight. It may be that there are other things affecting recognition. Reilly and 
Doherty (1989) themselves point out that own policy recognition requires knowledge of 
features that distinguish it from those of fellow subjects. With the conventional 
measurement of self-insight, certain subjects would apparently have better insight i f the 
explicit policy they give matches the one they happen to be tacitly using. However, these 
subjects would not necessarily show any better self-recognition, which would additionally 
require knowledge about what distinguishes their own policy from those of others. 
Referring to classic measurement of self-insight as a stating task and Reilly and 
Doherty*s forced choice method as a recognition task, performance on the recognition task 
should reflect both self-knowledge and some degree of self-discrimination. I f the stating 
task does measure self-knowledge then performance on the recognition task should be a 
product of performance on the stating task and the degree of similarity between the policies 
being assessed. I f this is not the case then either some other factor is additionally affecting 
performance on the recognition task or the stated task failed to measure self-insight, 
Reilly and Doherty are obviously aware of the effect of similarity between policies 
' This is not 'recognition' in the usual sense of the word in that subjects have not 
previously seen the stimulus. 
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on own policy recognition but they do not measure it explicitly. They do however, measure" 
two related phenomena. They measure "subjective evaluation" as the similarity between a 
subject's stated policy (the standard measure of self-knowledge) and all tacit policies. 
Subjects are scored as having a hit on this score i f their tacit policy is either most similar or 
second most similar to their stated policy. This measure takes into account both the 
similarity between subjects' explicit and tacit policies (the standard stating task measure) 
and also the similarity between all tacit policies. Obviously in situations where several 
policies are similar there is less chance of having a hit. Reilly and Doherty also measured 
similarity between judgements made by correlating judgements by pairs of subjects. [In 
Study 1 of this thesis Kendall's W was used to measure agreement between all subjects' 
judgements on a task.] Least agreement was shown between subjects in the condition where 
twelve orthogonal cues were presented (mean correlation between pairs of subjects' 
judgements = 0.41). The standard stating measure of self-insight for subjects in this (twelve 
orthogonal cues) condition was average: the mean correlation between subjective and 
objective weights was 0.69. However, this was the only condition in which a significant 
number of subjects had hits on the subjective evaluation score and policy recognition was 
best in this condition. In the twelve correlated cues condition, however, extremely good 
self-insight had been shown (average r = 0.92) but subjective evaluation was not significant 
and recognition, although good, was worse than on the orthogonal condition. Agreement 
between subjects' judgements was higher here (mean correlation between pairs of subjects' 
judgements = 0.58). 
The decision making tasks Reilly and Doherty used are not as subject to explicitly 
taught ideals as others might be: Both attractiveness of job offers and of room mates are 
personal decisions and thus a variety of policies were used and stated as used. Although the 
actual weighting of the cues used may differ they still may be subject to generally agreed 
principles^ . In the event, individual differences in policy are also ( i f not more oO a feature 
of clinical judgements. However, as Chapter 5 showed, different tasks may lead to different 
amounts of agreement between subjects. 
^ For example, most people would agree that a liigher paying job was more desirable than an identical but 
lower salaried job. Most people would not see having an angry room-mate as a benefit, 
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In addition, other studies have found greater agreement between explicit policies 
than tacit ones (Chaput de Saintonge and Haitersley. 1985, p. 210). In Study 1 (Chapter 5) 
judgements predicted from explicit policies generally showed greater inter-subjecl 
agreement than those predicted from tacit policies. If this were the case in Reilly and 
Doherty's study, recognition of subjective policies might expect to be worse than 
recognition of tacit policies. In fact, in three of the conditions in Reilly and Doheriy's study 
(1992) subjects were significantly better at selecting their subjective policies than their 
tacit policies. Only on the twelve orthogonal cues condition was there no difference. There 
may have been a ceiling effect here since in this condition recognition was very high. 
Reilly and Doherly bring in various factors to explain subjects' better recognition of 
subjective policies than tacit ones. For example recognition would be good i f subjects 
remembered the actual number they had assigned to a particular cue. However, another 
interpretation of this superior performance with explicit policies is that subjects really 
believed these were their policies. 
Study 1 ascertained both tacit and explicit policies in decision making tasks for 
which there is considerable consensus (prescribing prophylaxis for migraine) and for 
which there is considerably less consensus (prescribing lipid lowering therapy). That this is 
the case was seen in the differences in agreement of both policies and judgement making 
on the LIPID and MIGRAINE tasks (Chapter 5). In this study the same subjects were 
shown selections of these policies and were asked to select their own. 
A subject's ability to pick out his or her own policy is a measure of self-insight that 
could still be due to the incidental matching of explicit and tacit policies. For example, 
although suboptima]» there is usually a significant correlation between tacit and explicit 
policies. This suggests that subjects are aware of some features of their tacit policies. It 
could be these that ihey use to pick out their tacit policies and significantly often they hit 
on the correct policy. In other words although it suggests that subjects have explicit 
knowledge about some features of their policy that distinguish it from others, it does not 
suggest any greater self-insighi than is already seen by the degree of similarity between 
tacit and explicit policies. However, i f subjects select their explicit policies at greater rates 
than they select their tacit policies it would suggest that these are a better match for the 
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subject's explicit knowledge. As mentioned earlier Reilly and Doherty (1992) suggested 
that recognition of explicit policies might be enhanced by memory for factors unrelated to 
the shape of the policy. 
Two hypotheses to be tested in this chapter are ( I ) that the degree of similarity 
between the policies being shown would affect the degree of recognition of both tacit and 
explicit policies and (2) that where doctors show greater self-insight in terms of similarity 
between tacit and explicit policy they would show greater self-recognition. 
Method 
Subjects 
32 doctors who had participated in Study 1 participated in this study (see Chapter 
5).^ Four subjects were female. The average time elapsed since subjects were seen for the 
primary study was 10 months (range 8 to 13 months.) This study was run immediately after 
Study 2 (Chapter 6) and the consistency task of Study 1 (Chapter 5). 
Task and instructions 
For each of the original tasks in Study 1 (the LIPID, the MIGRAINE and the HRT 
tasks), a subject was shown a set of tacit policies from which they were asked to identify 
their own, then a set of explicit policies from which they were asked to identify their own. 
Instructions, provided on a laminated card described briefly the form of the policies in 
terms of relative importance. Subjects were also given a key to aid interpretation of the 
policies for each task and the meaning of this was discussed with the experimenter in the 
context of an example policy. The instructions, keys and example policies are shown in 
Appendices 35 to 39. The same examples, which were not real policies, were used for all 
the doctors. Doctors completed the task in their own time. 
Tacit policies always preceded explicit policies on a task^ and the same order was 
used with all doctors: recognition of the LIPID policies then recognition of the 
^ These same doctors did the consistency part of Study 1 (Chapter 5) and a subset of 30 
participated in Study 2 (Chapter 6). 
Except where the data for a task had not been saved and so tacit policies could not be 
calculated. 
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MIGRAINE policies. Then two doctors did the HRT recognition task immediately. Six 
doctors completed the HRT consistency task prior to the HRT policy recognition task. 
Twelve doctors' policies were presented in each set and each policy was displayed 
as a bar chart of cue weights on a separate laminated card. Each subject picked out three 
policies that might be their own and ranked these three in order of likelihood that they 
were. Eleven of the set of 12 policy bar charts presented to the doctor had been chosen at 
random, using a computer program^, from the set of all doctors' policies for that task. The 
other was that doctor's own policy. 
Formation of bar charts 
The cue weights used were standardised regression coefficients where tacit policies 
were being identified and subjective ratings where explicit policies were being identified. 
For the LIPID and HRT tasks policies were formed from the standardised regression 
coefficients or subjective ratings obtained in Study I (Chapter 5). The height of the bar for 
a cue indicated its relative importance in the decision making. Negative weights were 
shown as such and fell below the x-axis. However, for the MIGRAINE task the sign of the 
cue response to acute treatment was changed so that a positive cue weight indicated 
increasing likelihood of prescribing for a patient with a good response to acute treatment. 
Consequently many of these became negative weights. 
Different tasks and type of policy (tacit or explicit) had different coloured card: 
Type of policy Colour of card 
Lipid tacit policies White 
Lipid explicit policies Beige 
Migraine tacit policies Lemon yellow 
Migraine explicit policies Pink 
HRT tacit policies Bright yellow 
HRT explicit policies White 
Cards were coded on the back with randomly allocated numbers. 
^ See Author's Declaration. 
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Feedback 
Having selected policies for all tasks, doctors were told which policies they had 
correctly picked ouL This was ascertained by matching up policy bar chart codes and 
doctor codes from a chart. Doctors were then given paper copies of all their policies to 
keep. 
Experimenter bias 
The first eight subjects (group A^) had a slightly different procedure from the 
remaining subjects (group B). This manifested itself in two ways: Firstly for subjects in 
group A. but not group B, the experimenter, who was present during the task, may have 
unconsciously been aware of the number code on the back of the correct policy and the 
pattern the policy took. Secondly, and in connection with this, subjects in group B but not 
group A received copies of their policies after the recognition task (for the purpose of 
feedback) in sealed envelopes.'' To see i f subjects in group A had unknowingly been cued 
by the experimenter in any way the results of group A and group B were compared. 
Results and Discussion 
Definition and probability of a 'hit' 
If a doctor managed to pick out their card at all in the three guesses that they had 
this was counted as a successful recognition (a hit). Doctors picked three out of twelve 
cards. Therefore the probability that they would pick out their own policy by chance was 
0.25. 
6 Group A consisted of CPs I I 13 14 19 20 28 30 and 37. Group B consisted of GPs 1 2 3 
4 5 67 9 12 15 17 21 22 23 24 2627 29 31 32 33 34 35 and 36. 
^ For all doctors the random selections of cards to be shown had been pre-generaled. 
Selections of cards for subjects in group A were assembled some time during the 24 
hours preceding the study. For this the experimenter looked up the code of each subject 
in order to ascertain which selection they should be given. At the same time the 
experimenter also selected the previously prepared bar charts of policies to be given to 
the subjects during feedback. Thus the experimenter may have been aware of which 
pohcy was the subjects during the study and may have unknowingly cued them in some 
way. For all subjects in group B the selection of cards to be presented was ascertained 
well in advance. At this time the policies to be given as feedback were all placed in 
carefully labelled envelopes which were then sealed up. 
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Table 7.1 Results for all doctors on the Policy Recognition task 
N Number of doctors with a 'hit' Proportion of hits Significance* 1st choice^ A 13 
LIPID tacit policies 30 17 0.57 p< 0.001 7 4/8 13/22 
LIPID explicit policies 30 18 0.60 p < 0.001 12 3n 15/23 
MIGRAINE tacit policies 30 12 0.40 p = 0.029 5 2/8 10/22 
MIGRAINE explicit policies 30 12 0.40 p = 0.029 6 3/8 9/22 
HRT tacit policies 8 1 0.13 p = 0.267 0 1/3 0/5 
HRT explicit policies 9 4 0.40 p = 0.117 2 1/3 3/6 
* Significance of the number of hits is calculated frpm a binomial distribution with a probability of 0.25 of success over N (the number of doctors) trials. 
2 These were those doctors who ranked their actual policy first out of the three. 
Table 7.1 shows the actual rates of own-policy-recognition as well as the number of 
doctors who ranked their actual policy first out of the three that they had chosen. As can be 
seen a significantly greater number of doctors were able to pick out their own policy than 
would be seen by chance. This is similar to the findings of other studies and indicates a 
certain level of self-insight (see Chapter 4 and introduction to this chapter). Appendix 40 
shows which doctors picked out their own policies. 
Experimenter bias 
Rates of own policy recognition of doctors in groups A and B were compared in 
two ways. Neither of these found any experimenter cueing effect. Firstly an independent t 
test of the proportion of correct hits by doctors in groups A and B showed no significant 
difference (t = 2.30, p = 0.07). 
Differences in self-recognition between doctors in groups A and B were also tested 
using Fisher's exact lest, and no differences were found in recognition of any type of 
policy. Tacit and explicit recognition on the different tasks was looked at separately. The 
null hypothesis Ho was that there was no significant difference between groups A and B on 
a type of policy on a type of task. This was never rejected in favour of H i : recognition was 
greater in either group A or B. Differences between the two groups were not significant for 
any type of policy (Fisher s exact probability = 0.49.0.27,0.28,0.60,0.38,0.76 for the 
LIPID tacit and explicit, the MIGRAINE tacit and explicit and the HRT tacit and explicit 
policies respectively). 
Tacit versus Explicit policy recognition 
A McNemar test on dependent samples was done on the difference between a 
doctor's recognition of tacit and explicit policies for each task. There was no significant 
difference between self-recognition of tacit and explicit policies in any of the tasks (LIPID: 
= 0.10. p = 0,75, N = 29; MIGRAINE: = 0.07, p = 0.79, N = 30; HRT: x^ =1-30. p = 
0.25, N = 8). Subjects' recognition of their explicit knowledge was no better and no worse 
than that of their tacit knowledge. 
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Inter-task differences 
Recognition of both tacit and explicit policies on the LIPID task were significantly 
better than on the MIGRAINE task. Twenty-eight doctors did the recognition task on both 
the LIPID task and the MIGRAINE task. A McNemar test on dependent samples was done 
using the results of these doctors: the number of doctors who recognised their tacit policy 
on the LIPID task but not the MIGRAINE task was significantly greater than the number 
who recognised their MIGRAINE tacit policy but not their LIPID tacit policy (x^ = 5.79, p 
< 0.05). The same result was found when the calculation was done using the number of 
explicit policies recognised. 
Own-policy recognition and self-insight 
Self-insight had been measured in Study 1 (Chapter 5) as the correlation between 
subjective ratings and standardised regression coefficients for a doctor. This measure was 
available for each doctor for each task. Here the proportion of hits they had was the 
measure of own-policy recognition. It was hypothesized that the ability to pick out one's 
own tacit policy would be related to one's ability to state it explicitly. This would be 
refuted if doctors who had picked themselves out did not have significantly better self-
insight than doctors who had not picked themselves out. On the LIPID and MIGRAINE 
tasks although average subjective-objective weight correlations were greater for *Jiose 
doctors who picked themselves out, the difference in Fisher's z transformations of this self-
insight index was not significant. [Mean self-insight r = 0.68 for the doctors who picked 
their LIPID tacit policy out, compared to a mean of 0.63 in those doctors who did not; 
mean self-insight r = 0.72 for the doctors who picked their MIGRAINE tacit policy out, 
compared to a mean of 0.69 in those doctors who did not.] 
Confounding effect of policy similarity 
If the ability of doctors to pick out their own policy is not significantly related to 
self-insight there must be other factors which affect this greater than chance policy 
recognition. Certainly if a doctor is able to pick out their own policy they must have some 
insight as to the important features in that policy. However, in addition, they must be aware 
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of the features that distinguish it from the other poHcies available. Thus in the policy 
recognition task the similarity between the policies displayed may act as a confounding 
variable. This would affect recognition of both tacit and explicit policies on all tasks. 
Where policy recognition is suboptimal it may be due to forgetting (there was on average 
ten months delay in this study), or it could be due to the confounding effect of similarity 
between policies, or in the case of tacit policies it could be due to limited self-insight. 
Although doctors were better at stating their policies on the MIGRAINE task than 
on the LIPID task, ten months later they were belter able to identify their LIPID policies 
than their MIGRAINE policies. This detriment occurred equally on both tacit and explicit 
policy recognition. Doctors were no better able to recognise their explicitly stated policies 
than the tacit ones we had calculated. One explanation is that forgetting occurred equally 
on tacit and explicit policies but was worse on the MIGRAINE task than the LIPID task. 
Another explanation is that, regardless of the amount of forgetting that occurred, it was 
harder for doctors to pick out their policies on the MIGRAINE task than on the LIPID task 
because of the greater agreement shown on this task. Greater similarity was shown both in 
terms of the tacit policies and in terms of the explicit policies. The greater similarity 
between explicit policies quashed the advantage of recognition explicit policies might have 
otherwise had. 
Similarity between policies was measured in terms of the correlation between cue 
weights: either subjective ratings as in the case of the explicit policies or standardised 
regression coefficients as in the case of the tacit policies. These were calculated between 
each doctor's policy and all the others presented with it on the particular recognition task. 
An analysis of variance was done to compare the similarity ratings of doctors who had 
picked their policy out as either first choice, second choice, third choice or not at all. 
Although there were significant differences between the recognition groups on the 
LIPID explicit policy recognition task (F (^2,327) = 11.7, p < 0.01) and on the MIGRAINE 
tacit (F (3,315) = 8.47, p < 0.01) and explicit (F (3,326) = I0.8h p < 0.01) policy 
recognition tasks, this difference was not always in the way expected. On the explicit 
policy recognition tasks, those doctors who recognised their own policies actually had 
8 There were no doctors who picked out their policy at the third guess. 
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policies more similar to the ones ihey were looking at than the doctors who recognised 
themselves less accurately or not at all. On the MIGRAINE tacit policy recognition task 
doctors who picked out their policy in their third choice had significantly less similar 
policies to the other groups. There was no significant difference between groups on the 
LIPID tacit policy recognition task (F (3.326) = 0.45. p = 0.72). 
So on the MIGRAINE task selection of tacit policies was somewhat affected by 
similarity between policies as predicted. However, the effect of policy similarity on 
recognition of explicit policies is odd. Study 1 showed that agreement between predictions 
from subjects' tacit policies was worse than agreement between predictions from their 
explicit policies on the LIPID and HRT tasks. Agreement was the same on the MIGRAINE 
task. Therefore recognition of explicit policies might be predicted to be worse than thai of 
tacit policies on at least the LIPID and HRT tasks. However, as seen earlier, this was not 
the case. 
It may be that the effect of similarity between explicit policies is itself confounded. 
There are two possibilities here: Where there is a consensus, similarity between policies 
may be great and, as predicted, it may be harder to pick out one's own policy. Firstly 
however, this may be exactly the situation where the subject knows their stated policy. 
Subjects who are aware of their policies may have more similar ones to each other. 
However, this would suggest an increase in self-insight with increased recognition that was 
not apparent earlier. Secondly, subjects may all tend to pick commonly agreed explicit 
policies on the recognition task. Then those subjects that actually stated those sort of 
policies in the first place, and showed agreement with a status quo would be more likely to 
pick their own. This does not suggest any greater self-insight on the part of those with 
better self-recognition. 
Conclusion 
Just as in the Reilly and Doherty studies (1989, 1992), own policy recognition for 
both types of policy in all tasks was at considerably greater than chance levels. Reilly and 
Doherty used four different types of cue design: 6 cues or 12 cues that were negligibly 
correlated or had correlations similar to how they would appear in real life. Although they 
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pointed out that recognition of own explicit policies was being affected by factors other 
than knowledge of the unique features of one's policy, for example memory of specific 
unusual numbers given, recognition of explicit policies was considerably better than 
recognition of tacit policies in three of the conditions. The fourth condition was similar to 
tasks used here in that there were 12 orthogonal cues used. In this condition explicit policy 
recognition was no different to tacit policy recognition but both were high. In this study 
where 13 orthogonal cues were presented, there was again no difference between tacit and 
explicit policy recognition. 
Two hypotheses were tested in this chapter. Firstly, it was hypothesized that 
similarity had a negative affect on self-recognition. In Reilly and Doherty's study (1992) 
the condition with the least inter-subject agreement was the one with the greatest policy 
recognition. In this study loo worse self-recognition was seen in the task in which there 
was greater similarity between policies (the MIGRAINE task). There was greater 
agreem.ent between explicit policies than between tacit policies so worse self-recognition 
would be predicted i f similarity between policies has a confounding effect on pohcy 
recognition. The lack of difference can be explained i f explicit policy recognition would 
naturally be better than tacit policy recognition. 
However, on both LIPID and MIGRAINE explicit policy recognition tasks, doctors 
who tended to recognise their own policy had policies more similar to others in the set they 
chose from than doctors who failed to recognise themselves. One possible explanation is 
that doctors who had well thought out policies and were more aware of them tended to 
have more similar policies to each other than those doctors who had thought less about the 
subject, did not follow the consensus and were less aware of their own policies. This 
relates to the second hypothesis tested that those who were better at picking out their tacit 
policies would have had a better correlation between tacit and explicit policies. In other 
words subjects showing better self-insight would also show belter self-recognition. This 
was also not found to be the case. Alternatively, all subjects might show a tendency to pick 
out the policy matching some (socially agreed) ideal policy. If , ten months previously, that 
is what they had tended to state, a subject will have a greater chance of picking their own 
behaviour. In other words, those tending to give a commonly held explicit policy, and 
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therefore showing greater agreement with others would be more likely to pick themselves 
out In this case, not only do subjects not have to have self-insight lo have good policy 
recognition, they also need not remember what they explicitly said! 
The Reilly and Doherty (1989 and 1992) results were replicated in that significant 
self-recognition was shown. However, although the results do not show any greater levels 
of meiacognition than previously seen in self-insight measures, there is no significant 
correlation between self-insight and self-recogniiion. 
Greater than chance performance on forced choice tasks however does not 
differentiate between identification of policies similar to one's own (well known one) and 
poor identification of one's own policy. It may be that the tacit policy describing one's own 
behaviour is the one on the forced choice task most similar to one's explicitly held policy. 
This would be selected, apparently showing perfect self-knowledge. 
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Chflptgr Eight 
Swdy Four: Risk 
Introduction 
In this study doctors are asked, in two separate tasks, to make judgements about 
first their likelihood of prescribing lipid lowering therapy for a patient and second the 
patient's risk of coronary heart disease (CHD). Judgement analysis is carried out on both of 
these tasks. The purposes of this chapter are threefold. The first purpose it serves is to 
examine the relationship between judgements of risk and prescribing. Secondly, and 
related to this, two theories about the nature of self-insight shown in Study 1 are explored. 
Thirdly, the level of achievement seen in assessments of risk is measured in the framework 
of a lens model. 
It has been hypothesized that inter-individual differences in patient management 
may be partly due lo differences in perceived risk or probability of a disease (Poses. Cebul 
and Wigton, 1995). Lipid lowering drugs should, according to the pharmaceutical and 
general practice advisory literature, be prescribed in the presence of multiple risk factors 
for. or evidence of, coronary heart disease (CHD) (e.g. British National Formulary 28, 
September 1994; GP Pocket Guide to Cholesterol. 1994; Grant, 1992, p. 136). Several risk 
factors have been identified in the medical literature (Heller. Bailey, Gotl and Howes, 
1987) and studies such as the Framingham Heart study have demonstrated their relative 
effects on mortality (see Anderson, Wilson. Odell and Kannel. 1991). The relationship 
between risk of coronary heart disease and prescription of lipid lowering therapy is similar 
to that between probability of any disease and an appropriate treatment for it in that an 
increase in perceived probability or risk would lead to an increase in likelihood of 
treatment. Doctors may differ in treatment because they differ in likely diagnosis. Doctors 
may also have different probability thresholds at which they would treat. Study 1 (Chapter 
5) showed that there are differences in the policies used to prescribe lipid lowering therapy. 
In this chapter use of lipid lowering therapy and the factors affecting it will be compared to 
risk judgements and the factors affecting those. The relationship between prescribing and 
perceived risk wil l be examined in terms of whether cases at higher risk are more simply 
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likely to be prescribed for or whether other factors affect the decision. Behaviour on Study 
1 suggests that the latter is the case: Subjects were influenced by non-clinical cues and 
some cues were influential in more than one way. 
Assume here that, as the ideal practice described in the literature suggests, doctors' 
decisions to prescribe are influenced in some way by their judgement of the patient's risk. 
Doctors may disagree about prescription because they disagree about a patient's degree of 
risk; or they may disagree about prescription because they have because they have 
different risk thresholds for prescription; or they may have different ideas about what to do 
with that high risk person. I f doctors have different risk judgement policies then, where 
cues are orthogonal as in these studies, they will have different prescription decision 
policies. On the other hand doctors may actually agree about the factors influencing a 
person's risk but disagree about how to treat them. In this study the degree of individual 
variation wil l be compared for the prescription and risk judgement tasks. I f agreement 
between doctors on the risk judgement task is the same as or less than that on the 
prescription task it indicates that individual differences on the risk task may contribute to 
individual differences in prescription. If agreement on the risk judgement task is however 
better, disagreement between doctors must lie at the level of patient management. There 
are two reasons for expecting this latter result. Firstly, there is more of an explicit criterion 
in the medical literature as to what are risk factors than as to what should influence 
prescription. Secondly, the doctors' explicitly stated policies on the LIPID task suggested 
that many aspects of the decision were being driven by total patient management and use 
of factors not related to risk such as patient attitude rather than considerations of risk of 
CHD. An example of this is the explicitly stated, manipulative decision not to prescribe to 
smokers in order to persuade them to give up. However, this last interpretation of the 
results of Study 1 wi l l only be borne out in a direct comparison of risk judgements and 
prescription decision policies. 
Risk of CHD is expressed as a continuous variable - as is probability - and thus it is 
suitable for judgement analysis. In this study subjects were asked to estimate risk along a 
visual analogue scale anchored by low risk and high risk. There are two reasons for this. 
Firstly, in real consultations, although general practitioners do make judgements about the 
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severity or probability of disease this is not a numerical assessment but is more a pragmatic 
judgement. Secondly, as is shown below, one off numerical values given by subjects in 
experiments do not reflect their underlying perception of risk or probability. 
Studies looking at physicians' estimates of risk and probability almost invariably 
show there is a tendency to overestimate (e.g. Christensen-Szalanski and Bushyhead. 1981; 
Tape and Wigton, 1989; Poses, Cebul. Collins, and Fager, 1985; Poses. Cebul. and 
Wigton. 1986; Poses. Cebul, and Wigton, 1995; Tape. Kripal, and Wigton, 1992). Since 
probabilities and risks in these studies tend to be small this is in accordance with the 
general finding that subjects tend to overestimate small probabilities and underestimate 
large probabilities (Baron, 1988, pp. 198-204). An exception is the accurate estimation of 
risk of atherosclerotic heart disease (ASHD) by subjects who had a family history of the 
disease (Tape and Wigion, 1989). This may be because subjects are aware of actual 
probability values. Indeed calibration can be improved using outcome feedback (e.g. Tape. 
Kripal, and Wigton, 1992; Poses, Wigton and Cebul, 1995). However, the numerical 
estimates of probability or risk may not get to the underlying psychological representation 
of likelihood. It could be argued that a subject showed a good understanding of the 
situation i f he or she rated less likely cases of a disease as less likely, more likely cases of a 
disease as more likely and used the information that was relevant to the diagnosis in doing 
so. Christensen-Szalanski and Bushyhead (1981) presented results in which, although 
physicians overestimated the probability of disease (numerically), they were influenced by 
a symptom's predictive value of the disease in their judgements: more likely cases were 
assigned higher probabilities. Measures of accuracy of probability estimates that only look 
at the nearness of exact probability values (looking at calibration) do not take this into 
account. Similarly, two individuals could be said to show agreement i f they rated one case 
as higher risk and another as lower risk even i f they gave different numerical responses. 
There is evidence that prescribing is related to probability estimates and that 
overcstimation of probability coincides with unnecessary prescribing (see Poses. Wigton 
and Cebul. 1995). However, several other factors could influence the decision to prescribe 
and lead to unnecessary prescription. Using cognitive feedback and feedback of monthly 
prevalence.data, Poses, Wigton and Cebul (1995) found that despite improved calibration 
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through a reduction in the experimental group's estimations of the probability of 
streptococcus pharyngitis in patients with sore throats, the aggregate level of antibiotic 
prescribing actually increased significantly. For these doctors the relationship between 
clinical variables and prescribing seemed fairiy consistent. This was despite changes in 
accuracy, and possible changes in discriminating ability, of physicians' probability 
judgements. Whereas it may be the case that inter-individual differences in probability 
estimates may reflect differences in perceived probability of a case having a disease, it 
appears that recalibration of subjects' estimates does not reflect an underlying change in the 
perception of probability of the disease and the need to do something about it. In this study 
then the pattern of interest is whether a doctor is more likely to prescribe for cases they 
perceive to be at high risk; not whether doctors who perceive patients to be at higher risk 
were more likely to prescribe. 
In the above discussion, agreement between subjects refers to the agreement 
between the policies they actually use. Agreement between explicitly stated policies is 
something else. In Study I» the importance of a number of risk factors on the LIPID task, 
such as Hypertension, Evidence of arteriosclerosis. Gender and Family history of 
ischaemic heart disease, were over-rated (see Figure 5.4. Chapter 5). Although, in Chapter 
6. CPs' ratings of cues importance was found to correlate well with the way they selected 
cues, this is of course no proof that what they said was based on what they had been 
looking at. Two possibilities will be discussed here. One is that the rating of importance 
related to clinical rather than relative importance. In the LIPID task for example, cues can 
be very important in clinical terms in that they increase risk of CHD and they would be 
selected in order to find out the risk of CHD. But in terms of influence on the decision 
making the same cue might be much less important than rated. Doctors could have rated 
these cues as important because risk is increased and it is important to do something. But 
in this set of cases these cues' importance was less when considering the decision whether 
or not to use a lipid lowering drug. Similarly on the MIGRAINE task, over-rating tended to 
occur on the cues that indicated the effect that the migraine was having on the patient's life. 
For example. Misses work and Nausea or Visual disturbance were all over-rated (see 
Figure 5.5). Importance here could have been in terms of severity: It was important to do 
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something about this person's problem though this was not necessarily prophylaxis. 
Subjects' self-insight on the risk task should throw light on whether this is the case. If 
subjects are giving assessments of the clinical importance of cues, they should not show 
the pattern of over-rating where clinical severity judgements were made. 
Although the above suggestion is that subjects reinterpreted the notion of 
importance, why they would do that has to be questioned. The possibility, introduced in 
Chapter 6. is that subjects are giving some explicitly held knowledge about judgement 
policy. This is similar to an ideal policy and relates to Nisbett and Wilson's (1977) 
suggestion that subjects' reports are based on a priori theories and Nisbett and Ross's 
(1980) suggestion that subjects' self-knowledge is to a degree theorization about their own 
behaviour. I f subjects' policies are based on iheorizations about their behaviour they may 
be describing how they think the task should be done. A number of risk factors were being 
over-rated in Study 1. Some risk factors, although stated as being of relevance, were in fact 
being neglected. The hypothesis here is that they were neglected because of limits to 
information processing capacity. 
Since some criterion measure of actual risk is calculable from epidemiological data 
it is also suitable for a lens model analysis. Lens model analysis, described in Chapter 3. 
examines a subject's ability to state a correct judgement (their achievement) in terms of the 
consistency of implementation and appropriateness of their judgement policy. Predictions 
from models derived from epidemiological data form the environmental side of the lens 
model. The equations involved in calculation of the criterion are however, not linear. Tape, 
Kripal and Wigton (1992) compared subjects' numerically stated judgements of the risk of 
death from heart disease in the next ten years with those calculated from a model derived 
from Framingham data. Both matching (correlation between predictions from the model of 
the criterion and predictions from the model of the judgements) and achievement (usually 
correlation between criterion values and judgements) were measured using predictions 
from this model on the criterion side. Initial achievement levels were around r = 0.4 or 0.5. 
Matching was around r = 0.6 and 0.7. The coefficient of multiple correlation (R) was about 
0.8. However, i f linear equations can be used to model risk judgements then they could be 
used to model risk calculations and estimates of the relative importance of cues in subject 
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and criterion linear models can be compared. This is done here. 
So, perhaps it is the case that doctors are looking at the factors that wil l tell them 
how serious the case is but these do not have equal bearing on the decision whether or not 
to prescribe the particular drug. Here this was tested by comparing individual doctors' 
ratings of relative importance for a judgement of risk of CHD and their self-insight into the 
factors affecting their judgements of risk with their ratings of relative importance of cues in 
prescription decisions. Self-insight is looked at on a risk assessment task where importance 
in clinical terms would relate well to importance in terms of impact on the decision. 
Method 
Subject recruitment 
A mailshot, including a freepost return envelope and reply slip, was sent to 127 
CPs with Cornish "PL" postcodes. Forty-one of these (32.3%) initially responded 
positively. Thirty-six (28.3%) were able to participate for 2 hours, during the data 
collection period (January and February 1995). Payment was at the rate of £25 per hour for 
their time and all participants were promised and given feedback'. 
Subjects 
36 (jeneral Practitioners from a variety of settings in Cornwall participated in this 
study. Practices included several health centres and one single-handed practice in town 
centres as well as rural locations. No doctors had participated in previous studies in this 
project or were members of practices who had. Three participants were female. 
Environment 
Most doctors were visited at their practice and carried out the tasks in their 
consulting rooms. Two doctors were visited at home. 
* This was sent by post at the end of March 1995 and consisted of barcharts showing that 
doctor's tacit and explicit policies for each task as well as average tacit and explicit 
policies for each task. 
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CASE 2 
CHOLESTEROL LEVEL 7.1 
HYPERTENSION 
AGE 
GENDER 
EVIDENCE OF ARTERIOSCLEROSIS 
DRINKS 
SMOKES 
DIABETES Yes. poorly controlled 
COMPLIANCE WITH ADVICE ON DIET Some 
WEIGHT Very obese 
ATTITUDE TO TREATMENT Open to advice 
FAMILY HISTORY I.H.D. 1st degree relative 
No 
30 
Male 
No 
No 
No 
CHANCE OF PRESCRIBING LIPID LOWERING AGENT 
VERY LOW VERY HIGH 
Figure 8.1 An example of a case from the PRESO^IBE task 
CASE1 
- J 
;HOLESTEROL LEVEL 
HYPERTENSION 
AGE 
GENDER 
EVIDENCE OF ARTERIOSCLEROSIS 
DRINKS 
SMOKES 
DIABETES!, 
COMPLIANCE WITH ADVICE ON DIET: 
WEIGHf 
ATTITUDE TO TREATMENT 
FAMILY HISTORY I.H.D. 
7.9 
No 
59 
Female 
No 
Heavily 
Heavily 
No 
Some 
Obese 
Cautious 
No ^ I 
RISK OF CORONARY HEART DISEASE 
VERY LOWi VERY HIGH 
Figure 8.2 An example of a case from the RISK task. 
Tasks 
Two computer presented tasks were used in this study. Each was followed by a tape 
recorded discussion as to the factors affecting decision making on the task. The majority of 
doctors completed both tasks, presented in the same sequence, in one session. One doctor 
did the second task three weeks later. 
The first task (PRESCRIBt) presented a sheet of instructions followed by a series 
of hypothetical cases described along 12 dimensions (cues). The doctor made a judgement 
about the likelihood of prescribing a lipid lowering drug for each case. This task was 
similar to the original LIPID task of Study 1 (see Chapter 5). Again LIPID always refers to 
the lipid lowering decision task of Study I . However, the cues and instructions used were 
slightly different and the bar used to indicate the doctor's chance of prescribing was 
anchored by "Very low" and "Very high". An example of a case is shown in Figure 8.1. 
The second task (RISK) presented the same cases in the same order. However, this 
time the doctor judged the 'patient's' risk of coronary heart disease and the response bar 
labelled "Risk of Coronary Heart Disease" was anchored with "Very low" and "Very high". 
An example of a case from the RISK task is shown in Figure 8.2. 
The discussion after each task was designed to identify which cues the doctor felt 
had been affecting their decisions or judgements and how their behaviour related to their 
judgement and decision making behaviour in real life. 
Case generation and instructions 
100 cases were generated for the tasks and these were described along the twelve 
dimensions shown on the left hand side of Table 8.1. The greatest intercue correlation for 
these 100 cases was between Age and Diabetes (-0.165). Al l inter-cue correlations are 
shown in Appendix 41, 
Eleven of these cues and their ranges were identical to those in the LIPID task (see 
Chapter 5). Two of the LIPID task cues (personality and occupation) were dropped 
because of their minimal use. One new cue, describing the patient's drinking behaviour, 
was added in their place. 
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Table 8.1 Cues and their ranges on the PRESCRIBE and RISK tasks 
C U E W E I G H T 
< ^ 
^ NEGATIVE POSrriVE 
Cue Range 
C H O L E S T E R O L L E V E L 6.5-8 
HYPERTENSION No/Yes, well controlled/Yes, poorly controlled 
A G E 30-60 
GENDER Female/Male 
E V I D E N C E OF ARTERIOSCLEROSIS No/Yes 
DRINKS No/Occasionally/Regularly/Heavily 
SMOKES No/Occasioiially/Regularly/Heavily 
DIABETES No/Yes, well controlled/Yes, poorly controlled 
C O M P L L \ N C E WITH A D V I C E ON DIET No/Some/Yes 
WEIGHT Under/Normal/Over/Obese/Very obese 
ATTITUDE T O TREATMENT Opposed/Cautious/Open to advice/Requesting treatment 
F A M I L Y HISTORY I.H.D. No/2nd degree relative/lst degree relative 
A few doctors in the LIPID task had mentioned that in real life they might want to 
know the patient's exercise level and alcohol consumption in addition to the information 
they had been presented on the task. In the instructions for the PRESCRIBE and RISK 
tasks the exercise level of all patients was stated to be appropriate to their age and general 
health. The instructions stated that the triglyceride levels of the patient's blood sample were 
normal. This information was added because in the original study the few doctors that 
expressed a wish to know the patient's alcohol consumption had done so because 
triglyceride levels may be raised in heavy drinkers and this could be the cause of a raised 
cholesterol level. Instructions included additional assumptions about the patient that had 
been included in the LIPID task. Full written instructions for the prescribing and risk tasks 
are shown in Appendices 42 and 43. 
Consistency 
The first thirty cases were repeated at the end of all 100 cases as a measure of 
consistency. They were renumbered on their second presentation (Case 101- Case 130). 
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Post task inten'iew 
The format of this was similar to the post task interview of Study 1 (Chapter 5). 
Again firstly an effort was made to quantify the doctor's perception of each cue's relative 
importance to the decision. He or she was asked which of the values at either end of a cue's 
range would be more likely to make them prescribe, other things being equal, or i f there 
was no difference between the two. Then the doctor was asked to give a rating between 0 
and 10 to each cue to indicate how much of a bearing it had on their decision. The doctor 
was told that '0' indicated that the dimension had no bearing on the decision, '10' indicated 
that it had maximum bearing on the decision and that he or she could allocate the same 
number to more than one dimension. Doctors were able to see the ratings they had given 
and so could compare these. The self-insight sheet seen by the CPs is shown in Appendix 
45. The verbal instructions given at this stage are shown in Appendix 44. 
Having rated each dimension the doctor was given an opportunity to discuss his or 
her strategy on the task and to indicate for example whether the effect of one particular 
dimension was dependent on the value of other dimensions. 
They were also prompted to talk about their behaviour, with references to cases 
such as these, in real life. They were asked if they did consider prescribing lipid lowering 
drugs, or make judgements about risk in real life. Each doctor was asked what sorts of 
factors would be affecting the decision to prescribe lipid lowering drugs in real life or what 
sorts of factors would be affecting judgements about the degree of risk they felt a real 
patient had. 
Pilot 
The study was piloted on two doctors. One of these was a GP in the region and, 
since nothing was changed, his data was included in the general analysis.^ 
2 The other was Dr. Mark Harries. 
175 
Results and Discussion 
The main judgement analysis was carried out using judgements on the last 100 of 
the 130 cases presented. In this way, where cases had been repeated-the second judgement 
on them was used. A correlation between original responses (on the first 30 cases) and 
second responses (on the last 30 cases) was used as a measure of consistency. Tacit and 
explicit policies were calculated as in Study 1 with tacit polices as a set of standardised 
regression coefficients and explicit policies as a set of subjective ratings or weights. The 
signs of these were assigned as indicated in Table 8.1. Four types of analysis were carried 
out Firstly, the factors affecting decisions on the PRESCRIBE task were compared with 
those on the original LIPID task of Study 1 and the IS task of Study 2 (Chapters 5 and 6). 
Secondly, factors affecting judgements of risk were compared to those affecting 
prescription on the same set of cases. Thirdly, the degree of self-insight shown on the 
RISK task was compared with that shown on the PRESCRIBE task. Fourthly, a Lens 
model analysis of subjects answers on the RISK task was done using data from the 
Framingham study as a criterion. 
Agreement 
Agreement between doctors over the 100 cases was slightly worse on the 
PRESCRIBE task with judgements about prescription (Kendall's W = 0.36) than that on 
the RISK task with judgements about risk (W = 0.39). Whether this is a significant 
difference cannot be calculated (Kendall 1975,6.14, p. 102). Kendall's W measurement of 
concordance can be converted into an average Spearman's rank correlation coefficient for 
all pairs of doctors (Howell. 1982, p. 229). The corresponding average Spearman's 
correlations are 0.34 for the PRESCRIBE task and 0.37 for the RISK task. Agreement 
about prescribing was similar to that seen on the IS task of Study 2 where a slightly 
different formal of presentation was used (W = 0.35). But both were better than that on the 
judgements on 100 cases in the LIPID task of Study 1 which had the same format (W = 
0.28). As discussed in the introduction, better agreement was expected on risk judgements 
than on prescription judgements i f the latter are affected by agreement between subjects as 
to risk assessment as well as differences in management policy. However, the fact that the 
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difference is only marginal (if at all) is also of interest. A considerable amount of 
disagreement was shown in judgements about risk as well as in decisions about 
prescription. 
Kendall's W (concordance) was also calculated across judgements predicted from 
standardised regression coefficients (doctors' tacit policies) and from subjective weights 
(doctors' explicit policies). Kendall's W for the predicted judgements were greater on the 
RISK task (0.62 and 0.82 for tacit and explicit policies respectively) than on the 
PRESCRIBE task (0.54 and 0.65'* for tacit and explicit policies respectively) as predicted. 
There is greater agreement in the medical literature about how to judge risk of coronary 
heart disease than when (and whether) to treat with lipid lowering drugs. Correspondingly 
there was greater agreement between policies. Values of concordance are higher than the 
Kendall's W measures between doctors' actual judgements given earlier. Doctors' actual 
judgements may be more diverse because they are subject to the doctor's level of 
inconsistency. Judgements predicted from a model did not have this element of random 
error. This greater agreement between subjects on the RISK was not large in subjects' 
actual judgements but these are affected by both consistency and policy and the greater 
agreement in policy is perhaps offset by a reduction in consistency on this task. Other 
analyses will further unpack the relationship between the two judgement tasks. 
Comparison between PRESCRIBE, UP ID and!S policies 
Despite a complete change of subjects and a slight change in the cues presented, 
where cues were the same, their use was similar on the PRESCRIBE task to that on both the 
LIPID and IS tasks. The average regression coefficients of the PRESCRIBE task, shown in 
Figure 8.3 appear similar to those of the IS task seen in Figure 6.5 (Chapter 6). Table 8.2 
summarises cue use by doctors on the PRESCRIBE task in a similar manner to the LIPID 
cue use summary in Table 5.11 and the IS cue use summary in Table 6.3. Age, Smoking 
and Diabetes again act as both indicators and contra-indicators to prescribe. Differences are 
that Hypertension and Compliance with advice on Diet did not act as both 
^ Agreement here is between the 30 doctors whose policy could be expressed in linear tenns. Otherwise in all 
cases agreement is calculated on predictions of judgements on 100 cases. 
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indicators and contra-indicalors in the PRESCRIBE task; fewer doctors took account of 
diabetes, whilst more took account of Evidence of Arteriosclerosis, Altitude to treatment 
and Family History of ischaemic heart disease. 
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Figure 8.3 Average standardised regression coefficients for doctors on the PRESCRIBE 
task (N = 36). 
Explicit policies can also be compared on these different tasks. However, not all 
doctors were able to express their PRESCRIBE explicit policies in linear rating terms. For 
six of the doctors the ratings they attached to cues on the PRESCRIBE task could not all be 
allocated linear signs. Thus the doctors do not have linear explicit PRESCRIBE policies. 
There was either an interaction as in the case of Attitude and Smoking for GP40 or a 
simple non-linear function as Weight took for GP41. The remaining doctors expressed 
policies which were again remarkably similar to those expressed by subjects in the LIPID 
task of Study 1. Average subjective ratings of the two tasks in Tables 5.8 and 8.3 are 
similar both in size and in sign and there are similar levels of dissension as to the effects of 
Smokes, Diabetes, Compliance with advice on diet and Weight. However, Hypertension in 
the PRESCRIBE task is only ever rated as an indicator to prescribe. Subjective ratings for 
all GPs are in Appendices 51 and 52. Subjective weights are in Appendices 53 and 54. 
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Table 8.2 Standardised regression coefficients P R E S C R I B E task (N = 36 doctors) 
Cues +ve n.s. -ve Mean St. dev. 
CHOLESTEROL L E V E L 34 2 0 0.43 0.20 
HYPERTENSION 9 27 0 0.09 0.09 
AGE I 23 12 -0.11 0.14 
GENDER 5 31 0 0.05 0.12 
EVIDENCE OF ARTERIOSCLEROSIS 11 25 0 0.11 0.12 
DRINKS 3 28 5 -0.04 0.14 
SMOKES 3 22 11 -0.09 0.19 
DL^BETES 11 23 2 0.10 0.14 
COMPLL\NCE WITH ADVICE ON DIET 6 30 0 0.07 0.10 
WEIGHT 0 23 13 -0.11 0.12 
ATTITUDE TO TREATMENT 24 12 0 0.25 0.18 
FAMILY HISTORY I.H.D. 15 20 1 0.15 0.16 
Key:- +ve. -ve = significantly positive or negative regression coefficients, n.s. = not 
significant. 
Table 8.3 Subjective ratings P R E S C R I B E task (N = 36) 
Cues +ve zero -ve Mean St. dev. 
CHOLESTEROL L E V E L 36 0 0 8.53 1.30 
HYPERTENSION* 31 4 0 5.67 2.33 
A G E 1 4 31 -5.74 3.12 
GENDER 24 12 0 3.13 2.87 
EVIDENCE OF ARTERIOSCLEROSIS 33 3 0 6.07 2.78 
DRINKS 6 17 13 -1.42 4.09 
SMOKES* 15 3 17 -0.59 6.65 
D L ^ E T E S * 30 0 3 5.76 4.09 
C O M P L L ^ C E WITH ADVICE ON DIET 25 8 3 3.64 4.49 
WEIGHT* 4 9 22 -3.00 3.99 
ATTITUDE TO TREATMENT* 32 3 0 5.21 3.29 
FAMILY HISTORY I.H.D. 36 0 0 6.97 1.68 
* Some ratings could not be assigned signs since non-linear influences were described 
This data is omitted. 
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Linear modelling and consistency 
There was no significant difference between linear fits of tacit policies calculated 
from judgements on ihe last iOO cases of the PRESCRIBE lask and the RISK task. The 
averages for both are seen in Table 8.4. The average difference of Fisher's z 
transformations of R were 0.017 (t =0.4. p = 0.69. N = 36). Just as in Study 1. on both 
tasks there was a significant correlation between Fisher's z transformations of the multiple 
correlation coefficient (R) and consistency of judgement making (r = 0,373 and r = 0.651 
on the PRESCRIBE and RISK tasks respectively). 
Table 8.4 Mean Consistency and Linear fit of models for each task 
Task N Mean consistency'* Mean R^ St. dev. R^ 
PRESCRIBE. 35 0.52 0.52 0.13 
RISK 35 0.62 0.53 0.10 
However, as can be seen from the averages in Table 8.4, consistencies were 
significantly better on the RISK than on the PRESCRIBE task (t = 2.1. p = 0.04. N = 36). 
Individual subjects* consistencies and linear fits are shown in Appendices 46 and 47. The 
degree of agreement between subjects on tasks, described earlier, is affected by both 
agreement in policies and the subjects' consistencies. Where a subject shows less 
consistency (agreement with themselves) they will show less agreement with others. This 
again suggests that the greater agreement in judgements on the RISK task reflects a greater 
agreement in policy that is dampened by the level of consistency. 
Both tasks showed higher consistencies than the LIPID task and lower 
consistencies than the MIGRAINE task of Study 1 where there was a delay of 10 months 
before measurement of consistency. Less consistency might have been expected on these 
tasks where there was this delay. It may have been the case that where both consistency 
and linear fit were low it was because there was little variance in the subjects' responses. 
However, the correlation between Fisher's z transformations of the multiple correlation 
coefficient and standard deviation was not significant for either task (r = 0.27 and r = 0.09 
'* Consistency was the correlation in responses over 30 repeated cases. 
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for the PRESCRIBE and RISK tasks respectively). Nor was that between standard 
deviation and Fisher's z transformations of consistency (r = 0.238 and r = 0.156 for the 
PRESCRIBE and RISK tasks respectively). In other words when consistency was low 
linear fits tended to be low too and it was not because there was little variance in response, 
Risk judgements and prescription of lipid lowering drugs 
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Figure 8.4 Scatter plot showing the relationship between 36 doctors' judgements of risk of 
Coronary Heart Disease (RISK) and their likelihood of prescribing a lipid lowering drug 
(PRESCRIBE) for 100 hypothetical patients. 
Correlations between doctors' judgements, latencies, regression coefficients and 
subjective ratings on the PRESCRIBE and RISK tasks are shown in Appendix 55. The 
correlation between doctors'judgements of risk and their likelihood of prescribing for the 
last 100 cases is on average significantly different from zero (mean r = 0.22, sl.dev. = 0.24, 
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^ t = 5.23, p < 0.01). Figure 8.4 shows this relationship which seems conditional: if the case 
was prescribed for it will have been rated as a high risk. Prescription rarely occurred when 
the patient was perceived as having a low risk of coronary heart disease (CHD) but patients 
rated at high risk of CHD may or may not have been prescribed for. This group of untreated 
high risk patients might include those who were, for example, at high risk but only have 
moderate cholesterol levels, are opposed to treatment, who smoke, are overweight or who 
drink heavily. To test this likelihood of prescription for cases with risk judgements above 
the doctor's median were correlated with the relevant cues values. These correlations are 
shown in Appendix 50. 
Twenty-nine out of the 36 doctors had a significant positive correlation between 
cholesterol level and prescription for these cases. For the majority of doctors then, cases at 
high risk but not being prescribed for had relatively low cholesterol levels. Not to prescribe 
a lipid lowering drug for someone with relatively low cholesterol levels seems quite 
rational behaviour. However, the range was such that the lower limit of the cholesterol 
level cue was 6.5 mmol/1. The range was set thus so as not to be too low for treatment. 
Given the assessment of high risk doctors might have been expected to prescribe for 
patients with this level of cholesterol. Fourteen out of 36 doctors had significant positive 
correlations between attitude and prescribe over these higher risk cases. So some doctors 
would be less likely to prescribe lipid lowering treatment for high risk patients who were 
opposed to treatment. For seventeen doctors the correlation between smoking and prescribe 
was significant and negative. In other words, although these patients were still perceived as 
at high risk, those who smoked were less likely to be prescribed for by these doctors. The 
correlation between weight and prescribing on these higher risk patients was significantly 
positive for five doctors and significantly negative for one. So five doctors were less likely 
to prescribe for overweight people even though they perceived them as being at high risk. 
One doctor was more likely to prescribe for overweight people at high risk. Finally, 
drinking was significant and negative for two doctors. These were less likely to prescribe 
for heavy drinkers, even though they were at high risk. For two doctors the correlation was 
significant and positive. However, over all cases, drinks was not a significant factor for 
* t-lest of Fisher's z transformations. 
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these doctors. In other words two doctors were more likely to prescribe for drinkers if they 
were at high risk but were not influenced by drinking behaviour generally. This indicates 
non-linear cue use. In subjective ratings of relative importance, one indicated no influence 
of drinking behaviour overall and the other indicated being somewhat but negatively 
influenced (a rating of -4). The relationship between non-linear behaviour and self-insight 
is discussed in Chapter 9. These correlations indicate that doctors differ in terms of patient 
management policy even for high risk patients. These differences in policy are not due to 
differences in perceived risk of the patient 
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Figure 8.5 Average standardised regression coefficients for doctors on the RISK task 
(N = 36). 
With knowledge of the guidelines on prescription of lipid lowering drugs, outlined 
in the introduction, and having seen the relationship between judgements made on the two 
tasks (Figure 8.4) it might be assumed that decisions to prescribe encompass some sort of 
risk assessment. In this case cues relevant to risk should form a subset of those affecting a 
doctor's judgements on prescription. There is some evidence for a similarity when cues' 
regression coefficients on the two tasks are correlated (mean =0.21, st.dev. = 0.39.1 = 
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2.99, p < 0.01). However, the average pattern of cue use on the RISK task (Figure 8.5) is 
different from that on the PRESCRIBE task (Figure 8.3). 
Although an average of four cues were significant for doctors on the PRESCRIBE 
task five were significant on the RISK task. This is similar to Study 1 and Study 2 where 
on average four cues were used on tasks. This is again suggestive of limits to information 
processing capacity as discussed in the previous chapters. However, this fact alone 
questions the possibility of cues influencing risk judgements being a subset of those 
influencing prescribe judgements. 
Table 8.5 Standardised regression coefficients R I S K task (N = 36 doctors) 
Cues +ve n.s. -ve Mean St dev. 
CHOLESTEROL L E V E L 26 10 0 0.21 0.15 
HYPERTENSION 24 12 0 0.18 0.11 
AGE 1 28 7 -0.07 0.13 
GENDER 10 26 0 0.10 0.14 
EVIDENCE OF ARTERIOSCLEROSIS 19 17 0 0.18 0.22 
DRINKS 5 31 0 0.07 0.09 
SMOKES 32 4 0 0.39 0.17 
DDVBETES 28 8 0 0.28 0.14 
COMPLLVNCE WITH ADVICE ON DIET 0 0 0 0.02 0.06 
WEIGHT 8 27 1 0.05 0.14 
ATTITUDE TO TREATMENT 0 0 0 0.02 0.05 
FAMILY HISTORY I.H.D. 20 15 1 0.20 0.17 
ley;- +ve. -ve = significantly positive, negative regression coefficients. n.s. = not 
ignficiant. 
Table 8.6 Subjective ratings RISK task (N = 36) 
Cues +ve zero -ve Mean St dev. 
CHOLESTEROL L E V E L 36 0 0 5.83 1.96 
HYPERTENSION 35 1 0 6.64 1.69 
AGE 11 8 17 -1.58 4.88 
GENDER 28 6 2 3.72 3.08 
EVIDENCE OF ARTERIOSCLEROSIS 33 3 0 6.46 3.27 
DRINKS 29 6 1 3.38 2.88 
SMOKES 36 0 0 8.61 1.22 
DIABETES 36 0 0 7.81 1.31 
COMPLIANCE WITH ADVICE ON DIET 1 21 14 -1.36 2.27 
WEIGHT 31 5 0 3.93 2.17 
ATTITUDE TO TREATMENT 1 33 2 -0.33 1.67 
FAMILY HISTORY I.H.D. 36 0 0 6.82 2.27 
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Several cues are on average used in the same way on the PRESCRIBE and RISK 
tasks. Cholesterol has a much greater impact on prescription decisions than risk 
judgements and attitude to lipid lowering treauneni and compliance with advice on diet did 
not influence any doctor's judgements of risk. The opposing use of cues by different 
doctors in the PRESCRIBE task can also confuse comparisons of averages. For example, 
on the PRESCRIBE task the regression coefficients*averages for smoking, drinking and 
weight were negative, some doctors having significant positive some significant negative 
weights. On the RISK task however, the average standard regression coefficient for all 
three of these cues is positive. Smoking has considerable impact on risk. 
AH GPs* explicit policies on the RISK task could be put in linear terms. The 
conrelations between subjective ratings on the two tasks were significantly different from 
zero (mean =0.33, st.dev. =0,31, t = 6.06, p < 0.01), and were significantly greater than 
correlations between regression coefficients (t = 2.29, p = 0.03). The average subjective 
ratings on the RISK task (Table 8.6) are again different from those of the PRESCRIBE 
task (Table 8.3). Perhaps the major difference between ratings is due to differences in the 
number of cues that are rated positively and negatively by different doctors for example in 
the case of Age. Drinks, Smokes. Diabetes, Compliance with advice on diet and Attiaide to 
treatment. Attitude to treatment was generally not thought to affect a person's degree of 
RISK. Whereas in the PRESCRIBE task Smoking, Drinking and Compliance with advice 
on diet had been used in a slightly moralistic way previously with an argument along the 
lines of "why help someone who won't help themselves" in the RISK task these were 
generally seen as increasing a person's risk. Whereas three doctors had felt they would be 
less likely to prescribe a lipid lowering drug to people with poorly controlled diabetes, all 
doctors felt people with poorly controlled diabetes would have been at greater risk. Finally 
although the majority of people had felt they would be more likely to prescribe for younger 
patients, the perceived influence of Age on risk varied with doctor 
The way Age has affected judgements of risk and was explicitly thought to affect 
judgements of risk is interesting. Older patients are statistically more at risk from Coronary 
Heart Disease than younger patients in that for example they are more likely to have a 
heart attack in the next 5 or 10 years (see the section on lens model analysis below). This is 
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well known. However^ several doctors explicitly and tacitly rated younger people as at 
greater risk. Doctors may have interpreted the question differently with some interpreting 
the question as lifetime risk in which case an older person with the same symptoms as a 
younger person had shown themselves to be a survivor. Some doctors could be expressing 
a pragmatic interpretation of risk in terms of their anxiety to do something for the patient 
Doctors could have been influenced by their behaviour on the previous task where many 
had explicitly and tacitly been more likely to treat younger patients. The judgements may 
also reflect a lack of biomedical knowledge. 
When a cue's regression coefficients on both tasks are correlated across all doctors 
the correlations for Age. Gender, Evidence of Arteriosclerosis. Diabetes, Compliance with 
advice on diet and Family History are all significant (Table 8,7). All of these are known 
risk factors. Where a doctor took any of these risk factors into account on the risk task it 
also influenced their prescription. The significance of Compliance with advice on diet is 
surprising since the cue is not a significant one for any doctor on the RISK task. There are 
other known risk factors that did not have significant correlations. However, when absolute 
values of coefficients are correlated the pattern changes slightly (see Table 8,7 column 2). 
The correlations for Drinks and Weight also become significant and that of smokes has 
increased. Compliance with advice on diet ceases to be significant Smoking, drinking and 
weight were used differently by different doctors on the PRESCRIBE task. Although many 
of them felt that the cues were relevant they were being used in different ways by different 
doctors. However, when they were significant on the RISK task they tended to be used in 
one way. Thus it does seem that doctors who were influenced by drinks and weight on the 
PRESCRIBE task also saw them as determinants of RISK. It would be expected that the 
same would be true of smoking. Smoking is interesting in that although it played a large 
part in risk assessment for all but four doctors, it was only used by fourteen doctors on the 
PRESCRIBE task. 
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Correlations between Cue Weights on the P R E S C R I B E and RISK tasks 
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 
Cues Signed standardised Absolute standardised Signed subjective Absolute subj 
regression coefHcients regression coefficients weights weights 
CHOLESTEROL L E V E L 0.269 0.248 -0.150 -0.150 
HYPERTENSION 0.306 0.242 0.233 0.233 
AGE 0.457 0.360 0.143 0.551 
GENDER 0.593 0.634 0.400 0.398 
EVIDENCE OF ARTERIOSCLEROSIS 0.462 0.472 0.286 0.286 
DRINKS -0.109 0.552 0.174 0.090 
SMOKES -0.013 0.269 0.140 0.115 
DIABETES 0.414 0.444 0.345 0.400 
COMPLIANCE WITH ADVICE ON DIET -0.350 -0.149 -0.115 0.119 
WEIGHT 0.007 0.365 -0.013 0.183 
ATTITUDE TO TREATMENT -0.099 -0.188 0.020 -0.008 
FAMILY HISTORY I.H.D. 0.672 0.662 0.417 0.417 
When signed subjective weights are correlated between tasks (column 3 in Table 
8.7) the correlation is only significant for gender, diabetes and family history. Age is also 
significant when absolute values are used (column 4). In other words those doctors who 
thought gender was important for prescribing also thought it was an important risk factor, 
those who thought diabetes was important in prescribing also thought it was an important 
risk factor and those who thought family history was important in prescribing also thought 
it was an important risk factor. Those who were more likely to prescribe for either young 
or old people were more likely to see age as a risk factor loo. 
The immediate question that needs asking however is why all the risk factor 
weights don't correlate significantly with prescribing weights. If a factor influences or is 
believed by the doctor to influence risk judgements then why does that not have an affect 
on prescribing. According to the medical literature it should: if the patient has risk factors 
they should be more likely to get treatment (see introduction). One interfering factor may 
be the lack of variance over some cues. For example cholesterol was important for ail but 
two doctors on the PRESCRIBE task and was also rated as being important by almost all 
doctors on the PRESCRIBE task. What is odd is that eight doctors who had previously 
used it as a basis for prescribing did not allow cholesterol to affect judgements of risk. 
Even if they did not perceive a difference in risk between those with cholesterol levels of 
6.5 mmoiyi and 8 mmol/I it is still odd that they were more likely to prescribe for the higher 
cholesterol levels. The odd use of cholesterol is also seen in the fact that doctors who were 
more influenced on the RISK task by cholesterol were no more likely to prescribe lipid 
lowering therapy on average than those less influenced (r = 0.089» N = 36). This may have 
been influenced by those doctors who were prescribing even though they did not consider 
cholesterol to be a risk factor or could be influenced by doctors who do feel cholesterol 
drugs are beneficial despite feeling high cholesterols in the range presented are a problem. 
Latencies 
Another interesting point to note is that correlations between latencies on the two 
tasks are significantly different from zero (mean r = 0.05, st. dev. = 0.13, t = 2.29, p = 
0.03). When doctors spent longer assessing the risk of a patient they also took longer 
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deciding on their treatment. This makes sense if consideration of a person's risk is a 
prerequisite to prescribing. As in the LIPID task of Study 1 and the IS task, several doctors 
showed a pattern of decision making whereby they were more likely to prescribe for cases 
on which they had spent longer on the PRESCRIBE task. On average the correlation was 
significantly different from zero (mean r = 0.10, st, dev. = 0.20, t = 2.91, p < 0.01).The 
correlation was significantly positive for nine doctors and significantly negative for three 
(see Appendix 46). However, on the RISK task, nine doctors were significantly less likely 
to give a high rating of risk to those cases they spent longer on (none had a significant 
positive correlation). The correlations were significantly different from zero (mean r = -
O.IO. St. dev. = 0.16. t = -3.89. p < O.Ol). So on the RISK task doctors tended to give lower 
ratings of risk the longer they spent on a task. But on the PRESCRIBE task doctors tended 
to prescribe for cases on which they spent longer. 
Self-insight 
In this study another of the hypotheses set up in Study 1 (Chapter 5) to explain the 
triangular pattern of insight will be tested. To recap, the over-rating of importance was 
found to be cue related. It appeared from Study 1 that the cues that were being over-rated 
were those that had an impact on the severity of the case and were important in that sense 
but were less important in terms of prescriptive decision making. In the LIPID task in 
Study 1 the degree of risk the patient was at was a measure of severity. Here two tests were 
used. Firstly, over-rating on both the PRESCRIBE and RISK tasks were looked at. 
However, secondly the cues that were important in terms of risk were measured for the 
doctor and compared with those cues that were being over-rated on the PRESCRIBE task. 
The average correlation between tacit (standardised regression coefficients) and 
explicit (subjective ratings) policies on the PRESCRIBE task was 0.69, (st.dev. = 0.14). On 
the RISK task the average correlation was 0.68 (si dev. = 0,21). These correlations are 
shown in Appendices 53 and 54. There was no significant difference between these two 
and both were similar to the average coirelation of 0.66 seen on the LIPID task of Study 1. 
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Figure 8.6 Plots of subjective ratings against standardised regression coefficients for 
doctors on (a) the PRESCRIBE task (N = 30) and (b) the RISK task (N = 36) 
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Figure 8.7 Subjective weights plotted against standardised regression coefficients for 
doctors on the (a) PRESCRIBE (N = 30) and (b) RISK tasks (N = 36). 
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When explicit policies and tacit policies are plotted against each other a triangular 
pattern similar to that seen in Figure 5.2 in Study 1 is observed. When cues are rated as not 
important they are not. But some cues that are being rated as imponani are not. This over-
rating occurs on both tasks as can be seen in Figure 8.6. Again GP40. GP41, GP44. GP59, 
GP71 and GP74 are not included in the calculations or figures for the PRESCRIBE task. 
The over-rating pattern is again still there when subjective ratings are changed to 
subjective weights as in Figure 8.7. 
Over-rating on both PRESCRIBE and RISK is cue-related but not doctor-related, 
just as it was found to be in Study 1. A two way ANOVA of the absolute difference of 
subjective weights and regression coefficients was significant for cues but not for doctors 
on both tasks as Table 8.8 shows. Which cues are being over-rated is shown in Figures 8.8 
and 8.9. 
Table 8,8 Two way analysis of variance of subjective weight-regression coefficient 
differences 
Task F statistic, between doctors p F statistic, between cues p 
PRESCRIBE^ F(29319) = 1.39 0.47 F( l 1,319) = 3.35 <0.01 
RISK F(35,385) = 1.58 0.15 F( l 1.385) = 4.56 <0.01 
One hypothesis set out at the beginning of this chapter was that the cues that were 
being over-rated on the LIPID task were those that the doctor felt were important in terms 
of the risk of the case. Important was being interpreted in different ways. However, here 
over-rating occurred on the RISK task as well as the PRESCRIBE task. On the RISK task 
a clinical interpretation of importance should not have lead to over-rating since if a cue 
was important in that it increased risk it should have been important in that it increased the 
judgement of risk! Therefore this different interpretation of "importance" can be rejected. 
Although doctors are not re-interpreting the instructions, it does seem to be the case 
that some doctors were more likely to over rate those cues on the PRESCRIBE task that 
they explicitly stated were more important in terms of risk. For some doctors there was a 
significant correlation between their pattern of over rating of cues and their stated pattern 
6 The subjective policies for GP40. GP41, GP44, GP59, GP71 and GP74 were not 
included since non-linear policies were described on this task. 
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of cue use on the RISK task. The difference beiween absolute values of subjective weights 
and absolute values of standardised regression coefficients (the latter subtracted from the 
former) was used as the measure of over-rating for each doctor. Absolute values of 
subjective ratings on the RISK task were used as a measure of the doctors' perception of 
the relative importance of cues to risk. The correlation was significant for six doctors as 
can be seen in Appendix 55 but for one of these the correlation was significantly negative: 
he was less likely to over rate the importance of cues important in risk terms. The average 
correlation was 0.22 and Fisher's z transformations proved to be significantly different 
from zero (p < 0.002). 
There is a second interpretation of the pattern of self-insight. This is that cue over-
rating is based on a model the subject feels they ought to be using. Subjective accounts are 
based on some explicitly held and socially agreed causal explanation. Subjects cannot use 
the model they profess to be using because it involves the use of more cues than they can 
take into account The amount of information affecting decision making has been limited 
on every task. A number of risk factors were rated as important on the LIPID task but not 
used to that extent. Statements about the factors influencing decision making on the 
PRESCRIBE task were more similar to statements about factors influencing judgements on 
the RISK task than actual policies were similar to each other. On both the PRESCRIBE 
tasks and the RISK tasks cues stated as being of importance were not so. Another crucial 
piece of evidence supporting this theory lies in the level of agreement between subjects 
about judgement policy. Judgements for the 100 cases in the tasks were predicted from 
policy weights and were used to measure agreement in policy as discussed in the section 
on agreement earlier. This was done with both subjective weights and regression 
coefficients and for both the PRESCRIBE and the RISK task. There is greater agreement 
between predictions from subjective weights (W = 0.65 and W = 0.82 on the PRESCRIBE 
and RISK tasks respectively) than from regression coefficients (W = 0.54 and W = 0.62 on 
the PRESCRIBE and RISK tasks respectively). This supports the hypothesis that subjects* 
relative importance ratings are based on socially influenced causal theories. 
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Figure 8.8 Average standardised regression coefficients and average subjective weights for each cue on the PRESCRIBE task (N = 30). 
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Figure 8.9 Average standardised regression coefficient and average subjective weight for cues on the RISK task (N = 36). 
Lens model analysis of the RISK task 
The risk task is unique in this set of experiments in that a number of tools exist that 
purport to give a patient's risk of coronary heart disease. In post-task interviews fourteen 
doctors explicitly stated that they had some sort of risk assessment iooC and eight stated 
that they did not. Of the former, one doctor used the tool, five used it in some way, such as 
with new patients or "seldomly", and eight admitted not using it at all. The remaining 
doctors did not mention any aid or tool. 
Table 8.9 Cues and their ranges used in the Mercke, Sharp and Dohme Coronary 
Risk Calculator 
Sex Male/Female 
Age In years 
Systolic blood pressure Level in mmHg 
Total Cholesterol Level in mmol/l 
HDL Cholesterol* Level in mmol/l 
Smoking Yes/No 
Diabetes Yes/No 
Left ventricular hypertrophy Yes/No 
* " I f the HDL value is unknown, the program will assume a 'mean' value of 
1.15 mmol/l in men and 1.4 mmol/l in women." (HDL = high density 
lipoprotein) 
Here actual risk of CHD could be calculated for each hypothetical patient using the 
Merke, Sharp and Dohme Coronary Risk Calculator (1993) which is based on equations 
formed from Framingham study data (Anderson, Wilson, Odell, and Kannel, 1991). This 
program collects eight pieces of data about the patient and then calculates the patient's ten 
year risk of a coronary event. It also calculates the risk for a healthy sex and age matched 
individual. The data entry requirements of the Risk calculator, which are shown in Table 
8.9, did not match the information form of the hypothetical cases. For example, one of the 
pieces of information required was the HDL cholesterol, a piece of information not given in 
the original task. Where the HDL is unknown, as it was in our set of hypothetical patients, 
the program assumes a mean value of 1.15 mmol/l in men and 1.4 mmol/l in 
' Dundee scores (either as discs or in the computer system) and Shaper scores were explicitly mentioned. 
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women. Systolic blood pressure relates to the RISK task information about Hypertension. 
Where the patient was described as having poorly controlled hypertension a value of 170 
mmHg was entered otherwise the patient was classified as having a systolic blood pressure 
of 120 mmHg. Smoking was reclassified as "yes" if the hypothetical patient smoked 
Occasionally. Regularly, or Heavily. Otherwise they were classified as "no". Diabetes was 
classified as "yes" i f the patient had well or poorly conU*olled diabetes and as "no" i f the 
patient did not have diabetes. Finally the program asked i f the patient had left ventricular 
hypertrophy and for all patients presented in the task the answer was no. Age and sex were 
taken as they were presented from the age and gender information. 
There was information not represented in the program which had been presented in 
the task. This was Evidence of Arteriosclerosis. Drinks, Compliance with advice on diet. 
Weight. Attitude to treatment and Family History of Ischaemic heart disease. Although 
Compliance with advice on diet and attitude to treatment were not influential on any 
subject's judgement making. Family History of ischaemic heart disease was significant for 
21 subjects. Evidence of arteriosclerosis for 19 subjects and Drinks and Weight for five 
and nine subjects respectively. 
The point of the lens model, first described in Chapter 3, is to examine the different 
components involved in a person getting the right answers in a probabilistic world. In the 
lens model equation 
rA = RE Us G + Cy/(\ - / g ) ( l -
where 
• = achievement = the correlation between judgements and the criterion, 
• RE = the degree of systematic linear variance of the criterion. = the correlation 
between predictions from the linear model of the criterion and its actual values; 
• Rs = ('consistency') the degree of systematic linear variance of the subject. = the 
correlation between predictions from the linear model of the judgements and the 
actual judgements. 
• G (matching) = the correlation between predictions from the model of the 
judgements and of the criterion. 
• C = the amount the remaining variance in subject's judgements, unaccounted for 
by the model correlates with that of the criterion. 
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Here the criterion wasn't strictly a real world environmental criterion. An individual's 
risk or probability can only be calculated from a larger population. Although the real world • 
is probabilistic in that there is a certain amount of random variation in many phenomena, 
the criterion value calculated here was not. Measures of the Coronary Risk calculation on 
repeated cases led to a consistency (r„) of 1. The equation that had been used to form 
judgements of risk in the programme is a non-linear one (the program is based on equations 
given in Anderson etal, 1991). However, rather than using this as the model of the 
environment, its predictions were calculated over the set of cases in the RISK task and the 
relative importance of cues for the criterion were calculated. These calculated risk values 
over the 100 cases were well described using a linear model. The correlation between 
predictions from the risk calculator and from the linear model of these {R^) = 0.93. So 
there is a small amount of systematic non-linear variance in the criterion. 
Different subjects had different policies and a separate lens model analysis was done 
for each. Figure 8.10 is a diagrammatic representation of the lens model in this context. 
Using the Judgements the subject made over cases, the risk calculation for those cases and 
linear models of both of these the value of the different component parts of the equation, 
described above, were calculated for different subjects. These are shown in Table 8.10. 
The first interesting and obvious point is thatr^ , the measure of achievement, is low 
in all doctors and only reaches significance for 14 of them. Achievement here is 
considerably worse than that of medical student subjects in Tape, Kripal and Wigton's study 
(1992). However, in Tape et al's study the additional varying cues included in cases 
(triglycerides, uric acid and haemoglobin levels) were unrelated to risk of coronary heart 
disease. Achievement is affected by differences in linear policy as well as differences in the 
descriptive ability of those policies. Differences in policy occur if a subject uses the cues 
available that were not included in the risk calculation; if a subject is influenced by cues in 
a different way to the way the cue influences the risk calculation. Both of these will result 
in reduced matching (a low G). A subject may also vary judgements unsystematically. This 
will lead to poor consistency and will again result in low achievement or accuracy. 
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Figure 8.10 Diagrammatic representation of the lens model analysis of risk judgements 
Table 8.10 
Table of Lens model characters RISK task 
Re = 0.931 
GP Non-linear 
Matching 
Cognitive control Matching Achievem 
C Rs G ra 
40 0.063 0.782 0.21 0.167 
41 -0.032 0.713 0.411 0.265 
42 -0.131 0.818 -0.143 -0.136 
43 0.405 0.789 0.198 0.236 
44 0.021 0.504 0.668 0.32 
45 0.022 0.747 -0.097 -0.062 
46 0.034 0.716 0.055 0.046 
48 0.038 0.882 0.197 0.168 
49 0.279 0.777 0.217 0.221 
50 0.136 0.724 0.388 0.295 
51 -0.07 0.748 0.026 0.001 
52 -0.034 0.766 0.395 0.274 
53 -0.033 0.763 0.063 0.037 
54 0.062 0.675 0.166 0.121 
55 -0.127 0.733 0.126 0.054 
56 0.092 0.577 0.388 0.236 
57 -0.136 0.723 0.174 0.083 
58 0.057 0.777 0.285 0.219 
59* -0.048 0.686 0.057 0.024 
60 0.075 0.711 0.02 0.033 
61 -0.095 0.69 0.156 0.075 
62 -0.001 0.822 0.094 0.072 
63* -0.236 0.574 0.361 0.123 
64 0.411 0.734 0.172 0.22 
65 0.104 0.769 0.246 0.2 
68 0.111 0.778 0.213 0.18 
69 0.114 0.733 0.243 0.194 
71 0.065 0.739 0.285 0.212 
72 -0.01 0.644 0.252 0.149 
73 -0.161 0.742 0.306 0.172 
74 -0.199 0.826 0.192 0.107 
76 0.047 0.728 0.029 0.031 
77 0.097 0.726 0.068 0.07 
78 -0.009 0.712 0361 0.237 
79 0.251 0.652 0.325 0.267 
80 -0.044 0.674 0.331 0.196 
* = CPs who used only cues which are used by the coronary risk calculator. 
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Differences in the actual cues affecting the judgement making can be seen to 
account for low levels of matching. Only iwo doctors (GP59 and GP63) were influenced 
solely by the information that is used in the Risk Calculation. Other doctors might still 
have reasonable achievement i f they were only minimally influenced by information not 
used by the criterion. This is possibly the case for GP44 who, despite poor consistency (ru 
= 0.22) and the additional tendency to rate thin people as at higher risk, was influenced 
appropriately by the criterion cues and had a high G (0.67) and the highest achievement of 
all the doctors (rA = 0.32). Low matching may also have been affected by the way cues 
influenced judgements. For example coronary risk is greater for older people as can be 
seen from the importance weights of the risk calculator shown in Figure 8.11. However, 
for many doctors concern for younger patients was such that they considered them at 
greater risk. For example, although GF59. used only those cues that were used in the risk 
calculation he was influenced negatively by Age and G the match between predictions 
from a linear model of his judgement and those from that of the criterion is poor (0.06). 
C, which is a measure of the coinciding systematic non-linear variance, is difficult 
to interpret i f the linear models are very different Since all but three doctors were 
significantly influenced by factors not used in the criterion equation it would be surprising 
if non-linear variance did correspond. For those doctors who did not use other cues, only 
GP63 has a significant C and this is negative. However, judgement making by GP63 who 
despite a low linear f i t (R = 0.57) was moderately consistent, may not have been well 
captured by the linear model and he may have had considerable systennalic non-linear 
variance. 
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Figure 8.11 Bar graph showing the standardised regression coefficients of the coronary risk 
calculations over 100 cases. 
The limited usefulness of this lens model analysis lies in the inadequacy of the 
criterion. Despite evidence for the relevance of almost all the task factors in risk of CHD 
the criterion only takes into account six of them (see Heller, Bailey, Gott, and Howes, 
1987). The importance weights calculated from the criterion risk calculations also correlate 
poorly with the explicitly stated policies of risk judgement. These were shown earlier to 
reflect a degree of agreement greater than that of prescribing thai was thought to relate to 
the greater agreement in the literature about the factors leading to increased risk. However, 
the criterion bears no greater resemblance to explicit policies (average correlation = -0.09) 
than it does to tacit pohcies (average correlation = -0.09). Plots of the average subjective 
weights, average regression coefficients and the criterion weights also bear this out. Figure 
8.12 shows the weights of the criterion bear poor resemblance to the average subjective 
weights as they do to the average regression coefficients. Even Tape et al. (1992), who 
only used five cues in their criterion measure included weight as a predictor of heart 
disease. When so many subjects were influenced by factors other than those used in the 
criterion it is not surprising that both matching (G) and achievement (rA) tend to be low. 
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Figure 8.12 Bar graph showing the standardised regression coefficients of the coronary risk calculations over 100 cases. 
Conclusion 
Judgements of risk of CHD proved to be suitable for judgement analysis and with 
the uncalibrated scale used gave good linear fits. This study showed that there is a 
conditional relationship between perceived risk of CHD and prescribing: if subjects were 
prescribed for they were perceived as being at high risk. However, this does not resemble a 
threshold model hypothesized in other studies whereby subjects having a probability of a 
disease above a threshold probability would be prescribed for. Although those who were 
prescribed for were at high risk and those who were at low risk were not prescribed those 
at high risk may or may not have been prescribed for. Risk of CHD is multifactorial and 
several factors could have led to high risk values. The decision to prescribe is clearly based 
on more than the patient's risk of CHD. When the cues used on each task are compared, 
although several doctors were influenced by the patient's attitude to treatment on the 
prescribe task, this was not used to judge risk. However, no more cues were significant for 
doctors on the PRESCRIBE task than on the RISK task. Average cue use on the tasks was 
much the same as in previous studies. So although prescription seems in some way 
dependent on the perceived risk being high, the decision to prescribe seems to use cues 
very differently to those affecting risk judgements. 
Conclusions from the lens model analysis of risk judgements were limited because 
the criterion model used only a proportion of the cues that were available to and used by 
doctors. However, there was disagreement even over the use of these. Several doctors 
either did not use age or rated younger people as at greater risk when in fact the cue was 
the most important one for the criterion which assessed older people as at far greater risk. 
Doctors may have been influenced on the RISK task by the PRESCRIBE task they had just 
completed in which several had been significantly more likely to treat younger patients. On 
average subjects appear to have under-estimated the importance of hypertension and 
overestimated the importance of cholesterol and smoking. Hypertension is rated on average 
as more important than cholesterol for example, and the difference between smoking and 
the other cues is not so great. 
Self-insight on the RISK task was much the same as that on the PRESCRIBE task 
and on the tasks in Study 1 (Chapter 5). Again all doctors over-rated the importance of 
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some cues and certain cues had a tendency to be over-rated. However, the importance of 
cues in the assessment of risk is discussed explicitly in the medical literature. Indeed 
subjects' tacit and explicit policies on the RISK task showed greater agreement than those 
on the PRESCRIBE task. In addition stated policies showed greater agreement both within 
and across tasks than actual (tacit) policies. This explicit agreement about the importance 
of cues in temis of the severity of the case does not seem to have aided doctors* self-insight 
into their own judgement and decision making behaviour. A few doctors tended to over-
rate those cues on the prescribe task that they thought were important in terms of risk. One 
interpretation is that subjects' stated policies are partly hypotheses about the cues that 
should have been affecting their behaviour rather than a mere reflection on those that did. 
205 
Chapter Nine 
Thg ConFotin<jed Rating Hypothesis Revisitg<j 
Introduction 
Study 1 had shown that subjects had relatively poor insight into the factors 
affecting their decision making. They rated more cues as important than were important. 
Although they only ever tended to use about four cues, other cues had a tendency to be 
over-rated. This is similar to the pattem of self-insight described in other studies whereby 
few cues are used and more are rated as important (Slovic and Lichienstein, 1971, p. 684). 
Study 2 confirmed this finding and showed that the pattem of explicit policy was more like 
the pattern of frequency of selecting cues than pattem of tacit policy and that prediction of 
tacit policies from stated ones was no better than their prediction from patterns of cue 
selection. This gave evidence for the distinction between explicit and tacit knowledge and 
supported the Attention Hypothesis. Subjects tended to select more cues than were actually 
influencing their decision making. Configurality of cue selection, whereby the amount of 
information collected varied from case to case, did not appear to influence the configurality 
or non-linearity of judgement making or influence self-insight Study 3 showed that self-
recognition, although saying something slightly different about subjects' self-knowledge, 
did not suggest that subjects had greater self-insight than we had already found. Study 4 
showed that even on a task where, coincidentally, importance in tenns of severity was what 
was being measured and therefore should have matched importance in terms of influence 
on the decision, cues were still over-rated. A similar number of cues were being used on 
these tasks. 
It looks as if subjects are showing limited self-knowledge. They are not giving a 
clinical interpretation of importance. It looks as i f they are aware of how they looked at 
cues but not how they were influenced by them. This chapter will examine whether the 
pattem of self-knowledge seen so far could be due to nonlinear or non-additive use of cues. 
Evidence for the Confounded Rating Hypothesis, described in Chapter 6. is examined with 
reference to both previous literature and the studies described so far. The results of Study 4 
(Chapter 8) are also analysed further. 
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To recap, the Confounded Rating Hypothesis, first introduced properly in Chapter 6, 
states that subjects' ratings of importance might well correspond to the influence that cues 
could have on cases. But their influence is affected by their configural or non-linear use. 
The effect of interactions between cues used would lead to some cues having apparently 
low regression coefficients when within particular cases they were very influential. In this 
model subjects have a degree of understanding of the relationship between cues and 
decision making. 
There are actually two parts to this hypothesis. Firstly there is an assumption within 
this model that the linear model of subjects' tacit policy has not captured all subjects' 
consistent decision making. Subjects' explicit policies were also inappropriately forced into 
a linear model. I f it is the case that the linear model is the best model of their behaviour 
then the Confounded Rating Hypothesis must be false. Secondly, the over-rating of cues 
should correspond to this non-linear cue use: where subjects are using cues consistently but 
non-linearly, they should show worse self-insight. To test this, the addition of some non-
linear components or the use of non-linear models should significantly improve linear fits 
and the cues with non-linear components added should be those that are being over-rated 
for those doctors whose linear fits are improved. 
Non-linear policies can take a number of forms. Analysis using multiple linear 
regression assumes that the behaviour is linear and additive (Stewart, 1988). Linearity 
describes a relationship between cue and judgement: as the value of the cue increases 
regularly, the value of the judgement also increases regularly. Non-linear policies include 
those with irregular increases such as step ftinctions, inverted-U or U-shaped functions or 
S-shaped functions. Being additive means that cues affect the judgement independently of 
the value of other cues. [Billings and Marcus (1983) refer to this sort of policy as 
compensatory.] Non-compensatory or non-additive models are such that the effect of a cue 
on the judgement depends on the value of other cues. These include conjunctive, 
disjunctive, multiplicative and absolute difference policies, elimination by aspects 
(Tversky, 1972, described in Wright, 1984, p. 105-107) and the selective consideration of 
cues dependent on the value of other cues. These models are termed non-linear because the 
cues have non-linear relationships with the judgement or because they interact in their 
effects on the judgement. 
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Evidence in the literature for non-linear policy use 
The literature to be discussed here is that introduced in Chapters 3 and 4, on clinical 
judgement analysis and on self-insight. The use of multiple linear regression assumes that 
cues have a roughly linear and additive relationship with judgements or decisions. Linear 
models are a good fi t for the majority of subjects'judgement making in the majority of 
studies, even i f subjects actually have a configural or non-linear pattern of cue use 
(Brehmer and Brehmer, 1988). The addition of non-linear terms or interactions leads to 
little i f any improvement in fit. The emphasis in policy capturing studies is that what is 
captured is a paramorphic representation of the subject's behaviour. Subjects' policies in 
lens model studies are well described by linear models even when the environmental 
criterion takes a non-linear pattern (Hammond and Summers, 1965). The phenomenon of 
bootstrapping (see Chapter 3) has also suggested that even i f subjects are using a more 
complex, configural model they are not consistent in applying it (Meehl, 1954; 1965). 
However there is some evidence for nonrlinear behaviour. I f subjects are told about a 
non-linear criterion then they can behave non-linearly (Hammond and Summers, 1965). 
Bootstrapping could be explained in terms of subjects use of the wrong non-linear model: 
A linear estimation of this is nearer the criterion than subjects' actual policies. Individual 
subjects are exceptions in some judgement analyses: For them policy is significantly better 
captured when non-linear components were added to the linear model. In terms of the 
Confounded Rating Hypothesis, this significant improvement with non-linear components 
could make ail the difference. 
Einhom (1970) has used parabolic and hyperbolic mathematical formulae to model 
conjunctive and disjunctive behaviour; Billings and Marcus (1983) have distinguished 
between conjunctive behaviour and Elimination by aspects (EBA) as non-compensatory 
models. More recently, Ganzach and Czackes (1995) compared Einhom's models to two 
others (the "scatter" and the "true conjunctive-disjunctive" models) in descriptions of 
theoretically conjunctive and disjunctive behaviour. They found that linear models were 
better fits than either parabolic or hyperbolic models on all types of task. Only the scatter 
models were significantly better fitting than linear models and this was only the case in two 
of the five data sets where non-linear non-compensatory behaviour had been predicted. 
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However, this model was a better f i t than all the other non-linear models on all data sets. 
The scatter model takes account of the degree to which the case departs form the average in 
terms of all cues, measuring its "scatter". Other researchers have simply added non-linear or 
interactive terms to linear models (e.g. Wiggins and Hoffman, 1968; Summers, Talioferro 
and Fletcher, 1970). 
In a few studies non-linear policies have been found to be the best fitting model for a 
large proportion of subjects. Which non-linear models they use can be seen to be affected 
by the type of judgement. Einhorn (1972) found the same (conjunctive) model was the best 
fit for severity of Hodgkin's disease judgements for all three of his pathologist subjects. 
Einhom (1971) found that subjects rating jobs tended to use conjunctive models i f their 
behaviour was not linear. However, the conjunctive model was only significantly better for 
sixteen sets of judgements out of 78, the linear model was significantly better for five. But 
there was no significant difference between the models for the rest of the judgement sets. 
On a graduate assessment task linear models were significantly better in eleven out of sixty 
data sets, non-linear models (disjunctive or conjunctive) were significantly better for 
twelve. Wiggins and Hoffman (1968) similarly found that although the linear model was 
best for 12 subjects' judgements of MMPI profiles, sign models were best for 13 and 
quadratic models were best for three subjects. The sign models used were linear 
combinations of a number of terms that could be specified from the data. These terms 
included simple cues and complex combinations of cues. So on a few studies, even when 
for a proportion of subjects, judgements are better described by a non-linear model, the 
non-linear model that is best may vary. Different non-linear models seem more likely on 
different tasks. 
In addition to type of policy being related to the type of task, some authors have 
proposed that it might be related to the information load being presented (Billings and 
Marcus, 1983; Einhom, 1971). Information load is changed by changing the time pressure, 
the number of alternatives being considered or the number of pieces of information about 
each alternative (the number of cues presented). Einhom (1971) pointed out that 
mathematically more complex models are not necessarily cognitively more difficult (and 
may be simpler) to carry out. He hypothesized that with increasing numbers of cues 
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subjects would revert to more non-linear, non-compensatory strategies. On both of his tasks 
fits of all models were better for the two cue condition than for either the four or six cue 
condition. However, on only one task was there an interaction between the number of cues 
presented and the type of policy being used. This was a result of very low fits of a 
disjunctive model when six cues were presented. 
There is some evidence that subjects may use non-linear policies, and they may be 
more inclined to do so where more cues are being presented. Although well described with 
linear models, judgement making on the tasks presented in Studies 1 to 4 may be non-
linear. I f subjects are behaving non-linearly their consistency would be high but linear f i t 
limited. 
Stated non-linear policy use and self-insight 
Subjects' elicited models, whether linear or non-linear have consistently been found 
to be worse descriptions of behaviour than the objective linear model (Slovic and 
Lichtenstein, 1971; Reilly and Doherty, 1992; see Chapter 4). I f subjects are able to 
describe their behaviour as being non-linear when it is then that is certainly some degree of 
self-insight. Cook and Stewart (1975) showed that where non-linear subjective models 
were formed insight was no better than where linear models were. 
Summers, Talioferro and Fletcher (1970) however, describe two findings that suggest 
another degree of self-insight. Over half their subjects had indicated using a non-linear 
policy. Summers et ai found that multiple correlations of cues were worse for those 
subjects who described using a non-linear policy than for those who did not. This could 
have been the result of inconsistent rather than non-linear behaviour. When new, non-linear 
models were formed little improvement in fit was seen. However, those who had described 
non-linear behaviour had significantly more improvement than those who had not. On one 
reading of this subjects had some self-insight as to whether their behaviour was non-linear. 
However, although not all subjects stated non-linearities all showed some improvement 
when they were added. Summers ei al do not state whether the subjects' descriptions of the 
nature of the non-linearity of their own behaviour proved to be correct. 
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Evidence from Studies 1 to 4 
Subjects* judgement and decision making in Studies 1-4 could be described 
reasonably well with linear models. However, these are only paramorphic representations 
of subjects' policies. A non-linear model might form a slightly better f i t of a subject's 
behaviour. Patterns of self-insight may be due to non-linear cue use. Where cues have been 
over-rated they may be used in a non-linear way or have interactions with other cues that 
have not been captured by the linear model. 
Study 3 (Chapter 7) does not help to clarify the situation one way or the other. 
Regardless of why the discrepancies arose between subjective and objective cue weights, 
significant correct policy recognition could have been due to the tactics used by doctors to 
pick out policies. For example, subjects could have picked themselves out on the basis of 
the cues that felt they didn't use: Any policy with those cues as significant is not their 
pohcy. Reilly and Doherty (1992) gave subjects a post-experiment questionnaire in which 
subjects described the method they used to identify their own policies. Sixteen percent 
described looking for cues they knew they hadn't used and eliminating policies in which 
that cue was important. Fifty seven per cent described looking for the cue they felt was 
most important and eliminating policies where that was not used. I f either of these 
strategies was used where the same pattern of self-insight had been seen as on our task 
recognition would generally be successful: Cues that subjects stated not using generally 
were not used and subjects often were able to identify their most important cue. Even i f the 
importance of other cues was confused due to non-linear interactions, i f either of these two 
policies was being used the correct policy would be picked out. The results of Study 3 do 
not confirm or deny the Confounded Rating Hypothesis. 
In Study 2 (Chapter 6) the cues selected were noted. I f cues were thought to be 
important they would be selected regardless of whether they were used linearly or not. 
Patterns of cue importance seemed to be based on known patterns of selection: stated cue 
use and cue selection were found to be similar but.both were equally dissimilar from actual 
linear policy. I f it was configural cue use that was leading to the apparent over-rating of 
cues then where cues were known to be selected configurally less self-insight and less 
linearity might be expected. Where cue selection is configural it should be more similar to 
patterns of actual cue use than stated policies are. Subjects' patterns of cue selection were 
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no more like their pattern of cue use than their subjective ratings were and subjects 
selecting cues configurally were no more likely to over-rate cues than other subjects. But 
configurality of cue selection was also seen to be uncorrelated with configurality of cue 
use. 
Although on all tasks described so far (in Chapters 5, 6, and 8) there have been 
significant correlations between consistency and linear fi t , these correlations have not been 
perfect. Thus, although it can be said that a significant amount of doctors' non-linear 
behaviour is related to inconsistency, it is not all. There may still be a certain amount of 
systematic non-linear behaviour. Self-insight was much the same on all tasks: objective-
subjective weight correlations were similar and there was over-rating of certain cues. 
However, the correlation between consistency and linear f i t varied between tasks: on the 
MIGRA[NE task it was much higher than on the LIPID task for example. Thus, although 
the tasks differed in terms of systematic non-linear behaviour, they did not differ in terms 
of self-insight. This would suggest that the over-rating phenomena being observed are not 
due to poor capturing of a non-linear policy. 
In order to disprove the Confounded Rating Hypothesis subjects would have to be 
found who had used cues configurally but had not over-rated their relative importance. 
Over-rating by subjects who had apparently used cues in a linear additive manner would 
mean that there could be more than one explanation for over-rating. But it would not 
disprove the Confounded Rating Hypothesis. 
Testing the hypothesis 
On an individual by individual basis, non-linear behaviour would be indicated by a 
significant increase in f i t with the addition of non-linear components to a policy model. In 
addition, i f over-rating was due to non-linear behaviour, all those cues that were over-rated 
should also be those involved in a better fitting non-linear model. The obvious way to test 
the Confounded Rating Hypothesis is to build non-linear models and see i f where there is 
improvement in the model's f i t there was over-rating of the importance of a cue. I f there 
was over-rating of a cue but there was no improvement of f i t with a non-linear model it 
may be that the over-rating is still caused by a non-linear pattern but not one that we have 
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put into the model. However, i f there is improvement in a model with the addition of a 
non-linear component where there was no over-rating it suggests that not capturing a non-
hnear component does not necessarily lead to over-rating. The problem comes in deciding 
which non-linear or configural models to try out. 
There are a myriad of different types of model. As Stewart (1988) points out there 
are an infinite number of possible non-additive policies. Obviously it is impractical as well 
as inefficient to test all of these. General non-linear models of the types used in other 
studies (described earlier) could be fitted or individual non-linear components could be 
added to existing linear models to test out specific interactions. Something has to be used 
as the basis on which to add non-linear components to an existing model or to create a 
completely different type of non-linear model. Apart from the actual judgements made 
only two other types of information were collected in the studies described so far: cue 
selection and the content of the post task interviews. In previous studies non-linearity of 
actual judgement making policy has not been predictable from subjects' descriptions of 
their policies. Even when complex descriptions of policy are given often linear models 
have been found to be the best fit. But these descriptions can be used to ascertain the types 
of non-linear behaviour that subjects might exhibit. 
St'jdy 4 (Chapter 8) reanalysed 
The first difficulty in testing the Confounded Rating Hypothesis is to decide which 
interactions or non-linear patterns to start including in the model. In Study 4 (Chapter 8) 
subjects were explicitly asked i f they were happy with the ratings they had given and i f 
more important cues were getting higher ratings. They were asked i f they wished to 
describe their policy in any other terms. They were asked i f there were any interactions 
between cues whereby the importance of one cue was dependent on the value of another. 
Not all doctors described non-linear cue use or cue interactions. The comments made are 
presented in Appendices 56 and 57. 
A few doctors were identified on the PRESCRIBE task for whom cues could not be 
given signed ratings. These cues had either been described as being involved in 
interactions in some convoluted way, or had been described as affecting decision making 
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in some other non-linear way. Other interactions were described between cues but these 
did not prevent assignment of signed ratings. Not all doctors described any interactions or 
non-linear behaviour on that task, but all doctors tended to over-rate cues. On the RISK 
task descriptions of interactions were often general. For example : -
" . . I think the combination of family history in a first degree relative and er 
established pathology such as arteriosclerosis, hypertension; that plus any one of the 
others, let alone combination widi any of the others, was er critical in risk assessment, 
yeah, I think." (GP41) 
"..Females over f i f ty I would put at higher risk.. 
"Higher risk than females under fifty yup and I mean again I'd be looking for a 
combination of risk factors so ..somebody who had a lot of risk factors was more at risk 
than somebody who only had one or two" (GP50) 
"Well once again you're making a judgement - a real judgement on a combination 
of factors aren't you., and i f you've got somebody with poorly controlled diabetes and 
poorly controlled hypertension obviously that is going to magnify the risk more than i f 
they had poorly controlled hypertension and were say overweight. It is a multifactorial 
decision... 
... Well I think that smoking interacts with everything - well all. Put it this way, all 
the factors interact. But I'd have thought thai smoking was probably the most significant 
multiplier" (GP46) 
" Um, well 1 suppose smoking and diabetes were - increased my likelihood of 
assessing them at high risk. That was probably my main one actually" (GP51) 
Even i f non-linear patterns of cue use are found to account for the discrepancies 
between objective and subjective accounts of cue importance, subjects still show lack of 
self-insight in that these were not always described. Subjects' accounts of their own cue use 
policy cannot be relied upon to describe or predict their judgement and decision making 
behaviour. 
However, non-linearity or cue interaction could still have been the cause of 
apparent over-rating even where doctors had not explicitly identified these. The 
discrepancy between a doctor's subjective and objective weights give an indication of 
which cues are being over-rated. Where restructuring of a cue leads to improvement in a 
model's f i t it would not be surprising i f that cue had previously been over-rated. In this 
chapter a number of analyses are done, each of which reforms subjects' models to include a 
non-linear analysis or an interactive component. One change in the models is tried out at a 
time and significant improvements in a model's f i t are tested for. Non-linear use of two 
cues is looked at: Diabetes and Hypertension, Cue-interactions between age and gender, 
between Cholesterol level and all other cues, attitude to treatment and all other cues and 
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between smoking and all other cues are also examined. 
( I ) Non-linear cue use: diabetes and hypertension. 
A couple of doctors described a non-linear use of diabetes: although they were 
more likely to prescribe for well controlled diabetics, i f the diabetes was poorly controlled 
they were less likely to prescribe. It may have been the case for other doctors that diabetes, 
whether or not it was well controlled would lead to increased prescribing. The following 
analysis was carried out on data from all doctors. Diabetes, which had originally been 
coded as 1, 2 or 3 depending on whether there was no diabetes, well controlled diabetes or 
poorly controlled diabetes, was put into two columns. In one column only well controlled 
diabetes was coded as 1 and anything else was coded as 0. In the other column poorly 
controlled diabetes was coded as 1 and anything else was coded as 0. Judgements in both 
PRESCRIBE and RISK tasks were regressed onto cases with these two diabetes measures. 
When diabetes was recoded into two "cues", the new linear model was just a less 
constrained version of the original linear model. The significance of any increase in linear 
fit was therefore calculated for each doctor using an F test: F ( l , 86) = 86 * (R^N- R^o) / ( l -
R M where R^o = the linear fit of the doctor's original model and R^N = the linear fit of the 
new model (Howell, 1982 p.435). This difference was found to be significant for eight 
doctors on the PRESCRIBE task and for 13 doctors on the RISK task. 
Hypertension was recoded in an identical manner to the recoding of diabetes and 
new models were calculated where there were two standardised regression coefficients 
relating to hypertension. Well controlled hypertension was the only non-zero for one 
hypertension "cue" and poorly controlled hypertension was the only non-zero for the other 
hypertension"cue". The significance of the difference in linear fits was again calculated. 
The difference was significant for four doctors on the PRESCRIBE task and six doctors on 
the RISK task. 
TTie relationship between over-rating of cues and significant increase in linear fit 
was examined using Fisher's exact statistic. Over-rating of cues was looked at in terms of 
die difference between subjective and objective weights. Doctors were classified as having 
over-rated the importance of a cue i f and only i f the subjective weight was greater than the 
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objective weight. Otherwise they were classified as not having over-rated it. The 
significance of this difference could obviously not be measured since subjective weights 
are not statistics. 
When hypertension was recoded as two cues there was no significant relationship 
between a significant increase in linear fit and tendency to over-rate hypertension on the 
PRESCRIBE or RISK tasks (p = 0.313, p = 0.569). When diabetes was recoded there was 
no significant relationship between significant increase in linear f i t and tendency to over-
rate diabetes on the PRESCRIBE task (p = 0.56). However there was a significant 
relationship on the RISK task (p = 0.047). Four out of the thirteen subjects who had 
significant improvements in linear fit had not over-rated diabetes whereas all but one of the 
23 subjects who did not have significant improvements in linear fit had over-rated the cue. 
So in this task subjects who had significant increases in linear f i t were less likely to have 
over-rated than subjects who did not have significant increases in linear fit . This is the 
opposite way round to the result predicted by the Confounded Rating Hypothesis. 
The above analyses show that non-linear behaviour does not necessarily lead to 
over-rating. No general conclusions can be drawn from the large numbers of doctors had 
over-rated the importance of the cues diabetes and hypertension but did not have 
improvement in linear fit. Other cue interactions could have caused the over-rating in these 
instances. 
(2) Interactive cue use: age and gender 
Another type of non-linear model could involve interactions between cues. Some 
doctors had indicated that the importance of age and gender were related. For example 
GP45 indicated increased likelihood of prescription for young females over young males 
but that this difference disappeared in old males and females. 
An interactive term was added to the linear equation which then included the 12 
original cues plus a product of age and gender. With this additional independent variable 
five doctors showed a significant improvement in linear fit on the PRESCRIBE task and 
three showed a significant improvement in linear fit on the RISK task. 
There was no significant relationship between over-rating of gender and 
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improvement of linear fit on either the PRESCRIBE (p = 0.51) or RISK (p = 0.58) task. 
There was also no significant relationship between over-rating of age and improvement of 
linear fit on either task (p = 0.45, p = 0.58). 
(3) Multiplicative models of interaction of cholesterol with all other cues and interaction 
of attitude to treatment and all other cues. Disjunctive model: Interaction of smoking 
with other cues. 
Some doctors had described a policy whereby for some of the range of cholesterol 
level they would be very unlikely to prescribe regardless of other factors. Outside this 
range other factors would play some part in the decision. To test to see if providing an 
interaction between cholesterol and all other cues made a difference to the f i t of the model 
to the data, all cues were recoded as the product of the cue with cholesterol. Cholesterol 
was included as it had originally been. Since the new model differed quite substantially 
from the original one the difference in linear fits could not be tested for significance. 
However, the model would also not have improved automatically. Since the number of 
cues were the same in the original and the new model, linear fits were compared directly 
and classified as either having improved or not having improved. On the PRESCRIBE task 
twelve doctors had a better fitting model when an interaction was included between 
cholesterol and all the other cues. On the RISK task no doctor's model improved. 
Just as some doctors had indicated that there was an interaction between cholesterol 
and other cues, a similar interaction was mentioned for attitude by some doctors. For 
example, GP56 indicated on the PRESCRIBE task that i f subjects indicated opposition to 
treatment they would not prescribe, regardless of the other factors. A model similar to the 
one described above was formed for all the doctors on each task. This time attitude to 
treatment remained the same but all other cues were the product of their original value and 
attitude to treatment. Again there was no test of significance of any increase of linear fit 
but subjects were classified as having an improved linear fit or not having an improved 
linear fit. Five doctors (not including GP56) showed improved linear fit with this new 
model on the PRESCRIBE task. No doctors showed improvement on the RISK task. 
The above two interactions were only described by doctors as occurring on the 
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PRESCRIBE task and were not mentioned on the RISK task. They were also only found to 
have an effect on the PRESCRIBE task and not on the RISK task. This again indicates 
some son of insight. Some doctors specifically mentioned smoking as one of the factors 
involved in interactions on the RISK task. Accordingly a new model was formed for all 
doctors whereby the value of all cues was multiplied by the value of smoking bar itself 
which was included as was. Again any improvement in linear fit was noted. No 
improvement was shown by any doctor on the PRESCRIBE task. Two doctors showed 
improvement on the RISK task. 
Since a number of cues had been affected by these multiplicative policies, over-
rating of individual cues could not be looked at. However, over-rating of all cues could be 
seen in the pattern of self-insight or the correlation between objective and subjective 
policies. To test the effect of this type of non-linear cue use on self-insight, the self-
insight of doctors with and without significant improvement in linear fits on the 
PRESCRIBE task were compared. 
I f this analysis was done for each policy separately, differences in self-insight 
between subjects with significant improvements in fit and those without may not show up. 
The group without significant linear fits could include subjects exhibiting a different sort 
of non-linear behaviour (who thus have poorer self-insight). As a result of this subjects 
with significant improvements from any of the non-linear policies tried here were grouped 
into the 'non-linear' group. The rest were grouped into the 'linear' group. The (Fisher's z) 
self-insight shown by subjects in these two groups was compared. 
Twenty-one doctors had a significant improvement in linear fit on the PRESCRIBE 
task with one of the non-linear or interactive adjustments described above. These wil l be 
referred to as having non-linear PRESCRIBE policies. Fifteen doctors showed no such 
improvement. There was no significant difference in self-insight between these two groups 
(F(l,34) = 2.65. p = 0.113). On the RISK task nineteen doctors had a significant 
improvement and were classified as having non-linear RISK policies. Seventeen doctors 
showed no such improvement. Again there was no significant difference in the groups' 
self-insight (F(1.34) = 1.03. p = 0.316). 
218 
Conclusions 
Evidence for the Confounded Rating Hypothesis has been looked for. Comparison 
between self-insight by those who had non-linear policies and those who had linear ones 
showed no difference between the two groups for the majority of non-linear adjustments 
tried. When subjects* policies involved particular cue interactions they were no more likely 
to over-rate those cues than other subjects and in one case they were less likely to do so. It 
could be argued that the subjects without a significant pattern of cue interaction or non-
linearity could stilJ be using those cues in some non-linear way which would lead to 
apparent over-rating and no significant differences between non-linear and linear groups. 
But analyses in this chapter have failed to find any evidence to confirm the Confounded 
Rating Hypothesis. Again, the interactions and non-linear uses tested for were the ones that 
were mentioned by subjects. This would suggest that even i f over-rating does relate to non-
linear cue use, subjects are not stating that use. 
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Chapter Ten 
Central Discussion 
Introduction 
There have been three major findings in the studies presented. Firstly, the use of 
multiple regression based policy capturing techniques has proved useful in analysing 
different types of decisions and judgements made by CPs. Systematic differences, which 
may be more of clinical than psychological interest, have been observed between CPs in 
terms of the information that they both actually use and think that they use. There was 
greater inter-subject agreement in stated than tacit policies. Secondly, and of wholly 
psychologiced interest, doctors' ability to use the information was limited. Thirdly, the 
pattern of self-insight shown has been looked at in greater detail than in previous studies. 
Possible accounts for the pattern were tested and results indicate that self-hypothesising by 
CPs as to the factors affecting their decisions is no better than an account based solely on 
the infoimaiion selected. 
On the capturing of GFs' policies 
The nature of general practice was introduced in the first chapter of this thesis. The 
fundamental characteristics are that consultations are short: Decisions are made under time 
pressure. But the CP's knowledge of the patient is built up over a long period of time and 
over several (albeit brieO consultations. CPs see a wide range of problems of varying 
degrees of severity. Brooke and Sheldon (1985) also add that a large number of 
psychosocial problems are presented. General practice is more oriented to data collection 
for patient management rather than following the taught pattern of data collection, 
diagnosis, therapy planning, and management (see Sheldon, Brooke and Rector, 1985). 
Structures have still been used to analyse the consultation but these tend to be idealistic 
and simple. However, the judgement or decision process can still be divided into pans that 
conunbute to individual differences in patient management. Different data may be 
collected. These may be interpreted differently. They may be combined to affect the 
decision differently. 
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Individual differences in the first, and perhaps in the second, can be identified 
through analysis of recorded consultations or verbal protocols of the doctors' retrospective 
analysis of their consultations. Differences in the third are more difficult to analyse. 
Through the use of judgement analysis the same data was presented to subjects in the same 
form. Individual differences in infonnation combination could be seen and subjects' ability 
to state this was also noted. 
At fu^t it looks as if the problems presented difi'ered in their suitability for policy 
capturing. Linear fits and consistencies varied between the tasks. At the same time decision 
making by different GPs appeared to be better or worse captured using linear regression. 
Again some individuals were less consistent than others. Differences in hnear fit of policy 
captured could be due to non-linear behaviour or due to general inconsistency in decision 
making. The latter was found to correlate significantly with linear fit on all tasks. Although 
in Chapter 9 some doctors' policies were significantly improved by the addition of non-
linear components, a significant amount of variance in decision making was accounted for 
using linear models. Policy capturing techniques are still of use in identifying the relative 
importance of cues. 
There were several interesting individual differences in policy, some of which were 
systematic in that they occurred across tasks. Doctors differed as to the amount they were 
affected by the patient's attitude to treatment. Those that did take it into account on the 
LIPID task also tended to on the MIGRAINE task (Chapter 5). Two thirds of doctors took 
it into account on the PRESCRIBE task (Chapter 8). This seems to indicate some 
differences in sensitivity to the patients' wishes. Doctors taking the patient's attitude into 
account might be said to be patient-centred. McWhinney (1985) describes the differences 
between patient-centred and doctor-centred (models oO decision making. Doctors may 
practice either (or both). Being patient-centred is characterised by being aware of the 
patient's point of view and attitude towards their illness and taking their wishes into 
account. Doctor-centred approaches focus on the illness itself, its identification, and how 
best to overcome i t Of course those not doing so here may pay attention to patients' wishes 
in real life, where the patient is actually present and influencing both the consultation and 
information available to the doctor. 
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There were other systematic differences between doctors. For example, a few 
doctors tended to prescribe less for those who were overweight. There may be quite 
separate, clinical reasons for favouring treatment for those of normal or below average 
weight on the different tasks. For example, the policy of some doctors not to prescribe lipid 
lowering therapy for overweight patients might be justifiable on the grounds that dieting 
would reduce the lipid levels of the blood, reducing that risk factor. The tendency for some 
doctors to prescribe more for males however, whilst dubiously clinically justifiable on the 
grounds of risk of CHD on the LIPID task, is certainly questionable on the MIGRAINE 
task. Only four doctors showed this behaviour. Even on the LIPID and PRESCRIBE tasks 
however, this gender related preference should not be great. Being male is a risk factor for 
CHD. Where a man and a woman both have the same symptoms, the man may be more at 
risk. However, CHD is one of the biggest killers of women as well as men and gender 
preference should only occur where the other risk factors independently lead to a moderate 
level of risk (see Sharp, 1994 for a discussion of this point). Again only five doctors 
showed this preferential treatment of men and they were not strongly influenced. 
On the LIPID (and IS and PRESCRIBE) task certain cues acted as contra-indicators 
to prescribe for some doctors but as indicators for others. Indeed two of these - weight and 
smoking - were only ever perceived as increasing risk but still affected doctors' 
management decision making differently. The relationship between risk and prescribing 
was examined in Chapter 8. Although those patients prescribed for were a subset of those 
perceived to be at high risk, the use of cues on the different tasks was very different. I f a 
judgement about risk is made prior to prescribing, the cues used in the risk judgement 
might be expected to be a subset of those used in the prescribe judgement This was 
certainly not the case. Some cues reduced the likelihood of a doctor prescribing despite 
recognition of a patient's high risk. As mentioned earlier, the avoidance of drug treatment 
for overweight people may be explicable on the LIPID task. However, the policy of some 
doctors on this task amounts to avoiding prescribing lipid lowering treatment for smokers 
despite the recognition that they are at greater risk. These doctors explicitly stated they 
would try to persuade the person to stop smoking rather than give them drugs. But stopping 
smoking, whilst reducing overall risk, does nothing for risk caused by having a high 
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cholesterol level. This reflects a prejudice against smokers on the part of some doctors but 
others felt the patient was more likely to give up smoking i f they were not being given lipid 
lowering treatment (and a false sense of security about the reduction in their risk). 
On limits to information processing capacity 
Throughout all the studies presented, subjects have been limited in the number of 
cues that they use. Although 12 or 13 cues were always presented, subjects never used more 
than eight and used an average of four or five on all tasks. Individual differences were 
shown on tasks but did not carry across tasks. In other words, where a doctor used fewer 
cues on one task, they did not necessarily use few cues on another task. Differences in the 
number of cues used cannot then be attributed to individual differences in working memory 
capacity. 
In the literature reviewed in Chapter 3, the effects of expertise on working memory 
were discussed briefly. Although the number of chunks of information that could be used is 
still limited in experts, experience is such that information can be chunked into units of 
known recurring patterns. Thus chess masters,.for example, can reproduce complex patterns 
of pieces when they are possible chess situations but are hampered i f the arrangement is not 
feasible (de Groot, 1978; described in Simon, 1979). The importance of chunking can be 
seen in discussions of medical expertise where pattern matching is seen as an intrinsic part 
of diagnosis within the domain of expertise. Similarly the use of identification of forceful 
features in diagnosis as discussed by Grant and Marsden (1987; Gale and Marsden, 1985) 
would only be successful in the context where other features, characteristic of the disease, 
are likely to occur alongside that forceful feature. I f different doctors were more expert on 
a particular task it would be expected that they could take more information into account. 
They would be more aware of patterns of cues. Expertise is certainly domain dependent and 
so different doctors might take more information into account on different tasks. 
Although this was the pattern found over the studies presented here, differences in 
expertise cannot explain the task specific individual differences in quantity of cues used. 
Advantages of expertise are lost where cues are orthogonal as they were in the tasks in this 
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thesis. In real life where cues correlate to a certain degree, recognisable patterns may be 
learnt and sets of features may be picked out on the basis of one or two forceful ones. 
Where cues are not intercorrelated the use of one or two cues is just that and not the 
recognition of several associated cues. So the differences in quantity of cue use between 
CPs on our task is not due to differences in patterns of expertise. This is confirmed by the 
general limit to the number of cues used. I f differences in expertise really could account for 
these differences then the number used would be greater. As it is, the number being used is 
in the range expected i f each item of information were taking up one chunk: Cue use is 
limited for all doctors. 
I f not domain specific expertise then what can account for task specific individual 
differences in the number of cues used? Here the differences can only be explained through 
differences in policy. There are individual differences in the number as well as choice of 
cues. It might then be argued that differences in the number of cues used is not evidence 
for limits to information processing capacity and that these differences are simply policy 
differences. There are two facts that make this unlikely. Firstly, this does not explain why 
no GP used more than eight cues. Secondly, in statements about cue use GPs consistently 
said they were using more cues than they actually were. Explicit policies were not limited 
in cue use in the same way as tacit policies were. 
On self-insight 
One reason for using judgement analysis is its lack of reliance on subjects' stated 
policies. It might seem odd to then compare doctors' staled policies with their captured 
policies. If doctors had shown good self-insight obviously there would be no need for the 
statistical calculations involved in judgement analysis. But doctors' lack of self-insight into 
their decision making can be seen elsewhere. For example, another study on the same 
sample of doctors used in Chapter 5 showed that they either lacked any insight or gave 
responses in terms of some sort of academic decision theory when asked how they make 
decisions (DiCaccavo and Reid, 1995). However, the point in these studies was not to 
justify the use of policy capturing techniques by simply showing that GPs lack self-insight. 
Here the particular pattern of self-insight has been examined and reasons for it discussed. 
224 
The pattern found was a triangular one. As in previous studies subjective policies 
were flatter than objective ones: More cues were rated as important than actually were 
(Slovic and Lichtenslein. 1971). Previously, where the pattern has been described, 
important cues have been said to be under-rated and unimportant ones over-rated (Slovic 
and Lichtenstein, 1971). Here however, where a GP said a cue was unimportant it was not 
significant Cues that GPs indicated were important may or may not have been. Where 
cues were actually significant GPs tended to say they were. So there was selective over-
rating of certain insignificant cues. Some cues had more of a tendency to be over-rated 
than others but there were no significant differences between doctors in their tendency to 
fit this pattern. Important cues were not under-rated. This pattern could be seen when 
subjective ratings were used as stated and also when subjective weights, comparable to 
regression coefficients were used in the comparison. This pattern occurred on both 
decision tasks and the risk judgement task and with the two different samples of doctors 
used. 
In Chapter 5. self-knowledge was defined as a measure of the match between a 
subjective model of behaviour (or knowledge) and an objective model of behaviour (or 
knowledge) (see Figure 5.7). There are two types of explanation for the pattern of self-
insight seen in these studies. Firstly, the pattern could be classed as some artefact of the 
method: the subjective model is inappropriate or the objective model is inappropriate (or 
both). Secondly, reasons can be hypothesized for the pattern of self-insight which is 
assumed to be genuine. 
Given that this pattern was found on all tasks, one conjecture then was that the 
pattern is actually caused by the task or the means of analysis. One thing all the tasks had 
in common was the use of orthogonal cues. This could conceivably have caused the pattern 
of self-insight seen, as explained below. Call this the "Artificiality Hypothesis". Another 
possibility is that the method used to capture policies causes this pattern. Perhaps it is 
where cues are used non-linearly that there is apparent over-rating. This has been referred 
to as the "Confounded Rating Hypothesis". 
If. as in real life, cues are correlated, then their use may be substituted over a series 
of cases. For example, i f overweight people usually have hypertension then a doctor could 
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use the fact that a person in front of them was overweight or could measure their blood 
pressure to make a management decision. These things are not perfectly correlated - some 
thin people for example have hypertension. However, for the management of the majority 
of patients it wouldn't matter which cue the doctor used. Suppose a doctor alternated which 
cue he or she paid attention to. I f the doctor was to then rate their importance, he or she 
might rate them both equally as very important. In the situation where they were both 
correlated this might be true. 
But suppose now that the doctor had been making decisions on a set patients where 
cues were orthogonal. In this case the doctor might rate both cues as equally very important 
again, assuming that the use of one really meant the use of the other. However, in this 
situation the alternating use of cues would mean two things. Firstly, both cues would be 
equally important ( i f they had been used an equal amount of times) but only moderately 
important. As a consequence of this both would appear to be over-rated in comparison to 
other cues that would not be naturally correlated. Secondly, the doctor's decision making 
might appear slightly inconsistent and the f i t of the model might not be ideal. After all they 
have been alternating cue use policy. 
This, of course, is exactly the pattern that was found - in all studies, on all tasks. 
However, i f the Artificiality Hypothesis is correct then subjects making decisions on 
realistically correlated sets of cues should show better self-insight. I f they do not, the 
Artificiality Hypothesis can be rejected. Studies with both intercorrelated cues {e,g. 
Kirwan, Chaput de Saintonge, Joyce, Holmes, and Currey, 1986) and orthogonal cues {e.g. 
Fisch, Hammond, Joyce, and O'Reilly, 1981) have shown the same lack of self-insight. 
Reilly and Doherty (1989) found that subjects' ratings of the relative importance of cues 
given just before the task showed significantly worse self-insight than those given after the 
task. In other words subjects had been influenced to some degree by the pattern of cues they 
had seen. However, in the study by Reilly and Doherty (1992) subjects did show better self-
insight where cues were intercorrelated, in a representative design, than when they were 
orthogonal. But in this measure of self-insight Reilly and Doherty did not compare cues* 
subjective and objective importance weights because of the difficulty of identifying the 
separate relative importance of cues when they are correlated. They 
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grouped together (twelve or six) cues into five factors for which they calculated usefulness 
indices and summed the relative importance ratings for the cues in each factor. This 
grouping may have led to the apparently excellent self-insighl shown by subjects in these 
conditions, [The mean correlation between objective and subjective factors in the twelve 
cue condition was 0.92.] This suggests that the artificiality of the task set may contribute to 
the pattern of over-rating seen. It cannot explain it totally, since self-insight is still lacking 
where cues are correlated. What this means in terms of CPs' decision making is that in 
theory policies are not completely consistent, although in practice they may appear to be 
so. 
The Confounded Rating Hypothesis was discussed in Chapter 9. This hypothesized 
that over-rating of cues might have occurred where cues were used (systematically) non-
linearly. Despite being given the opportunity, not all doctors stated non-linear cue use so 
their self-insight can still be said to be limited. However, their ratings of importance may 
have been confounded nevertheless, leading to this triangular pattern of self-insight. Where 
non-linear cue use was demonstrated, doctors were no more likely to over-rate those cues 
than doctors who had used them linearly. In one case they were actually significantly less 
likely to do so. This, the reverse result to that predicted, seems enough to reject the 
hypothesis. However, it can always be argued that those doctors classified as not using 
those cues non-linearly may have had a different non-linear policy than the one tested. 
Since all doctors tended to over-rate certain cues then, i f the Confounded Rating 
Hypothesis were correct, all doctors must have tended to use certain cues non-linearly. 
However. linear fit is also somewhat a measure of non-linearity. Linear fits varied in their 
ability to describe subjects' behaviour. Although this variation was significantly related lo 
consistency of cue judgement making, that correlation was not perfect and there must also 
have been differences in systematic non-linear behaviour. However, there were no 
significant differences between doctors in terms of the pattern of self-insight. 
The suggestion from the above two hypotheses is that subjects may have had self-
insight but that this was warped by the method used - by the artificiality of the task or by 
the use of a linear model. In these cases both objective and subjective models were 
inappropriate. It has similariy been suggested that subjects may have better self-insight 
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than shown by asking for explicit ratings: the subjective model is inappropriate. Reilly and 
Doherty (1989. 1992) investigated this by looking at subjects' recognition of their own 
policies. In Chapter 7 the same was done here and subjects' ability to pick out their own 
policies was significantly greater than by chance. However, they were no better at picking 
out their own explicit policy than they were at picking their tacit policy. Performance in 
picking out subjective policies may have been reduced because of the influence of the 
similarity between policies or because of forgetting. But it would still be expected to be 
belter than selection of tacit policies if the pattern of difference between them was caused 
by inaccuracy on the part of the tacit policy. 
The results of the studies contained in this thesis then show that subjects cannot 
state the relative importance of cues - they cannot state their combinatorial policies. Even 
if the orthogonality of cues may have contributed to the pattern of lack of self-insight, as 
described in the Artificiality Hypothesis above, it suggests that subjects are insensitive to 
the covariation of cues and their use. Explicit and implicit knowledge of these policies 
appear to be separate. However, it app)ears, in fitting with the findings of other researchers 
that subjects can state explicitly certain aspects of the decision making process. Bui that 
others remain elusive and can only be hypothesized about, just as another person might. 
The part of decision making that subjects seem to be able to state is which cues 
they have paid attention to - that they know phenomenally. When subjects' stated policies 
were compared with both their tacit policies and their cue selection policies in Study 2 
(Chapter 6) tacit policies could be predicted from cue selection policies just as well as from 
stated policies. Their stated policies were more similar to their cue selection policies that to 
their tacit policies. 
Attention to cues is the focus of process tracing techniques, which often use verbal 
protocol analysis. Although retrospective verbal protocols have been criticised as being 
open to memory loss and reconstruction (Ericsson and Simon, 1980). the post task analysis 
of the relative importance of cues in the studies presented here produced a fairly good 
likeness to the cues selected. Although not requested, subjects seem able to give this sort of 
phenomenal self-knowledge retrospectively. 
Although cue selection policies correlated well with staled cue use, it could of 
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course be the case that the two are correlated with something else. One possibility is that 
both cue selection and stated cue use correlate with cue use in real life decision making, 
where cues are correlated. This would fit the results shown. But this is the artificiality 
hypothesis which was earlier rejected as a full explanation of the findings. 
Another possibility considered was that the type of importance was misinterpreted 
and that subjects were giving some measure of clinical importance rather than the bearing 
cues had had on the decision making. The same cues would be looked at in that they had a 
bearing on risk» and would be rated highly in terms of clinical risk. However, they need not 
affect decision making quite this strongly. Thai doctors were not giving just a clinical 
interpretation of importance was seen in Chapter 8 when the fact that the pattern of self-
insight was still apparent in statements of policy on risk assessments. 
Another possibility is that subjects could be stating the cues they thought they 
ought to have attended to and also selected these. Explicit policies are hypotheses based on 
taught knowledge. It is unlikely they would have done this deliberately. They were asked 
about their decision making policies specifically on the task they had just completed and 
participation was anonymous. However, two lines of evidence support this. Firstly, risk 
factors, or factors contributing to the severity of the case, tended to be the ones over-rated. 
These are the cues that doctors wi l l have been taught are of import. Secondly predictions of 
judgements from explicit policies showed greater agreement than those from tacit policies. 
This was greater on the RISK task than on the PRESCRIBE task. Again doctors will have 
been explicitly taught the factors of relevance to a risk calculation. A variation of this is 
that knowledge of the clinical importance of cues comes into some ideal model of the 
decision policy. If this were the case it would again be evidence that the sort of knowledge 
that CPs can give is based on that which they have been taught explicitly, have constructed 
from explicitly held knowledge or are phenomenally aware of. There was greater 
agreement between subjective models than objective models. Even when the socially 
agreed ideal combination of cues is known, this is not what doctors are actually doing. 
That much of self-knowledge is hypothesizing, influenced by generally agreed 
theories was put forward by both Nisbett and Wilson (1977) and Nisbelt and Ross (1980 
chapter 9). Relative importance is a measure of influence of pieces of information in 
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covarianl terms and the pattern of self-insight here seems to match general patterns of 
estimation of correlation. Estimates of correlation have been found to be subject to 
attentional bias whereby evidence positively confirming the presumed relationship is 
disproportionately attended to (Baron, 1988 chapter 14). This would mean that a decision 
to prescribe for a hypertensive patient might be seen as evidence for the strong effect of 
hypertension. No account is taken of prescription decisions when hypertension was not 
present, or of the value of hypertension when the value of other cues lead to non-
prescription. This pattern of assessment has been seen both when subjects estimate 
covariation or correlation from summary tables and from real life phenomena (see Nisbett 
and Ross. 1980 chapter 5). The attentional bias is related to the other bias mentioned by 
Baron - the effect of prior beliefs on estimations of covariation and correlation. Subjects 
(including clinicians) have been found to perceive correlations consistent with their 
hypotheses and to miss actual correlations in the data that they would not have predicted 
(Nisbetl and Ross, 1980 chapter 5). In keeping with an altentional bias subjects may only 
attend to data that fits their hypothesis. The atteniional bias is also however, exhibited in 
correlation estimations on "theory free data". 
A comparison can be made with confirmation bias (see Evans, 1989. chapter 3) 
whereby subjects only seek and notice evidence consistent with their theory or hypothesis. 
Obviously it is unlikely that such a policy would lead to a correct assessment of correlation 
and it is easy to see how it leads to overeslimation of correlations. However, only the 
importance of cues attended to are likely to be overestimated. If this were the case, those 
cues not attended to would be correctly identified as uninfiuential. Thus the pattern of 
similarity between cue selection and stated cue use is not surprising. Of those cues that are 
attended to there is no way of predicting which would be over-rated and which would not 
It appears that subjects are selecting cues and rating them as important on the basis of 
hypotheses about their own behaviour. 
So either way, the suggestion is that doctors lacked self-insight in terms of how 
information was combined. At best they were aware of their relative attention to different 
pieces of information, which seems to be based on factors they believed were relevant to 
themselves for a particular type of case. The results of these studies have shown that 
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explicit knowledge and implicit knowledge are again separate phenomena. 
Implications for communication 
It has been suggested that the methods of process tracing and policy capturing are 
complementary and that both look at different aspects of the same process (Einhom, 
Kleinmuntz and Kleinmuntz. 1979). The former identifies the information attended to and 
its order of aquisition. This is then formed into a series of rules by the analyst. Policy 
capturing in contrast looks at how much of a bearing each piece of information has on the 
decision. As was seen in Chapter 6. the relative importance of cues has a something of a 
relationship with cue attendance (or selection in this case). Subjects certainly have some 
insight into the information they have attended to as can be seen from the success of 
certain reported protocol analyses {e.g. Boreham. 1989) and this may be what they are 
stating here. 
General Practitioners were the subjects used in all studies presented. The tasks used 
were ones they encounter regularly and were familiar with. One argument might be that 
CPs may appear to lack self-insight more because of the way they aquire their expertise. 
However, all subjects lack self-insighl in terms of cue combination. Although they can 
state phenomenal knowledge or knowledge they were taught explicitly, where self-insight 
is shown it is because this happens to coincide with how cues are actually used. The point 
of this section is to show that this limit to self-insight does not have bad consequences for 
teaching of or communication of skills. 
CPs* behaviour is learnt through experience, and is very different to the practice 
that is taught explicitly during clinical training. This can be seen even in different models 
of the consultation. Even in hospital medicine, procedure and knowledge bases change 
substantially as expertise develops (Schmidt and Boshuizen, 1993). Some behaviour is 
taught explicitly, some is learnt implicitly through interaction with the patient. Whereas, in 
other areas of expertise, where some processes are taught explicitly and can be explicitly 
stated when asked for, in general practice that explicit knowledge of the process was not 
taught. It would be unfeasible to teach trainee CPs how to combine information to make 
patient management decisions for every type of case that could come up. During clinical 
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training they were guided towards establishment and judgment of diagnosis on the basis of 
information presented. As stated earlier, it may be because much behaviour is learnt 
intuitively, through interaction with patients that general practice is seen by some as an art. 
GPs are aware of the factors of relevance to disease paltems and can state and seek out 
these. 
In situations where procedural knowledge is learnt (taught) explicitly subjects may 
appear to have self-knowledge. By recalling this they may describe something that fits 
their pattern of behaviour and communicate to others so that they can exhibit similar 
behaviour. Indeed some of the literature discussed in Chapter 4 showed this to be the case. 
Where procedural knowledge is not available only phenomenal, experiential knowledge 
may be elicited. Here all GPs, who don't have this explicit procedural knowledge to call 
upon, showed the same lack of self-insight. 
However, even where experts are explicitly taught processes, it is unlikely that they 
will have been taught them in terms of the relative importance of cues. In accordance with 
this it is rare for subjects to show good self-insight in terms of being able to state the 
relative importance of cues. However, they may be able to state the cues they attended to. 
One argument is that whenever procedural information is being communicated it is the 
information about cue attendance rather than combination that is transferred. 
Imagine being taught a skill, such as driving. You can be instructed to feel the 
biting point, instructed verbally on hand eye co-ordination in steering. You can be taught 
the different parts of the engine and how they work together. This latter information is not 
necessary for the driving procedure. But the procedural instruction must be given. It would 
take a person of exception to be able to work out how to drive solely intuitively. However, 
nobody can learn to drive solely on the basis of verbal instruction about how to proceed. 
They must actually do it. Driving ability is not instant but is something that is built up till it 
becomes automatic. This isn't just a physical skill. Considerable judgement and decision 
making is involved until eventually an experienced driver can take familiar routes without 
recalling the journey. When less familiar routes are taken more concentration must be 
given. However, i f asked how they drove the driver would not describe the automatic 
process that he or she regularly exhibits but would describe the process in terms of its 
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procedural components. If asked how they drove along a particular route the driver would 
give information about turnings, traffic lights and pubs - in terms of the things that had 
featured in their attention during the journey. 
In a similar way, a GP asked about the process employed in patient management 
might talk about data collection and diagnosis, or problem identification, maybe hypothesis 
testing. Asked about management of a particular patient, they might talk about the features 
of that patient that they had particularly attended to. However, they would not include a 
description of how the features are incorporated into a judgement or into a decision. 
The studies presented here have shown that when asked about the bearing cues 
have on decision making. GPs may give information about cue aquisition in the process 
but not its relative influence. Indeed they were able to do this retrospectively. Again this is 
the sort of information given in verbal protocols. The construction of actual cue use 
policies from information about which cues were attended to is obviously a skilled 
procedure. However, if, as in this study, subjects are only actually influenced by a subset 
of cues they selected, analysis may be misled by sole reliance on verbal protocols. On the 
other hand, analysis of verbal protocols can be useful in identifying which cues might (in 
some cases) influence behaviour. The reliance on this sort of information with respect to 
skill learning is not surprising. It is also not surprising that subjects can communicate their 
policies satisfactorily to one another (Brehmer and Brehmer. 1988 cite a paper by Ekegren, 
1983). They can describe their policies on one level, but this is not the level of cue 
combination. Skills can be learnt through knowledge of cues to attend to and aquisition of 
factual knowledge of the situation. 
The pattern of learning from feedback (see Chapter 4) also provides evidence for 
this two tier knowledge system. The information relayed is what the subject is or should be 
attending to. By changing the focus of attention or data collection, cue use policies can 
change considerably. In the phenomena of feedback only cognitive feedback has been 
found to be of benefit: infomiaiion about policies is useful, whereas simply giving the 
correct response (outcome feedback) is not. However, not all cognitive feedback is of 
benefit, although task information (the ideal policy) leads to improvements in decision or 
judgement making, cognitive information (infomiation about one's own policy) makes no 
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difference. At first this might suggest that subjects do not then lack self-insight but lack 
knowledge as to what they should be doing. However, evidence presented both in this 
work and in other studies suggests that subjects do lack self-insight. Another interpretation 
is that the information subjects glean from these policies is information about the cues they 
should be attending to. Feedback of cognitive information is redundant not because 
subjects know the relative importance of cues but because they already know which cues 
they have been attending to. 
Policies can be communicated and changed through description at the level of cue 
attention. The lack of self-insight about cue combination is not a problem. 
On analysis of judgement and decision making 
It appears that there are two tiers to knowledge in judgement and decision making. 
The first is on the relevant facts for the situation. Subjects may have self-insight into this as 
can be seen in verbal protocols. It is this that is given explicitly in teaching and in 
conveying the essentials of a practice. The second is data combination, into which subjects 
do not apparently have self-insight and which is measured in policy capturing. The 
combination of data, the use of selective features to trigger pattern recognition is 
something that develops only with experience. 
With the policy capturing techniques described here the relative bearing 
information has on the decision making can be seen without interruption of the process and 
without requesting self-insight from the CP. However, there is one caveat. This relates to 
the model fitting cue combination. It has been pointed out that mathematically simple 
models such as linear regression are not necessarily cognitively simple ones. The apparent 
ease of analysis using linear regression may shadow the ease of use of other models. The 
policies captured in these studies are paramorphic ones: They are useful ways of 
comparing decision making by different subjects but probably do not represent their actual 
method of cue combination. The capturing of relative importance of cues can be compared 
to the description of a painting in terms of its colours. Not in terms of which colours lie 
where but in terms of the percentages of green and of yellow e(c. in the picture. Subjects 
can say which colours are in the paint box. Policy capturing in terms of relative 
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importances identifies which colours are in the painting and how much of each colour is 
there. But whether these are combined in large areas, in a pointillistic style, in stripes, 
which colours are next to which etc. is not defined by identification of relative percentages. 
Relative importances are not enough to identify how cues are combined. Other sorts of 
rules and mathematical models can do that. They can predict which colours go next to 
which - which cues lead to the use of other cues etc. But the basic identification of relative 
importance certainly tells us more than a subject can. 
Clinical judgement analysis of GP decision making is advantageous in that these 
selective features can be identified and possible reasons for interindividual differences can 
be highlighted. The use of process tracing techniques is possible but verbal protocol 
analysis may interrupt the semi-intuitive process of patient management under a time 
pressured consultation. Where the process is akin to pattern recognition or is Dipped by the 
recognition of forceful features as has been suggested, verbal protocol analysis may be 
unsuitable. I t is precisely in recognition processes or automatised processes that Ericsson 
and Simon (1980) suggested verbal protocol analysis may be less useful. However, it 
appears that even retrospectively in these instances subjects may show insight into the 
information that they attended lo. 
Future Research 
This chapter has outlined the major findings of this study and its practical 
implications. What is left is to outline areas that would be useful to explore in the future. 
Research developments related to the work discussed in this thesis are of medical or 
psychological interest or both. 
On the medical side, judgement analysis of other types of decision or judgement 
might be of interest or the development of a multifactorial model might be considered. 
Where several management options are possible on cases, policies for each could be 
captured and compared just as risk judgements and prescribing policies on the same cases 
were compared. A second issue for medics might rest in the validity of the studies: the 
relation of behaviour on these tasks to ever>'day practice. Although other tasks have shown 
paper presented cases elicited much the same responses as real life ones there may be 
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doubts about any study that has not actually tested this. To lest validity, responses on real 
and paper versions of the same cases could be compared directly or policies on 
hypothetical cases with realistic cue ranges and combinations could be compared to 
policies on real life patients. In either of these cases the doctors' behaviour on real life 
cases might well be changed by having to note information proforma (as would be 
necessary). There arc many other factors that additionally might affect doctors' behaviour 
in real life. For example, lime pressure has been given as a reason for prescribing (to end 
the consultation); the information available is affected by what the patient chooses to 
disclose; the patient may bring several problems to the doctor at the same time and may 
dictate the focus of consultation. Generalisations can not be made about doctors policies 
other than on the range of cases on which they have made decisions where other factors do 
not vary. However, by reducing the variance of other factors (such as lime pressure) 
systematic differences between doctors can be seen. 
Another possible practical follow-up of interest to the medic is the application of 
lens model analysis and cognitive feedback to everyday judgements such as risk. The 
majority of doctors have computers on their desks; many of them have risk assessment 
packages on ihem (many of them may do but don't know about it). As was seen in Chapter 
8, risk assessment is a complex multifactorial judgement. Tacit policies have been found to 
be limited in cue use. Even explicit policies included inappropriate relative importances of 
cues. For example many doctors rated younger people as at greater risk when statistically 
risk increases with age. However, doctors could be trained to make belter judgements of 
patients' risk using cognitive feedback. Currently they may receive outcome feedback 
through use of computer risk calculators on a patient's data. Outcome feedback, as was 
discussed in Chapter 4 is of no benefit in changing behaviour. To give doctors versions of 
the mathematical models from which risk assessments are calculated would also be of no 
use in that they would be meaningless to the majority of doctors. However, feedback of 
task information (and possibly cognitive information) would indicate to doctors the relative 
importance they should give each piece of information (and how they should be influenced 
by it). The weighting would be specific to the range of cases that the doctor saw and so 
would be more meaningful to him or her. Of course, the possibility of such a model would 
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rely on a good criterion measure being found rather than one that omits to take into account 
important features as was seen in Chapter 8. 
The effect of feedback on self-insight might be of interest to psychologists. 
Although when task information has been fed back subjects* self-insight has not improved 
(Luckett and Hirst, 1989). it might be the case that subjects could be trained to perceive the 
relative importance of cues with repeated feedback of cognitive information. In this case 
subjects would become sensitive to the cues that they attend to whose variance ziffects their 
decision making little (and which have been overrated in these studies). 
Although the case mix was unrealistic it is of interest lo psychologists thai even on 
a relatively simplified set of cases subjects could not state their own policies accurately. 
However, the account that has been left somewhat hanging in this thesis is is the effect of a 
real life case mix on both cue use and self-insight. Studies using realistic cases have 
reported poor self-insight too but using realistic sets of cases seems to have improved self-
insight in at least one study (Reiily and Doherty. 1992). The effect of realistic case sets on 
cue use seems to depend on the measure. If the relative importance of a cue is measure in 
terms of its regression coefficient then those cues accounting for most of the variance get 
high regression coefficients. Cues that correlate somewhat with these may appear 
insignificant. In this case, i f subjects use several conrelated cues, the number of cues they 
use may be under-estimated. If the relative importance of cues is measured otherwise, such 
as through analysis of variance or correlation coefficients, the number of cues subjects use 
may be over-estimated because of the inter-cue correlation. For example cues that correlate 
with cues that the subject has used may appear to have affected their decision making even 
if they have not attended to them. So although it is of interest to investigate the effects of 
inter-cue correlations on self-insight; obtaining an objective measure of the subject's policy 
in these circumstances is difficult. 
One way to proceed might be to use information from more than one type of 
analysis to obtain an objective measure of behaviour. Information about the cues doctors 
selected to attend to could be used to eliminate the importance of those unselecled but 
correlating cues. However, there is still the question of the relative importance of the 
information that they did attend to, which will be intercorrelated. As was shown in the last 
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paragraph, no individual cue index of relative importance is useful under these 
circumstances. The only alternative might be to group the cues into psychologically 
meaningful factors as Reilly and Doherty (1992) did. However, in this case subjects' 
explicit understanding of the factorial grouping of cues might also be of interest. 
Although there are a couple of studies that directly compare process tracing and 
policy capturing methods of describing behaviour (e.g. Einhom, Kleinmuntz and 
Kleinmuntz, 1979; Billings and Marcus, 1983), there is still need of a thorough 
investigation of the relationship between process tracing and policy capturing, particularly 
in relation to the issue of self-insight. Neither Einhom. Kleinmuntz and Kleinmuntz 
(1979), who used subjects' verbal protocols as the basis for their process tracing models, 
nor Billings and Marcus (1983). who formed process tracing models and policy capturing 
ones on behaviour on separate tasks, measured subjects' self-insight. Both process tracing 
techniques (other than those based on verbal protocols) and policy capturing are ways of 
objectively measuring behaviour, against which subjective measures might be compared. 
However, as shown earlier, they measure different aspects of the decision making process. 
That subjects have self-knowledge of one aspect of their behaviour but not the other might 
be clearly demonsuated in a task in which both measures were used. The selection of cues 
in Study 2 might have been used as the basis for a process tracing model but time 
limitations meant that that was not possible. In addition to clarifying the nature of self-
insight, the use of process tracing models could coniplemeni judgement analysis: i f a cue is 
not always selected, it cannot always be used and models of non-linear aspects of 
behaviour can be guided (but not dictated) by non-linear patterns of cue selection. I f the 
same behaviour is modelled using both techniques they might also be combined: rather 
than just having two separate (complementary) descriptions of aspects of the process one is 
obtained. 
A number of possible follow up studies have been suggested, some of which wil l 
be more complex than others and some of which are of more interest to medics rather than 
psychologists. But the work in this thesis has pointed out the limits to processing capacity 
and limits to self-insight that can only be identified through the use of orthogonal cues. 
Pragmatically speaking, some of the time neither of these mailer: few cues can be used in 
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real life as a basis for decisions because cues are correlated with each other, doctors 
implicitly learn to recognise frequently occurring patterns of cues through use of key 
features to make decisions. This works well when the panem of cues seen in a patient fits 
the standard pattern of cue. However, where cases are atypical (as in fact many are) 
decision making based on this sort of automatic behaviour may be inappropriate and policy 
differences between doctors may show up. Whether or not doctors are using an appropriate 
few cues in their automatic behaviour can best be identified through judgement analysis 
and lens model analysis. Behaviour can perhaps be modified with cognitive feedback. The 
limits to self-insight are also inconsequential in a pragmatic sense since subjects do show 
some self-insight and are able to communicate their policies to other practising individuals. 
But it takes time for those individuals to learn behaviour and patterns of cue combinations. 
Subjects' explicit directions indicate which cues might be relevant but again not how or 
which might be the key cues to attend to. Judgement analysis gives a useful description of 
judgement behaviour over cases. It is important to model the task environment as well as 
the relationships between cues and judgements to really identify subjects' key cues. 
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Appendix 1 
Examples of JA Studies 
This appendix contains details from 43 judgement analysis studies presented in two sets. 
Studies 1 to 20 are presented on pages 252 to 255, studies 21 to 43 are presented on pages 
256 to 259. 
Key:-
Name and date = reference of study 
Cues = number of cues presented 
Cases = number of cases presented 
Repeats = number of cases repeated for a consistency check 
Design = case and cue design of the study: 
FF = Full factorial design 
Frac F = fractional factorial design 
Real = real life judgements 
Real paper = details of real cases presented in paper form 
Nomothetic = analysis done over more than one subject's responses 
Linear or non-linear describes the relationship of cues to criterion 
Orth. = orthogonal cues 
Random = randomly generated cases 
Real distribution = cases designed with the range and mix of cues resent in the real 
world 
Paper = paper cases used 
MCPL = multiple cue probability learning task 
Subjects = type of subject used 
Judgement = judgement or decision being made 
Crit = linear f i t of the criterion 
Obj = linear f i t of the objective model 
subj = linear f i t of the subjective model 
Equal = linear f i t of an equal weights model 
Rand = linear f i t o f a random weights model 
cons = consistency 
r(s-i) = self-insight measure: correlation of subjective and objective weights 
= achievement or agreement 
Notes = notable aspects of the study 
(N) = see notes. 
See also Table 4.1 and text. 
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Appendi.x 1 coniinued. 
Name 
1 Balzer. Sulsky. Hammer. & Sumner 
2 Billings & Marcus 
3 Blood 
4 Brehmer 
5 Chaput de Saintonge & Haihaway 
6 Chaput de Saintonge & Hattersley 
7 Chaput de Sainlonge et al 
8 Cook & Stewart 
9 Dawes & Corrigan 
10 Einhom 
Date Cues Cases Repeats Design 
1992 5 50 Real paper 
1983 4 27 FF 
1971 5 - - Nomothetic 
1987 2/4 25+25 linear fn 
non-linear 
1981 Profomia 48 41 +photo Real(N) 
1985 24 50 19 Real paper 
1988 10 30 20 Real paper 
1975 3 50 Onh. 
7 50 
3 50 
7 50 
3 50 
7 50 
3 50 
7 50 
3 50 
7 50 
3 50 
7 50 
3 50 
7 50 
1974 n 71200 Real 
10 90 Real 
3 ? Real 
3 7 ? 
1974 9 193 26 Real slides 
11 Einhom. Kleinmuntz & Kleinmuntz 1979 10 
A 
96 Real 
11 67 20 Real 
12 Elstein et al 1992 2 6 6 FF 
13 Fisch, Hammond, Joyce & O'Reilly 1981 
00 
00 
00 
41 39 Random 
14 Fisch. Gillis & Daguet 1982 
00 
00 
00 30 10 Random 
15 Holmes et al 1989 4 16 4 Real distn. 
16 Holzman et al 1984 4 24 6 FF 
17 Kirwan, Chaput de Saintonge, 1983a 15 Total 70 70 Real, paper 
Joyce & Currey. 
18 Kirwan et al (as above). 1983b 5 Total 19 19 Real, paper 
19 Kinvan et al (as above). 1983c 20 50 20 Paper 
20 Kirwan et al (as above + Holmes) 1986 10 30 20 Paper 
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Appendi.x 1 continued. 
Subjects 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
133 soidents 
48 students -Time pressure 
-No time pressure 
380 clerical workers 
32 Students 
7 CPs 
5GPs K trainee CP 
48 rheumatologists (15) 
21 students & staff 
21 students & staff 
19 students & staff 
19 students & staff 
17 students & staff 
17 students & staff 
29 students & staff 
29 students & staff 
21 students & staff 
21 students & staff 
16 students & staff 
16 students & staff 
20 students & staff 
20 students & staff 
29 clinical psychologists 
80 students 
Faculty 
subjects 
3 pathologists 
MMPI users (1 selected) 
1 subject 
21 residents (3rd yr) 
15 CPs (Swiss) 
14 CPs 
24 swiss.70 US Psychiatrists 
98 physicians 
25 CPs, 25 gynecologists 
9 rheumatologists 
2 rheumatologists 
48 rheumatologists 
89 rheumatologists 
4 rheum alologisis 
Judgement 
Baseball team wins 
+ second session 
Apartment desirability 
Job satisfaction 
MCPL task 
Probability of Otitis Media 
other, & treatment given 
H It It (1 
Degree of change 
Financial Assessment (FA) 
Grade Assessment (GA) 
FA 
GA 
FA 
GA 
FA 
GA 
FA 
GA 
FA 
GA 
FA 
GA 
MMPI. neurotic/psychotic 
Grade point averages 
Admissions rating 
"Values" of elipses 
Features of a biopsy 
+ disease severity 
Degree of adjustment 
Nutrition of cereals by category 
Certainty of prescribing HRT, 
later categorised. 
Knowledge base & practice consistent for 13/21 
Severity of depression & 
any drug prescribed 
Treatment of psychiatric patients 
Number of tests ordered 
Probability of HRT 
Severity of RA 
Severity of RA 
Change in severity of RA 
Change in severity of RA 
253 
Appendix 1 continued. 
Crit 
1 0.89 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
0.96 
ObJ 
0.74 
0.79 
0.83 
0.77 
0.79 
0.67 
0.78 
R = 0.43 
80-100% 
>0.8 
0.79 
0.73 
0.82 
0.69 
0.82 
0.71 
0.81 
0.69 
0.82 
0.76 
0.81 
0.67 
0.83 
0.7 
SubJ Equal Rand cons. r(s-i) 
0.34 
0.56 
0.43 
0.54 
0.48 
0.85, 0.89 
0.16, 0.29 
p<0.05 
79-100% 
>0.8 
(N) 
0.75 
0.58 
0.76 
0.49 
0.72 
0.49 
0.74 
0.54 
0.75 
0.55 
0.72 
0.5 
0.75 
0.52 
0.46, 0.27, 
0.49 (N) 
R = 0.88 
0.87 
R = 0.77 
R = 0.86 0.49 
0.56 
0.69 
0.95. 0.94 
2/3s > 0.75 
0.73 0.39 
0.88 0.34 
0.25 0.22 
0.19-0.93 
0.63(N) 
3 errors 
6/21 consi 
0.69 
0.77 
93%,83%(N) 
78% 
0.90, 0.97 
cO.75 
k = 0.3 
0.28 
0.33 
0.19 
0.84 
0.33-0.80 
0.27(N) 
0.63,0.64 
0.76 
0.41 
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Appendix 1 coniinured. 
Notes 
1 Components of Cognitive Feedback: no feedback. T l . 
CI. Tl + CI , Tl + CI + FVI (see Chapter 3 & 4) . 
2 Comparison with process tracing 
3 Cues classified in terms of their importance 
used in regression. Weights not corresponding. 
4 No effect of no. of cues. S concerned with 
cue combinations rather than ind. ms. 
5 Real life, written & photo presentation 
compared. Validity test. 
6 Agreement compared over time. Logical 
models not statistical ones. Expressed policies compared with 
fined ones: worse fit. 
7 Results reported for 15 subjects. Little agreement between them. 
8 Comparison of different measures of 
self-insight. 100 
Rate (1-100) 
Rate (1-100) 
Paired comparison 
Paired comparison 
Ratio 
Ratio 
No. of times influenced 
No. of times influenced 
ICR I + 100 
ICR I + 100 
ICRM 
ICR II 
9 Summarised others snidies: (Goldberg, 1965) 
(Wiggins & Cohen. 1971) 
(Dawes. 1971) 
(Yntema&Togerson, 1961) 
10 R2 of 3 subjects. Judgements made of signs and also global judgements 
11 12 step forced nomial distn. ( Q sort) 
Regression model good compared to Process Tracing model 
Cues amalgamated: 3 in model 
12 ( 1 ) Think aloud during decision making 
(2) Interview re probabilities & utilities 
13 Based on HDRS 
GP chose own variables 
14 Comparison between Groups, agreement on drug class. 
15 Validity: written cases comp. chart audit. Standard algorithm vs consistent cue use. 
17 Validity of paper cases, proforma used. All real presented as paper, some paper repeats. 
18 Real, paper & paper repetitions in model. Flat distribution of subjective weights shown. 
19 O A . before & after info as cues in model. Average of 6 cues used per doc. 
Agreement between 2 s: no improvement with discussion but improvement with 
discussion over CJA models. 
20 Equal > subjective model for 49/89 s. 4 subjects interviewed re. subjective policies 
10 obtain considered policy (no better). 
2 5 5 
Appendix 1 continued 
21 
Name Date Cues Cases Repeats Design 
LaDuca, Engel & Chovan 1988 5 30 Realisitic 
22 Lipe 1990 4 34 (N) 
23 Mear & Firth 1987 10 30 Orthogonal 
24 Poses et al 1985 27 308 Real 
25 Reilly & Doherty 1989 19 115 + 45 Paper 
26 Reilly & Doherty 1992 12 
12 
6 
100 
100 
100 
Orth. 
Real paper 
Orth. 
27 
6 100 Real paper 
Richardson, Gabbe & Wind 1984 7 18 Paper 
Real 28 Roose & Doherty 1976 64(9) 200+ 160 
29 Roose & Doherty 1978 *28 175 25 Real 
30 Rothert 1982 4 27 Frac, F 
31 Rothert et al. 1984 4 24 _ FF 
32 Rovner et al 1985 4 24 6 FF 
33 Russell 1985 ?18 c200 each Real 
34 Schmitt et al 1991 3 8 8 FF 
35 Sperroff, Connors & Dawson 1989 32 500 Real 
36 Steinmann 1974 3 100+100 MCPLtask 
37 Summers, Talioferro & Fletcher 1970 4 175 
38 Tape et al 1991 12 clusters Real 
39 Ullman et al 1981 19 80 15 Random* 
40 Ullman & Doherty 1984 7 52 Real, paper 
19 80 15 Random* 
41 Wigton, Hoellerich & Patil 1986 8 27 Frac. F 
42 Wigton, Paiil & Hoellerich 1986 7 18 (X3) Frac. F 
43 Wigton, Poses, Collins & Obul 1990 7 12(X4) Frac. F 
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Appendix 1 continued. 
Ref Subjects 
21 13 physicians 
22 Mainly students 
23 38 financial analysts etc. 
24 10 physicians 
25 40 faculty students 
26 19 students 
18 students 
19 students 
21 students 
27 211 Obs&Gyne. 
28 16 Agency managers 
29 42 faculty judges 
30 30 patients 
30 physicians 
31 45 primary care physicians 
32 Total of 45 physicians 
15 Family practitioners 
15 Gynecologists 
15 Internal Medicine 
33 10 Assessors 
34 265 perimenopausal women 
35 123 physicians 
36 8 students: L M F ( A ) 
4 students: F F ( B ) 
4 students: OF(C) 
37 131 students 
38 Illinois Physicians 
Nebraska Physicians 
Virginia Physicians 
39 16 clinical psychologists 
40 11 professionals 
74 professionals 
41 19 Medical students (group) 
First year HOs (grouped) 
Third year HOs (grouped) 
13 Faculty members (group) 
All grouped 
42 11 medical students (CF) 
16 Medical students (OF) 
43 11 student physicians 
12 medical students (2nd yr) 
Judgement 
Severity of Congestive Heart Failure 
Judgements of covariation 
Ponfolio risk & remm 
Probability of strep throat & treatment (antibiotics), 
Desirability of job offers. 
Room-mate desirability 
Room-mate desirability 
Room-mate desirability 
Room-mate desirability 
Likelihood of referral 
Sucess/failure + confidence. 
Salary 
Likelihood of compliance 
of hypothetical patients. 
Endocrine Disorder 
Likelihood of referral. (A) 
Morbidity due to weight. (B) 
Endocrine disorder. (C) 
Overall Assessment Rating. 
Likelihood of taking HRT 
Hemodynamic dysfunction 
Level of S.E. development 
Est chest radiograph would show pneumonia 
Hyperactive plus confidence 
Hyperactive plus confidence 
Hyperactive plus confidence 
Likelihood of Pulmonary Embolism 
? treat. 
Likelihood of +ve UTI 
Probability of strep throat 
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Ref Crit 
21 0.93 
22 0.89 
23 
25 
26 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
0.43 
0.83 
0.45 
0.73 
0.73 
0.75 
0.78 
0.74 
0.39 
0.64 
0.59 
0.2 
Obj 
0.70-0.91 
0.74 
0.73.0.74 
0.70* 
0.73 
0.81 
0.73 
0.84 
0.75 
0.87 
0.53 
0.68 
0.68 
0.82 
0.75 
0.76 
0.69-0.82 
0.59 
0.31,0.72 
0.75,0.81 
0.74, 0.85 
0.84, 0.87 
0.91,0.90 
0.56, 0,74 
0.69, 0.85 
0.69, 0.82 
0.77, 0.85 
0.66, 0.73 
0.78,0.80 
0.86, 0,89 
0.72, 0.79 
0.86, 0.86 
0.85,0.79 
R = 0.75 
0.59 
0.7 
0.63 
0.75 
(?)0.67 
0.72 
0.41 
0.34 
0.57 
0.43 
0.4 
.81,.8I 
.90,.98 
Subj 
0.34,0.33 
0.34* 
Equal 
0.09,0.23(N) 
Rand cons r(s.i) 
0.30. 0.32 
0.69 
0.92 
0.43 
0.66 
0.91 
0.41 
0.37 
R = 0-60 
67% 
69: >70% 
0.03-0.99 
0.91 
0.13 
0.86 
0.42 
0.18,0.45 
0.37,0.53 
0.51.0.57 
0.58, 0.65 
0.55, 0.59 
0.31,0.52 
0.44, 0.54 
0.36, 0.56 
0.51,0.58 
0.43, 0.49 
0.55,0.51 
0.55, 0.50 
0.43, 0.50 
0.56,0.59 
0.55, 0.44 
0.41 
0.66 
0.55 
.55,.73..79 
.55„62,.64 
0.4, 0.69 
0.34, 0.93 
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Appendix 1 continued. 
Ref Notes 
21 Lens mode! analysis 
22 Meta-analysis of several studies: different cells emphasised. 
23 Results for risk & return judgements. Signed equal weights; 0.31,0.25. 
24 Overestimation for 81% Discussion of R-ship between probability & treatment. 
25 * Correlations on holdout sample. 
Significant self-recognition. 1-10 cues used. 
26 Representative data: cues grouped into five factors for analysis. 
Cross validation: beta-weights benerthan 
subjective weights for all but 2 subjects. 
Significant self-recognition. l-IO cues used. 
27 Conjoint analysis. Diabetes pregnancy. 
28 Unit weights good for bootstrapping. 
Non-zero insight for 3 subjects. 
29 * not including gender: Sex bias. 
31 Av. judged typicality of cases = 67%. 
r(A,C) = 0.42, r(A.C) = 0.28. Two articles re. same study. 
32 + questionnaire. 7 point scale: >6 = referral. 
33 3 or 4 factor solutions. 
34 Oestrogen only vs. plus progestin. Discounted subjects whose < 0.6 (14). Clustering. 
Regression against subject variables. 
36 Plus 20 practice trials per session 
Lens Model Feedback, Feedforward (no Ul) 
or Outcome Feedback. (8, 5 & 5 tasks) 
Differences between groups & sessions. 
Same 5 tasks. First then second session. 
N.B. R not R 2 given, 
37 Significantly smaller R^ where non-linear models described, increase in fit with non-linear 
greater for those than for subjects describing linear models. 
39 * ranges as in reality. 
41 Conjoint analysis. Average individual R^ = 0.7 
42 Feedback. OF vs.CF 
43 Lecture + 3 feedback sessions. 
All 4 in one go. 
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Appendix 2 
Instructions for tho I J P I D tnsk (Shidy 1. Chnpror 
You will be presented with a series of 130 hypothetical cases in which you have to decide 
whether or not the individual should be prescribed a lipid lowering agent. Assume that the 
option to refer is not available. In each case you will be supplied with a number of details 
about the patient and their medical history. 
You can assume that in each case you originally tested the patient's blood cholesterol level 
at least six months previously and have offered the usual advice on alterations to diet and 
have recommended, where appropriate, that the patient should give up smoking cigarettes. 
The blood cholesterol level given in the problem is the current one and reflects any 
changes in the patients life-style that he or she has made or is likely to make. 
Given all the information, you have to decide whether or not you would now prescribe a 
lipid lowering drug. We realise that the cases may not be clear cut and that in practice you 
might seek further information. However, you can express your preference for prescribing 
the drug in percentage terms. If you are certain that you would prescribe then give a 
response of 100% and i f you arecertain you would not give a response of 0%, Where you 
are not certain then please given any intermediate value you wish to convey the likelihood 
that you would prescribe. 
In each case you can set the percentage by pulling the mouse to the left or right. When the 
reading is correct then please press any button on the mouse to proceed to the next 
problem. 
PRESS ANY MOUSE BUTTON TO START 
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Appendix 3 
I n s t r u c t i o n s f o r ihP M i r . R A l N F tnsk TStnHv 1. r h n p t p p ^ ) 
The following are a series of hypothetical cases in which all the patients presented have 
been having some symptoms of migraine headache. You must decide whether or not to 
prescribe prophylactic treatment. None of the patients has had any symptoms to suggest 
that there is any more ominous cause and you have a high degree of confidence that this is 
purely a migraine headache. 
You have seen the patient previously and in each case the patienthas modified their 
lifestyle to avoid trigger factors such as certain foods and flashing lights and to reduce 
stress. 
Given the information in each case you have to decide whether or not you would treat the 
patient with prophylaxis. We realize that the cases may not be clear cut and that in practice 
you might seek further infomiation. However, you can express your preference for 
prescribing a prophylactic in percentage terms. If you are certain that you would prescribe 
then give a response of 100% and if you are certain you would not give a response of 0%. 
Where you are not certain then please given any intermediate value you wish to convey the 
likelihood that you would prescribe. 
In each case you can set the percentage by pulling the mouse to the left or right. When the 
reading is correct then please pressany button on the mouse to proceed to the next problem. 
PRESS ANY MOUSE BUTTON TO START 
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Appendix 4 
I n ^ t r n r t i o n s f o r t he H R T tn^k r<stiidy 1. C h a p t e r 
You will be presented with a series of 130 hypothetical cases in which you have to decide 
whether or not to treat the patient by prescribing some Hormone Replacement Therapy. In 
each case you will be supplied with certain pieces of information about the patient. The 
option to refer is not available. 
You can assume that in each case there is no reason why the patient would be already 
receiving hormone therapy. They have a normal pelvic examination and there is no 
relevant medical history, other than that displayed in each case, which would affect your 
decision. Where appropriate you have given advice about smoking and diet. 
Given all the information, you have to decide whether or not you would now treat the 
patient with some sort of hormone replacement therapy. We realize that the cases may not 
be clear cut and that in practice you might seek further information, and use all the 
information to make a choice between types of hormone replacement therapy. However, 
you can express your preference for prescribing some sort of HRT in percentage terms. I f 
you are certain that you would prescribe then give a response of 100% and i f you are 
certain you would not give a response of 0%. Where you are not certain then please given 
any intermediate value you wish to convey the likelihood that you would prescribe. 
In each case you can set the percentage by pulling the mouse to the left or right When the 
reading is correct then please press any button on the mouse to proceed to the next 
problem, 
PRESS ANY MOUSE BUTTON TO START 
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Appendix 5 
I n t e r - c u e corrplnHnn<: on the M P I D tfi<;k 
Occ Eva Smo Dia Com Wei Att FH Per 
0.13 -0.07 0.13 0.04 0.08 0.07 -0.05 -0.08 -0.17 
0.02 -0.01 -0.04 0.02 0.09 -0.03 -0.06 0.04 0.05 
0.07 -0.05 -0-11 0.03 -0.09 -0.09 0.01 0.03 -0.08 
-0.08 0.19 -0-01 -0.08 -O.06 0.02 -0.11 -0.05 -0.13 
1 -0.09 0.03 0.02 0.19 0.13 0.05 0.11 0.09 
-0.09 1 -O.l -0.07 -0.02 0.09 -0.11 0.07 -0.14 
0.03 -0.10 1 0.01 -0.05 -0.11 0.00 -0.15 -0.14 
0.02 -0.07 O.Ol 1 0.12 -0.04 -0.09 0.09 -0.05 
0.19 -0.02 -0.05 0.12 1 0.1 -0.06 0.13 -0.07 
0.13 0.09 -0.11 -0.04 0.1 1 -0.03 -0.04 0.07 
0.05 -0.11 0.00 -0.09 -0.06 -0.03 1 0.15 -0.05 
0.11 0.07 -0.15 0.09 0.13 -0.04 0.15 1 0.08 
0.09 -0.14 -0.14 -0.05 -0.07 0.07 -0.05 0.08 1 
Key:- CHO = cholesterol leveL HYP = hypertension, AGE = age, GEN = gender, OCC = 
occupation, EVA = evidence of arteriosclerosis, SMO = smoking behaviour, DIA = 
diabetes. COM = compliance with advice on diet, WEI = weight, ATT = attitude to 
treatment, FH = family history of ischaemic heart disease, PER = personality. 
Cho Hyp Age Gen 
Cho 1 0.1 -0.03 0.05 
Hyp 0.10 1 0.05 0.17 
Age -0.03 0.05 1 -0.02 
Gen 0.05 0.17 -0.02 1 
Occ 0.13 0.02 0.07 -0.08 
Eva -0.07 -0.01 -0.05 0.19 
Smo 0.13 -0.04 -0.11 -0.01 
Dia 0.04 0.02 0.03 -0.08 
Com 0.08 0.09 -0.09 -0.06 
Wei 0.07 -0.03 -0.09 0.02 
Att -0.05 -0.06 0.01 -O.ll 
FH -0.08 0.04 0.03 -0.05 
Per -0.17 0.05 -0.08 -0.13 
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Appendix 6 
Inter-cue correlations on the MIGRAINK tnsk (SfiiHyn 
Dur Pre Age Gen Occ Mwk Smo Nau Vis Wei Att Res Per 
Dur 1 -0.06 -0.01 0.12 0.09 -0.03 0.04 0.08 -0.02 -0.09 0.02 0.06 0.05 
Pre -0.06 1 -0.03 -0.09 -0.09 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 -0.06 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.04 
Age -0.01 -0.03 1 -0.06 0.08 0 -0.07 -0.04 -O.Ol O.Ol 0.01 -0.19 0.05 
Gen 0.12 -0.09 -0.06 1 0.03 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.08 -0.08 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 
Occ 0.09 -0.09 0.08 0.03 I 0.02 -0.13 0.05 0.09 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.08 
Mwk -0.03 -0.02 0.00 -0.06 0.02 1 0.07 0.03 -0.11 0.07 0.10 -0.13 0.19 
Smo 0.04 -0.04 -0.07 -0.05 -0.13 0.07 1 0.07 0.09 -0.02 -0.12 0.04 0.11 
Nau 0.08 -0.06 -0.04 -0.05 0.05 0.03 0.07 1 0.12 0.02 -0.19 -0.06 0.03 
Vis -0.02 -0.06 -0.01 -0.08 0.09 -0.11 0.09 0.12 1 0.10 -0.07 -0.06 0.02 
Wei -0.09 -0.02 0.01 -0.08 0.02 0.07 -0.02 0.02 0.1 1 -0.07 0.16 0.11 
Att 0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.14 0.10 -0.12 -0.19 -0.07 -0.07 1 -0.13 0.01 
Res 0.06 0.01 -0.19 0.02 0.02 -0.13 0.04 -0.06 -0.06 0.16 -0.13 1 -0.04 
Per 0.05 -0.04 0.05 -0.01 0.08 0.19 0.11 0.03 0.02 0.11 0.01 -0.04 1 
Key:- DUR = duration. PRE = frequency, AGE = age, GEN = gender. OCC = occupation. 
MWK = misses work. SMO = smoking, NAU = nausea. VIS = visual disturbance. WEI = 
weight. ATT = attitude. RES = response to acute treatment. PER = personality. 
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Appendix 7 
I n t e r - c i i e corro ln t inn<; on the H R T task (S t i iHy 1^  
Men Hot Age Occ Moo Smo Lib Vag Wei Att FHD FBC Per 
Men 1 -0.03 0.02 0.04 0.01 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 0.02 -0.05 0.09 0.14 0.07 
Hot -0.03 1 0.00 -0.04 0.04 0.08 -0.13 -0.14 -0.08 -0.04 -0,17 0.04 0,14 
Age 0.02 0.00 1 0.05 -0.01 0.18 -0.16 0.01 0.10 0.12 0.19 -0.07 0.19 
Occ 0.04 -0.04 0.05 1 -0.08 -0,08 -0.07 -0,14 0.18 -0,04 -0.05 0.05 -0.01 
Moo O.OI 0.04 -0.01 -0.08 1 0.06 -0.11 -0.05 0.05 -0.07 0.00 0.06 -0.13 
Smo -0.04 0,08 0,18 -0,08 0.06 1 -0.08 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 0,05 0,08 
Lib -0.05 -0.13 -0-16 -0.07 -0.11 -0.08 I 0.06 0.12 -0.13 -0.11 -0.09 0.11 
Vag -0.05 -0.14 0.01 -0.14 -0.05 -0.05 0.06 1 O. l l -0.08 0.06 0.01 -0.05 
Wei 0.02 -0.08 0,10 0.18 0.05 -0.04 0.12 0.11 I -0.16 0.06 -0.01 0.03 
Att -0.05 -0.04 0.12 -0.04 -0.07 -0.03 -0.13 -0.08 -0.16 1 -0.05 0.01 -0.11 
FHD 0.09 -0.17 0.19 -0.05 0.00 -0.03 -0.11 0.06 0.06 -0.05 1 0.00 -0.05 
FBC 0.14 0.04 -0.07 0.05 0.06 0.05 -0.09 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 1 0.03 
Per 0.07 0.14 0.19 -0.01 -0.13 0.08 0.11 -0.05 0.03 -0.11 -0.05 0.03 1 
Key:- MEN = menstruation, HOT = hot flushes, AGE = age, OCC = occupation, MOO = 
mood states, SMO = smoking behaviour, LIB = libido, VAG = vaginal dryness, WEI = 
weight, ATT = attitude, FPtD = family history of ischaemic heart disease, FBC = family 
history of breast cancer, PER = personality. 
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Social Class eroupings and job titles for Occupntion cue used in the I.IPID, 
MICRAINF and HRT tnsks of Study 1. Chapter ^ 
I (Social class one) 
"Barrisier"."Solicilor"."Chartered Accountant"."Industrial Statistician"."University 
Lecturer","Management Consultant"."Civil Engineer"."Architect"."Company 
Director"."Head Teacher" 
I I (Social class two) 
"Claims Assessor"."Systems Analyst"."Building Inspector"."Secondary School 
Teacher","Joumalist"."Laboraiory Technician","Air Traffic Controller"."Surveyor" "Social 
Worker"."FE Lecturer" 
I I I N M (Social class three, non-manual) 
"Manager's PA"."Driving Instructor"."Camera Operator"."Receptionist";'Shop 
Assistant"."Police Constable","Clerk"."Cashier"."Caravan Site Manager"."Office Machine 
Operator" 
I I I M (Social class three, manual) 
"Cher."Hairdresser"."Shoe Repairer";'Butcher";Tishmonger"."Printer","Carpet 
Fitter"."Painter and Decorator"."Electrician"."TraveI Steward" 
IV (Social class four) 
"Bus Conductor"."Packer"."Production Worker"."Spray Painter"."Laundry Manager"."Post 
Office Worker"."Gardener"."Bar Staff'."Horticultural Worker"."Market Trader" 
V (Social class five) 
"Refuse Worker"."Office Cleaner"."Kitchen Hand"."Sewage Plant Attendant"."Lavatory 
Cleaner"."Window Cleaner"."Road Sweeper"."Janitor" 
Selected from OPCS Classification of Occupation. 1980, Appendix B . I . (page Ixxxiii-civ). 
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Appendix 9 
Sample sheet to remind doctors of the cues available on the L I P I D task whilst rating 
the cues' relative importance (Study 1. Chapter 5) 
E X E R C I S E O N E 
CHOLESTEROL L E V E L 
HYPERTENSION 
AGE 
GENDER 
OCCUPATION 
EVIDENCE OF ARTERIOSCLEROSIS 
SMOKES 
DIABETES 
COMPLIANCE WITH ADVICE ON DIET 
WEIGHT 
ATTITUDE TO TREATMENT 
FAMILY HISTORY OF I.H.D. 
PERSONALITY 
IMPORTANCE RATING SCALE 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
No Of 
Attention Maximum 
P^'^ importance 
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Appendix 10 
Standard sheet used bv the e x p e r i m e n t e r t o note down subjective ratings in S t i i r i y 1, 
Chnpfer 5 
I N S I G H T : E X E R C I S E O N E 
I would like you to be as honest as possible in trying to estimate what affects your 
decisions. Al l the following questions are trying to ascertain what you feel did, not 
what you feel should have, affected your behaviour. 
1) DIRECTIONALITY: 
Firstly, for each item on the list I would like to ascertain what values or category 
would be more likely to make you prescribe. For example, other things being equal, 
do you feel you would be more likely to prescribe for a sixty year old or for a thirty 
year old or would age make no difference? 
Go through each item asking if A or B would make you more likely to prescribe. 
Things to note: A or B or neither (in this case should score 0 on second half of insight 
assessment). 
Attribute 
Cholesterol level 
Hypertension 
Age 
Gender 
Occupation 
Evidence of arteriosclerosis 
Smokes 
Diabetes 
Compliance with advice on diet 
Weight 
Attitude to treatment 
Family history of IHD 
Personality 
2) WEIGHTING: 
Now I would like to get an idea of how much you feel that each piece of information 
has a bearing on your decision. I would like you to assign each information type a 
number between 0 and 10 to indicate how much you feel you take note of this 
attribute . I f you feel that you pay no attention at all to a piece of information then 
you should assign it 0. I f you feel that it is the most important factor then you should 
assign it 10 points. Other intermediate values should be assigned as appropriate to 
attributes which you feel have some affect on your decision. 
Note value assigned (O-IO) for each cue. 
3) REPRESENTATIVENESS: 
Have you goi anything to add about how you might do this task in the real world? 
Record answer, note any other varibles that might be taken into account, any variables 
showing interactions, any indication of non-linearity of variable. 
Would you normally refer patients whom you thought might need lipid lowering 
drugs? 
A B 
8 6.5 
No Poorly controlled 
30 60 
Male Female 
Architect Window cleaner 
Yes No 
Heavily No 
No Poorly controlled 
Yes No 
Very obese Under 
Requesting Opposed 
First degree rel. No 
Co operative Demanding 
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Appendix 11 
Mathematical e v p l a n n t i o n f o r t h p convpr s ion o f sub j ec t i ve rat ing*; t o «;iihjprfiv<> 
weigh t s (y'f)^ 
Let V i = subjective weights (1 < i < 13) 
Let S, = original subjective ratings 
Let Y 5 = the set of 130 decisions predicted by treating Sy as regression coefficients in a 
linear equation and then inserting X values from the standardised X matrix into this 
equation. 
Let = the set of 130 decisions predicted by treating tpi as regression coefficients in a 
linear equation and then inserting X values from the standardised X matrix into this 
equation. 
= the mean of = 0 since all predictor cues are standardised 
a, = the standard deviation of Y, 
= the standard deviation of Y^^  
Vi are calculated for direct comparison with standardised regression coefficients (Pi). 
These are the multiple linear regression coefficients which when multiplied by the 
standardised X matrix produce a set of values with mean = 0 and standard deviation = 1. 
This same property is desired in subjective weights: 
V, = cS, : = 1 
Y5 = i:s,x, 
Y^ = IiPiXi = IcS/Xy = cISiXi = cYs 
= 1 .-. Var (Y^) = 1 .-. Var (cY^) = 1 
c^  Var(Y5)= 1 
" ^/Var(ys) ~ 
Si 
Thus V / = ^ 
All credit to Ian Dennis 
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Appendix 12 
Indices on the LIPID tnsk (Study n - Cnns i s tPnry , M n e n r fif. m e a n piiripAmPnf onH 
1 mi,*.!! 
Mean 
mil utriwt-t-ii 
St. dev Mean^ 
t i l l anci i: 
St. dev. 
rency-
Correlation^ 
GP Consistency Judgement Judgement latency latencies Judgement & latency 
1 0.60 0.43 35.9 27.3 2394.3 968.8 o.oso 
2 0.29 0.37 11.2 17.9 1224.8 792 0.199 
3 0.30 0.50 58.7 15.6 1931.5 947.9 -0.001 
4 0.77 0.61 16.6 13.6 1476.8 917.3 -0.090 
5 0.44 0.48 24.12 32.0 3024.1 1079.9 0.109 
6 0.17 0.36 44.8 17.9 514.8 438.6 0.131 
7 0.32 0.36 6.6 15.2 1198.6 660.9 0.593 
8 - 0.45 47.8 23.6 1692.6 489.7 0.027 
9 0.19 0.48 10.8 19.8 1424.6 912.9 0.418 
10 - 0.38 44.4 36.2 1939.5 1133.9 0.201 
11 0.15 0.39 17.3 23.7 1646.4 1013.1 0.156 
12 0.34 0.11 7.8 10.5 2829.5 966.4 0.088 
13 0.46 0.22 92.5 11.7 424.2 512.2 -0.125 
14 -0.12 0.25 49.2 5.5 1408.8 649.9 0.028 
15 -0.12 0.29 8.3 20.1 2350.4 1302.2 -0.020 
17 0.26 0.28 47.3 38.8 1536.1 886 -0.052 
19 0.43 0.50 16.3 13.9 1850.8 1253.7 0.378 
20 0.23 0.40 18.8 24.0 1856.8 1359.1 0.397 
21 0.36 0.80 54.1 37.6 2415.7 1462.1 -0.036 
22 0.10 0.30 32.4 15.6 2020.9 1148.5 ^.213 
23 - - -
24 0.32 0.22 18.0 20.1 1834.5 972 0.105 
25 - 0.32 38.8 32.6 1900.0 1508.3 -0.123 
26 0.72 0.81 55.7 22.2 1821.2 820.6 0.021 
27 - - -
28 0.22 0.61 16.0 8.5 1395.4 733.9 -0.223 
29 0.44 0.20 19.4 14.5 2528.4 1075.8 -0.066 
30 0.49 0.39 13.3 205 1134.4 633.7 0.289 
31 0.68 0.59 75.8 37.9 1124.4 1453.1 -0.120 
32 0.64 0.38 20.1 32.3 1151.0 829.8 0J04 
33 0.37 0.55 15.8 33.0 896.6 821.1 0.256 
34 0.28 0.29 10.1 21.2 947.7 926.9 0.014 
35 0.51 0.38 40.7 30.4 1823.5 1044.7 0.056 
36 0.63 0.58 65.3 22.6 538.6 485J 0.139 
37 -O.U 0.53 74.6 31.6 2301.8 912.7 -O.IOI 
Mean 0.35 0.42 33.6 22.7 1653 942.8 0.085 
Stdev. 0.23 0.16 23.0 9.1 640 285.7 0.192 
^ Measured in centiseconds. 
3 Numbers in bold are significant (p < 0.05). 
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A p p e n d i x i : ^ 
I nd ices o n the M I H R A I N R tnsk f S t i i d y n 
a n d m e a n In t encv . r n r r e l a t l o n be tween n i d a e m e n t nnH J a t e n c v 
Mean St. dev. Mean* St. dev. Correlation' 
GP Consistency Judgement Judgement Latency latencies Judgement & latency 
1 0.67 0.55 42.7 45.8 1303.2 739.2 0.174 
2 0.79 0.63 39.8 46.0 823.1 807.1 0.355 
3 0.91 0.80 40.3 31.0 1190 443.9 0.087 
4 0.82 0.67 58.7 25.7 1525.7 955.7 0.222 
5 0.88 0.60 20.1 31.4 1543.7 890.7 0.408 
6 0.69 0.56 50.3 22J 527.2 270.6 0.137 
7 0.88 0.76 38.0 37.8 726J 723.1 0.329 
8 - 0.69 47.4 24.1 1263.2 489.2 0.065 
9 0.94 0.76 42.2 36.3 1293 2802 0.056 
10 - 0.72 49.2 46.6 576.9 552.2 -0.009 
11 0.56 0.72 45.6 41.3 1212 736.5 0.122 
12 0.66 0.73 43.9 36.9 736.7 419.7 0.057 
13 0.87 0.75 67.0 39.4 258.4 183.5 -0,222 
14 0.55 0.47 50.0 13.0 583 347.9 0.206 
15 0.83 0.65 28.1 33.4 1396.7 1510 0.212 
17 0.39 0.54 55.1 42.8 1209.7 1423.2 -0.122 
19 0.94 0.86 53.0 38.2 1098.6 906.9 0.190 
20 0.76 0.62 52.9 31.0 1216.5 1800.8 0.104 
21 0.89 0.67 30.7 36.1 1535.6 1331.3 0.565 
22 0.81 0.62 29.8 25.1 1828 1241.9 0.050 
23 0.62 0.50 6.5 11.1 220.9 156.2 0.427 
24 0.50 0.50 19.5 29.7 1063.1 480.1 0.307 
25 - 0.62 25.0 28.1 1047J 453.2 0.319 
26 0.68 0.71 48.0 25.9 1195.6 591 -0.063 
27 0.84 0.77 49.4 38.6 677 492.9 -0.146 
28 0.73 0.72 24.7 26.3 749.4 685.5 0.303 
29 0.71 0.77 47.7 25.6 2472.1 1186.8 0.017 
30 0.91 0.79 51.4 46.4 839.9 414.2 0.162 
31 0.06 0.12 63.6 17.4 1069.5 916.6 0.102 
32 0.52 0.73 35.2 42.3 664.7 634.2 0.129 
33 0.75 0.71 34.6 AOS 540.2 425.5 0.002 
54 - - - _ 
35 0.67 0.67 42.9 38.3 1149.9 720.4 0.003 
36 0.63 0.43 57.7 34.6 580.1 376.9 0.133 
37 0.61 0.43 20.2 34.9 1611.6 909.4 0.427 
Mean 0.71 0.64 41.5 33.1 1050.9 794.6 0,150 
St^ev. 0.19 0.14 13.9 9.2 469.0 527.9 0.177 
" Measured in centiseconds. 
^ Significant numbers in bold (p < 0.05). 
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A p p e n d i v 14 
Indices on the HRT task (Study n - rnn<:istPnrv. I .inPnr fi^, mean judgement and 
mean Intencv. correlation hptwPPn judgpmpnf nnd Intpnry, 
Mean St .dev. Mean St.dev. Correlation* 
GP 
1 
Consistency Judgement latency' Judgement & 
2 
3 - _ 
4 -
5 -
6 -
7 -
8 - - _ 
9 0.39 0.61 64.3 25.2 1510 1835 -0.244 
10 - - - - - - -
11 
12 _ : -
U 0.19 0.28 71.4 39.7 476.0 223.5 •0.200 
14 - - _ 
15 -
17 - - - - - -0.104 
19 - 0.31 86.4 19.5 1176.5 931.9 _ 
20 - -
21 - -
22 - - _ 
23 - - -
24 - . 0.45 60.9 37.0 1655.2 823i -0.163 
25 -
26 - -
27 0.38 0.33 53.0 15.0 892.2 369.6 0.033 
28 - 0.67 43.9 20.7 1229.7 913.3 -0.081 
29 - - - _ _ 
30 - 0.59 54.8 24.4 1446.2 606.1 -0.032 
31 0.25 0.52 51J 27.1 581.8 480.5 -0.123 
32 - - -
33 0.24 0.54 60.8 26.2 681.7 1095.9 ^.024 
34 0.32 0.39 18.4 35.3 658.4 838J 0.518 
35 • 0.58 44.4 35.6 1513.6 694.7 -0.176 
36 - 0.32 60.8 32.7 647.3 427.9 -0.038 
37 - - - _ _ 
Mean 03 0.47 55.9 28.2 747 770 -0.05 
St^dev. 0.08 0.14 16.6 7.8 651 425 0.197 
Significant numbers in bold (p < 0.05). 
Measured in centiseconds. 
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Appendix 15 
Explicit nolicies: Subjective ratings on the L I P I O task (Study n 
GP CHO HYP AGE GEN o c c EVA SMO DIA C O M WEI A T T FH PER No.>5 
1 10 7 -5 8 0 0 7 7 0 -5 0 6 0 6 
2 9 2 -2 2 0 0 -6 8 6 4 9 1 -2 5 
3 9 6 -6 3 1 8 -7 7 6 -6 8 8 3 10 
4 9 4 -3 3 0 6 6 9 0 0 6 1 0 5 
S 9 9 -9 2 0 0 -9 9 9 -4 6 7 0 8 
6 9 7 -6 6 -4 8 -8 9 5 -5 4 6 -5 8 
7 10 7 -8 8 -2 7 -10 7 9 -9 10 8 -3.5 11 
8 9 6 -5 2 0 2 8 4 6 -5 8 5 8 6 
9 10 7 0 2 0 7 -2 1 2 0 4 0 0 3 
10 10 8 0 8 0 10 3 8 0 -3 3 8 0 6 
11 9.5 5 -7.5 8.5 0 0 0 -5.5 4.5 0 7,5 8.5 0 6 
12 7 7 -5 0 0 6 -3 6 5 -7 7 8 0 7 
13 10 8 -10 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 5 
14 7 6 0 6 -5 6 -6 0 5 -5 6 6 0 7 
15 8 8 -8 9 -2 7 -9 9 9 -7 1 9 -1 10 
17 6 4 -7 9 0 8 -4 10 0 -1 0 6 0 6 
19 9 7 -10 0 0 3 4 8 0 -1 0 0 0 4 
20 7 6 -6 0 0 7 -9 7 0 -8 10 8 0 9 
21 10 1 0 1 0 iO 2 2 0 0 5 0 0 2 
22 8 -8 -8 6 1 7 -9 -8 6 -7 7 8 2 11 
24 6 6 0 8 -5 5 -8 -10 5 -7 9 7 0 8 
25 6 -6 -6 0 0 5 -6 8 7 -5 7 7 0 8 
26 7 2 -8 0 0 0 2 2 0 2 10 8 -3 4 
27* 4 -4 -7 8 0 6 -9 7 6 5 7 8 2 8 
28 7 6 -7 8 0 3 6 8 0 0 0 5 0 6 
29 7 6 -7 0 0 0 -6 5 6 0 7 7 0 7 
30 10 7 0 2 0 3 -4 6 1 -8 0 3 0 4 
31 10 9 0 0 0 3 8 8 0 3 0 8 0 5 
32 9 7 -9 1 0 7 7 6 5 -9 3 6 1 8 
33 10 -5 -10 10 -2 5 -10 10 10 -10 5 10 0 8 
34 10 0 -10 10 -1 6 0 0 10 0 5 5 2 5 
35 10 -9 -9 1 0 6 6 9 5 -7 9 6 -1 9 
36 8 0 0 0 0 8 0 7 5 -1 7 8 -4 5 
37 10 10 -10 8 2 9 -6 10 -5 10 2 10 2 9 
Mean 8.52 4.00 -5.54 4.10 -0.50 5.18 -2.12 5.10 3.75 -2.82 5.07 6.22 0.02 6.74 
Sudev. 1.59 5.05 3.64 3.73 1.52 3.09 6.08 5.08 3.72 4.63 3.41 2.89 2.19 2.23 
N o . > 5 33 24 21 15 0 19 22 26 12 12 18 25 1 
* _ = only subjective data available for this subject. 
K E Y : CHO = cholesterol level, HYP = hypertension, AGE = age, GEN = gender, OCC = 
occupation, E V A = evidence of arteriosclerosis, SMO = smoking behaviour, DIA = 
diabetes, COM = compliance with advice on diet, WEI = weight, ATT = attitude to 
treatment, FH = family history of ischaemic heart disease, PER = personality and No. >5 = 
Number of ratings greater than 5. 
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Appendix U 
Explicit policies: Suhimivp ratinps on the MIGRAINE task (S tnHv n 
GP DUR FRE AGE GEN o c c M W K SMO NAU VIS WEI A T T RES PER No. > 5 
1 0 10 0 0 0 -10 0 6 2 0 9 9 7 6 
2 2 10 0 0 0 -8 0 3 3 0 8 2 0 3 
3 3 9 0 0 0 -9 0 0 0 0 6 7 3 4 
4 7 9 0 0 0 -10 0 3 4 0 8 6 2 5 
5 8 10 0 0 3 -7 0 4 4 0 10 7 0 5 
6 8 8 -5 0 -2 -6 0 8 8 0 5 6 0 6 
7 7 1.0 0 0 0 -10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
8 9 7 0 0 0 -7 0 7 7 0 8 6 8 8 
9 10 10 0 0 0 -7 0 0 0 0 8 6 0 5 
10 10 10 0 0 0 -5 0 3 0 0 3 8 0 3 
U 7.5 9.5 0 0 0 -5.5 0 0 0 0 8.5 8.5 0 5 
12 9 9 0 0 0 -7 0 3 3 0 8 7 0 5 
13 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
14 7 7 0 0 0 -6 0 0 0 0 7 6 0 5 
15 8 10 0 0 -8 -9 0 6 6 0 3 4 8 7 
17 6 9 0 -3 -2 -10 0 7 7 0 4 6 0 6 
19 10 10 0 0 0 -3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 
20 6 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 9 0 4 
21 4 10 0 6 -4 -7 0 0 0 -8 10 3 0 5 
22 8 9 0 0 0 -8 0 6 6 0 7 7 3 7 
23 5 10 0 0 0 -6 0 6 3 0 8 6 -7 6 
24 8 10 0 0 0 -7 0 0 3 0 8 8 0 5 
25 9 9 0 0 0 -9 -9 9 9 -9 1 9 0 8 
26 6 8 0 0 0 -3 0 8 6 0 8 7 0 6 
27 3 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 2 
28 3 10 0 0 0 -3 0 3 3 0 7 0 0 2 
29 5 10 0 0 3 -7 0 6 6 -4 7 5 0 5 
30 3 10 0 0 0 -4 0 1 2 0 5 6 0 2 
31 8 8 0 0 0 -8 0 8 8 0 0 8 0 6 
32 7 9 0 0 -4 -4 0 1 1 0 2 8 2 3 
33 10 10 0 0 10 -10 0 8 8 0 8 10 0 8 
35 7 10 0 0 2 -7 0 6 8 0 10 -4 0 6 
36 8 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 8 0 4 
37 8 10 -4 0 -4 -7 0 5 5 0 3 4 5 3 
Mean 6.8 9.2 -0.3 0.1 -0.2 -6.2 -0.3 3.4 3.3 -0.6 5.9 5.6 0.9 5 
St.dev. 2.6 1.2 1.1 1.1 2.7 3 1.5 3.2 3.1 2.1 3.4 3.2 2.7 2 
N o . > 5 26 34 0 1 2 24 1 13 11 2 21 24 4 
K E Y : DUR = duration. FRE = frequency. AGE = age. GEN = gender. OCC = occupation, 
MWK = misses work. SMO = smoking. NAU = nausea, VIS = visual disturbance. WEI = 
weight. ATT = attitude. RES = response to acute treatment, PER = personality. No. > 5 = 
number of ratings greater than 5. 
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Appendix 17 
Explicit policies: SuhiecHve ratings on the HRT t^^k (Study U 
GP M E N HOT AGE o c c MOO SMO LIB VAG W E I A T T FHD FBC PER No.>S 
9 -5 8 -5 0 6 2 6 8 -4 8 5 -6 0 6 
13 -10 10 -10 0 4 0 2 7 0 0 5 0 0 4 
17 -7 9 -3 -4 5 0 10 5 -1 6 0 -2 4 4 
24 -8 8 -5 0 5 5 0 7 -5 10 3 0 0 4 
26* -2 6 0 0 6 0 6 5 0 10 6 -9 0 6 
27 -9 7 -7 0 3 5 7 8 -6 8 0 0 0 7 
28 -7 9 8 0 6 0 5 5 0 9 0 0 0 5 
30 -6 8 3 0 6 0 5 7 -1 8 3 -3 1 5 
31 7 9 1 0 0 0 3 7 0 0 0 0 0 3 
33 0 10 0 0 0 0 5 10 0 7 8 0 0 4 
34 -10 10 0 0 10 -6 10 10 0 10 0 -5 0 7 
35 -10 10 2 0 4 1.5 5 5 0 10 2 0 5.5 4 
36 0 7 0 0 0 0 6 8 0 9 0 0 0 4 
Mean -5.2 8.5 -1.2 -0.3 4.2 0.6 5.4 7.1 -1.3 7.3 2.5 -1.9 0,8 4.8 
St. dev. 5.1 1.3 4.7 1.1 2.9 2.7 2.8 1.8 2.2 3.5 2.8 3 1.8 1.3 
No .>5 9 13 3 0 5 1 6 9 1 n 2 2 1 
K E Y : MEN = mensirualion, HOT = hot flushes. AGE = age, O C C = occupation, MOO = 
mood states, SMO = smoking behaviour, LIB = hbido, VAG = vaginal dryness, WEI = 
weight. ATT = attitude. FHD = family history of ischaemic heart disease, FBC = family 
history of breast cancer, PER = personality. No. > 5 = number of ratings greater than 5. 
= Subjective ratings only collected for this subject. * _ 
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Appendix 18 
Tacit policies: Sfanfinrdised Repression rnefrir.Pnt^ (fi^ on the I J P i n tn^k (S^tndy u 
GP CHO HYP AGE GEN o c c EVA SMO DIA C O M WEI A T T FH PER No.S 
1 0.42 0.15 0.05 0.15 0.02 -0.10 0.05 0.37 0.17 -0.04 0.07 0.14 0.06 5 
2 0.36 -0.04 0.04 0.03 0.12 -0.01 -0.25 0.31 -0.15 0.00 0.43 -0.14 0.00 4 
3 0.37 -0.07 -0.09 -0.03 0.01 0.49 -0.18 -0.01 0.17 0.08 0.33 0.12 0.00 5 
4 0.58 0.04 -0.03 0.00 0.02 0.07 -0.08 0.39 0.06 -0.06 0.43 -0.09 -0.01 3 
5 0.58 0.04 0.12 -0.01 0.02 0.03 -0.15 0.18 0.09 0.03 0.35 0.04 -0.03 4 
6 0.55 0.06 -0.06 -0.10 0.00 -0.04 -0.24 0.21 -0.05 -0.06 O.lt -0.08 -0.10 3 
7 0.45 0.14 -0.02 0.10 -0.05 0.13 -0.37 0.12 0.03 -0.28 0.06 0.03 0.01 3 
8 0.24 OJS -0.20 0.00 0.01 0.16 0.21 0.12 0.00 -0.04 0.39 0.21 -0.08 7 
9 0.57 0.07 0.17 0.03 0.04 0.01 -0.02 0.21 0.01 0.05 0.26 0.02 -0.12 4 
10 0.44 0.08 -0.17 0.06 0.09 0J7 -0.18 0.18 -0.04 -0.16 0.22 0.04 0.00 7 
11 0.38 0.05 -0.15 0.34 0.05 -0.05 -0.13 -0.34 0.10 -0.10 -0.04 0.06 -0.10 4 
12 0.20 0.16 -0.10 0.05 0.00 0.22 -0.12 0.22 -0.11 -0.01 0.00 0.10 0.08 3 
13 0.31 0.03 -0.24 0.06 0.02 0.11 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.14 0.04 0.11 -0.02 2 
14 0.02 0.19 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.11 0.08 0.17 -0.05 0.13 0.44 0.20 0.06 4 
15 0.21 -0.05 -0.15 0.17 0.15 0.12 -0.08 0.04 -0.01 -0.35 -0.07 0.37 0.01 4 
17 0,14 0.00 -0.09 0.05 0.04 0.37 -0.25 0.30 0.14 -0.15 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 3 
19 034 O.U -0.57 0.09 -0.03 0.00 0.02 0.20 0.07 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 3 
20 0.26 0.06 -0 .1! -0.03 0.11 -0.01 -0.53 0.12 -0.21 -0.07 0.26 0.15 -0.05 5 
21 0.28 0.07 0.06 -0.03 0.02 0.87 0.05 0.08 -0.04 0.05 0.03 0.05 -0.05 3 
22 0.25 -O.IO -0.18 -0.01 0.04 0.01 -0.38 -0.01 0.23 -0.06 0.16 0.18 0.05 6 
24 0.23 0.11 -0.03 0.08 -0.04 -0.03 -0.09 -0.29 0.29 -0.09 0.22 0.04 -0.07 4 
25 0.24 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.17 -0.01 -0.01 0.42 0.07 -0.30 0.07 -0.02 0.03 4 
26 0.25 0.04 -0.05 0.04 0.09 0.02 0.05 0.08 -0.01 -0.03 0.86 0.09 -0.03 5 
28 0.35 0.17 -0.12 0.09 0.18 0.04 0.06 0.58 0.09 -0.02 -0.04 0.00 -0.02 5 
29 0.22 0.22 0.05 -0.05 -0.02 -0.03 -0.10 0.30 0.05 0.05 0.29 -0.02 0.04 4 
30 0.60 0.01 0.08 -0.13 -0.03 0.05 -0.06 0.12 -0.09 -0.19 -0.01 0.09 -0.11 2 
31 0.74 0.03 -0.02 0.09 0.01 0.06 0.16 0.12 -0.02 0.03 0.08 0.13 0.13 5 
32 0.34 0.20 -0.10 -0.12 0.03 0.14 -0.20 0.24 -0.16 -0.39 -0.10 0.07 -0.11 6 
33 0.42 0.10 -0.05 034 0.12 0.00 -0.50 0.13 0.13 -0.14 O.IO -0.05 0.18 1 
34 0.36 0.02 -0.14 0.37 -0.02 -0.09 -0.10 0.09 0.19 -0.02 0.22 -0.06 0.13 4 
35 0.38 -0.29 -OJO 0.07 -0.05 0.08 0.01 -0.15 0.04 -0.28 0.18 0.10 -0.02 5 
36 0.74 0.16 -0.12 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 0.06 0.01 -0.05 0.02 0.07 -0.01 0.02 3 
37 0.70 -0.02 0.01 -0.04 0.00 0.03 0.17 0.19 -0.05 0.00 0.19 0.04 0.11 4 
Mean 0.38 0.06 -0.07 0.05 0.03 0.09 -0.09 0.15 0.03 -0.07 0.17 0.06 0.00 4.24 
St.dev. 0.17 0.11 0.14 0.12 0.06 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.11 0.13 0.20 O.IO 0.07 1.32 
No.S 31 8 10 5 4 6 14 22 8 8 16 7 2 
K E Y : CHO = choiesierol level, HYP = hypertension, AGE = age, GEN = gender. OCC = 
occupation, EVA = evidence of arteriosclerosis, SMO = smoking behaviour, DIA = 
diabetes, COM = compliance with advice on diet, WEI = weight, ATT = attitude to 
treatment, FH = family history of ischaemic heart disease, PER = personality and No. S = 
Number of significant regression coefficients (p < 0.05). 
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Appendix 19 
Tacit PQlicics: Standardised Repression rnefficients (ft.) on the M I ^ R A I N R t^^u 
rstiidv n 
GP DUR PRE AGE GEN OCC M W K SMO NAU VIS W E I A T T RES PER NO.S 
1 0.06 0.66 -0.04 0.04 0.07 -0.16 -0.01 0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.33 0.16 -0.01 4 
2 -0.09 0.74 0.08 0.15 -0.01 -0.05 0.07 0.07 0.09 -0.02 0.36 0.08 -0.04 3 
3 0.03 0.85 -0.01 0.03 -0.03 -0.11 0.02 -0.01 0.06 0.00 0.32 0.10 0.02 4 
4 0.11 0.55 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 -0.36 0.01 0.01 0.11 -0.04 0.52 0.11 -0.04 6 
5 0.10 0.58 -0.18 -0.08 -0.07 -0.17 0.00 -0.05 0.04 0.04 0.47 -0.01 0.01 4 
6 -0.01 0.74 -0.04 -0.01 -0.08 -0.05 0.08 0.12 0.19 0.01 0.03 0.04 0,00 3 
7 0.06 0.88 -0.04 0.03 0.00 -0.06 0.07 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.04 -0.06 1 
8 034 0.22 -0.03 0.03 0.02 -0.15 0.02 0.34 0.38 0.04 0.57 0.25 -0.07 7 
9 0.18 0.81 -0.05 0.01 -0.04 -0.08 0.08 -0.01 0.04 0.00 0.27 0.12 -0.12 5 
10 0^1 0.84 -0.08 0.10 -0.04 0.08 -0.03 0.07 0.08 -0.02 0.09 0.06 0.00 3 
11 0.06 0.82 -0.04 0.09 -0.06 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.26 0.11 -0.06 3 
12 0.14 0.82 -0.09 -0.02 -0.01 -0.06 0.07 0.04 -0.05 0.05 0.08 0.13 -0.13 4 
13 0.02 0.88 -0.03 0.03 0.02 -0.05 -0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.04 0.05 -0.01 1 
14 0.05 0.26 0.03 -0.04 -0.04 0.04 0.05 0.12 0.02 -0.01 0.68 0.20 -0.08 3 
IS 0.18 0.80 -0.03 0.06 -0.08 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.09 -0.01 0.05 0.07 -0.05 2 
17 0.14 0.55 -0.06 0.18 -0.04 -0.22 0.09 0.14 0.21 -0.02 0.38 0.16 -0.06 8 
19 0.08 0.94 0.01 0.03 0.04 -0.06 0.05 0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.03 -0.05 2 
20 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.13 -0.04 0.07 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.69 0.50 -0.03 6 
21 0.05 0.74 -0.09 0.06 -0.04 -0.10 0.06 -0.03 -0.01 -0.09 0.34 0.08 -0.02 2 
22 0.15 0.62 -0.07 0.03 -O.IO -0.11 0.10 -0.04 0.09 -0.10 0.43 0.21 0.00 4 
23 0.12 0.70 -0.06 -0.08 0.00 0.07 -0.05 -0.07 0.04 -0.06 0.03 0.10 0.02 I 
24 0.18 032 -0.08 -0.09 -0.01 -0.21 0.09 0.00 -0.07 0.01 0.20 033 -0.07 5 
25 0.16 0.76 -0.01 0.00 -0.04 -0.06 -0.04 0.05 0.02 0.01 O.IO 0.24 0.07 3 
26 0.26 0.71 -0.03 0.05 0.06 -0.11 0.06 0.18 0.14 -0.02 033 0.25 -0.06 7 
27 0.07 0.88 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 0.02 0.04 -0.06 -0.02 0.04 0.10 0.01 2 
28 0.07 0.84 -0.02 -0.05 -0.01 0.04 0.02 -0.10 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.02 2 
29 0.08 0.82 0.05 0.02 -0.12 0.04 0.07 -0.02 0.22 -0.11 0.28 0.10 -0.05 6 
30 0.01 0.89 -0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.05 0.11 -0.02 2 
31 -0.07 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.17 -0.27 0.21 0.11 0.14 0.05 0.09 0.13 -0.05 2 
32 0.11 0 ^ 0.01 0.00 -0.13 -0.02 -0.05 -0.05 0.07 -0.05 -0.03 0.03 0.01 3 
33 0.16 0.81 -0.09 0.00 -0.13 0.07 0.06 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.03 0.11 0.04 4 
35 0.08 0.74 -0.05 0.04 -0.02 -0.09 0.04 0.00 0.07 -0.02 039 -0.02 -0.04 2 
36 0.12 0.32 0.06 0.03 -0.04 0.11 -0.02 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.51 0.41 -0.13 3 
37 0.06 0.59 -0.10 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 0.10 -0.14 0.08 0.01 0.10 0.24 -0.04 3 
Mean 0.10 0.67 -0.03 0.02 -0.02 -0.06 0.04 0.03 0.06 -0.01 0.24 0.14 -0.03 3.53 
S.d. 0.08 0.23 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.10 0.05 0.09 0.09 0.04 0.21 0.11 0.04 1.81 
No.S 15 33 2 4 3 9 1 5 6 1 18 20 2 
K E Y : DUR = duration. FRE = frequency, AGE = age, GEN = gender. OCC = occupation. 
MWK = misses work. SMO = smoking. NAU = nausea. VIS = visual disturbance, WEI = 
weight, ATT = attitude, RES = response to acute treatment, PER = personality, No. S = 
number of significant regression coefficients (p < 0.05). 
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A p p e n d i x 2ft 
Tacit policies: Stnndnrfllsffl Repression roeffioients (ft.^ nn the H R T tnsk (<^U}^y |) 
GP M E N HOT AGE OCC MOO SMO L I B VAG WEI A T T FHD FBC PER NO.S 
9 -0.04 0.47 -0.07 0.01 0.41 -0.03 0.24 0.46 -0.24 0.30 -0.03 -0.10 0.00 6 
13 -0.20 0J3 0.40 0.11 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02 -0.05 0.01 0.04 -0.07 0.07 3 
17 -0.09 0.22 -0.12 -0.19 0.13 -0.01 0.32 0.01 -0.06 0.43 0.02 -0.08 0.03 4 
24 -0.21 0J6 0.19 -0.12 0.27 0.08 0.10 0.03 -0.09 0.39 0.04 -0.08 0.08 5 
27 -0.04 0.07 -0.08 -0.01 0.19 -0.01 0.19 0.00 -0.15 0.55 -0.03 0.02 -0.07 3 
28 -0.03 032 OJS -0.01 0.08 0.05 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.64 -0.05 -0.03 0.01 3 
30 -0.05 0.34 0.46 0.05 0.15 -0.01 0.36 0.26 -0.15 0.46 0.06 -0.05 -0.06 7 
31 0.00 0.63 0.06 -0.14 -0.07 -0.04 0.02 0.42 0.07 -0.01 -0.01 0.09 0.02 3 
33 0.05 0.71 O.IO -0.07 0.08 0.06 -0.05 -0.05 0.00 O.l l -0.02 -0.09 -0.03 1 
34 -0.60 0.01 0.03 0.08 -0.05 0.01 -0.02 0.05 O.IO 0.16 -0.01 -0.14 0.05 2 
35 -0.02 0.43 0.13 -0.06 0.18 0.04 0.15 0.12 -0.11 0.60 -0.08 -0.02 0.02 6 
36 0.00 0.27 -0.09 0.10 -0.03 0.03 0.13 0.27 -0.02 0.56 0.09 -0.03 -0.01 3 
Mean -0.10 0.35 0.11 -0.02 0.12 0.02 0.12 0.13 -0.06 0.35 0.00 -0.05 0.01 3.83 
St.dev. 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.09 0.13 0.04 0.13 0.17 0.09 0.22 0.05 0.06 0.04 1.80 
No.S 3 10 5 2 5 0 5 5 2 9 0 0 0 
K E Y : MEN = menstruation, HOT = hot flushes, AGE = age, OCC = occupation, MOO = 
mood states, SMO = smoking behaviour, LIB = libido, VAG = vaginal dryness, WEI = 
v/eight, ATT = attitude. FHD = family history of ischaemic heart disease. FBC = family 
history of breast cancer, PER = personality. No. S = number of significant regression 
coefficients (p < 0,05). 
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Appendix 21 
Correlation of cue weights LIPID task. Study 1 
Correlation of cue standardised regression coefficients (fii) 
N = 33 therefore significance (p < 0.05) when r > 0.33. 
CHO HYP A G E GEN O C C A R T SMO DIA CMP WEI ATT FHD 
HYP -0.150 
A G E 0.204 0.115 
G E N -0.100 -0.078 -0.229 
O C C -0.215 -0.022 0.102 0.217 
A R T -0.222 -0.053 0.029 -0.261 -O.026 
SMO 0.147 0.164 -0.038 -0.114 -0.196 0.042 
DIA 0.025 0.316 0.240 -0.240 0.403 -0.025 0.082 
CMP -0.142 -0.148 -0.131 0.464 -0.122 -0.111 0.016 -0.219 
WEI 0.075 0.181 0.103 -0.108 -0.213 0.063 0.334 0.066 0.129 
A T T -0.089 -0.023 0.236 -0.173 0.004 -0.104 0.081 -0.017 -0.035 0.373 
FHD -0.322 -0.021 -0.140 -0.061 0.024 0.159 0.192 -0.318 -0.063 -0.I2I -0.070 
PER 0.026 -0.073 -0,048 0.450 0.035 -0.128 -0.020 0.154 0.212 0.173 -0.006 -0.033 
Correlation of cue subjective weights (v,) 
N - 34 therefore correlations are significant (p < 0.05) when greater than 0.329 
CHO HYP AGE GEN OCC ART SMO DIA CMP W E I 
HYP 0.312 
AGE 0.360 0.205 
GEN -0.288 -0.057 0.002 
OCC 0.230 -0.092 -0.303 -0.318 
ART 0.229 -0.071 0.350 -0.016 -0.034 
SMO 0.498 0.197 -0.037 -0.141 0.290 -0.017 
DIA 0.030 0.101 -0.043 -0.223 0.323 -0.007 0.194 
CMP -0.325 -0.402 -0.073 0.059 -0.299 -0.231 -0.436 -0.197 
W E I 0.137 0.061 -0.069 0.047 0.311 -0.056 0.168 0.109 -0.327 
A T T -0.097 -0J85 0.123 -0.293 -O.081 -0.078 -0.239 -0.274 0.401 -0.005 
FHD -0.587 -0.104 ^.219 0.025 -0.010 -0.200 -0.185 -0.187 0.090 -0.076 
PER -0.018 0.037 -0.124 0.109 0.237 -0.029 0.188 -0.165 0.079 -0.092 
A T T FHD 
0.026 
-0.068 -0.053 
K E Y : - Cho = cholesterol level, Hyp = hypertension, Age = age, Gen = gender, Occ = 
occupation, Art = evidence of arteriosclerosis, Smo = smoking behaviour, Dia = 
diabetes, Cmp = compliance with advice given on diet, Wei = weight, Att = attitude to 
treatment, Fhd = family history of ischaemic heart disease. Per = personality. 
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Correlation of cue we igh t s M I G R A I N E task . S t u d y 1 
Correlation of cue standardised regression coefficients {fi,) 
N = 34: significance (p < 0.05) where r > 0.33. 
DUR FRE AGE GEN OCC M W K SMO NAU VIS W E I A T T 
FRE -0.076 
AGE -0.259 -0.308 
GEN -0.088 -0.082 0.430 
OCC -0.206 -0.310 0.128 0.057 
M W K 0.027 0.232 0.266 0.025 -0.465 
SMO -0.295 -0.261 -0.044 0.107 0.283 -0.377 
NAU 0.301 -0.421 0.255 0J70 0.375 -0.239 0.134 
VIS 0.257 -0.386 0.140 0.344 0.007 -0.241 0.167 0.581 
W E I 0.021 -0.438 0.092 -0.012 0.299 -0.004 -0.015 0.309 -0.063 
A T T 0.176 -0.645 0.250 0.248 -0.005 -0.193 0.016 0.338 0.343 0.115 
RES 0.337 -0.650 0.401 0.099 0.082 0.087 0.024 0.247 0.088 0.364 0.500 
PER -0.136 0.319 -0.172 -0.164 -0.216 0.096 -0.365 -0.286 -0.146 -0.251 -0.341 
RES 
-0.307 
Correlation of cue subjective weights {ipi) 
N = 34 therefore correlations are significant (p < 0.05) when greater than 0.329 
DUR FRE AGE GEN OCC M W K SMO NAU VIS W E I A T T 
FRE -0.066 
AGE -0.066 0.122 
GEN -0.151 0.008 0.019 
OCC -0.018 -0.074 0.285 -0.174 
M W K 0J74 0.188 0.001 0.077 0.027 
SMO 0.036 0.263 -0.043 0.013 -O.020 0.014 
NAU -0.286 -0390 -0.303 -0.270 0.063 -0.326 -0.220 
VIS -0.208 -0J83 -0.313 -0.270 0.076 -0.317 -0.227 0.905 
W E I 0.228 0.181 -0.075 -0.624 0.074 0.038 0.595 -0.079 -0.089 
A T T -0.321 -0.216 0.154 0.190 0.237 -0.024 0.267 -0.113 -0.088 0.035 
RES -0.132 -0.303 0.062 -0.134 0.023 -0.174 -0.041 -0.138 -0.228 0.097 0.152 
PER -0.107 -0.168 -0.139 -0.025 -0J74 -0.253 0.059 0.173 0.175 0.103 -0.090 
RES 
0.043 
K E Y : Dur = duration of untreated attack, Fre = frequency of attack, Age = age, Gen 
= gender, Occ = occupation, Mwk = whether they miss work or not, Smo = smoking 
behaviour, Nau = nausea. Vis = visual disturbance, Wei = weight, Att = attitude to 
treatment. Res = response to acute treatment. Per = personality. 
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Correlation of cue ^vcights HRT task, Study 1 
Correlation of cue standardised regression coefficients (fij) 
N = 12: significance (p < 0.05) when r > 0.5324 
M E N HOT AGE OCC MOOD SMO L I B VAG WEI 
HOT 0.609 
AGE -0.028 0.179 
OCC -0.327 -0.395 0.287 
MOOD 0.219 0.073 -0.068 -0.203 
SMO -0.063 0.107 0.375 0.071 0.001 
L I B 0.278 -0.237 -0.116 -0.109 0.535 -0.451 
VAG 0.249 0.337 -0.166 0.061 0.127 -0.642 0.297 
W E I -0.395 -0.014 -0.004 -0.035 -0.894 0.147 -0.712 -0.237 
A T T 0.300 -0.368 -0.068 -0.006 0.333 0.168 0.502 -0.157 -0.417 
FHD -0.081 -0.172 0.092 0.309 -0.251 0.018 0.239 0.162 0.077 
FBC 0.543 0.251 -0.021 -0.264 -0.256 -0.371 0.000 0.332 0.081 
PER -0.542 -0.040 0.139 -O.I 14 -0.126 0.356 -0.400 -0.149 0.373 
A T T FHD FBC 
-0.103 
0.083 -0.124 
-0.351 0.062 -0.288 
Correlation of cue subjective weights (V',) 
N = 13 therefore correlations are significant (in bold) when > 0.514 (p < 0.05) 
MEN HOT AGE OCC M O O SMO L I B VAG WEI 
HOT 0.649 
AGE 0.261 0.274 
OCC 0.118 0.034 0.118 
M O O -0.625 -0.650 0.086 -0.086 
SMO -0.172 -0.226 -0.394 0.083 -0.185 
L I B 0.118 -0.144 0.242 -0.500 0.028 -0.447 
VAG 0.659 0.539 -0.034 0.348 -0.675 -0.103 0.053 
W E I 0.300 0.498 0.524 -0.044 -0.132 -0.796 0.242 0.053 
A T T -0.250 -0.499 0.365 0.135 0.238 0.138 0.273 -0.086 -0.142 
FHD 0.033 0.080 -0.206 0.256 -0.013 0.065 -0.244 0.233 0.051 
FBC 0.006 0.492 -0.007 0.002 -0.604 0.234 -0.317 0.219 -0.007 
PER -0.319 0.060 0.142 -0.540 0.084 0.017 0.239 -0.509 0.186 
A T T FHD FBC 
0.080 
-0.291 -0.367 
0.080 -0.204 0.130 
K E Y : Men = menstruation, Hot = hot flushes, Age = age, Occ = occupation, Mood = 
mood states, Smo = smoking behaviour, Lib = libido, Vag = vaginal dryness, Wei = 
weight, att = attitude, Fhd = family history of ischaemic heart disease, Fbc = family 
history of breast cancer. Per = personality. 
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Between task c o r r e l a t i o n o f Re ln t ive I m p o r t n n r e s o f cues. S t u d y I 
LIPID and MIGRAINE 
Cue ft s,-
N = 32 N = 33 
Age -0.130 0.168 
Gender 0.139 -0.238 
Occupation -0.170 -0.051 
Smoking 0.03! 0.111 
Weight 0.138 -0.050 
Attitude 0J60 0.421 
Personality 0.077 0.503 
LIPID and HRT 
Cue ft S/ 
N = 11 N = 12 
Age -0.118 0.049 
Occupation -0.124 -0.128 
Smoking -0.280 -0.379 
Weight 0.204 -0.144 
Attitude -0.195 0.653 
FHD 0.037 0.142 
Personality 0.003 -0.064 
MIGRAINE and HRT 
Cue ft Si 
N = 11 N = 12 
Age -0.133 * 
Occupation -0.135 0.296 
Smoking -0.465 * 
Weight 0.599 * 
Attitude 0.354 0.784 
Personality -0.264 * 
Key:- * = All doctors rated the cue on one or other task at 0. 
Significant figures are in bold (p < 0.05). 
Pi = standardised regression coefficients 
Si = subjective ratings 
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S u b j e c t i v e We\ghtK hp.) on the LIPID t a sk . S t u d y 1 
GP r Rs CHO HYP AGE GEN OCC ART SMO DIA CMP W E I A T T FHD PER 
1 0.70 0.55 0.48 0.33 -0.24 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.33 0.00 -0.24 0.00 0.29 0.00 
2 0.73 0.47 0.49 0.11 -0.11 0.11 0.00 0.00 -0.32 0.43 0.32 0.22 0.49 0.05 -0.11 
3 0.64 0.51 0.39 0.26 -0.26 0.13 0.04 0.34 -0.30 0.30 0.26 -0.26 0.34 0.34 0.13 
4 0.73 0.63 0.52 0.23 -0.17 0.17 0.00 0.35 0.35 0.52 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.06 0.00 
5 0.52 0.44 0.35 0,35 -0.35 0.08 0.00 0.00 -0.35 0.35 0.35 -0.16 0.24 0.27 0.00 
6 0.58 0.33 0.37 0.28 -0.24 0.24 -0.16 0.32 -0.32 0.37 0.20 -0.20 0.16 0.24 -0.20 
7 0.79 0.51 0.34 0.24 -0.27 0.27 -0.07 0.24 -0.34 0.24 0.31 -0.31 0.34 0.27 -0.12 
8 0.65 0.57 0.44 0.29 -0.24 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.39 0.20 0.29 -0.24 0.39 0.24 0.39 
9 0.61 0.51 0.66 0.46 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.46 -0.13 0.07 0.13 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.00 
10 0.72 0.51 0.44 0.35 0.00 0.35 0.00 0.44 0.13 0.35 0,00 -0.13 0.13 0.35 0.00 
11 0.81 0.51 0.45 0.24 -0.35 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.26 0.21 0.00 0.35 0.40 0.00 
12 0.62 0.30 0.35 0.35 -0.25 0.00 0.00 0.30 -0.15 0.30 0.25 -0.35 0.35 0.40 0.00 
13 0.69 0.41 0.48 0.38 -0.48 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.48 0.00 
14 0.21 0.24 0.37 0.32 0.00 0.32 -0.27 0.32 -0.32 0.00 0.27 -0.27 0.32 0.32 0.00 
15 0.67 0.42 0.28 0.28 -0.28 0.32 -0.07 0.25 -0.32 0.32 0.32 -0,25 0.04 0.32 -0.04 
17 0.74 0.47 0.29 0.19 -0.34 0.43 0.00 0.39 -0.19 0.48 0.00 -0.05 0.00 0.29 0.00 
19 0.90 0.67 0.49 0.38 -0.54 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.22 0.43 0.00 -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 
20 0.80 0.52 0.31 0.27 -0.27 0.00 0.00 0.31 -0.40 0.31 0.00 -0.36 0.44 0.36 0.00 
21 0.80 0.74 0.69 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.69 0.14 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.00 0.00 
22 0.81 0.47 0.34 -0.34 -0.34 0.25 0.04 0.29 -0.38 -0.34 0.25 -0.29 0.29 0.34 0.08 
24 0.80 0.42 0.25 0.25 0.00 0.34 -0.21 0.21 -0.34 -0.42 0.21 -0.29 0.38 0.29 0.00 
25 0.50 0.30 0.30 -0.30 -0.30 0.00 0.00 0.25 -0.30 0.40 0.35 -0.25 0.35 0.35 0.00 
26 0.71 0.71 0-39 0.11 -0.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 O . l l 0.11 0.00 O.U 0.56 0.45 -0.17 
27* - - 0.17 -0.17 -0.31 0.35 0.00 0.26 -0.39 0.31 0.26 0.22 0.31 0.35 0.09 
28 0.65 0.44 0.37 0.31 -0.37 0.42 0.00 0.16 0.31 0.42 0,00 0,00 0.00 0.26 0.00 
29 0.63 0.32 0.36 0.31 -0.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.31 0.26 0.31 0.00 0.36 0.36 0.00 
30 0.74 0.38 0.58 0.41 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.17 -0.23 0.35 0.06 -0.47 0.00 0.17 0.00 
31 0.55 0.46 0.50 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.40 0.40 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.40 0.00 
32 0.66 0.32 0.40 0.31 -0.40 0.04 0.00 0.31 0.31 0.27 0.22 -0.40 0.13 0.27 0.04 
33 0.66 0.41 0.35 -0.17 -0.35 0.35 -0.07 0.17 -0.35 0.35 0.35 -0.35 0.17 0.35 0.00 
34 0.73 0.24 0.44 0.00 -0.44 0.44 -0.04 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.00 0.22 0.22 0.09 
35 0.81 0.24 0.41 -0.37 -0.37 0.04 0.00 0.24 0.24 0.37 0.20 -0.29 0.37 0.24 -0.04 
36 0.30 0.33 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.37 0.26 -0.05 0.37 0.42 -0.21 
37 0.20 0.10 0.34 0.34 -0.34 0.27 0.07 0.31 -0.20 0.34 -0.17 0.34 0.07 0.34 0.07 
Mean 0.44 0.41 0.19 -0.25 0.18 -0.02 0.24 -0.08 0.24 0.17 -0.12 0.24 0.28 0.00 
S.d. 0.14 O. l l 0.23 0.16 0.16 0.07 0.16 0.27 0.23 0.15 0.20 0.17 0.13 O.IO 
• -= only subjective data available for this subject. 
K E Y : CHO = cholesterol level. HYP = hypertension, AGE = age. GEN = gender. OCC 
occupation. ART = evidence of arteriosclerosis. SMO = smoking behaviour. DIA = 
diabetes. CMP = compliance with advice on diet. WEI = weight. ATT = attitude to 
treatment. FHD = family history of ischaemic heart disease. PER = personality. Rs = 
correlation between values predicted from these subjective weights when used as 
regression weights and the actual decision values, r = correlation between subjective 
weights and standardised regression coefficients. 
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Suhiecfivp Weights he ) on the M I G R A I N E tn^^k. S t u d y 1 
GP r DUR FRE AGE GEN OCC M W K SMO NAU VIS W E I A T T RES PER 
1 0.72 0.58 0.00 0.52 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.52 0.00 0.31 0.10 0.00 0.47 0.47 0.36 
2 0.78 0.66 0.13 0.66 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.53 0.00 0.20 0.20 0.00 0.53 0.13 0.00 
3 0.73 0.68 0.19 0.57 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.57 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.44 0.19 
4 0.88 0,72 0.38 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.55 0.00 0.16 0.22 0.00 0.44 0.33 0.11 
5 0.76 0.56 0.41 0.52 0.00 0.00 0.16 -0.36 0.00 0.21 0.21 0.00 0.52 0.36 0.00 
6 0.54 0.45 0,41 0.41 -0.26 0.00 -0.10 -0,31 0.00 0.41 0.41 0.00 0.26 0.3! 0.00 
7 0.69 0.62 0.44 0,63 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.63 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
8 0.75 0.71 0.45 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.35 0.00 0.35 0.35 0.00 0.40 0.30 0.40 
9 0.76 0.69 0.54 0.54 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.43 0,33 0.00 
10 0.64 0.59 0.57 0.57 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.29 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.46 0.00 
11 0.65 0.61 0.43 0.54 0.00 0.00 0,00 -0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.48 0,48 0.00 
12 0.61 0.56 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.39 0.00 0.17 0.17 0.00 0.45 0.39 0,00 
13 0.68 0.62 0,73 0.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
14 0.63 0.46 0.48 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.48 0.41 0,00 
15 0.53 0.48 0.39 0.49 0.00 0.00 -0.39 -0.44 0.00 0.29 0.29 0.00 0.15 0.20 0.39 
17 0.76 0.60 0.31 0.46 0.00 -0.15 -0.10 -0.52 0.00 0.36 0.36 0.00 0.21 0.31 0.00 
19 0.73 0.70 0.71 0.71 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.21 0.00 0,00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 
20 0.86 0.73 0.39 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.66 0.59 0.00 
21 0.78 0.65 0.20 0.50 0.00 0.30 -0.20 -0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.40 0.50 0.15 0.00 
22 0.70 0.55 0.42 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.42 0.00 0.32 0.32 0.00 0.37 0.37 0.16 
23 0.49 0.41 0.27 0.55 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.33 0.00 0.33 0.16 0.00 0.44 0.33 -0.38 
24 0.89 0.66 0.44 0.55 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.38 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.44 0.44 0.00 
25 0.55 0.43 0.36 0.36 0,00 0.00 0.00 -0.36 -0.36 0.36 0.36 -0.36 0.04 0.36 0.00 
26 0.81 0.72 0.42 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0,00 0.42 0.36 0.00 
27 0.85 0.77 0.24 0.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0,00 0.00 0.00 0.56 0.00 
28 0.67 0.60 0.23 0,78 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.23 0.00 0.23 0.23 0.00 0.55 0.00 0.00 
29 0.63 0.57 0.28 0.56 0.00 0.00 0.17 -0.39 0.00 0.33 0,33 -0,22 0.39 0.28 0,00 
30 0.78 0,72 0.22 0.75 0,00 0.00 0.00 -0.30 0.00 0.07 0.15 0.00 0.37 0.45 0.00 
31 0.46 0.28 0.39 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.39 0.00 0.39 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.39 0.00 
32 0.67 0.60 0.46 0.59 0.00 0.00 -0.26 -0.26 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.13 0.53 0.13 
33 0.26 0.26 0.38 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.38 -0.38 0.00 0.30 0.30 0.00 0.30 0.38 0.00 
35 0.70 0.57 0.35 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.10 -0.35 0.00 0.30 0.40 0.00 0.50 -0.20 0.00 
36 0.85 0.62 0.53 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0,00 0.59 0.53 0.00 
37 0.58 0.43 0.44 0.55 -0.22 0.00 -0.22 -0.39 0.00 0.28 0.28 0.00 0.17 0.22 0.28 
Mean 0.58 0.39 0.53 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.34 -0.01 0.17 0.16 -0.03 0.33 0.31 0.05 
St.dev. 0.12 0.15 0.12 0.06 0.06 0.13 0.16 0.06 0.15 0.15 0.10 0.19 0.19 0.14 
K E Y : DUR = duration, FRE = frequency, AGE = age, GEN = gender, O C C = occupaUon, 
MWK = misses work. SMO = smoking, NAU = nausea, VIS = visual disturbance, WEI = 
weight. ATT = attitude. RES = response to acute treatment. PER = personality, Rs = 
correlation between values predicted from weights when used as regression weights and 
the actual decision values, r = correliation between subjective weights and standardised 
regression coefficients. 
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GP r Rs MEN HOT AGE OCC MOO SMO LIB V A G 
9 0.85 0.69 -0.29 0.46 -0.29 0.00 0.34 0.11 0.34 0.46 
13 0.13 0.05 -0.54 0.54 -0.54 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.11 0.37 
17 0-84 0.50 -0.38 0.49 -0.16 -0.22 0.27 0.00 0.54 0.27 
24 0.70 0.53 -0.43 0.43 -0.27 0.00 0.27 0.27 0.00 0.38 
26* - - -0.12 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.00 0.36 0.30 
27 0.62 0.38 -0.45 0.35 -0.35 0.00 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.40 
28 0.74 0.66 -0.39 0.50 0.45 0.00 0.34 0.00 0.28 0.28 
30 0.78 0.66 -0.38 0.51 0.19 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.32 0.44 
31 0.78 0.60 0.56 0.72 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.56 
33 0.43 0.29 0.00 0.64 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.64 
34 0.56 0.37 -0.42 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.42 -0.25 0.42 0.42 
35 0.73 0.61 -0.53 0.53 0.11 0.00 0.21 0.08 0.26 0.26 
36 0.89 0.55 0.00 0.52 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.45 0.60 
Mean 0.49 -0.26 0.50 -0.06 -O.02 0.23 0.04 0.31 0.41 
St. dev. 0.19 0.30 0.10 0.26 0.06 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.13 
W E I A T T FHD FBC PER 
-0.23 0.46 0.29 -0.34 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.00 
-0.05 0.32 0.00 -O.U 0.22 
-0.27 0.54 0.16 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.60 0.36 -0.54 0.00 
-0.30 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 
-0.06 0.51 0.19 -0.19 0.06 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0,00 0.00 
0.00 0.45 0.51 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.42 0.00 -0.21 0.00 
0.00 0.53 O.n 0.00 0.29 
0.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 
-0.07 0.42 0.14 -0.11 0.04 
0.12 0.20 0.17 0.17 O.IO 
K E Y : MEN = menstruation, HOT = hot flushes. AGE = age. OCC = occupation. MOO = 
mood stales. SMO = smoking behaviour. LIB = libido, V A G = vaginal dryness. WEI = 
weight. ATT = attitude. FHD = family history of ischaemic heart disease. FBC = family 
history of breast cancer, PER = personality. Rs = correlation between values predicted 
when using weights as regression weights and the actual decision values, r = correlation 
between subjective weights and standardised regression coefficients. 
= Subjective weights only collected for this subject. « — 
285 
A p p o n d i v 28 
Instructions for the I.S tn^k (Study 2. C h n p ^ P r ^ ) 
INSTRUCTIONS 
You will be now be presented with 100 hypothetical cases for which you have to decide 
whether or not the individual should be prescribed a lipid lowering agent. You should 
assume that the option to refer is not available. In each case you originally tested the 
patient's blood cholesterol level at least six months previously. You offered the usual 
advice on alterations to diet and recommended, where appropriate, that the patient should 
give up smoking cigarettes. The blood cholesterol level given in the problem is the current 
one and reflects any changes in the patient's life-style that he or she has made or is likely to 
make. 
A number of pieces of information about the patient and their medical history are 
available. These will appear on the screen as the relevant bar on the attached keyboard is 
pressed. Please choose only that information which you consider is necessary to make the 
decision and in the order in which it seems natural to seek it. When you feel you have 
uncovered all relevant facts available press the bar at the bottom of the board. This will 
activate the mouse. We realise that the cases may not be clear cut and that in a real life 
consultation you might wish to know other information before making a definite decision. 
Given all the information you have chosen to look at. you should indicate your preference 
for prescribing a lipid lowering drug in percentage temis. If you are certain that you would 
prescribe then give a response of 100% and if you are certain you would not prescribe then 
give a response of 0%. Where you are not certain then please given any intermediate value 
you wish to convey the likelihood that you would prescribe. 
In each case you can set the percentage by pulling the mouse to the left or right. When the 
reading is correct then please press any button on the mouse to proceed to the next 
problem. 
PRESS ANY MOUSE BUTTON TO S T A R T 
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A p p e n d i v 20 
Inter-cue c o r r e l a t i o n s on the IS tnsk (Study2^ 
Cho Hyp Age Gen Occ Eva Smo Dia Com Wei Att FH Per 
Cho I 0.09 -0.05 0.00 0.17 -0.11 0.11 0.07 0.15 0.08 -0.01 -0.03 -0.10 
Hyp 0.09 1 0.05 0.19 0.03 -0.01 -0.04 0.02 0.09 -O.I -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Age -0.05 0.05 1 0.07 0.01 -0.04 -0.14 0.00 -0.17 -0.03 -0.03 0.02 -0.14 
Gen 0.00 0.19 0.07 1 -0.12 0.22 -0.04 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.10 -0.12 -0.03 
Occ 0.17 0.03 0.01 -0.12 1 -0.11 0 0.04 0.26 0.13 0.04 0.06 0.03 
Eva -0.11 -0.01 -0.04 0.22 -0.11 1 -0.17 -0.06 0.03 0.04 -0.15 0.09 -0.19 
Smo 0.11 -0.04 -0.14 -0.04 0.00 -0.17 1 -0.01 -0.05 -0.12 0.01 -0.17 -0.12 
Dia 0.07 0.02 0.00 -0.07 0.04 -0.06 -0.01 1 0.02 -0.04 0.00 0.05 0.03 
Com 0.15 0.09 -0.17 -0.06 0.26 0.03 -0.05 0.02 1 0.16 0.01 0.14 -0:12 
Wei 0.08 -0.1 -0.03 -0.06 0.13 0.04 -0.12 -0.04 0.16 1 0.00 -0.05 0.09 
Att -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.10 0.04 -0.15 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 1 0.14 -0.12 
FH -0.03 -0.02 0.02 -0.12 0.06 0.09 -0.17 0.05 0.14 -0.05 0.14 1 0.06 
Per -0.10 -0.02 -0.14 -0.03 0.03 -0.19 -0.12 0.03 -0.12 0.09 -0.12 0.06 I 
Key:- CHO = cholesterol level. HYP = hypertension, AGE = age. GEN = gender. OCC = 
occupation. E V A = evidence of arteriosclerosis, SMO = smoking behaviour, DIA = 
diabetes. COM = compliance with advice on diet. WEI = weight. ATT = attitude to 
treatment. FH = family history of ischaemic heart disease, PER = personality. 
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Appendix 30 
Comparison ofindices on the I . I P I D rask o f S t u d y l n n d thP \s task o f .St»Hy 2 
Task L I P I D IS L I P I D (100) IS L I P I D (100) IS Consistency 
GP Consistency Cunsislency Mean judgenieni Mean judgement R> of policy 
1 0.60 0.48 43.8 42.1 0.55 0.60 0.31 
2 0.29 0.51 11.4 23.9 0.53 0.64 0.40 
3 0.30 0.65 57.6 47.7 0.57 0.50 0.82 
4 0.77 0.55 17.9 12.7 0.66 0.52 0.67 
S 0.44 0.50 26.9 59.4 0.51 0.75 0.61 
6 0.17 0.54 45.5 36.5 0.33 0.65 0.88 
7 0.32 0.66 6.8 17.0 0.42 0.51 0.87 
8 - - 46.2 - 0.60 _ 
9 0.19 0.86 10.9 17.4 0.52 0.58 0.90 
10 - • 38.1 - 0.54 
11 0.15 0.53 20.1 8.7 0.45 0.28 0.75 
12 0.34 0.34 6.1 11.4 0.32 0.41 0.72 
13 0.46 0.19 92.7 62.6 0.27 0.39 0.28 
14 -0.12 0.28 48.6 47.6 0.36 0.13 0.64 
15 -0.12 0.33 7.1 0.5 0.32 0.16 -0.01 
17 0.26 0.51 54.8 49.4 0.48 0.56 031 
19 0.43 0.55 16.0 15.4 0.62 0.68 0.56 
20 0.23 0.39 16.9 19.4 0.38 0.44 0.03 
21 0.36 0.22 50.2 21.9 0.79 0.66 0.12 
22 0.10 0.52 36.8 29.3 0.45 0.61 0.78 
23 - - . 
24 0.32 0.39 20.6 14.5 0.22 0.40 0.38 
25 - - 43.8 0.39 _ 
26 0.72 0.77 56.1 68.0 0.87 0.60 0.94 
21 - - -
28 0.22 0.55 16.9 55.1 0.72 0.73 0.58 
29 0.44 0.22 21.6 53.5 0.22 0.47 0.77 
30 0.49 0.54 11.7 21.0 0.45 0.70 0.84 
31 0.68 0.93 75.0 71.1 0.63 0.71 0.99 
32 0.64 0.48 16.3 22.1 0.46 0.54 0.47 
33 0.37 0.43 17.8 15.2 0.55 0.24 0.86 
34 0.28 0.57 11.0 17.5 0.37 0.37 0.80 
35 0.51 0.43 39.0 27.8 0.42 0.45 0.35 
36 0.63 0.08 62.8 60.0 0.69 0.51 ^.05 
37 -0.11 0.37 72.5 40.4 0.60 0.57 0.74 
Mean OJS 0.48 33.9 32.97 0.49 0.51 0.58 
St.dev. 0.23 0.19 22.7 20.1 0.16 0.16 030 
Key :- rb = correlation between absolute values of doctor's standardised regression 
coefficients for cues on information study and on original study (N = 13) [p < 0.05 when rb 
> 0.553 (2 tailed test)] 
r = consistency/reliability = conrelalion between decisions made on information seeking 
study and same cases in original task (N = 100) [p < 0.05 when r > 0.2]. 
R2 = linear fit. 
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A p p e n H i v .^1 
Tacit policies: Standardised Repress ion CoefTicients based on dPcision^ m n H ^ nn i^ sr 
IQO cases of the I IPID tnsk of Sh .dy 1 
GP CHO HYP AGE GEN o c c ART SMO DIA COM W E I A T T FHD PER 
I 0.50 0.21 -0.01 0.09 0.07 0.01 0.08 0.46 -0.06 0.03 0.05 014 -0.02 
2 0.43 -0.05 -0.06 0.01 0.21 0.02 -0.29 0.27 -0.22 -0.01 0.46 -0.16 0.01 
3 0.35 -0.12 -0.15 0.03 0.00 0.39 -0.21 0.00 0.19 0.03 0.40 0.16 -0.08 
4 0.58 0.05 -0.04 0.00 0.07 0.15 -0.03 0.39 -0.03 0.01 0.42 -0.07 -0.05 
5 0.56 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.07 0.02 -0.20 0.20 0.02 009 0.33 003 -0.14 
6 0.55 0.09 -0.06 -0.09 0.04 -0.03 -0.15 0.21 -0.08 -0.05 0.08 -0.05 -0.07 
7 0.50 0.06 0,01 0.03 0.01 0.10 -0.41 0.14 0.03 -0.32 0.03 -0.05 -0.07 
8 0.27 0.26 -0.29 0.03 -0.05 0.12 0.19 0.17 0.08 -0.07 0.46 0.22 -0.13 
9 0.59 0.09 0.16 0.01 0.08 0.02 -0.03 0.16 -0.03 0.07 0.29 0.08 -0.13 
10 0.58 0.12 -0.08 0.04 0.05 0.40 -0.14 0.20 0.01 -0.14 0.17 O.IO 0.04 
11 0.45 0.09 -0.21 0.32 0.04 0.03 -0.09 -0.36 -0.03 -0.08 -0.07 007 -0.10 
12 0.35 0.15 -0.06 0.05 0.08 0.24 -O.IO 0.34 -0.02 -0.13 0.05 017 -0.02 
13 0.25 0.09 -0.22 0.02 -0.04 0.20 0.19 0.17 0.21 0.20 -0.02 O06 -0.03 
14 -0.08 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.05 007 0.13 0.03 O i l 0.63 012 0.11 
15 0.29 -0.08 -0.01 0.10 0.16 0.14 -0.13 -0.03 0.07 -0.43 -0.05 0.29 006 
17 0.18 0.03 •0.18 0.01 0.08 0.52 -0.26 0.34 -0.06 -0.06 -0.08 -0.03 -0.09 
19 0.36 0.14 -0.59 0.06 0.02 -0.02 a n 0.22 0.07 0.04 OOO -0.02 0.03 
20 0.29 -0.01 -0.08 -0.05 0.09 -0.02 -0.56 0.16 -0.08 -0.13 0.24 0.03 OOO 
21 0.30 0.11 0.05 -0.04 0.01 0.87 0.05 0.07 -O.03 0.09 0.01 004 -0.04 
22 0.23 -0.10 -0.34 -0.09 0.11 0.14 -0.44 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.21 0.22 0.04 
24 0.29 0.12 -0.09 0.04 -O.02 -0.03 -0.13 -0.31 0.17 -0.09 0.20 -0.02 -0.15 
25 0.31 0.04 0,01 0.03 0.18 O.IO 006 0.44 -0.05 -0.30 012 0.01 -0.06 
26 0.22 0.03 -0.12 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.89 0.09 003 
28 0.32 0.22 -0.14 0.01 0.18 ao9 O05 0.68 0.04 0.05 -0.06 OOO 0.01 
29 0.25 0.26 -0.02 -0.05 -0.02 0.03 -O.Il 0.30 -0.03 0.11 0.26 -0.01 -0.03 
30 0.61 -0.06 0.03 -0.12 -0.07 -0.04 -0.10 0.12 0.09 -0.32 -0.06 O05 -0.11 
31 0.80 0.00 0.03 0.03 -0.03 a 10 013 0.10 0.03 ooo 0.09 0.05 0.14 
32 0.39 0.11 -0.08 -0.13 0.08 O.IO -0.26 0.19 -0.05 -0.53 -0.09 0.00 -0.05 
33 0.40 0.09 -0.05 0.31 0.15 -0.01 -0.51 0.13 0.12 -0.12 0.07 -0.06 0.17 
34 0.35 0.04 •0.18 0.43 -0.04 -0.15 -0.15 0.05 0.19 0.03 0.18 -0.08 005 
35 0.41 -0.32 -0.41 0.13 0.00 -0.02 -0.07 -0.13 0.02 -0.25 0.11 0.11 -0.06 
36 0.80 0.13 -0.08 0.00 -0.05 0.03 O07 0.02 0.11 -0.02 0.09 -0,03 0.11 
37 0.72 -0.02 0.07 -0.04 -0.03 0.01 0.19 0.17 0.05 -0.05 0.15 004 009 
Mean 0.41 0.05 -0.09 0.04 0.05 0.11 -0.10 0.15 0.02 -0.07 0.17 0.05 -0.02 
St.dev 0.18 0.11 0.15 0.12 0.07 0.19 019 0.20 0.09 0.16 0.22 0.10 0.08 
Ttest p 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.16 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.27 
Key:- C H O = cholesterol level, H Y P = hypertension, A G E = age, G E N = gender, O C C = 
occupation, E V A = evidence of arteriosclerosis, SMO = smoking behaviour, DIA = 
diabetes, C O M = compliance with advice on diet, W E I = weight. A T T = attitude to 
treatment, F H = family history of ischaemic heart disease, P E R = personality 
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Appendix 32 
Tacit polirips: Standardised Regression CQef f i c i en t s on t he \ ^ task (StnHy 2^ 
GP CHO HYP AGE GEN o c c ART SMO DIA C O M W E I A T T FHD PER 
1 0.33 0.16 -0.02 0.07 0.07 0.07 O.IO 0.21 0.07 0.03 0.67 -0.13 0.10 
2 0.41 -0.20 -0.29 0.32 -0.01 0.27 -0.09 0.30 -0.05 0.04 0,43 -0.06 -0-06 
3 0.42 -O.OI -0.16 O.IO -0.08 0.32 -0.05 0.13 0.22 -0.09 0.40 0.09 -0.05 
4 0.62 0.13 0.02 -0.02 0.08 -0.04 -0.01 0.07 -0.07 O.OI 0.13 0.32 -0.10 
5 0.41 0,00 -0.31 0.04 0.02 -0.07 -0.21 0.60 0.11 0.03 0.18 0.05 -0.05 
6 0.70 -0.01 -0.26 0.03 0.12 0.02 -0.03 0.15 0.03 -0.03 0.05 -0.07 -0.15 
7 0.52 0.04 -0.12 0.10 0.08 0.05 -0.37 0.27 0.04 -0.22 0.22 0.01 0.04 
9 0.65 0.18 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.18 -0.07 0.23 -0.07 -O.OI 0.26 0.01 -0.09 
11 0.33 ^.20 -0.28 0.24 -0.08 0.17 -0.09 -0.17 0.06 -0.03 0.04 -0.11 -0.06 
12 0.33 0.20 -0.09 -0.03 0.05 -0.04 0.08 0.36 0.04 0.08 0.15 0.26 -0.14 
13 0.25 0.06 -0.34 0.13 0.06 -0.03 0.30 0.24 0.01 -0.03 0.17 0.20 0.06 
14 0.07 -0.05 -0.09 0.06 -0.01 0.08 -0.19 0.01 0.15 0.01 0.29 0.20 -0.01 
15 0.14 -0.20 -0.29 0.28 0.03 -0.12 -0.24 O.OI 0.11 -0.22 0.06 0.02 -0.09 
17 0.40 0.14 -0.06 0.21 0.00 0.29 -O.ll 0.35 0.04 -0.20 0.44 -0.04 0.12 
19 0.69 0.01 -0.13 -0.01 0.03 0.00 0.07 0.37 0.02 0.08 -0.01 0.03 0.05 
20 0.40 -0.02 0.09 0.01 -0.02 0.53 -0.08 0.05 0.07 -0.04 0.25 0.23 0.10 
21 0.67 -0.01 -0.07 0.02 0.06 0.09 -0.11 0.20 -0.02 -0.05 0.41 -0.14 -O.II 
22 0.24 -0.12 -0,13 0.14 0.17 -0.08 -0.70 0.00 -0.08 -0.07 -0.10 0.30 -0.12 
24 0.45 -0.15 -0.04 0.00 0.08 0.19 -0.29 -0.03 0.04 -0.22 0.33 0.10 -0.08 
26 -0.02 0.11 -0.06 -0.05 0-05 0.17 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.82 -O.IO 0,11 
28 0.33 0.09 -0.15 -0.05 0.02 0.12 0.04 0.50 0.08 -0.01 0.59 -0,06 O.OI 
29 0.36 0.10 -0.12 0.06 0.06 -0.08 -0.21 0.49 0.04 -0.09 0.18 0.08 -0.04 
30 0.70 -0.01 -0.03 0.03 0.07 0.01 -0.38 0.07 0.20 -0.18 0.06 0.04 -0.10 
31 0.85 0.02 -0.07 0.03 0.01 0.07 0.12 0.00 -0.03 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.16 
32 0.56 -0.03 -0.41 0.09 0.12 O.IO -0.28 0.14 -O.OI -0.14 -0.01 0.05 -0.11 
33 0.33 -O.Il -0.02 0.14 0.02 0.03 -0.41 0.16 -0.06 -0.16 0.17 -0.02 0.13 
34 0.28 -O.OI -0.16 0.44 0.01 -0.13 -0.12 0.12 -0.01 0.02 0.41 0.01 0.06 
35 0.40 -0.28 •0.19 0.06 -0.16 0.29 0.02 0.00 0.33 -0.20 0.25 0.03 0.05 
36 0.06 0.04 -0.08 -0.01 0.05 0.11 0.03 -0.03 0.02 -0.05 0.77 -0.17 0.09 
37 0.50 -0.04 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.02 -0.53 0.16 0.02 -0.03 0.03 0.17 -0.05 
Mean 0.41 -0.01 -0.12 0.08 0.03 0.09 -0.13 0.17 0.04 -0.06 0.26 0.05 -0.01 
St.dev 0.21 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.06 0.15 0.21 0.18 0.09 0.09 0.23 0.13 0.09 
T t e s t p 0.00 0.79 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 O.OI 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.51 
Key:- C H O = cholesterol level, HYP = hypertension. A G E = age, G E N = gender. O C C = 
occupation. E V A = evidence of arteriosclerosis. SMO = smoking behaviour, DIA = 
diabetes, C O M = compliance with advice on diet. W E I = weight, A T T = attitude to 
treatment, F H = family history of ischaemic heart disease, P E R = personality 
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Appendix 33 
Percentnpe cue splpoHnn on IS task ^Shidy 2^ 
CP CHO HYP AGE GEN o c c ART SMO DIA COM WEI ATT FHD PER 
1 100 100 100 96 0 0 100 100 37 10 99 0 0 
2 100 1 74 70 0 73 2 67 3 0 99 35 0 
3 100 22 100 0 1 100 98 98 98 61 100 52 32 
4 100 46 54 52 1 46 46 46 42 5 53 75 13 
5 100 100 100 100 0 0 100 100 86 2 100 70 38 
6 100 49 100 2 I 42 48 48 4 7 1 43 0 
7 100 80 100 100 13 20 90 76 33 63 23 25 2 
9 100 42 10 29 0 71 30 44 0 0 38 42 0 
11 95 57 100 100 18 51 64 66 29 44 32 41 20 
12 100 100 96 0 0 11 67 90 10 0 52 100 0 
13 100 6 78 0 1 6 69 57 3 1 9 74 5 
14 100 99 100 99 I 1 100 100 93 0 34 98 0 
15 100 27 100 100 7 100 100 98 92 92 19 42 5 
17 100 100 98 96 30 98 82 100 16 44 93 82 24 
19 100 0 100 0 0 0 0 100 100 0 0 100 0 
20 62 34 31 0 1 100 34 29 35 26 54 100 0 
21 100 50 100 0 0 52 53 59 42 50 99 54 0 
22 100 100 100 100 3 94 100 100 16 18 5 100 2 
24 100 77 100 100 5 41 100 73 32 34 92 83 2 
26 45 61 43 0 0 1 I 34 1 0 100 75 0 
28 100 58 99 0 0 40 86 99 0 2 100 16 0 
29 100 100 100 98 98 2 100 100 8 9 99 99 4 
30 100 73 11 0 0 58 81 44 74 61 39 59 0 
31 100 89 85 60 2 64 65 66 5 57 7 59 4 
32 100 58 100 0 2 52 72 60 18 45 5 55 3 
33 100 1 84 0 0 11 81 1 0 2 25 13 0 
34 100 0 85 67 1 1 1 3 40 4 50 28 11 
35 100 42 100 2 0 87 12 46 90 74 95 58 0 
36 86 14 69 6 3 1 4 2 3 2 99 1 0 
37 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 99 100 100 
Mean 96.3 56.2 83.9 45.9 9.6 44.1 62.9 66.9 37 27.1 57.3 59.3 8.8 
S t dev 12.1 36.0 27.1 45.9 25.2 37.8 36.5 32.2 36.4 30.7 39 31.2 19.9 
Key:- C H O = cholesterol level, H Y P = hypertension. A G E = age, G E N = gender. O C C = 
occupation, E V A = evidence of arteriosclerosis, SMO = smoking behaviour. DIA = 
diabetes, C O M = compliance with advice on diet. W E I = weight. A T T = attitude to 
treatment. F H = family history of ischaemic heart disease. P E R = personality 
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A p p e n d i x .^4 
A v e r a g e cue selection pos i t ions on i5» task ( S t u d y 2) 
GP CHO HYP AGE GEN o c c ART SMO DIA C O M W E I ATT FHD PER 
1 12.99 12.99 10.96 9.63 0.00 0.00 9.05 8,05 2.23 0.70 6.92 0.00 0.00 
2 12.63 0.10 7.50 7.43 0.00 6.83 0.18 5.54 0.36 0.00 12.21 2.59 0.00 
3 13.00 0.50 9.27 0.00 0.12 0.58 7.58 5.70 0.25 0.06 0.72 7.46 0.39 
4 13.00 4.07 5.94 5.20 0.02 2.74 3.64 3.17 2.07 0.18 2.79 8.95 0.36 
5 13.00 8.99 11.82 11.12 0.00 0.00 8.01 9.99 4.62 0.07 7.01 4.10 1.67 
6 13.00 4.10 11.99 0.12 0.09 3.73 4.79 5.16 0.29 0.50 0.03 3.03 0.00 
7 12.99 7.66 11.93 10.93 1.39 !.14 7.93 6.18 1.98 4.60 1.01 1.12 0.05 
9 12.99 3.97 0.72 2.15 0.00 8.50 2.35 4.30 0.00 0.00 3.16 4.04 0.00 
11 10.34 4,52 11.98 13.00 0.28 3.86 5.81 6.43 1.26 2.55 1.07 2.01 0.43 
12 13.00 10.97 9.51 0.00 0.00 0.93 5.38 8.16 0.67 0.00 3.65 11.98 0.00 
13 13.00 0.50 9.27 0.00 0.12 0.58 7.58 5.70 0.25 0.06 0.72 7.46 0.39 
14 13.00 11.85 11.03 9.92 0.09 0.09 9.00 8.00 6.46 0.00 1.71 6.00 0.00 
15 12.97 1.25 11.96 10.99 0.32 9.96 8.95 7.81 5.49 6.44 0.63 2,10 0.05 
17 8.82 11.20 8.63 9.06 0.93 10.98 5.94 12.97 0.68 2.14 5.05 4.69 0.69 
19 13.00 0.00 11.98 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.01 10.00 0.00 0.00 9.01 0.00 
20 6.85 2.88 2.41 0.00 0.03 12.94 2.72 1,83 2.26 1.27 5.01 11,94 0.00 
21 13.00 3.88 12.00 0.00 0.00 2.73 5.56 5.31 2.43 3.36 8.45 5.20 0.00 
22 9.99 10.90 12,92 11.86 0.36 8.34 8.13 7.13 0.85 0.92 0.23 6.01 0.08 
24 12.97 5.78 11.97 10.98 0.41 2.43 9.94 4.45 1.61 1.57 7.78 6.24 0.10 
26 5.13 6.57 4.41 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.06 3.14 0.07 0.00 13.00 8.69 0.00 
28 13.00 4.76 11.80 0.00 0.00 2.81 7.84 9.92 0.00 0,12 10.81 1.14 0.00 
29 13.00 11.99 11.01 9.80 8.84 0.18 7.97 7.02 0.43 0.38 5.87 4.89 0.14 
30 13.00 8.62 0.51 0.00 0.00 6.16 7.81 3.53 5.72 5.06 2.28 5.72 0.00 
31 12.77 10.43 9.14 5.73 O.IO 5.64 5.44 5.16 0.30 3.66 0.35 3.37 0.10 
32 11.75 5.58 12.99 0.00 0.06 4.11 7,82 5.88 0.99 2.95 0.24 3.96 0.11 
33 13.00 0.12 10.07 0.00 0.00 0.96 8.92 0.09 0.00 0.17 2.47 1.20 0.00 
34 13.00 0.00 10.20 7.32 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.21 3.68 0.27 4.97 2.52 0.82 
35 13.00 2.22 12.00 0.19 0.00 8.89 0.49 2.78 8.07 5.89 9.98 4.35 0.00 
36 10.68 1.53 7.55 0.61 0.30 0.11 0.39 0.21 0.37 0.21 12.36 0.10 0.00 
37 13.00 12.00 11.00 9.82 8.46 7.49 7.18 6.13 5.15 4.16 3.18 2.21 1.21 
Mean 12.06 5.66 9.48 4.86 0.73 3.76 5.55 5.7 2.29 1.58 4.46 4.74 0.22 
St. dev 1.98 4.37 3.47 5.0 2.17 3.87 3.28 3.11 2.67 2.00 4.11 3.2 0.4 
Key:- C H O = cholesterol level, H Y P = hypertension, A G E = age, G E N = gender, O C C = 
occupation, E V A = evidence of arteriosclerosis, SMO = smoking behaviour, DIA = 
diabetes, C O M = comphance with advice on diet, W E I = weight, A T T = attitude to 
treatment, F H = family history of ischaemic heart disease, P E R = personality 
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A p p e n d i x 3a 
Instructions for the Pol icy R o c n g n i f i o n tnsk r S t u d v 3. T h n p f p r 7^ 
Instructions for feedback task 
Using judgements you made previously on the likelihood of prescription for a set of cases 
we have calculated the relative importance of the cues available on each task. This gives, 
for example, the bearing 'Hypertension' had, in comparison lo 'Gender* or any other cue. on 
the decision to prescribe lipid lowering drugs. These relative importances are shown in 
terms of statistical weights known as 'regression coefficients' on a series of graphs that 
each represent one doctor's policy on this decision making. 
At the time of the original task you also gave a rating to each cue to indicate the relative 
influence you felt each cue had on your decisions. These did not correspond very well with 
the statistical weights. However, it may be the case that although there are problems in 
explicitly stating a policy, it can be recognised when displayed amongst a group. 
You will be shown a selection of graphs including one representing your own policy on 
this task. We would like you to select three of these graphs that you feel may represent 
your policy and put these in order of likelihood. You may arrange the graphs how you wish 
for this purpose. 
The accompanying key indicates what positive or negative weights for each cue actually 
represent. For example when the rating is negative for 'Weight' that doctor was more 
likely to prescribe for underweight rather than overweight people. When the rating for 
'Gender' is positive that doctor was more likely to prescribe for males than females. Please 
pay more attention to darker bars as these show cues that were statistically significant. 
There is also a second set of graphs for each computer task for you to look at. These are 
based on the verbal description of your policy which you gave after you had worked 
through the cases. Again please pick the graph which you think is yours and choose two 
reserves. 
When you have completed these two tasks for both the Lipid lowering decisions and the 
Migraine prophylaxis decisions we will give you a copy of both your statistically 
calculated policy and your slated policy at the time. You will be free to look at the range of 
policies used by the whole sample of doctors. 
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A p p e n d i x 40 
Po l i cy R e c o g n i t i o n scores rStuHy ^) 
GP L I P . T LIP. E M I G . T M I G . E H R T T H R T E GROU 
1 I 3 3 0 * B 
2 0 0 0 0 * * B 
3 2 3 2 3 * * B 
4 0 0 3 3 * * B 
5 3 2 0 3 * B 
6 0 0 1 0 * * B 
7 3 2 0 0 * B 
9 0 3 1 2 0 1 B 
11 I * 0 2 * * A 
12 I 2 0 3 * B 
13 1 0 0 0 0 0 A 
14 0 0 0 3 * * A 
15 3 2 3 2 * * B 
17 1 3 0 0 * * B 
19 3 3 0 0 * * A 
20 2 3 1 0 * * A 
21 0 3 0 0 * * B 
22 0 3 3 0 * * B 
23 * * 0 0 * * B 
24 0 0 * * * B 
26 0 2 I 0 * 3 B 
27 * 0 0 0 0 I B 
28 0 0 0 1 1 2 A 
29 0 3 0 0 * * B 
30 0 0 0 0 0 0 A 
31 2 0 1 0 0 0 B 
32 2 0 0 3 * * B 
33 2 2 0 1 0 3 B 
34 3 3 * * 0 0 B 
35 3 3 0 0 * * B 
36 3 0 3 2 * * B 
37 0 3 2 0 * * A 
Key:- LIP. T = LIPID TACIT policy 
LIP. E = LIPID EXPLICIT policy 
MIG. T = MIGRAINE TACIT policy 
MIG. E = MIGRAINE EXPLICIT policy 
HRT T = HRT TACIT policy 
HRTE = HRT EXPLICIT policy 
3 = chosen first choice, 2 = 2nd choice, 1 = 3rd choice. 0 = failed to select own policy, * = no data. 
Group refers to whether the experimenter may have known the subject's policy (A) or not (B). 
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Appendix 41 
Inter-cue correlntinn in Study 4. Chnptpr f< 
Cho Hyp Age Gen EvA Dri Smo Dia Com Wei Att FH 
Cho I -0.05 -0.07 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.08 -0.02 -0.09 014 -0.10 -0.05 
Hyp -0.05 1 -O.IO OlO 0.05 0.04 0.03 -0.12 0.10 -0.05 -0.07 -0.08 
Age -0.07 -O.IO 1 -0.14 -0.04 -0.03 0.11 -0.17 O08 -0.07 0.09 -O.IO 
Gen -0.02 0.10 -0.14 I 0.02 0.10 -0.11 -0.15 -0.05 0.05 0.12 -0.01 
EvA 0.00 0.05 -0.04 0.02 I -0.08 0.07 0.00 0.07 -0.04 -0.06 -0.04 
Dri -0.01 0.04 -0.03 0.10 -0.08 1 -0.11 -0.07 -O.Il •0.03 -0.10 -0.08 
Smo -0.08 0.03 O i l -0.11 0.07 -0.11 1 -0.03 -0.05 0.08 -0.10 0.06 
Dia -0.02 -0.12 -0.17 -0.15 0.00 -0.07 -0.03 I 0.03 -0.14 -0.03 0.01 
Com -0.09 0.10 0.08 -0.05 0.07 -O.Il -0.05 0.03 I 0 -0.06 -0.05 
Wei 0.14 -0.05 -0.06 O05 -0.04 -0.02 0.07 -0.14 0 I 0.04 OOO 
An -0.10 -0.07 009 012 -0.06 -O.IO -O.IO -0.03 -0.06 0.04 1 0.05 
FH -0.05 -0.08 -0.10 -0.01 -0.04 -0.08 O06 0.01 -0.05 0.00 0.05 1 
Key:- Cho = cholesterol level. Hyp = hypertension. Age = age. Gen = gender, E v A = 
evidence of arteriosclerosis, Dri = drinking behaviour, Smo = smoking behaviour, Dia = 
diabetes. Com = compliance with advice on diet, Wei = weight, Att = attitude to treatment, 
F H = family history of ischaemic heart disease. 
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Appendix 42 
Instructions for the P R E S C R I B E ta^k (Study 4. Chapter R) 
You will be presented with a series of 130 hypothetical cases in which you have to decide 
whether or not lo prescribe a lipid lowering agent. Assume ihat the option to refer is not 
available, A number of details about the patient and their medical history will be shown. 
Given all the information, you have to decide whether or not you would now prescribe a 
lipid lowering drug. 
In each case you originally tested the patient's blood cholesterol level at least six months 
previously. The triglyceride levels on the returned lipid profile were normal. No patient is 
on a medication which might otherwise affect their lipid levels. You have offered the usual 
advice on alterations to diet and have recommended, where appropriate, that the patient 
should give up smoking cigarettes. They already exercise to a degree that is appropriate for 
their age and general state of health. The blood cholesterol level given in the problem is the 
current one and reflects any changes in the patient's life-style that he or she has made or is 
likely to make. 
We realize that the cases may not be clear cut and that in practice you might seek further 
information. However, you can express your decision in terms of the chance of you 
prescribing the drug. In each case you can indicate this by moving the mouse to the left 
(less likelihood) or right (greater likelihood of prescribing). When the bar is in the correct 
position please press any button on the mouse to proceed to the next problem. The first 
case shown will be an example. 
PRESS A N Y M O U S E B U T T O N T O S T A R T 
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Appendix 43 
Instructions for the RISK task (Study 4, Chapter 8) 
You will be presented with 130 hypothetical cases. We would like you to make a 
judgement about the patient's risk of coronary heart disease. A number of details about the 
patient and their medical history will be shown and certain assumptions can be made about 
all the patients. 
In each case you originally tested the patient's blood cholesterol level at least six months 
previously. The triglyceride levels on the returned lipid profile were normal. No patient is 
on a medication which might otherwise affect their lipid levels. You have offered the usual 
advice on alterations to diet and have recommended, where appropriate, that the patient 
should give up smoking cigarettes. They already exercise to a degree that is appropriate for 
their age and general state of health. The blood cholesterol level given in the problem is the 
current one and reflects any changes in the patients life-style that he or she has made or is 
likely to make. 
To make a numerical estimate of the patient's level of the risk you might wish to have more 
information. However, here only an approximate estimate is required. Please indicate the 
risk you feel this patient is at by moving the mouse to the left (less risk) or right (greater 
risk). Please use points all along the bar to indicate the different risks of different patients. 
When the bar shows your feeling of the patient's level of risk then please press any button 
on the mouse to proceed to the next problem. 
PRESS A N Y M O U S E B U T T O N T O S T A R T 
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Appendix 44 
Verhal instructions to ascertain self-insight on Study 4 
I would like you to be as honest as possible in trying to estimate what affected your 
judgements on the task you have jusi completed. All the following questions are trying to 
ascertain what you feel did affect, not what you feel should have affected your behaviour, 
or what might affect it in other circumstances. 
Firstly, we will go through each piece of information that would have been available to you 
on a case. I will give you two descriptions that may have come up for each information. 
Please indicate which of these would be more likely to make you prescribe by circling it 
or, if there is no difference between the two descriptions, put a line through both. 
After that I would like you to rate the importance of each piece of information on a 0-10 
scale. If a piece of information was of maximum importance: its value had a large effect on 
your judgement please rate it highly. If a piece of information did not have a bearing on 
your judgements please rate it at 0. Intermediate values should be assigned as appropriate 
to attributes which you feel have some affect on your decision. You can give the same 
rating to different items. 
Now I'd like you to describe in any other terms the process you were going through in 
making judgements. Was the importance of any cue dependent on the value of any other 
cue? 
How does this relate to your decision making in real life? 
Do you prescribe lipid lowering drugs in real life? 
Do you refer patients? 
Would you require any other information? 
Is there any information that was presented that you wouldn't know? 
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Appendix 45 
Sample S h m seen hv G P when rating relative i m n n r t n n r P n f C U P S in StuHy d 
Doctor code:- G P P R E S C R I P T I O N or R I S K A S S E S S M E N T 
Circle description more likely to make you prescribe or put a line through both if there was 
no difference. Go through all items indicating this. Then go through all items again 
assigning an importance rating of any number between 0 (no difference) and 10 (very 
important). 
Item Value 1 Value 2 Rating 
Cholesterol level 8 6.5 
Hypertension Poorly controlled No 
Age 60 30 
Gender Female Male 
Evidence of Arteriosclerosis Yes No 
Drinks Heavily No 
Smokes No Heavily 
Diabetes No Poorly controlled 
Compliance with advice on diet No Yes 
Weight Very obese Under 
Attitude to treatment Requesting Opposed 
Family History of IHD No 1st degree relative 
303 
Indices on the P R F S C R I R F t.<^]^-
Appendix 46 
linear fit, consistency. mean judgement nnH menn 
Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev. Correlation 
GP r Judgement Latency Judgement & latency 
40 0.64 0.82 44.3 20.93 2024.7 646.2 O.l 
41 0.71 0.57 47.67 25.22 I5I1.3 513 0.3 
42 0.40 0.61 62.04 20.21 2372.2 1285.5 0.02 
43 0.47 0.49 57.56 23.89 1773.9 873.8 0.18 
44 0.46 0.35 28.2 20.73 1946.5 1003.1 0.25 
45 0.28 0.05 53.91 14.64 1875.6 616.1 -0.06 
46 0.60 0.73 45.75 19.15 1865.9 1163.1 0.26 
48 0.48 -0.06 26.9 18.96 1540.9 637.7 0.06 
49 0.42 0.69 78.87 13.37 1183.2 417.8 -0.37 
50 0.72 0.70 41.32 30.27 652.2 377.9 0.5 
51 0.44 0.49 49.34 13.79 1124.1 407.2 -0.12 . 
52 0.34 0.19 7.09 14.63 644.2 335.3 0.43 
53 0.57 0.63 44.16 34.37 1440.6 323.7 -0.06 
54 0.35 0.73 71.36 12.39 1449.9 944 0.06 
55 0.58 0.72 34.12 14.82 2301.4 921.3 0.27 
56 0.55 0.42 44.48 22.79 1616.4 778.4 0 
57 0.56 0.36 38.72 15.4 1812.8 663.6 -0.21 
58 0.43 0.60 36.55 25.68 1462.9 391.1 0.02 
59 0.46 0.52 44.55 20.78 1930.1 1059.5 -0.09 
60 0.62 0.77 70.87 19.16 2649.3 766.1 0.23 
61 0.58 0.68 44.8 27.23 1034 538 0.02 
62 0.49 0.44 49.57 22.14 2181.1 1237.3 0.22 
63 0.27 0.21 27.39 27.33 1362.3 649.1 0.3 
64 0.41 0.50 46.15 19.68 1152 467.3 0.14 
65 0.75 -0.10 58.52 41.64 1191.9 593.6 0.16 
68 0.69 0.58 53.15 17.31 1815 666.3 0.05 
69 0.54 0.54 16.53 23.88 1087 512 0.15 
71 0.40 0.68 62.02 16.48 2347.1 1438.5 -0.07 
72 0.47 0.38 22.56 19.69 855.9 353 0.05 
73 0.50 0.77 46.89 12.79 1463 446.4 0.03 
74 0.48 0.67 42.5 18.89 1404.3 525.7 0.6 
76 0.63 0.67 53.48 24.27 2736.1 1354.2 0.05 
77 0.73 0.77 42.79 21.73 1740.4 746.6 0.11 
78 0.77 0.79 61.67 20.65 1704.1 791.7 0.02 
79 0.51 0.50 51.63 37.84 1115.1 643 -0.28 
80 0.31 0.31 19.98 26.23 2707.9 1595.8 0.24 
Mean 0.52 0.52 45.21 21.64 1641.0 741.2 0.10 
St Dev 0.13 0.24 15.65 6.75 545.0 337.2 0.20 
Key:- = linear fit; r = consistency 
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Appendix 47 
Indices on the RISK task: linear f i t , cnnsistpncv. menn judgempnf and mpnn latency 
Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev. Correlation 
GP r Judgement Latency Judgement & latency 
40 0.61 0.64 79.52 13.3 1224.6 417.7 -0.27 
41 0.51 0.76 69.66 19.43 1438.9 575.9 -0.14 
42 0.67 0.77 76.35 8.7 1760.9 885.3 -0.03 
43 0.62 0.78 74.57 14.12 1164.6 512.3 -0.14 
44 0.25 0.22 56.18 11.69 1246.4 716 0.08 
45 0.56 0.75 76.23 18.03 1212 528.7 0.19 
46 0.51 0.77 62.78 9.36 1079.2 437.3 -0.03 
48 0.78 0.77 76.42 20.87 1173.8 379.3 -0.13 
49 0.60 0.78 79.61 18.54 1015.4 438.8 -0.19 
50 0.52 0.73 57.25 21.01 863.3 307.1 0.03 
51 0.56 0.49 56.68 12.66 1283.1 523.4 -0.14 
52 0.59 0.57 73.34 22.92 1110.1 390.2 -0.23 
53 0.58 0.74 53.83 29.23 1251.5 324.2 -0.09 
54 0.46 0.46 65.75 11.17 808 430.1 -0.05 
55 0.54 0.48 82.34 11.75 2361.3 1007.3 0.04 
56 0.33 0.14 80.47 9.23 2091.8 876.3 0.00 
57 0.52 0.50 68.18 14.99 1552.5 712.9 -0.17 
58 0.60 0.66 71.65 15.1 1168 433.2 -0.24 
59 0.47 0.62 61.93 11.48 1243.3 576.8 -0.25 
60 0.51 0.73 86.28 12.96 2101.4 872.1 -0.28 
61 0.48 0.56 70.19 20.3 1269.4 780.3 -0.05 
62 0.68 0.80 88.62 12.56 908.1 1146 -0.44 
63 0.33 0.56 70.45 16.47 1166.8 491.2 -0.02 
64 0.54 0.57 67.66 15.85 968.7 419 -0.04 
65 0.59 0.70 75.36 28.64 1086.8 653.2 -0.39 
68 0.61 0.72 69.63 6.77 1497.2 508.4 -0.(M 
69 0.54 0.54 45.88 30.05 1060.9 436.5 -0.06 
71 0.55 0.42 71.12 9.46 2414.4 2161.7 -0.08 
72 0.41 0.55 64.7 12.7 916.5 550.9 -0.12 
73 0.55 0.61 59.81 12.51 975.4 340.6 -0.01 
74 0.68 0.70 83.72 11.27 888.1 346.6 -0.34 
76 0.53 0.72 72.79 11.48 1618J 660.3 0.12 
77 0.53 0.60 73.65 11.26 1422.6 653.6 0.08 
78 0.51 0.77 66.59 15.1 1246.7 836.1 0.11 
79 0.43 0.63 60.4 23.21 1125 581 -0.45 
80 0.45 0.51 43.08 14.83 2037.9 841.6 0.06 
Mean 0.53 0.62 69.24 15.5 1326.5 632.0 -0.10 
Sc Dev 0.10 0.15 10.57 5.9 418.2 334.3 0.16 
Key:- R 2 = linear fit; r = consistency 
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Apponfi iv 4S 
Tacit policies: Standnrdised Repression Cnemrion^s on the P R F S C R I R F rnsk 
(Study 4^ 
GP CHO HYP AGE GEN EVA DRI SMO DIA COM \VE1 ATT FH No. sig 
40 0.55 0.08 -0.16 0.05 0.28 -0.15 -0.26 0.20 0.14 -0.26 0.28 O06 9 
41 0.16 0.13 0.06 0.63 0.06 -0.02 O03 -O.OI O05 -0.08 0.41 0.28 5 
42 0.33 0.18 •0.29 -0.03 0.42 -O.IO -0.04 014 -0.02 -0.12 0.17 015 5 
43 0.22 0.00 -0.22 0.03 0.36 -0.02 -0.21 0.41 O09 -0.21 0.19 O08 7 
44 0.41 0.14 -0.03 0.03 0.06 0.12 -0.07 OOO 014 -0.48 0.38 OIO 3 
45 0.27 0.02 -O.IO 0.06 0.15 -O.OI -OIO OIO 0.37 -0.31 013 019 4 
46 0.46 0.20 -0.49 -O.OI 0.06 -0.05 -0.06 0.28 -0.08 O.OI -0-02 -0.04 4 
48 0.60 0.05 -O.II -0.08 0.03 -0.02 -0.21 O08 0.19 -0.21 0.03 -0,17 5 
49 0.14 0.36 ^.09 0.07 0.09 0.18 0.28 0.43 O.OI -0.09 0.20 0.26 6 
50 0.85 -0.02 0.00 -O.OI 0.09 0.11 O.OI 0.05 O.OI OOO O08 O05 2 
51 0.61 0.05 -0.23 -O.OI -0.03 -0.06 -0.12 O06 O09 -0.08 0.23 O i l 3 
52 0.39 0.07 O.OI 0.07 -0.06 015 -0.16 004 012 -Oi l 0.39 0.26 3 
53 0.24 0.06 -0.15 0.13 0.21 0.05 -0.08 O.OI -0.01 O06 0.02 0.69 4 
54 0.29 0.05 -0.05 O.OI 0.02 -0.02 -0.41 0.28 O04 -0.04 0.09 028 4 
55 0.28 ^.03 -0.07 0.03 O.OI -0.52 -0.23 -0.05 -0.03 -0.21 0.41 O08 5 
56 0.44 0.15 -0.16 -O.OI 0.07 -0.03 -0.38 O06 -0.06 OOO 042 OI2 5 
57 0.61 -O.OI -0.19 0.00 0.04 002 O04 O07 -O.OI -0.08 0.21 0.43 4 
58 0.39 O.IO -0.13 -0.04 -0.04 -0.13 -012 0.20 O02 O04 0.51 0.05 3 
59 0.63 0.21 0.00 0.08 O.OI -0,06 -0.05 -0.19 020 0.01 0.02 014 4 
60 0.49 0.02 -0.48 0.07 0.26 -0.04 -0.19 -0.03 O i l -0.16 0.16 O09 6 
61 0.69 -0.03 ^.02 -0.02 -0.09 0.02 -0.07 -0.07 0.01 -0.09 0.35 0.16 3 
62 0.52 0.18 -0.13 0.03 0.32 O02 -0,09 O08 0.08 -0.17 0.28 027 6 
63 0.19 O.I I 0.08 -0.03 0.12 -0.05 -0.29 015 O07 -0.20 0.35 013 4 
64 0.38 0.25 -0.31 0.00 0.22 -0.04 -0.02 OIO -0.01 O07 0.33 013 5 
65 0.14 0.06 0.17 0.22 -0.04 -0.05 0.20 0.18 O04 -0.14 0.75 020 8 
68 0.60 0.10 -o.i: -0.04 0.16 -0.14 0.02 0.16 O05 -0.02 0.56 0.09 6 
69 0.71 0.03 -O.II -0.02 0.08 O04 O02 O06 -0.01 -0.07 OOO 0.30 2 
71 0.40 -O.OI -0.13 0.16 0.24 006 013 -0.24 015 -0.12 0.38 OOO 5 
72 0.18 -0.02 -0.U3 -0.03 0.13 -0.45 -0.19 0.04 OIO -0.29 0.37 -0.12 5 
73 0.31 0.03 -0.06 0.03 0.04 -0.03 -0.56 -O.OI on -0.26 014 -0.01 3 
74 0.07 0.09 -O.II -0.04 0.05 -0.21 -0.49 -O.OI 0.29 -0.29 0.23 -0.01 5 
76 0.46 0.10 -0.03 0.15 0.11 ooo -0.04 0.18 0.16 -0.05 0.52 0.38 6 
77 0.69 -0.02 -O.IO O.IO 0.19 0.19 0.36 0.12 -0.06 -0.08 -O.OI 0.34 6 
78 0.87 0.07 -0.09 O.OI 0.04 -0.07 OOI O09 O04 -O.OI 0.15 017 3 
79 0.62 0.24 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.06 -0.09 0.35 -0.12 -0.04 O04 0.23 4 
80 0.40 0.07 -0.19 0.26 0.31 OOO 0.09 012 0.09 -0.03 O09 OOO 4 
Mean 0.43 0.09 -O.II 0.05 0.11 -0.04 -0.09 OIO O07 -O.II 025 015 4.6 
St Dev 0.20 0.09 0.14 0.12 0.12 014 019 014 OIO 012 018 016 1.6 
Key:- CHO = Cholesterol, HYP = hypertension. AGE = age, GEN = gender. E V A = 
evidence of arteriosclerosis. DRI = drinks, SMO = smokes. DIA = diabetes. COM = 
compliance with advice on diet. WEI = weight. ATT = attitude to treatment. FH = family 
history of ischaemic heart disease. Bold indicates significant (p < 0.05) value; No. sig. = 
the number of significant cues. 
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Apponfl iv 49 
Tacit policifs: Standnrdised Regression Coefficients on the RI^K tnsk rSfuHy 4^ 
GP CHO HYP AGE GEN EVA DRI SMO DIA COM \VE1 ATT FH No. sig 
40 0.17 0.28 -0.10 0.13 0.50 -0.03 0.18 0.48 0.05 -0.13 -0.01 0.16 6 
41 0.19 0.09 0.14 0.59 0.17 0.13 0.25 0.07 0.04 -0.08 0.01 0.36 5 
42 0.14 0.33 -0.43 0.15 0.43 0.06 0.18 0.21 -0.01 -0.05 0.00 0.28 8 
43 0.59 -0.03 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.28 0.43 0.02 -0.07 -0.02 0.35 4 
44 0.35 0.19 0.22 0.08 -0.04 -0.03 0.27 0.18 0.08 -0.27 -0.03 0.08 6 
45 0.09 0.07 -0.18 0.03 0.63 -0.03 0.06 0.36 -0.08 -0.01 -0.07 0.17 4 
46 0.22 0.24 -0.25 -0.01 -0.04 0.13 0.43 0.34 0.00 0.31 -0.02 -0.01 6 
48 0.22 0.26 -0.04 -0.06 0.57 -0.01 0.46 0.30 -0-02 0.23 0.08 0.10 7 
49 -0.02 0.15 -0.13 -0.04 -0.08 0.23 0.64 0.40 0.09 -0.05 -0.02 0.09 4 
50 0.31 0.32 0.01 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.52 0.27 -0.06 -0.02 0.02 0.29 5 
51 0.32 0.18 -0.31 0.13 0.23 0.15 0.39 0.40 -0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.12 6 
52 0.02 0.33 -0.10 0.41 0.04 0.10 0.51 0.32 0.04 0.16 -0.08 0.00 5 
53 0.15 O.IO -0.07 0.14 0.17 0.06 0.41 -0.02 0.03 0.04 0.13 0.61 4 
54 0.40 0.14 -0.06 0.08 -0.07 0.04 0.39 0.15 0.07 -0.07 0.08 0.46 3 
55 0.51 -0.05 -0.04 0.22 0.05 0.28 0.34 0.25 0.03 0.22 0.00 0.12 6 
56 O.IO 0.34 0.02 0.06 0.25 -0.01 0.15 0.45 0.07 -0.09 0.03 0.18 4 
57 0.21 0.16 0.05 -0.09 0.02 0.18 0.47 0.10 0.08 0.33 0.04 0.37 6 
58 0.23 0.37 -0.11 -0.08 0.01 -0.13 0.46 0.46 -0.06 0.00 -0.04 0.13 5 
59 0.26 0.30 •0.33 0.20 0.05 0.06 0.42 0.15 -0.06 -0.02 -0.06 0.14 5 
60 0.20 0.14 -0.23 0.08 0.48 -O.Il 0.34 0.24 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.14 5 
61 0.16 0.13 -0.08 -0.03 0.27 0.07 0.53 0.19 0.14 0.11 0.11 0.28 5 
62 0.12 0.15 0.01 0.04 0.80 0.05 0.04 0.18 -0.03 0.02 0.06 0.05 4 
63 0.27 0.10 0.03 0,21 0.07 0.14 0.51 0.07 0.08 0.13 -0.02 0.13 3 
64 0.24 0.26 -0.14 -0.13 -0.01 0.14 0.53 0.36 0.04 -0.05 0.07 0.27 6 
65 0.07 0.14 -0.03 -0.05 0.04 0.09 0.67 0.25 -0.03 -0.04 0.00 0.30 4 
68 0.34 0.44 -0.07 0.19 0.32 0.10 0.03 0.38 -0.06 -0.04 0.06 0.36 6 
69 0.26 0.19 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.43 0.34 -0.02 0.05 0.04 0.48 5 
71 0.38 0.11 0.00 0.09 0.34 0.05 0.46 0.34 0.02 0.13 0.10 0.09 4 
72 0.02 -0.03 0.07 0.02 0.25 0.15 0.59 0.11 0.07 0.12 -0.06 0.13 2 
73 0.02 0.16 -0.13 0.25 -0.06 0.08 0.63 0.34 -0.02 0.18 0.03 -0.01 5 
74 -0.02 0.15 -0.09 -0.02 0.25 0.03 0.66 0.13 -0.02 0.35 0.03 -0.13 6 
76 0.16 0.17 -0.18 0.08 0.39 0.03 0.41 0.13 -0.02 0.03 0.06 0.42 6 
77 O.Il 0.17 -0.13 0.11 0.24 0.22 0.34 0.31 0.14 0.14 O.IO 0.46 6 
78 0.49 0.17 0.01 0.08 0.16 0.13 0.48 0.31 0.06 -0.02 0.01 0.04 5 
79 0.06 0.08 0.01 0.20 -0.12 0.11 0.28 0.60 0.00 -0.04 -0.04 0.19 4 
80 0.24 0.29 -0.04 0.25 0.21 0.06 0.26 0.42 -0.06 0.27 0.07 0.06 7 
Mean 0.21 0.18 -0.07 0.10 0.18 0.07 0.39 0.28 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.20 5.1 
St Dev 0.15 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.22 0.09 0.17 0.14 0.06 0.14 0.05 0.17 1.2 
Key:- CHO = Cholesterol, HYP = hypertension, AGE = age, GEN = gender, EVA = 
evidence of arteriosclerosis, DRI = drinks, SMO = smokes, DIA = diabetes, COM = 
compliance with advice on diet, WEI = weight. ATT = attitude to treatment. FH = family 
history of ischaemic heart disease. Bold indicates significant (p < 0.05) value; No. sig. = 
the number of significant cues. 
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Appendix 50 
Correlations between m e values and Hprisinn<! nhont prp<:oriptinn f n r pgses wi^h r k k 
judgement prenter thnn the median risk iudpement ( for ihnt dncrnrV i f N = ^n, 
significant correlations f p < 0.05^ are > 0.2.^1 fone-sidedV 
GP Cho Atl Dri Smo Wei 
40 0.6 0.32 0.08 -0.58 -0.26 
41 0.16 0.55 -0.07 -0.23 -0-09 
42 0.32 -0.19 0.00 -0.12 -0.06 
43 0.18 0.44 0.08 -0.23 -0.09 
44 0.39 0.25 0.07 -0.23 -0.41 
45 0.20 -0.10 0.02 -0.16 -0.39 
46 0.40 0.00 0.05 -0.37 -0.03 
48 0.55 0.01 0.09 -0.41 -0.31 
49 0.26 0.23 0.00 0.05 -0.06 
50 0.88 0.19 0.01 -0.24 0.05 
51 0.68 0.23 -0.02 -0.49 0.01 
52 0.27 0.36 O.ll -0.29 -0.03 
53 0.24 -0.05 0.34 -0.41 -0.13 
54 0.20 0.22 -0.09 -0.43 0.07 
55 0.30 0.35 -0.54 -0.17 -0.1 
56 0.39 0.39 0.03 -0.54 0.25 
57 0.57 0.12 0.12 -0.24 -0.19 
58 0.43 0.50 -0.12 -0.32 0.20 
59 0.68 -0.05 -0.04 -0.12 0.04 
60 0.55 0.13 0.10 -0.38 -0.11 
61 0.70 0.10 0.04 -0.15 0.08 
62 0.43 0.22 0.09 -0-18 -0.16 
63 0.10 0.29 -0-05 -0.36 -0.30 
64 0.46 0.21 0.08 -0.19 0.18 
65 -0.10 0.80 -0.22 0.05 -0.06 
68 0.45 0.72 -0.22 -0.07 -0.02 
69 0.73 -0.07 0.20 -0-20 -0.03 
71 0.35 0.27 0.18 -0.10 0.06 
72 0.22 0.51 -0.49 -0.25 -0.11 
73 0.28 0.04 0.11 -0.64 -0.32 
74 -0.24 0.13 -0.04 -0.51 -0.05 
76 0.41 0.65 -0.12 -0-18 0.16 
77 0.73 -O.06 0.19 0.05 -0.19 
78 0.83 0.05 0.29 -0.29 0.10 
79 0.73 0.21 -0.20 -0.14 0.12 
80 0.45 -0.01 0.13 -0.03 -0.04 
Key:- Cho = cholesterol level, Alt = attitude to treatment, Dri = drinking behaviour. Smo = 
smoking behaviour, Wei = weight. 
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Apponfi iv ^1 
Explicit nolicie.s: Siihiective ratings; nn the PRFSCRIBK task (Situiiy d) 
GP C H O HYP AGE GEN EVA DRI SMO DIA C O M W E I ATT FH 
40 8 3.0 -5.0 5.0 8.0 0 * 7.0 6 -5 * 6.0 
41 7 8.0 -7.0 7.0 7.0 5 5.0 -7.0 -7 * 10.0 9.0 
42 8 8.0 -7.0 5.0 6.0 5 7.0 7.0 6 -6 4.0 7.0 
43 10 6.0 4.0 0.0 10.0 -4 -8,0 10.0 8 -6 3.0 10.0 
44 7 * -9.0 7.0 6.0 -9 -7.0 -8.0 9 -9 9.0 8.0 
45 10 8.0 -8.0 2,0 8.0 -3 4.0 7.0 7 -7 0,0 10.0 
46 8 6.0 -8.0 0.0 8.0 6 6.0 7.0 0 3 3.0 6.0 
48 8 6.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 -4 -4.0 6.0 8 -5 2.0 7.0 
49 7 7.0 0.0 0.0 7.0 0 7.0 7.0 2 0 2.0 7.0 
50 10 8.0 -8.0 4.0 3.0 0 8.0 9.0 0 -1 5.0 7.0 
51 9 7.0 -8.0 8.0 6.0 0 -8.0 8.0 6 -6 7.0 8.0 
52 10 0.0 -8.0 8.0 5.0 -4 -8.0 4.0 7 -3 7.0 5.0 
53 6 0.0 -6.0 7.5 7.0 -4 6.5 5.0 6 -7 1.0 9.0 
54 10 5.0 -10.0 0.0 6.0 -6 -10.0 10.0 10 -6 8.0 8.0 
55 9 6.0 -5.0 2.0 2.0 -8 -8.0 7.0 0 6 10.0 7.0 
56 9 6.0 -8.0 0.0 0.0 0 -7.0 5.0 5 0 7.0 7.0 
57 8 5.0 -7.0 0.0 7.0 0 -8.0 6.0 7 -6 7,0 8.0 
58 8 6.0 -5.0 6.0 8.0 -4 -6.0 8.0 5 -5 10.0 5,0 
59 7 6.0 -7.0 4.0 3.0 0 3.0 7 -4 1.0 4.0 
60 10 0.0 -8.0 0.0 9.0 0 -3.0 -2.0 5 -6 5.0 7.0 
61 8 5.0 -9.0 2.0 0.0 2 3.0 3.0 8 -6 6.0 7.0 
62 7 7.0 -7.0 0.0 7.0 0 -3.0 5.0 4 0 6.0 6.0 
63 9 7.0 -4.0 5.0 8.0 -7 -9.0 8.0 8 -7 8.0 9,0 
64 10 6.0 -3.0 2.0 10.0 0 4.0 7.0 3 -2 2.0 5.0 
65 7 7.0 0.0 6.0 3.0 0 10.0 7.0 3 0 10.0 7.0 
68 7 7.0 -7.0 6.0 8.0 7 7.0 8.0 -6 7 8,0 8.0 
69 10 7.0 -5.0 5.0 8.0 0 8.0 6.0 -8 -5 0.0 8.0 
71 10 6.0 -8.0 7.0 9.0 0 0.0 0 0 7.0 6.0 
72 10 0.0 -7.0 2.0 5.0 -10 -5.0 4.0 7 -7 7.0 4.0 
73 6 7.0 -7.0 2.0 0.0 -6 -9.0 6.0 0 -6 1.0 2.0 
74 9 7.0 -5.0 0.0 8.0 -8 -10.0 8 -8 4.0 7.0 
76 8 4.0 -6.0 2.0 7.0 0 0.0 8.0 5 0 9.0 8.0 
77 8 7.0 -7.0 6.0 7.0 0 7.0 7.0 0 0 0.0 7.0 
78 10 6.5 -7.5 0.0 4.5 0 -1.0 7.5 0 0 8.5 8.5 
79 10 7.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 0 0.0 9,5 0 0 3.0 6.5 
80 9 7.0 -4.0 2.0 10.0 1 8.0 8.0 2 2 2.0 7.0 
Mean 8.53 5.67 -5.74 3.13 6,07 -1.42 -0.59 5.76 3.64 -3.00 5.21 6.97 
St. dev. 1.30 2,33 3.12 2.87 2.78 4.09 6.65 4.09 4.49 3.99 3.29 1.68 
Key:- CHO = Cholesterol. HYP = hypertension, AGE = age, GEN = gender, E V A = 
evidence of arteriosclerosis. DRI = drinks. SMO = smokes. DIA = diabetes. COM = 
compliance with advice on diet. WEI = weight. ATT = attitude to treatment, FH = family 
history of ischaemic heart disease. 
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Appendix 9^2 
Explicit poliries: .Snhlertive ratinps on the RISK task r^t,.Hy 4) 
GP CHO HVP A G E GEN EVA DRI SMO DIA COM WEI ATT FH 
40 8 8 -8 5.0 9-0 4.0 7 9 -0.5 2.0 0 6.0 
41 7 6 -5 7.0 7.0 5.0 8 8 0.0 5.0 0 9.0 
42 7 8 -7 6.5 9.0 5.0 7 7 -5.0 4.0 0 7.5 
43 10 4 2 2.0 2.0 2.0 10 10 0.0 2.0 0 10-0 
44 7 8 -9 7.0 8.0 0.0 7 8 -7-0 7.0 0 8.0 
45 6 8 -7 -5.0 10.0 6.0 7 9 0.0 5.0 0 8.0 
46 6 9 7 8.0 8.0 6.0 9 8 -5-0 6.0 -7 7.0 
48 8 6 0 -1.0 10.0 1.0 8 6 -2.0 4.0 0 4.0 
49 2 4 0 0-0 0.0 0.0 6 6 0.0 0.0 0 2.0 
50 7 7 4 5.0 1.0 0.0 9 7 0.0 0-0 0 3.0 
51 5 7 -6 5.0 7.0 3.0 8 8 0-0 2.0 0 4.0 
52 3 8 -8 8.0 0.0 6.0 10 9 0.0 6.0 0 3-0 
53 6 5 -6 7.0 8.0 -4.0 8 7 0.0 5-0 0 9.0 
54 7 6 -8 7.0 6-0 8.0 10 7 0.0 5.0 0 9.0 
55 8 8 -A 3.0 2.0 7.0 9 8 0.0 5.0 0 7.0 
56 6 7 1 6-0 10.0 6.0 8 8 -5-0 5.0 0 7.0 
57 7 7 -7 6.0 7.0 6.0 9 8 0.0 6.0 0 7.0 
58 6 8 0 0-0 6.0 3.0 10 8 -3.0 4.0 0 6.0 
59 6 7 -3 5.0 7-0 0-0 7 4 -1-0 2.0 0 5.0 
60 4 4 -6 3.0 10.0 0.0 7 8 -2.0 4.0 2 8.0 
61 3 6 1 3.0 7.0 4.0 10 6 -1.0 4.0 0 7.0 
62 4 6 0 0.0 10.0 6-0 8 7 -4.0 4-0 0 5.0 
63 6 8 7 6.0 9.0 7.0 9 9 -7.0 6.0 0 8.0 
64 2 7 -2 0.0 7.0 4.0 10 10 0.0 3.0 0 5.0 
65 7 7 0 3.0 0.0 0.0 10 8 0.0 4.0 0 7.0 
68 7 8 -7 6.0 8.0 6-0 7 8 -6.0 6-0 -7 8.0 
69 7 8 2 5.0 6.0 2.0 10 10 0.0 0.0 0 9.0 
71 6 7 7 7-0 9.0 2-0 9 7 0.0 4.0 0 6.0 
72 3 5 3 3.0 10.0 2.0 8 7 0.0 0.0 0 10.0 
73 3 7 -3 6.0 1.0 1.0 8 7 1.0 5.0 0 1-0 
74 8 8 0 2.0 8.0 2-0 10 8 0.0 8.0 0 7.0 
76 9 7 0 5.0 6.0 3.0 9 6 0.0 0.0 0 9.0 
77 4 7 -6 0.0 6.0 6.0 8 8 0.0 7-0 0 8.0 
78 6 7 4 0.0 9.0 9.0 10 8 0-0 6.0 0 8.0 
79 5 0 0 1-5 1-5 1.5 10 10 -1.5 2.5 0 10-0 
80 4 6 1 2.0 8.0 2-0 10 9 0.0 3.0 0 8.0 
Mean 5.83 6.64 -1.58 3.72 6.46 3.38 8.61 7.81 -1-36 3.93 -0.33 6.82 
St Dev 1.96 1.69 4-88 3.08 3.27 2.88 1.22 1.31 2.27 2.17 1.67 2.27 
Key:- CHO = Cholesterol. HYP = hypertension. AGE = age. GEN = gender. E V A = 
evidence of arteriosclerosis, DRI = drinks. SMO = smokes. DIA = diabetes. COM = 
compliance with advice on diet. WEI = weight. ATT = attitude to treatment. FH = family 
history of ischaemic heart disease. 
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Appendix 53 
Suhjmive Weights on the P R E S C R I B E task (Study 4) 
GP r CHO HYP AGE GEN EVA DRI SMO DIA COM WEI ATT FH 
40 #0.86 0.45 0.17 -0.28 0.28 0.45 0.00 * 0.40 0.34 -0.28 * 0.34 
41 #0.51 0-27 0.31 -0,27 0.27 0.27 0.20 0.20 -0.27 -0.27 * 0.39 0.35 
42 0.68 0.39 0.39 -0.34 0.24 0.29 0.24 0.34 0-34 0.29 -0.29 0.19 0.34 
43 0.75 0.42 0-25 0.17 0.00 0-42 -0-17 -0-33 0.42 0.33 -0.25 0.13 0.42 
44 #0.64 0.27 * -0.34 0.27 0.23 -0.34 -0.27 -0.31 0.34 -0.34 0.34 0.31 
45 0.75 0.44 0.35 -0.35 0.09 0.35 -0.13 0.17 0.30 0.30 -0.30 0.00 0.44 
46 0.80 0-41 0.31 -0,41 0.00 0.41 0.31 0.31 0.36 0.00 0.15 0.15 0.31 
48 0-64 0.46 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.28 -0.23 -0.23 0.34 0.46 -0.28 0.11 0.40 
49 0.70 0.43 0-43 0-00 0.00 0.43 0.00 0.43 0.43 0.12 0.00 0.12 0.43 
50 0-38 0.48 0.38 -0.38 0.19 0.14 0.00 0.38 0.43 0.00 -0.05 0.24 0.34 
51 0.67 0.36 0.28 -0-32 0.32 0.24 0.00 -0.32 0.32 0.24 -0.24 0.28 0.32 
52 0.64 0.45 0.00 -0.36 0.36 0-23 -0-18 -0.36 0.18 0.32 -0.14 0.32 0.23 
53 0.51 0.31 0.00 -0.31 0.39 0.36 -0.21 0.34 0.26 0.31 -0.36 0.05 0.47 
54 0.79 0.37 0.18 -0.37 0.00 0.22 -0.22 -0.37 0.37 0.37 -0.22 0.29 0.29 
55 0.76 0.40 0-27 -0.22 0.09 0.09 -0.36 -0.36 0.31 0.00 0-27 0.44 0.31 
56 0.83 0.47 0.31 -0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.36 0.26 0.26 0.00 0.36 0.36 
57 0.61 0.37 0.23 -0.32 0.00 0.32 0.00 -0.37 0.28 0.32 -0.28 0.32 0.37 
58 0.68 0.36 0-27 -0.22 0.27 0.36 -0,18 -0.27 0.36 0.22 -0.22 0.44 0.22 
59 #0.59 0.46 0.39 -0.46 0.26 0.20 0.00 0.20 * 0.46 -0.26 0,07 0.26 
60 6.92 0.53 0.00 -0,43 0.00 0.48 0.00 -0.16 -0.11 0.27 -0.32 0.27 0.37 
61 0.51 0.45 0.28 -0.51 0.11 0.00 0.11 0.17 0.17 0.45 -0.34 0.34 0.40 
62 0-83 0.40 0.40 -0.40 0.00 0.40 0.00 -0.17 0.29 0-23 0.00 0.34 0.34 
63 0.80 0.35 0.27 -0.16 0.19 0.31 -0.27 -0-35 0.31 0.31 -0.27 0.31 0.35 
64 0.70 0.56 0.33 -0.17 0.11 0.56 0.00 0.22 0.39 0,17 -0.11 0.11 0.28 
65 0.68 0.36 0.36 0.00 0.30 0.15 0.00 0-51 0-36 0.15 0.00 0.51 0.36 
68 0.34 0.28 0.28 -0.28 0.24 0.32 0.28 0.28 0.32 -0.24 0.28 0.32 0.32 
69 0.59 0.45 0.31 -0.22 0.22 0.36 0.00 0.36 0.27 -0.36 -0.22 0.00 0.36 
71 #0.70 0.47 0-28 -0.38 0.33 0.43 0.00 0-00 * 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.28 
72 0.84 0.47 0.00 -0.33 0.09 0.24 -0.47 -0.24 0.19 0.33 -0.33 0.33 0.19 
73 0.72 0.33 0.38 -0.38 0.11 0.00 -0.33 -0.49 0.33 0.00 -0.33 0.05 0.11 
74 #0.87 0.38 0.30 -0.21 0.00 0.34 -0.34 -0.42 * 0,34 -0.34 0.17 0.30 
76 0.81 0.42 0.21 -0.31 0-10 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.26 0.00 0.47 0.42 
77 0.64 0.41 0.36 -0.36 0.31 0.36 0.00 0.36 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.36 
78 0.65 0.51 0.33 -0.38 0.00 0.23 0.00 -0.05 0,38 0,00 0.00 0.43 0.43 
79 0.92 0.63 0.44 0.00 0-00 0.19 0,00 0-00 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.41 
80 0.67 0.45 0.35 -0.20 0.10 0.49 0.05 0.40 0.40 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.35 
Mean 0.69 0.42 0.28 -0.28 0.15 0.29 -0.06 -0.01 0-29 0.18 -0.14 0.24 0.34 
St.dev. 0.14 0.08 0.12 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.18 0.31 .0-19 0.20 0.18 0.15 0.07 
Key:- CHO = Cholesterol. HYP = hypertension. AGE = age. GEN = gender. EVA = 
evidence of arteriosclerosis. DRI = drinks. SMO = smokes. DIA = diabetes. COM = 
compliance with advice on diet. WEI = weight. ATT = attitude to treatment. FH = family 
history of ischaemic heart disease, r = correlation between standardised regression 
coefficients and subjective ratings (# = some subjective ratings missing). 
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Appendix 54 
Subjective Weights; nn fhp RISK tnsk TStiiHy 4^ 
GP r CHO HYP AGE GEN EVA DRI SMO DIA COM WEI ATT FH 
40 0.77 0.37 0.37 -0.37 0.23 0.41 0.18 0.32 0.41 -0.02 0.09 0.00 0.27 
41 0.40 0.33 0.29 -0.24 0,33 0.33 0.24 0.38 0.38 0.00 0,24 0.00 0.43 
42 0.87 0.31 0.35 -0.31 0,29 0.40 0.22 0,31 0.31 -0.22 0.18 0.00 0.33 
43 0.90 0.51 0.20 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0,51 0.51 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.51 
44 -0,01 0.29 0.33 -0.37 0.29 0.33 0.00 0.29 0.33 -0.29 0.29 0.00 0.33 
45 0.69 0.27 0.36 -0.31 -0.22 0.45 0.27 0.31 0.4 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.36 
46 0.32 0.26 0.39 0.31 0.35 0.35 0.26 0.39 0.35 -0.22 0.26 -0.31 0.31 
48 0.92 0.45 0.33 0.00 -0.06 0.56 0.06 0.45 0.33 -0.11 0.22 0.00 0.22 
49 0.83 0.21 0.42 0.00 0,00 0.00 0.00 0.64 0.64 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.21 
50 0.84 0.46 0.46 0.26 0.33 0.07 0.00 0.59 0.46 0,00 0.00 0.00 0.20 
51 0.94 0.27 0.38 -0.33 0.27 0.38 0.16 0.44 0.44 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.22 
52 0.86 0.14 0.38 -0.38 0.38 0.00 0.28 0.47 0.42 0.00 0.28 0.00 0,14 
53 0.58 0.28 0.24 -0.28 0.33 0.38 -0,19 0.38 0.33 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.43 
54 0.55 0.30 0.26 -0.34 0.30 0.26 0.34 0.43 0.30 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.39 
55 0,64 0.41 0.41 -0.20 0.15 0.10 0.36 0.46 0.41 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.36 
56 0,40 0.29 0.33 0.33 0.29 0.48 0.29 0.38 0.38 -0,24 0.24 0.00 0.33 
57 0.44 0.32 0.32 -0.32 0.27 0.32 0.27 0.41 0.36 0.00 0.27 0.00 0,32 
58 0.85 0.33 0.44 0.00 0.00 0-33 0.16 0.55 0.44 -0.16 0.22 0.00 0,33 
59 0.87 0.37 0.44 -0.19 0.31 0.44 0.00 0.44 0.25 -0.06 0.12 0.00 0.31 
60 0.88 0.21 0.21 -0.31 0.16 0.52 0.00 0.36 0.42 -0.10 0.21 0.10 0.42 
61 0.74 0.18 0.35 0.06 0.18 0.41 0.23 0.59 0.35 -0.06 0.23 0.00 0.41 
62 0.61 0.22 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.56 0.33 0.45 0.39 -0.22 0.22 0.00 0.28 
63 0.32 0,26 0.35 0.31 0.26 0.40 0.31 0.40 0.40 -0.31 0.26 0,00 0.35 
64 0,78 0.11 0.38 -0.11 0.00 0.38 0.22 0.55 0.55 0.00 0,16 0.00 0.27 
65 0.75 0.40 0.40 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.57 0.46 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.40 
68 0,68 0.28 0.32 -0.28 0.24 0.32 0.24 0.28 0.32 -0.24 0.24 -0.28 0.32 
69 0.84 0.35 0.40 0,10 0.25 0.30 0.10 0.51 0.51 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.45 
71 0.58 0.31 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.46 0.10 0.46 0.36 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.31 
72 0.52 0.17 0.28 0.17 0.17 0.55 0.11 0.44 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.55 
73 0.86 0.20 0.46 -0.20 0.40 0.07 0.07 0.53 0.46 0.07 0.33 0.00 0.07 
74 0.62 0.38 0.38 0.00 0.09 0.38 0.09 0.47 0.38 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.33 
76 0.81 0.48 0.38 0.00 0,27 0.32 0.16 0.48 0.32 0.00 0.00 0,00 0.48 
77 0.84 0.20 0.35 -0.30 0.00 0.30 0.30 0.40 0.40 0.00 0.35 0.00 0.4 
78 0.49 0.28 0.33 0.19 0.00 0.42 0.42 0.47 0.38 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.38 
79 0.73 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.55 0.55 -0.08 0.14 0.00 0.55 
80 0.63 0.22 0.32 0.05 0.11 0.43 0.11 0.54 0.49 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.43 
Mean 0.68 0,30 0.34 -0.07 0.19 0.32 0.16 0.45 0.40 -0.06 0.19 -0.01 0.34 
St.dev, 0.21 0.10 0.09 0.23 0.15 0.16 0.13 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.11 
Key:- CHO = Cholesterol, HYP = hypertension, AGE = age. GEN = gender, EVA = 
evidence of arteriosclerosis. DRI = drinks. SMO = smokes. DIA = diabetes, COM = 
compliance with advice on diet. WEI = weight. ATT = attitude to treatment, FH = family 
history of ischaemic heart disease, r = correlation between standardised regression 
coefficients and subjective ratings. 
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Appenfl iv 
Relatlonshin between RISIK and PRKSCRIRR 
GP RawJ RawL Objective Subjective Over 
40 0.36 0.01 0.48 #0.71 * 
41 0.52 -0.16 0.68 #0.48 * 
42 0.48 -0.07 0.78 0.58 -0.02 
43 0.32 0.02 0.39 0.19 0.39 
44 0.22 0.49 0.48 #0.07 * 
45 0.08 -0.12 0.24 0.56 0.86 
46 0.39 -0.08 0.62 0.23 0.35 
48 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.16 0.17 
49 0.48 0.23 0.68 0.71 0.24 
50 0.3 0.19 0.24 0.57 0.36 
51 0.27 -0.07 0.36 0.37 0.29 
52 -0.08 0.05 -0.53 0.00 0.29 
53 0.6 0.09 0.73 0.69 -0.18 
54 0.10 0.06 0.2 0.14 -0.59 
55 -0.14 0.08 -0.16 0.11 0.42 
56 -0.01 0.26 0.08 -0.34 0.19 
57 0.27 0.09 0.28 0.19 -0.11 
58 0.20 0.15 0.19 -0.05 0.25 
59 0.32 O.IO 0.23 #0.58 * 
60 0.36 -0.07 0.50 0,39 0.42 
61 0.10 0.12 -0.05 0.02 -0.21 
62 0.35 -0,08 0.42 0.21 0.06 
63 -0.26 O.IO -0.69 -0.26 0.61 
64 0.21 0.00 0.29 0.53 0.59 
65 0.17 0.03 0.08 0.59 0.73 
68 0.36 0.04 0.34 0.74 -0.03 
69 0.34 -0,14 0.46 0.87 0.13 
71 0.27 0.04 0.22 #0,12 * 
72 -0.17 -0.05 -0,42 0.11 -0.06 
73 -0.25 0.00 -0.7 0.23 0.31 
74 -0.41 0.20 -0.66 #0.01 * 
76 0.33 0.00 0.19 0,36 -0.09 
77 0.41 0.12 0.44 0.70 0.16 
78 0.44 -0.05 0.55 0.13 0.04 
79 0.28 -0.02 0.30 0.44 0.19 
80 0.53 0.13 0,45 0.80 0.87 
Mean 0.22 0.05 0,21 0.33 0.22 
St.dev. 0.24 0.13 0.40 0.31 0.32 
Key:- RawJ = correlations between a doctors judgements on the PRESCRIBE task and 
their judgements on the RISK task (last 100 cases); RawL = correlation between latencies 
on the tasks (last 100 cases); objective = correlation between regression coefficients on the 
two tasks, subjective = correlation between subjective ratings on the two tasks (# = some 
subjective ratings missing). Over = coiTelation between over-rating on the PRESCRIBE 
task and subjective ratings on the RISK task. 
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Appendix 56 
Summary o f Comments made by CPs on non-linear cue use on the PRESCRIBE task 
GP40 Heavy smokers who were requesting = no ireainieni unless oihcr major risk factors 
But Heavy smokers with other major risk factors = treat 
Non-smokers, minimal risks, mildly raised cholesterol = no treatment 
Opposed less likely to treat Requesting more unless other RF they could deal with themselves 
Then if requesting no treat until dealt with those. E.g. smoking (major), drinkers, smokers, 
poorly controlled in every way. 
Favoured young if medium raised cholesterol. 
Look at sex and age If EvA &/or diabetes then if cholesterol level 7-8 reasonably inclined to 
prescribe dep. on other RF, e.g. hypertension. Requesting = more inclined unless heavy 
smokers. Isi rel + EvA + young age + even just moderately raised = persuade that necessary 
Poorly compliant + Heavy drinkers + opposed = waste of time = Evidence of not having 
taken previous advice. 
Look at I St relative: If no diabetes or EvA no prescription unless c8 and Ist rcl. But none 
here particularly high. 
GP41 Hypertension wc & pc as same 
Age & sex: YM = v likely; OM less likely; OF even less likely. (O = post menopausal age) 
Weight V . impt if outside BMl range (over and under) more likely to prescribe. 
Chances of CV event plus likelihood of compliance: Assessment of fomier based on e.g. 
hypertension, EvA, smoking,..diabertes,..weight.?If high risk then prescribe, ?If not high risk 
then look at attitude as well as compliance 
GP42 Attitude to treatment only when decision made but strong effect, (if opposed then down a 
few %) 
GP43 Age: 40-50 year olds more likely than 30 or 60 year olds. If going to treat but opposed = less 
likely. 
GP44 Hypertension: pc less likely to prescribe, wc = more likely to prescribe. 
GP45 Age and Gender: YF more than YM, OF and OM same. But Y more pres than O. 
RF: as increase impice of each increases. 
GP46 The greater the age the less the significance of the cholesterol level. Increased imptce of 
cholesterol level with diabetes. 
GP48 Many RF increases importance. ?control e.g. diabetes, smoking, drinking, overweight, hyp. 
Bands 5.2. 6.5. 7.8. Below 7.8 reluctant. ? Number of RF. ?avoidabIe RF. Not comp = no pre. 
GP49 
GP50 More RF = more likely to prescribe. Ch < 7 never treat 
GP51 If not compliant and smoking much less likely. 
Ch < 7 unlikely. Allow F to have higher levels before prescribing 
GP52 If Ch < 8 and F then no treat. 60 year olds no treat 
GP53 
GP54 Smoking and Diabetes: If smokers and Not diabetic = no pres. If smokers but diabetic pres. 
GP55 
GP56 Attitude: if don't want treatment don't prescribe 
GP57 High Ch and EvA = Ch more important 
GP58 Multiple RF increased likelohood. But Opposed = viio. 
GP59 Diabetes: wc more likely, no and pc equal. 
GP60 Age ad Ch.: Given Ch level more impl if person younger. Given age. higher Ch mre impt. 
GP6I Age. High Ch and compliance = positive interaction. 
GP62 
GP63 
GP64 Ch and requesting increase. Obese and smoker (and drinker) less likely to prescribe. Smoking 
postive otherwise. Age O trying to ignore some of the RF. e.g. FH 
GP65 
GP68 
GP69 Age and gender: YM more likely than YF but OF more likely than YF. OM less likely than 
YM.OM = OF. 
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Appendix 56 continued, 
GP7I Diabetes: pc = less likely to prescribe, wc = more likely to prescribe. Requesting = increase 
unless no other factors. PC led to recvaluation of importance of Ch. (less because deal + d) 
GP72 Pc indicated as more but "looking to control their diabetes first". Ch < 7.2 unlikely to pres. 
Ch > 7.2 &/or Dri Sdor smokes not prescribe. Ch > 7.2 &/or EvA. &/or FH. &/or diabetic pre. 
GP73 
GP74 ? less for pc hyp. Moderate and no drinkers no problem. Diabetes and compliance; If pc and 
not compl then less likely to pre, but if pc and comp with diet then more likely 
GP76 FH and Hyp ; if FH hyp increase pre. If no FH no difference. Gender and Age: No diffce if 
Y. If O less for F 
GP77 O: could mean factors unimportant that imporiani if Y 
GP78 If requesting more likely lo give to the non-smoking, than smokers (difference in handling) 
Diabetes and Comp: If diabetic and not comp more likely (compl N.D.) 
GP79 Any RF should have Ch < 7.5. No RF leave alone even if > 7.5. Ch > 7.5 with diabetes pre. 
I < 7.5 even if have diabetes, leave. 
GP80 M more than F in Y. even more than F in O. (didn't treat post-mcnopausal F). All linked. 
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AppcndiN 57 
Summary of Comments made hv GPs on nnn.linpnr cue use on the R I S K t-A^k 
GP40 
GP41 
GP42 
GP43 
GP44 
GP45 
GP46 
GP48 
GP49 
GP50 
GP51 
GP52 
GP53 
GP54 
GP55 
GP56 
GP57 
GP58 
GP59 
GP60 
GP6I 
GP62 
GP63 
GP64 
GP65 
GP68 
GP69 
GP7I 
GP72 
GP73 
GP74 
GP76 
GP77 
GP78 
GP79 
GP80 
Ch mildly raised but no FH and requesting less likely. If FH then more likely. Mildly raised Ch + 
No FH + rcq = no treat. High Ch v. Medium Ch. + FH = up 
Age and Gender: male 30 stuck, female not. Female 60 less differcnce.Combination fo FH. ist dcgr. 
rel. siablished path critical. 
Not really .. Ev A come in quite high i all other things equal 
YM higher than YF but n.d. OM and OF. J shaped curve of drinking. Muliplicaiive effects of RF. 
not jusi cumulative. But you ran out of space very quickly on your.. 
Downraicd iniptcc of Ch if overweight; heavy drinkers and Ch: if heavy drinkers and hyp. less impt; 
diabetic and overweight = diabetes less importani; weight and hypertension: overweight hyp less 
important. 
Compounding affect of imptce of several factors. Age and Gender: EvA & F more than EvA and M. 
But n.d if O. 
Multifactorial decision, all factors interact, pc diabetes and pc hyp magnify. Smoking = most 
significant muUiricr. Age and diabetes: Y + diabetes more at risk than O + diabetes, and more than 
O without. But no diabetes O more at risk than Y. 
More RF more compounding:Single not much notice of it. The more they had. the more I'd worry. 
More RF = increased risk. OF (over 50) higher risk than YF (nearing M?) 
Smoking and diabetes = increased risk 
hypertensive, diabetic, smoke, summaie 
Combination of smoking. Ch, diet, hypetension (poss) much more impt than any alone. Age. sex and 
fertility status. Can tolerate a highish Ch in F of childbcaring age. Risk for F increases with age 
Whole combination, summation of things: Y, bad FH. smoke, drink, raised Ch. overweight 
Age and Gender: below 50 M more at risk, after 50 F catch up with men. RF all add up. 
Age and sex: more risk in F over 50. But generally Y age more risk 
Smoking, hypertension, diabetes, (plus Ch important if everything else low risk). 
All inter-relate at once. Hypertension, smoking, diabetes. Ch. If O then discount hyp. 
All interact. I mean I really think that's a funny question. They all interact with each other. Surely 
that's what I'm suppposed to be doing: weighing up the different um factor - risk factor that each , 
that each er piece of information that I was given made into the equation? 
Many combinations: BP and smoking (positively), smoking plus any other positive factor e.g. pc 
diabetes, hypertension: EvA and any other positive factor- BP. pc hypenension, pc diabetes. 
smoking. Hyp and diab, all pair with each other. (?exacerbation of importance?) Yes, yes. 
Age and Gender: postmenopausal F (55+) risk climbs towards M. EvA and Smoking amplified risk. 
Smoking, diabetes, hypenension doubled influence. 
Multifactorial: many things contributing to increased risk. Smoked who had a high cholesterol 
Positive interactions between hypertension, diabetes, raised Oi. FH. More weight on Ch in absence 
of other RF ? + EvA 
Age and Gender? Take ihem all independently 
Not really but one very abnormal finding doesn't have as much bearing as 3 or 4 lesser abnormal 
findings 
Diabetes or Hyp weights value of whether they smoke or not. Obviously all multiple RF 
All part of a jigsaw basically 
Sort of:FH & smoking & pc hyp = higher risk, + EvA 
EvA. smoking. & drinking more impt, +BP, -Kliabetes 
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General practitioners' tacit and stated policies in 
the prescription of lipid lowering agents 
JONATHAN ST B T EVANS 
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JOHN DEAN 
SUMMARY 
Background. Research into general practitioners' prescrib-
ing behaviour with regard to lipid lowering agents has 
relied on survey methods which presume that doctors have 
insight into their prescribing behaviour and can describe it 
accurately. 
Aim. This study set out to measure the tacit policies used 
by general practitioners in prescribing lipid lowering agents 
and to compare these with their stated policies. 
Method. Effects of 13 separate cues on decisions to pre-
scribe were examined. The cues included cholesterol levels 
and a number of associated risk factors for coronary heart 
disease. Doctors rated 130 imaginary cases presented by a 
computer. Thirty five general practitioners in the Plymouth 
area participated in the study. Their ages ranged from 31 to 
55 years and all but four were men. The raw data in each 
case was a rating of the likelihood that the doctor would 
prescribe for the patient described. These were converted 
into statistical weightings by use of multiple linear regres-
sion. The pattern of (standardized) weights constituted the 
taJt policy for each doctor. Stated policies were measured 
in a subsequent interview by asking doctors to rate the 
influence of each cue. 
Results. Both tacit and stated policies diverged widely 
between different doctors. Most doctors overestimated the 
number of cues that had actually influenced their decisions, 
and many believed that they had taken into account associ-
ated factors for coronary heart disease when they had not. 
On lifestyle related risks doctors were generally less likely 
to treat overweight people and most stated this as their 
policy. Most were also less likely to treat smokers but some 
had the opposite policy. Those less likely to treat smokers 
were also less likely to treat obese patients. There was also 
considerable variation in the extent to which the doctors 
took account of the attitude of the patient to receiving treat-
ment. 
Conclusion, Doctors' policies are highly variable and particu-
larly inconsistent in the treatment of smokers. Relevant risk 
factors may be ignored — even though they are under-
stood — because the risk assessment involved is too psy-
chologically complex a task to be performed intuitively. 
Decision aids and clear protocols are needed in this area. 
Keywords: serum cholesterol level; coronary risk factors; 
drug therapy; medical decision making. 
Introduction 
THE decision to prescribe lipid lowering agents for patients with raised blood cholesterol levels involves a complex and 
difficult judgement requiring the doctor to weigh the risk of 
coronary heart disease against the continuing costs and possible 
side effects of long-term treatment.'"* There is evidence showing 
that doctors' assessments of cardiac risk may be quite 
inaccurate.' The assessment of risk is complicated by the need to 
consider a wide range of associated risk factors and the complex-
ity of the medical evidence on the dangers of hyperlipidaemia 
itself.'"* In addition, there are some associated risk factors — 
particularly cigarette smoking — where the medical risks are 
well understood, but where there has been some well publicized 
disagreement in the general media about the policy of treatment 
which should be followed. 
It is important to discover the policies which general practi-
tioners currently follow in the prescription of lipid lowering 
agents, and the degree to which these policies are sensitive to the 
relevant risk factors. Previous research into this problem has 
relied on survey methods^  which presume that doctors have 
insight into their prescribing behaviour and can describe it accur-
ately. In contrast, the research described in this paper is based on 
the methods of social judgement theory^  which derive tacit pol-
icies, in the form of statistical weights, by analysing decisions 
made over a large number of hypothetical cases in which cues 
are allowed to vary. Insight can be assessed by interviewing the 
subjects and asking them to identify the cues which they believe 
to be influencing their judgements. The method has been used 
quite widely in medical contexts with consultant groups and with 
general practitioners in other countries.^ -^  In general this kind of 
research shows that experts have widely differing policies and 
rather low levels of insight. Both fmdings have been demonstrat-
ed in a medical context by Kirwan and colleagues' studies of 
rheumatologists.'"-" 
It is important to explore the application of the methodology 
of social judgement theory to decision making in British general 
practitioners, especially in areas such as the treatment of hyper-
lipidaemia where complex judgements are required. The present 
study set out to discover both the tacit and stated policies of each 
member of a sample of British general practitioners in the pre-
scription of lipid lowering agents. The aims were to determine 
what these policies were, the extent to which different doctors 
agreed and disagreed with one another, and the degree of insight 
that individual doctors had into their own decision malcing. as 
measured by the correspondence between their tacit and stated 
policies. 
J S I B T Evans, BSC. PhD. A B P I S . professor. C Harries, B A . research siudcni; 
and I Dennis, M A . PhD. principal lecturer, Dcpanment of Psychology, 
University of Plymouth. J Dean, M R C G P . honorary lecturer in general 
practice. Plymouth Postgraduate Medical School. 
Submitted: 25 November 1993: accepted: 25 July 1994. 
& British Journal of General Practice. 1995.45, 15-18. 
Method 
Participating doctors 
Thirty five general practitioners practising in or close to the city 
of Plymouth were recruited as participants in the study, which 
was conducted between March and June 1993. Recruitment was 
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achieved by a mailshoi to all local doctors followed by personal 
visits by members of the research team to those who responded. 
Approximately a quarter of those mailed eventually panicipated 
in the study. The doctors varied in age from 31 lo 55 years and 
all but four were men. They were recruited from a variety of dif-
ferent types of practice in both urban and r\jral settings. 
Judgement task 
The judgement task was administered via a portable Acorn A4* 
computer which was custom programmed by J E in BBC BASIC 
5. Each case was displayed on a separate screen with a series of 
cue labels on the left (for example, sex. age) and corresponding 
cue values on the right (for example, male, 45 years of age). The 
doctors were given on-screen instructions informing them that 
ihey would receive 130 cases with information about blood cho-
lesterol levels and a number of other factors. The instructions 
stated; *You can assume that in each case you originally tested 
the patient's blood cholesterol level at least six months previous-
ly and have offered the usual advice on alterations to diet and 
have recommended, where appropriate, that the patient should 
give up smoking cigarettes. The blood cholesterol level given in 
the problem is the current one and reflects any changes in the 
patient's lifestyle that he or she has made or is likely to make." 
Doctors were also told by the investigator (C H) to assume that 
the option of referral to a consultant was not available and thay 
they had to decide themselves whether or not to prescribe. 
The doctors were told that they should indicate the likelihood 
that they would prescribe in each case by clicking with a mouse 
on a line between 0% and 100% shown at the bottom of the 
screen. After clicking, the screen cleared and the next case was 
presented. Each of the cases which followed provided informa-
tion on 13 separate cues. These cues and the range of values for 
each are shown in Appendix I . Although in real life some of 
these cues would be correlated with each other, the set of 130 
cases which were presented to each doctor was devised by a 
process of random generation of cue values in such a way as lo 
minimize their intercorrelation (the maximum r between any two 
cues was less than 0.20). This was done lo simplify the inter-
pretation of the weights derived in the subsequent multiple linear 
regression analysis. The cue values were generated prior to the 
study by a separate programme with each doctor receiving the 
same cases in the same order. The occupation cue was coded as 
social class I to 5 but displayed as an example occupation ran-
domly generated from a set of alternatives. 
The need for independence in the cues led to the decision to 
use total cholesterol levels without separate information on the 
balance between low density and high density lipoproteins which 
would normally be inspected prior to prescribing lipid lowering 
agents. The justifications for this were that levels of low density 
lipoproteins are highly correlated with total cholesterol levels 
and that doctors are in any case asked only to judge the probabil-
ity that ihey would prescribe. Hence, the extra information which 
they would achieve from lipid profiles is one of the uncertainty 
factors which their judgements could reflect. No doctors objected 
to performing the task with the data presented. 
Assessment of tacit policies 
An initial check for consistency among the doctors was made by 
computing the Kendall coefficient of concordance {W) across the 
130 raw judgements of each doctor. This statistic is a non-para-
metric test o f multiple correlation and can range f rom 0 (no 
agreement) lo I (perfect agreement). 
Each doctor's judgements were then entered individually into 
a multiple linear regression analysis. This is an extension of the 
familiar regression analysis in which a model is derived in which 
one dependent variable (in this case the judgement made) is prc-
16 
dieted as a function of a number of independent variables (in this 
case the 13 cues). The analysis results in a set of weights, each 
indicating the degree of influence of a cue. Where the cues are 
iniercorrelated stepwise linear regression is often preferred. This 
was avoided here because such intercorrelations had been min-
imized and the analysis used facilitates comparison between doc-
tors in their usage of cues. The 13 regression weights derived 
were standardized so as to remove the influence of differences in 
the original scale values. The weights could thus vary from -1 
(maximum negative use of a cue) through 0 (no use of a cue) to 
+ 1 (maximum positive use of a cue, that is to the exclusion of all 
others). 
The regression weights were also intercorrelated between cues 
and across doctors in order to sec whether doctors who took 
account of a given cue were more or less likely to be infiuenced 
by another cue. 
Assessment of stated policies 
On completion of the judgement task the doctors were shown a 
list of the cues used. For each cue in turn C H described the two 
cndpoinis and asked the doctors which would make them more 
likely to prescribe or i f the cue would make no difference. They 
were then asked to rate each cue lo indicate how much of a bear-
ing it had on their decisions f rom 0 indicating that it had no 
weight to 10 indicating that it had maximum weight. These 
weights were assigned a positive or negative sign by C H 
according to the previous indication of ihc direction in which the 
cue endpoints affected judgements. The sign of the subjective 
decision weights (as for the objective ones) is as indicated in 
Appendix 1. For example, a positive weighting for 'smoker' 
means that doctors were more likely to prescribe to a smoker 
whereas a negative weight means ihey were less likely to pre-
scribe to a smoker and so on. 
The Slated policies were elicited by directly asking the doctors 
which cues they had used on the task just performed. Hence, the 
degree of correspondence with the objective regression weights 
is a direct measure of insight or self-awareness on the task. 
Doctors were also invited to add any further comments about 
the task, their reasons for using or ignoring cues and about their 
general approach to the treatment of hyperlipidaemia. 
Results 
Objective decision weights (tacit policy) 
The consistency check on raw judgements yielded a Kendall W 
of 0.25 which though significantly non-zero (/*<0.001) indicates 
a substantial degree of variation between the doctors in the prior-
ity they assigned to treating the different cases presented. 
Of the 35 doctors participating 33 provided usable data on the 
computer presented judgement task, and the results of the regres-
sion analyses are shown in Table 1. For each cue the number of 
doctors who had statistically significant weights (at P<0.05) in a 
positive or negative direction is shown and also the mean weight 
for all 33 doctors. The cholesterol level was the biggest single 
predictor of decisions to prescribe lipid lowering agents with a 
mean weight of 0.38 and a significantly positive weight for 31 of 
the 33 respondents. There was a considerable variation across the 
sample in the extent to which other cues were used (Table 1). For 
example, nine doctors were significantly less likely to prescribe 
to older patients but the majority were not influenced by the age 
cue. 
Of the associated risk factors for coronary heart disease, only 
the presence of diabetes (mean weight 0.15) had a substantial 
effect on decision to prescribe and even here fewer than two 
thirds of the sample had a significantly positive weight (Table 1). 
Although the mean weights were positive for hypertension, evid-
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Table 1. Objective (regression) and subjective weights given to cues. 
Objective weights Subjective weights 
Number of doctors* Number of doctors 
Significant Significant 
negative Not positive Negative Zero Positive 
Cue direction significant direction Mean weight weight weight Median 
Cholesterol level 0 2 31 0.38 0 0 34 9.0 
Hypertension 1 25 7 0.06 5 2 27 6.0 
Age 9 23 1 -0.07 26 8 0 -6.5 
Sex 0 28 5 0.05 0 9 25 2.5 
Occupation 0 30 3 0.03 7 24 3 0 
Evidence of arteriosclerosis 0 27 6 0.09 0 6 28 6.0 
Smoker 11 19 3 -0.09 19 4 11 -3.5 
Diabetes 2 11 20 0.15 3 3 28 7.0 
Compliance with 
advice on diet 2 25 6 0.03 1 11 22 5.0 
Weight 8 25 0 -0.07 21 8 5 -3.5 
Attitude to treatment 0 17 16 0.17 0 7 27 6.0 
Family history of 
coronary heart disease 0 26 7 0.06 0 3 31 7.0 
Personality 0 31 2 0 7 20 7 0 
'Significance levels are computed at 5% two tailed. 
ence of arteriosclerosis, family history of coronary heart disease 
and sex. ihey were low and each of these cues exerted significani 
po.siiivc influence on decision.'; for ai most seven doctors in the 
sample. 
There were several significant correlations between cues of 
which the most interesting was a correlation of r = 0.334 
(P<0.05) between smoking and weight. In general, this means 
that the same minority of doctors who would be less likely to 
prescribe to smokers would also be less likely to prescribe to 
overweight patients. 
Subjective decision weights (stated policy) and insight 
The results of the post-task interview for 34 doctors are also 
shown in Table I . These results should be treated as the stated 
policies of the doctors, that is what they believe to be the cues 
which determined their decisions. The data are broken down by 
frequency of negative, zero and positive weights with the median 
weighting for all 34 doctors also being shown. As with the object-
ive weights, cholesterol level was the most important cue. 
Figure I presents a scatter chart In which each point represents 
the subjective and objective weights given by a particular doctor 
to a particular cue (the scores of all 33 doctors are included). The 
result is a triangular pattern for both positively and negatively 
weighted cues. Many cues have both subjective and objective 
weights near zero, resulting in many points near the origin. As 
subjective weights rise towards maximum (+10 or -10), how-
ever, the distribution of objective weights becomes increasingly 
spread out. In simple terms, this means that i f the doctors say 
they are not using a cue, they are likely not to be using it. I f they 
say they are using a cue. they may or may not be using it. 
Inspection of Table I shows that the pattern of insight is dif-
ferent for different cues. For example, while both evidence of 
arteriosclerosis and family history of coronary heart disease 
received high subjective weightings, they significantly inf lu-
enced fewer than a quarter of the doctors' tacit policies. On the 
other hand, diabetes which received a similar subjective weight-
ing influenced a substantial majority of the tacit policies. Thus, 
although this cue was much more influential in judgements, doc-
tors appear to lack awareness that this is the case. 
Comments of doctors 
Table 1 shows that 19 doctors said they were less likely to treat 
smokers and 11 had significantly negative weightings in the 
regression analyses. Since smoking is a positive risk factor for 
coronary heart disease the comments offered in justification of 
these policies are of interest. The central iheme appeared to be 
that they considered smoking to be a much more serious risk fac-
tor than hyperiipidaemia. This led some to say that it was a waste 
of money and effort to treat the lipid problems because this 
would be outweighed by the smoking. However, a number of 
doctors saw the hyperiipidaemia as an opportunity to control L*ie 
patient's smoking by withholding treatment until their behaviour 
had been altered. Another commonly expressed view amounted 
to 'why help someone who is unwilling to help themselves?' On 
the basis of the reports it also appears that some doctors thought 
that an acute ethical dilemma was involved in the treatment of 
smokers whereas others apparently did not. 
•1.0 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.^ 
*-ie 
0.2 0.4 . 0.6 0. 
• Objective weights 
1.0 
Figure 1. A plot of subjective against objective weights for each 
of the 13 cues, for each of the 33 doctors. 
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Docior's comments on the use of protocols or decision aids for 
treatment of raised blood cholesterol are also of interest. The 
great majority commented either that ihey had no such protocol 
or that they did not follow ihe ones thai were in their possession. 
Discussion 
This investigation of general practitioners' decisions to prescribe 
lipid lowering agents using the social judgement theory approach 
has produced findings broadly compatible with previous research 
using this methodology." Wide variations between doctors in 
both their tacit and slated policies for prescribing and a fairly low 
level of insight have been found. In general doctors believed they 
used many more cues than ihey actually did. However, this lack 
of insight does not account for the policy differences. Even in 
Slated policies, there was considerable variation between doctors 
in their beliefs about how information should be used with regard 
10 prescribing. 
l-or those associated risk factors for coronary heart disease 
which arc not directly within the control of the patient, namely 
hypenension, evidence of aneriosclerosis. sex. diabetes and fam-
ily history of coronary hean disease, while a .substantial majority 
of doctors stated that they took these factors into account, with 
the exception of diabetes fewer than a quarter of the sample had 
significant objective weights for any of these cues. This disparity 
between tacit and stated policies is of considerable importance. 
A plausible interpretation is that while doctors know that these 
risk factors are medically relevant, the task of weighing all these 
factors when making their decisions to prescribe is simply too 
psychologically complex and defeats them. I i is known from 
psychological research that people, including experts, can only 
consider a limited number of cues in making judgements'^ and 
that people have great difficulty in forming accurate assessments 
of ri.-iks and probabilities.'^ 
Two associated risk factors which are lifestyle related are 
smoking and obesity. Both tacit and stated policies were mark-
edly different for these factors compared with those considered 
above. No doctor was more likely to prescribe to an overweight 
patient and eight had significanily negative weightings, meaning 
that they were less likely to prescribe to an overweight patient 
who was equal on other risk factors (21 doctors also stated that 
this was their policy). The justification for this might be that the 
patient could lower his or her cholesterol level by losing weight, 
without the need for drug treatment. The case of cigarette smo-
king Is more interesting, however, since smoking raises associat-
ed risk but docs not affect the blood cholesterol level directly. 
Since smoking is seen as a choice of the patient, the doctor might 
decide not lo prescribe lipid lowering agents simply because the 
smoking behaviour in itself takes the patient over some threshold 
level of risk. This would result in smoking being effectively 
ignored as a risk factor and given a zero weighting. In fact, three 
doctors had a significantly positive weighting for smoking, treat-
ing it as risk factor which increased the argument for drug treat-
ment, 19 doctors ignored smoking as a factor and 11 had a sig-
nificantly negative weighting. Subjectively. 19 doctors said they 
would be less likely to treat smokers, although 11 said they 
would be more likely lo do so. 
The suggestion of a moral dimension in doctors' attitudes is 
supported by the finding of a significant correlation between the 
doctors who were less likely to prescribe to smokers and those 
who were less likely to prescribe to patients who were over-
weight. Doctors therefore differed with respect to their treatment 
of self-inflicted risks. A variety of explanations were offered in 
the post-task interview by those doctors who penalized smokers. 
The other indication of difference between doctors on non-med-
ical grounds was the way they responded to the 'attitude to treai-
18 
ment" cue. The sample was split in half here — 16 were more 
likely to prescribe to patients who were requesting the ueatment 
while 17 ignored the wishes of the patient. The occupation and 
personality cues were largely ignored. 
These findings have serious implications for medical practice 
in this area and the training of general practitioners. First, it is 
hard to reconcile both the wide variation in policy and the gen-
eral neglect of associated risk factors that have been observed 
with a generally effective treaimeni of hyperlipidacmia by doc-
tors. Secondly, it has been shown that while education by normal 
verbal communication (for example, lectures, textbooks) may 
increase doctors' awareness of relevant factors this may not ne-
cessarily impact on their actual prescribing decisions. There is a 
strong case for implementation of well defined clinical guide-
lines, preferably backed by risk assessment aids. 
Appendix I . Cues presented to doctors in order shown. 
Cue 
ChclcMerol level 
Hypenension 
Age 
Sex 
Occupation 
Evidence of 
aneriosclerosis 
Smoker 
Diabetes 
Compliance with 
advice on diet 
Weight 
AHitude to ireaimcni 
Family history 
of coronary 
hean disease 
Personality 
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No/some/ycs 
Under/normal/ovcr/obcse/vcry obese 
Opposed/caulious/open lo advjcc/requesiing 
treatment 
No/second degree relative/first degree relative 
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